Dr. Russell Norman Murray: Search results for middle knowledge

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Wednesday, August 07, 2024

Augustine And Allegory In Brief

Augustine And Allegory In Brief

Preface

Photo: Morocco, trekearth.com

Originally published 20140704, this is a brief section in my PhD work that did not make the final thesis version, before or after the PhD Viva. Not all my Augustine work made the final PhD version. Updated 20240807.

Augustine And Allegory In Brief

Edited from PhD

Augustine’s hermeneutic included the idea that one should be mentally clear in regard to issues of God in order to receive guidance.[1] This would support Robertson’s idea that Augustine’s hermeneutical assumptions began with a trust in divine guidance over scientific means of understanding the Biblical text.[2] Robertson explains that Augustine did use an allegory method in his exposition of Scripture, but this was done in order to find the fullest possible interpretations of Scripture.[3] Grenz, Guretzki, and Nordling define allegory as a method of Biblical interpretation where ‘hidden’ or ‘deeper’ understandings are sought.[4] This favours a ‘spiritual’ meaning over literal ones.[5] Klein, Blomberg, and Hubbard explain that this was the popular hermeneutical method within the era of the Church Fathers.[6]

New Testament scholar, Klyne Snodgrass (1991) explains allegorical approaches would assign a spiritual meaning to specific texts, in particular ones difficult to interpret.[7] Christian theology was often imposed on texts of the Old Testament, and this approach was common in the Christian Church until the Reformation.[8] Although Augustine, for example, understood satanic beings as actual entities, this does not mean he used a literal hermeneutic in his overall theological approach, as Robertson points out Augustine uses the allegory method.[9]

AUGUSTINE (388-395)(1964) On Free Choice of the Will, Translated by Anna S.Benjamin and L.H. Hackstaff, Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall.

AUGUSTINE (398-399)(1992) Confessions, Translated by Henry Chadwick, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

AUGUSTINE (400-416)(1987)(2004) On the Trinity, Translated by Reverend Arthur West Haddan, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Series One, Volume 3, Denver, The Catholic Encyclopedia.

AUGUSTINE (421)(1998) Enchiridion, Translated by J.F. Shaw, Denver, The Catholic Encyclopedia.

AUGUSTINE (426)(1958) The City of God, Translated by Gerald G. Walsh, Garden City, New York, Image Books.

AUGUSTINE (427)(1997) On Christian Doctrine, Translated by D.W. Robertson Jr., Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall.

AUGUSTINE (427b)(1997) On Christian Teaching, Translated by R.P.H. Green, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

GRENZ, STANLEY J., DAVID GURETZKI AND CHERITH FEE NORDLING (1999) Pocket Dictionary of Theological Terms, Downers Grove, Ill., InterVarsity Press.

ROBERTSON, F.W. (1887)(1956) ‘Sermons: First Series’, in Thiessen, Henry C. Introductory Lectures in Systematic Theology, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

SNODGRASS, KLYNE (1991) ‘The Use of the Old Testament in the New’, in David Alan Black and David S. Dockery (eds.), New Testament Criticism and Interpretation, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.

[1] Augustine (427)(1997: 13).

[2] I reason hermeneutically a scholar does not need to choose between a regimented scientific methodology, and trusting in divine guidance.

[3] Robertson (1958)(1997: xi).

[4] Grenz, Guretzki, and Nordling (1999: 8).

[5] Grenz, Guretzki, and Nordling (1999: 8).

[6] Klein, Blomberg, and Hubbard (1993: 32).

[7] Snodgrass (1991: 413).

[8] Snodgrass (1991: 413).

[9] Robertson (1958)(1997: xi).

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August 2024

Veritas: Jurnal Teologi Dan Pelayanan 2021

Cited

file:///E:/DT%20101%20G2/Back%20Up/04-rule-of-love.pdf

VERITAS: JURNAL TEOLOGI DAN PELAYANAN 20, no. 2 (December 2021): 207–218 pISSN: 1411-7649; eISSN: 2684-9194 DOI: https://doi.org/10.36421/veritas.v20i2.499

Rule of Love and Rule of Faith in Augustine’s Hermeneutics: A Complex Dialectic of the Twofold Rules

