Redness?

Redness?

20160506_135347 Colourized, my photo 

Preface

The review of the Pirie text was entry by entry. This was originally published on Blogger 20170725. Edited on Blogger, 20241222, for an entry on academia.edu.

PIRIE, MADSEN (2006)(2015) How To Win Every Argument, Bloomsbury, London.

Redness  

The fallacy of reification is also known as hypostatization. It consists in the supposition that certain words denote real things. (178). The 'redness' of the sunset, as example. Pirie reasons 'redness' is not present with a red sun, red ball, or red anything. (178).

The fallacy is turning descriptive qualities into real things. (178).

Perceived redness can vary from wavelengths. Oxford Science defines colour as the sensation produced when light of different wavelengths falls onto the human eye. (178). The visible spectrum varies continuously with wavelength ranges. (178). There is an abstract aspect to the human evaluation of colours and how each set of human eyes would interpret the sensations of light and colour.

I see dark red, you see red-blue, etcetera. It is not an error to describe the redness of something in subjective terms, but it should not be understood as objective terminology.

Reification occurs when it is assumed that the descriptive attributes are as real as the objects they depend on. (178).

Logically fallacious

'Reification (also known as: abstraction, concretism, fallacy of misplaced concreteness, hypostatisation)

Description: When an abstraction (abstract belief or hypothetical construct) is treated as if it were a concrete, real event or physical entity -- when an idea is treated as if had a real existence.

Example #1: How can you not want to go jogging? Look at that street -- it’s calling your name. It wants your feet pounding on it. “Jog on me!”'

'Fun Fact: Reification is similar to anthropomorphism, except that reification does not have to deal with human qualities.' 

'References: reification | literature | Britannica.com. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://www.britannica.com/topic/reification ---'

Internet Encylopedia of Philosophy 

Cited 

'Hypostatization 

The error of inappropriately treating an abstract term as if it were a concrete one. Also known as the Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness and the Fallacy of Reification. 

Example: 'Nature decides which organisms live and which die. 

Nature isn’t capable of making decisions. The point can be made without reasoning fallaciously by saying: “Which organisms live and which die is determined by natural causes.” Whether a phrase commits the fallacy depends crucially upon whether the use of the inaccurate phrase is inappropriate in the situation. In a poem, it is appropriate and very common to reify nature, hope, fear, forgetfulness, and so forth, that is, to treat them as if they were objects or beings with intentions. In any scientific claim, it is inappropriate.' 

My example: 'Nature chooses the survival of the fittest'. My Reformed, biblical, Christian worldview, also views nature as not capable of making decisions. It is a finite creation of the infinite, eternal, triune God. Nature has various life, but is not a conscious, rational entity in itself.

Cited from Internet Encylopedia of Philosophy website

'References and Further Reading 

Eemeren, Frans H. van, R. F. Grootendorst, F. S. Henkemans, J. A. Blair, R. H. Johnson, E. C. W. Krabbe, C. W. Plantin, D. N. Walton, C. A. Willard, J. A. Woods, and D. F. Zarefsky, 1996. Fundamentals of Argumentation Theory: A Handbook of Historical Backgrounds and Contemporary Developments. Mahwah, New Jersey, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers. 

Fearnside, W. Ward and William B. Holther, 1959. Fallacy: The Counterfeit of Argument. Prentice-Hall, Inc. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey. 

Fischer, David Hackett., 1970. Historian’s Fallacies: Toward Logic of Historical Thought. New York, Harper & Row, New York, N.Y. 

This book contains additional fallacies to those in this article, but they are much less common, and many have obscure names. 

Groarke, Leo and C. Tindale, 2003. Good Reasoning Matters! 3rd edition, Toronto, Oxford University Press. 

Hamblin, Charles L., 1970. Fallacies. London, Methuen. 

Hansen, Has V. and R. C. Pinto., 1995. Fallacies: Classical and Contemporary Readings. University Park, Pennsylvania State University Press. 

Huff, Darrell, 1954. How to Lie with Statistics. New York, W. W. Norton. 

Levi, D. S., 1994. “Begging What is at Issue in the Argument,” Argumentation, 8, 265-282. 

Schwartz, Thomas, 1981. “Logic as a Liberal Art,” Teaching Philosophy 4, 231-247. 

Walton, Douglas N., 1989. Informal Logic: A Handbook for Critical Argumentation. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 

Walton, Douglas N., 1995. A Pragmatic Theory of Fallacy. Tuscaloosa, University of Alabama Press. 

Walton, Douglas N., 1997. Appeal to Expert Opinion: Arguments from Authority. University Park, Pennsylvania State University Press. 

Whately, Richard, 1836. Elements of Logic. New York, Jackson. 