Steven Yong

Cited

'Abstract: Since the sixteenth-century Reformation, literal interpretation of the Bible has been deemed the best hermeneutical method to unearth the biblical writers’ original meaning. For the Reformers, allegorical interpretation was denigrated for reading an extraneous, or spiritual, meaning into any text. Although Augustine was among the first who champions a literal interpretation of the Scripture—as he outlined in his De doctrina christiana—until recent decades, Augustine is still being perceived as inconsistent in following his hermeneutical method as it is attested in his interpretation of the Good Samaritan. In his interpretation, Augustine seems to have allegorized the parable, thus his method was accused of being inconsistent. Is it really the case? This article attempts to contest such an accusation by showing that Augustine’s method of interpretation cannot simply be categorized as either entirely literal or allegorical. Augustine never professes as a literalist, an exegete who only applies what is now known as a historical-critical method. On the other hand, he did not recklessly legitimate the application of allegorical reading to any text. Taken as a whole, Augustine’s hermeneutics revolves around a complex dialectic of regula dilectionis (the rule of love) and regula fidei (the rule of faith) that allows both interpretations to be considered to be true.'

Note that De doctrina christiana is also known as, in English, 'On Christian Doctrine', and 'On Christian Teaching', both titles were used within my PhD work

Quote: 'Augustine never professes as a literalist, an exegete who only applies what is now known as a historical-critical method. On the other hand, he did not recklessly legitimate the application of allegorical reading to any text.'

This appears to be in general overall agreement with what was documented in my original work: Although Augustine, for example, understood satanic beings as actual entities, this does not mean he used a literal hermeneutic in his overall theological approach, as Robertson points out Augustine uses the allegory method.

Bible and Theology: By Dr. Paul Hoskins | February 11, 2017

Cited

'He (Augustine, my add) provides a lot of helpful guidance on how to interpret the Bible in On Christian Teaching (or De doctrina Christiana). On the one hand, Augustine values the literal sense and encourages readers to find value in it. Even so, he believes that the love command (to love God and to love one’s neighbor) provides a central principle that is useful for biblical interpretation. One should interpret passages that are consistent with the love command literally. However, biblical texts that appear to be in conflict with the love command should be interpreted figuratively (with allegorical interpretation). As one might suspect, he finds more Old Testament texts that appear to require allegorical interpretation than New Testament texts. Even so, Augustine’s spiritual or figurative interpretations are generally related to his interpretation of the literal sense, rather than being wholly fanciful (Smalley 24). As a result, then, Augustine places some limitations on allegorical interpretation, but finds it to be useful, especially in dealing with difficult passages.'

Smalley, Beryl. The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages. Oxford: Blackwell, 1952.

Cited

Augustine says, “In the first place, then, we must show the way to find out whether a phrase is literal or figurative. And the way is certainly as follows: Whatever there is in the word of God that cannot, when taken literally, be referred either to purity of life or soundness of doctrine, you may set down as figurative. Purity of life has reference to the love of God and one’s neighbor; soundness of doctrine to the knowledge of God and one’s neighbor” (On Christian Teaching, 3.14).

On Christian Teaching taken from Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, 1st series, vol. 2. Available online at NewAdvent.org.

My comments

In reviewing Augustine for my MPhil/PhD theses in regards to free will, determinism and problems of evil, I found that Augustine, historically was considered to be embracing free will theodicy, or according to others, a free will defense. Augustine was also considered to be embracing aspects of God's sovereignty which might not support human free will to a significant degree. It was often, in my mind, that the Augustine experts were often not in agreement on Augustine. Even as a great Church Father, I honestly, often, did not then, and do not now, find Augustine as a clear and concise theological and philosophical source. Although he is certainly a legitimate, great, Church Father, defending Christian faith and philosophy. This discussion and debate of literal versus allegorical interpretations to me was/is consistent with that overall, often lack of clarity. I raised successfully, the point of the unclarity of Augustine's writings at my Wales, PhD, Viva.

---

I find overall, an historical-grammatical approach to scripture more clear and concise than any attempt at an allegorical approach. In contrast to historical-critical approaches, I follow a historical-grammatical method.

Cited

Monergism 2008

'Thus, it was “historical,” relating real, interconnected historical events, that must be acknowledged and understood before the various teachings of the bible could make sense or have application; and “grammatical,” using language the way any normal person would. This grammatical-historical hermeneutic is absolutely vital, for it tethers the truth of the scriptures to real, historical events, that have a real impact on our life; and it gives us a way to study the scriptures with confidence, according to well-established dictates of human language.'

Wikipedia: Historical-grammatical method 2024

Wikipedia is helpful here:

Quote

'According to the historical-grammatical method, if based on an analysis of the grammatical style of a passage (with consideration to its cultural, historical, and literary context), it appears that the author intended to convey an account of events that actually happened, then the text should be taken as representing history; passages should only be interpreted symbolically, poetically, or allegorically if to the best of our understanding, that is what the writer intended to convey to the original audience.'

---

In contrast is the historical-critical method: Citing from Pocket Dictionary: Historical criticism places more emphasis on the human aspects and meanings of scripture, as opposed to divine aspects. (59). This reads similar to what I was taught in seminar meetings at Manchester University and The University of Wales, for my MPhil/PhD work, to look quote 'before' (59), 'behind' (59) and 'under' (59) the biblical text, especially reading into what the author (s) really meant. The methodology of the author (s) is considered key within historical criticism. In agreement with the Pocket Dictionary, historical-criticism, quote, 'tends to downplay Scripture as a divine book and instead overemphasizes its humanness.' (59)

I embrace an historical-grammatical method within the Reformed tradition, that seeks to evaluate scripture accurately within context, without completely dismissing, whatsoever, any need for considerations of the methodology of an author (s). I completed methodology work for my PhD and have posted it in my academic website. But, as I stated in Wales, during a PhD seminar, I am more interested in the philosophy/theology, the doctrines and worldview of a biblical author as opposed to primarily trying to deduce an author's reasons for writing such a work.

2010 Theodicy and Practical Theology: PhD thesis, the University of Wales, Trinity Saint David, Lampeter

Saturday, September 19, 2020 PhD Full Version PDF: Theodicy and Practical Theology 2010, Wales TSD

Monday, September 04, 2023

God cannot move a parked car

Parked in a traffic jam: Downtown Vancouver, June 2017

God cannot move a parked car

Preface

Originally a Sunday, June 18, 2017 article, significantly updated on Monday, September 4, 2023.

Logic

God cannot move a parked car

Note, that it is not illogical for God to move a parked car, so according to God's omnipotence, God can logically move a parked car. But God's omnipotence is not the primary topic within this article. However...

God's omnipotence = God can move a parked car (equals)

God's omnipotence : God can move a parked car (equals)

God's omnipotence ⊨ God can move a parked car (entails)

God's is omnipotent ∴ God can move a parked car (therefore)

Incompatibilism

God cannot move a parked car

I have heard and read this statement and like within the evangelical church. It is often in the context of salvation, dating and marriage and seeking employment.

This statement assumes incompatibilism. Libertarian free will is usually viewed as a form of indeterminism. The concept in libertarian free will is that a person is able to perform another action in the place of one that has been committed. This action cannot be predetermined by any circumstance or desire. There can be no antecedent (prior) conditions or laws that will determine that an action is committed or not committed. Feinberg (1994: 64). With this view, freedom is incompatible with contingently sufficient nonsubsequent conditions of an action. The contingently sufficient nonsubsequent actions would be God making people in such a way that they only freely did one thing or another. Feinberg (1994: 60).

Philosopher Tim Mawson reasons that incompatibilism, which again, is also known as libertarianism or libertarian free will, in regard to human free will, believes that true human free will must be uncaused by preceding states. Mawson (1999: 324). In other words, no external force must cause a legitimate and truly free act of the human will. Within incompatibilist theory, a human action would never truly be free because God or an another external force (non-deistic view) would have willed and determined it, before being simultaneously willed to a given person. Mawson (1999: 324).

David M. Ciocchi describes the incompatibilist idea as being God can determine that an agent commit action x, but he cannot determine that an agent commit action x freely. Ciocchi (2002: 46). The theory is that significantly free human will and actions cannot be caused by an external force. This external force would include a first cause. This external force would include God.

Norman Geisler mentions a form of incompatibilism which he, calls self-determinism. Moral choices are not caused or uncaused by another being, but are self-caused. Incompatibilists, therefore, do not deny there are outside forces that influence significantly free human actions; however, they do not accept any notion that a free act can be caused in a determined sense by one being upon another and remain a significantly free act. An act cannot be determined or simultaneously determined and remain truly free within incompatibilism. Geisler (1986: 75).