Woods, John and D. N. Walton, 1989. Fallacies: Selected Papers 1972-1982. Dordrecht, Holland, Foris.'

Cited

'Website author

Bradley Dowden
California State University, Sacramento
U. S. A.' 

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Oxford Dictionary of Science, (2010), Sixth Edition, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

PIRIE, MADSEN (2006)(2015) How To Win Every Argument, Bloomsbury, London.

Each needs the other to complete the universe

Add caption

LANGER, SUSANNE K (1953)(1967) An Introduction to Symbolic Logic, Dover Publications, New York.

The Langer philosophy text review, continues. Some key symbols from the textbook:
≡df = Equivalence by definition
: = Equal (s)
ε = Epsilon and means is
⊃ = Is the same as
⊨ is Entails
˜ = Not
∃ = There exists
∃! = There exists
∴ = Therefore
· = Therefore
< = Is included
v = a logical inclusive disjunction (disjunction is the relationship between two distinct alternatives).
x = variable

Fundamentum Divisionis

Whenever there is a class formed within any universe of discourse, then every individual in that universe must either belong to the class, or not belong to it. (142). A class of two-storeyed houses has every house in it that is two-storeyed, or the house is not in that class. (142).

Further from the last review of the Langer text, every class creates a dichotomy, also known as a division in two for every class. (143).

(x ε N)
Variable is N.
Variable = N.

(x ε -N)
Variable is not N.
Variable does not equal = N.

These two classes have no members in common. (143). But, this universe of discourse is divided between them and are known as complementary classes. (143). Each needs the other to complete the universe. (143).

(x ε N) ˜ ⊃ (x ε -N)
Variable equals N is not the same as variable equals not N. (143).

N = Cat

(x ε N)

x equals cat

(x ε -N)

x does not equal cat

˜ means x is unfeline. (144).

This text is from different eras (1953) (1967) but this quote is interesting in today's era as well and demonstrates how the use of the English language evolves.

'Male and female are equally "positive" notions, but in a universe of bi-sexual organisms they are complements.' (144-145). If females are represented by B, then males is -B and vice-versa. (145). In an equation the second class is the negated (negative) class. (145).

Opines on Philosophy of Religion and Apologetics

Yesterday

Opines on Philosophy of Religion and Apologetics

Originally published July 24, 2017, edited for an entry on academia.edu for July 1, 2023.

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Preface

At church yesterday (2017) a Christian apologist was a guest speaker. He stated (paraphrased) that he was a Christian apologist that presented philosophy, but later stated he was not heavily academic with his use of philosophy.

I realize there are significantly academic apologists that use philosophy/philosophy of religion, but his example had me consider the differences between apologetics and philosophy of religion. I found this blog article below on my mobile during the church service.

I will admit, that I considered the differences between philosophy theology, philosophy of religion and apologetics when pursuing PhD options, and I favoured philosophy theology and philosophy of religion for my career and ministry. Theistic, philosophy of religion, I have found often has significant agreement with philosophical theology, within the Reformed tradition on key points.

Philosophy of Religion and Apologetics

The author link below is now outdated.

Prosblogion April 12 2012: Kenny Pearce: Philosophy of Religion and Apologetics

Updated

Philosophy of Religion and Apologetics

April 12, 2012 This Post is Old! 

The post you are reading is 11 years old and may not represent my current views. I started blogging around the time I first began to study philosophy, age 17. In my view, the point of philosophy is to expose our beliefs to rational scrutiny so we can revise them and get better beliefs that are more likely to be true. That's what I've been up to all these years, and this blog has been part of that process. For my latest thoughts, please see the front page. 

blog.kennypearce

Kenny Pearce received his PhD in philosophy from the University of Southern California in 2014. Kenny is currently Professor of Philosophy at James Madison University.

Citations and my comments from this work from a philosopher...

'Philosophy of religion, as practiced by religious believers, is often confused with apologetics. (Perhaps it is even so confused, on occasion, by some of its practitioners.) Indeed, if we use the term ‘apologetics’ more broadly, to include not just the giving of an apologia (defense) of religion, but of just any belief system, then we could say that philosophy in general is often confused with apologetics. This is, I think, a serious mistake. The philosopher, qua philosopher, is up to something quite different than the apologist, qua apologist. The ‘qua’ clauses are necessary, because of course the same person may engage in both philosophy and apologetics and, as will emerge, it is even possible to do both at the same time, but as activities they have fundamentally different aims.'

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End citation = ---      

As many readers will know, I studied theodicy, problems of evil, free will, determinism and the nature of God in the United Kingdom, mostly distance learning, from 1999-2010. I have continued with this work and with biblical studies on my website and since 2004. I would define my academic priorities as mainly philosophical theology, philosophy of religion and biblical studies, pretty equally. My approach with philosophical theology reviewed and used moderate conservative, biblical views leading to a Reformed theological approach within my MPhil/PhD work. My approach with philosophy of religion reviewed and used non-biblical, not by definition, always anti-biblical, views within my theses. I reviewed philosophical theological views in agreement and disagreement and I reviewed philosophy of religion views in agreement and disagreement.

But I was not, in my opinion, advised by my British academic tutors to provide apologetics for the Christian faith, but rather to provide 'breadth' and 'depth' in views. I was allowed some academic freedom at the University of Wales, where I earned my two degrees, to present my Reformed theodicy views using philosophy theological and philosophy of religion concepts as support. My tutors were Christians but within secular Universities.

Citation

'Let’s start with apologetics. What the apologist would really like to do is to give arguments which will actually convince a particular audience who does not already believe the conclusion that the conclusion is true. This, of course, is a tall order, especially when it comes to anything so contentious and practically and emotionally important as religion.'

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From listening to the apologist at church, Sunday and other apologists, I would reason that in the general, the goal is to provide a defence of the Christian faith. The speaker, yesterday, did not prioritize a presentation, that was of 'breadth' and 'depth', that was similar to what I was expected to do within British academia. Rather, he emphasized presenting an apologetic with Christian character. 

Frankly, I agree with the speaker on Christian character, but myself would aim to present rational and true theological and philosophical arguments. I would work to present rationally challenging premises and conclusions. Even if some of these views did not support classically held, evangelical views, but in reality, my biblical approach in within the Reformed tradition. My view are within orthodox, biblical, Christianity. But, clearly my approach is as an academic theologian and theistic, philosopher of religion. To defend this speaker, context is key as he was speaking in an evangelical church and not in a University or academic setting.

Cited

'This, I claim, is not the aim of the philosopher (qua philosopher). The philosopher aims instead to discover arguments which are such that people holding certain views (which real people do, or at least are likely to, hold) will, upon considering the arguments, be rationally obligated to endorse the conclusion.'

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I will admit here that based on my education and academic approach, an essential priority is to present rational premises and conclusions. My view is that there are strong rational premises and conclusions that rationally support a biblical, Reformed Christian view. This is within an evangelical church, context.

Cited

'Thus the philosopher differs from the apologist in two ways: first, in that the philosopher aims to discover arguments, rather than just to give them to people...'

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This was the academic approach I was guided to take within British academia.

Cited

'...and, second, the philosopher is not concerned with what will actually convince people, but only about what people rationally ought to be convinced by.'

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This is largely the truth in many cases. Within the evangelical church, this can make the theistic philosopher of religion seem 'out of touch' with the evangelical agenda at points.

My Reformed, compatiblist (soft determinism) views related to free will and determinism, in particular, were not as accepted publicly in MPhil and PhD surveys as were incompatibilist (non-determinism) views. But, I will admit, I was and am, far more concerned with what by God's guidance, is rationally true than with attempts to convince people. I  primarily, leave the convincing to the Lord, in regards to the gospel and spiritual issues.

Cited

'In sum, the apologist is engaged in what could (depending on one’s attitude to the apologist in question) be classified either as a public education campaign, or a propaganda campaign. The philosopher, on the other hand, is engaged in a research program. This difference is the fundamental one; it is for this reason that the apologist is concerned with whether people actually accept his arguments, but the philosopher is concerned only with whether people are rationally obligated to accept hers.'

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There is at least some truth to this distinction in general, as in many contexts, the apologist is providing a defence, whereas the philosopher of religion is engaged in a research program. My British work was far more a research program than a defence of my religious, theological, and philosophical views.

However, within my United Kingdom theses studies I was defending a biblical, Reformed theodicy, no question. Christian apologetics, done well, will certainly include a significant amount of research and this will (should) include views which do not support biblical Christianity or the apologist's version of biblical Christianity.

Cited

'Finally, what does this mean for the relationship between philosophy and apologetics? Well, the obvious answer is that, if the apologist adopts the principle of only trying to get people to be convinced by arguments they rationally ought to be convinced by, then the apologist is really a popularizer of philosophy.'

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I reason an apologist can research and present reasonable philosophy and philosophy of religion. Is this done with every instance, no. But, theology and philosophy is also, at times, presented in a more popularized and less academic form. In the You Tube format, for example.

Cited

'This, furthermore, is why I said earlier that it is possible to engage in both activities at once, especially if philosophers are the target of the apologia. That is, one may publish one’s arguments both as part of the cooperative research program and in the hope of actually convincing one’s fellow researchers. (Or, in an increasingly popular trend, one may publish a book in which one tries to address both one’s fellow philosophers and the educated public at once.) The fact that a particular individual has both aims may effect her mode of presentation, but this need not interfere with doing good philosophy.'