Moral Responsibility

Feinberg importantly writes that just as the incompatibilist does not claim that all actions are significantly free, the compatibilist also does not attach significant freedom to all acts. Feinberg (2001: 637). I reason, for example, God as primary cause, and in some cases, other secondary causes, can force or coerce human actions. But when actions are committed by a human being without significant freedom, there is not moral responsibility. For example, a person being forced or coerced to commit crimes under mind control, may not have significant moral responsibly for thoughts and actions. I state may not because in my finitude, I leave ultimate judgement of persons, post-mortem, up to God (Revelation 20).

Hard determinism

Within hard determinism, God (theistic model) would be the only cause of human thoughts and actions, while within soft determinism/compatibilism, God would be the primary cause of human thoughts and actions and persons the secondary cause. Stace (1952)(1976: 30).

(A non-theistic hard determinism could state as examples, fate, chance or the unknown as a possible first cause)

Louis P. Pojman explains the difference between determinism, which is also known as hard determinism, and compatibilism, which is also known as soft determinism. Pojman (1996: 596). Within determinism or hard determinism, God (or an external force) causes an act and no created being is responsible for his or her moral actions, while for compatibilism or soft determinism, although God causes actions, created beings are responsible where they act voluntarily. Pojman (1996: 596). In other words, hard determinism holds that every event is caused and no one is responsible for actions, whereas soft determinism holds that rational creatures can be held responsible for determined actions as long as they are done voluntarily and without force or coercion. Pojman (1996: 586).

Simon Blackburn comments that this is the doctrine that human action has no influence on events. Blackburn (1996: 137). Blackburn gives the opinion that fatalism is wrongly confused with determinism, which by itself carries no implications that human actions have no effect. Blackburn (1996: 137). Tomis Kapitan notes that determinism is usually understood as meaning that whatever occurs is determined by antecedent (preceding cause) conditions. Kapitan (1999: 281).

Soft determinism/Compatibilism

Compatibilism, like incompatibilism, holds to free will but in a limited form. Pojman (1996: 596). It is also possible for angelic and fallen angelic beings to be secondary causes, significantly influencing human thought and action. Feinberg describes compatibilism as stating certain nonconstraining conditions could strongly influence actions in conjunction with human free will performing these actions. Feinberg explains that with this viewpoint, there will be no contradiction in stating God would create human beings who were significantly free, unconstrained, and yet committed actions that God willed. Feinberg (2001: 637). Within compatibilism, human beings can be simultaneously influenced to commit significantly free thoughts and actions, within incompatibilism, they cannot. These are classic definitions from my British theses work. Assuredly there are definitions and views that vary slightly.

P.S. Greenspan writes that compatibilism holds to free will and determinism being compatible. Greenspan (1998: 1). Feinberg explains that compatibilism does not allow for coercion or force, but holds that God, or some outside force, can simultaneously determine with the use of persuasion, that an action will or will not take place. Feinberg (1986: 24).

W.T. Stace (1952)(1976) explains that moral responsibility is consistent with determinism in the context of soft determinism and requires it. Stace (1952)(1976: 29). If human actions are uncaused then reward or punishment would be unjustified. Stace (1952)(1976: 29). Stace reasons that there must be at least some human cause within human actions to make them morally responsible acts. Stace (1952)(1976: 30).

It could be stated that human secondary causes, through a theoretical chain of human nature, human will and human choice, embrace what has been caused and chosen by God, the first and primary cause, directly or indirectly. The human being could also be influenced by other secondary causes, such as other persons and angelic beings, for example.

Limited free will

Based on my MPhil/PhD research and online research, my use of the term is definitively, compatibilistic. This is not the ability to choose otherwise, as in middle knowledge and versions of libertarian free will. In my compatibilistic model, at least, through a theoretical, non-exhaustive chain of human nature, human will and human choice, a person embraces as secondary cause, what was caused, willed and allowed by the primary cause. This in regard to human conscious thoughts, will, choices, acts and actions. This first cause would be God in a biblical view. During my British studies I looked for the term limited free will in texts and online and did not see it. I/we have significant moral responsibility in my/our conscious, thoughts, will, choices, acts and actions, that are not significantly forced or coerced.