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Yes, I reason an apologist can present good philosophy.

Cited

'Although philosophy and apologetics may go together, it is comforting to the philosopher that they need not. Being concerned only with the rational force of arguments, the philosopher may ignore the vagaries of human psychology, or of social pressures regarding belief, because, if these are the reasons the argument is not accepted, then the philosopher may nevertheless have succeeded at her aim of giving an argument which rationally ought to be accepted.'

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I can support the author's aim of rational, philosophy of religion as being in agreement with at least, aspects, of my ministry objectives, but I also focus on philosophical theology and biblical studies. This I write without disparaging the potential for significant academic presentation from the Christian apologist.

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

CONWAY DAVID A. AND RONALD MUNSON (1997) The Elements of Reasoning, Wadsworth Publishing Company, New York. 

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, in David Basinger and Randall Basinger (eds.), Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press. 

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (2001) No One Like Him, John S. Feinberg (gen.ed.), Wheaton, Illinois, Crossway Books.

FLEW, ANTONY, R.M. HARE, AND BASIL MITCHELL (1996) ‘The Debate on the Rationality of Religious Belief’, in L.P. Pojman (ed.), Philosophy, The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company. 

FLEW, ANTONY AND A.MACINTRYE (1999) ‘Philosophy of Religion’, in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press Ltd. 

GEIVETT, R. DOUGLAS (1993) Evil and the Evidence for God, Philadelphia, Temple University Press.

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1975) Philosophy of Religion, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House. 

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1978) The Roots of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press. 

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1996) ‘Freedom, Free Will, and Determinism’, in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books.

LANGER, SUSANNE K (1953)(1967) An Introduction to Symbolic Logic, Dover Publications, New York. (Philosophy). 

MACKIE, J.L. (1955)(1996) ‘Evil and Omnipotence’, in Mind, in Michael Peterson, William Hasker, Bruce Reichenbach, and David Basinger (eds.), Philosophy of Religion, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

MACKIE, J.L. (1971)(1977)(2002) ‘Evil and Omnipotence’, in The Philosophy of Religion, in Alvin C. Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids. Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

PIRIE, MADSEN (2006)(2015) How To Win Every Argument, Bloomsbury, London. 

PLANTINGA, ALVIN.C. (1977)(2002) God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

PLANTINGA, ALVIN.C. (1982) The Nature of Necessity, Oxford, Clarendon Press.

POJMAN, LOUIS P. (1996) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company. 

SANFORD, DAVID H. (1996) ‘Circular Reasoning', in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 

SAMPLES, KENNETH (2014) How to Evaluate an Abductive Argument, Reasons to Believe, Covina, California. 

SZUDEK, ANDY & TORSLEY, SARAH (2018) The Little Book of Philosophy, Landau Cecile (Ed), London, DK Publishing. 

Whitehead & The Infinite God

From Theodicy and Practical Theology, The University of Wales, Trinity Saint David. PhD, thesis. 

Whitehead explains that ‘It is not true that God is on all respects infinite.’ Whitehead (1926: 153). His Process theology is a philosophical approach that does not rely on any kind of divine revelation.Viney (2008: 1). Instead it relies on a process of change over time as a theory of metaphysics. Viney (2008: 1). God’s actual concrete nature is responsive and influenced by the processes that take in the world, and therefore God is limited.

Whitehead claims that if God was infinite in all ways this would make him as infinitely evil as he is good. I doubt logically and reasonably that an infinitely holy and good God could at the same time be infinitely evil and so I can grant Whitehead half a point here. However, God could still be infinite completely in nature and willingly allow evil to exist within his creation, which shall be discussed particularly in Chapter Three as a Reformed view. I definitely agree with Whitehead that an infinitely good and evil God would be a God of nothingness. Whitehead (1926: 153). I doubt this being could logically exist.

July 21, 2017 

What exists as necessary is good.

God exists as necessary.

Therefore, God is good.
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Evil, if it exists at all, it is a corruption of the good. For God to be proposed as infinitely good and infinitely evil, would mean that the infinite evil is not defined correctly as evil.

VINEY, DAVID (2008) ‘Process Theism’, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Palo Alto, California, Stanford University.

WHITEHEAD, ALFRED NORTH (1926) Religion in the Making, New York, The MacMillan Company.

WHITEHEAD, ALFRED NORTH (1927-1929)(1957) Process and Reality, New York, The Free Press/MacMillan Publishing Company, Incorporated.

WHITEHEAD, ALFRED NORTH (1967)(1986) ‘Adventures of Ideas’, in Forest Wood JR., Whiteheadian Thought as a Basis for a Philosophy of Religion, University of Southern Mississippi, Hattiesburg, University Press of America, Inc. http://www.religion-online.org/showchapter.asp?title=2736&C=2479