God cannot move a parked car

From an incompatibilistic view, in a sense, God cannot move a parked car. A person will not be saved, date or marry, or be seeking employment, without deciding to do so autonomously, without being simultaneously influenced by God or another force, to do so. If God did so, this would be hard determinism.

From my compatibilistic view, even if God could be stated to merely allow a person to have thought leading to action, by allowing thought and action, God is causing and willing these things to occur. This is because, God, unlike any other entity is infinite, and omnipotent. God cannot, not be involved in anything.

If a person appears to be a parked car, it is because God has caused and willed it and the person has embraced the position, in thought and action as a secondary cause.

God can cause and will a car to stay parked, or God can cause and will a car to move. In either scenario, for significant moral accountability to exist within limited free will, the human being embraces what God has willed. God could force or coerce a car to stay parked or move, but then there is no moral, human, accountability.

Some would argue God can force or coerce thoughts and actions that human beings embrace. If this would be accepted, it is a different concept of embracing. In a related way, a lion can embrace killing its prey, in a sense, but I would not coin this as embracing within limited free will. A lion does not philosophize of theologize on the concept. It kills its prey by nature within what is a rationality that cannot know God, nor be morally responsible to God. A very limited rationality even in comparison to human, angelic and demonic, rational limitations. This would be hard determinism within the animal kingdom.

From a human perspective, we are to pray that God's will be done, as in the Lord's Prayer, Matthew 6, Luke 11. We should ask for things according to God's will, from I John 5, realizing God causes and wills all things in the life of the Christian, Ephesians 1-2, Romans 8-9. God causing all things to work together for good to those who love God, to those who are called according to His purpose.

The Christian should pray to be an obedient secondary cause in thought and action via a nature enlightened by the Holy Spirit through the salvific work of God through Jesus Christ.

Therefore, the title statement is false, but even so, pondering on the concepts involved, the Christian should seek to be obedient in all things.

AUGUSTINE (388-395)(1964) On Free Choice of the Will, Translated by Anna S.Benjamin and L.H. Hackstaff, Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall.

AUGUSTINE (398-399)(1992) Confessions, Translated by Henry Chadwick, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

AUGUSTINE (400-416)(1987)(2004) On the Trinity, Translated by Reverend Arthur West Haddan, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Series One, Volume 3, Denver, The Catholic Encyclopedia.

AUGUSTINE (421)(1998) Enchiridion, Translated by J.F. Shaw, Denver, The Catholic Encyclopedia.

AUGUSTINE (426)(1958) The City of God, Translated by Gerald G. Walsh, Garden City, New York, Image Books.

AUGUSTINE (427)(1997) On Christian Doctrine, Translated by D.W. Robertson Jr., Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall.

AUGUSTINE (427b)(1997) On Christian Teaching, Translated by R.P.H. Green, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) ‘Fatalism’, in Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy,. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

BLACKBURN, S. (1996) ‘Reductio ad Absurdum’, Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

BRUCE, F.F. (1987) Romans, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

CALVIN, JOHN (1539)(1998) The Institutes of the Christian Religion, Book IV, Translated by Henry Beveridge, Grand Rapids, The Christian Classic Ethereal Library, Wheaton College. http://www.ccel.org/ccel/calvin/institutes.html

CALVIN, JOHN (1540)(1973) Romans and Thessalonians, Translated by Ross Mackenzie, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

CALVIN, JOHN (1543)(1996) The Bondage and Liberation of the Will, Translated by G.I. Davies, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

CALVIN, JOHN (1550)(1978) Concerning Scandals, Translated by John W. Fraser, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

CALVIN, JOHN (1552)(1995) Acts, Translated by Watermark, Nottingham, Crossway Books.

CALVIN, JOHN (1553)(1952) Job, Translated by Leroy Nixon, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

CALVIN, JOHN (1554)(1965) Genesis, Translated by John King, Edinburgh, The Banner of Truth Trust.

COURSON, JON (2005) Application Commentary, Thomas Nelson, Nashville

CIOCCHI, DAVID M. (2002) ‘The Religious Adequacy of Free-Will Theism’, in Religious Studies, Volume 38, pp. 45-61. Cambridge.

DUNN, JAMES D.G. (1988) Romans, Dallas, Word Books.

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, in David Basinger and Randall Basinger (eds.), Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1729)(2006) Sovereignty of God, New Haven, Connecticut, Jonathan Edwards Center, Yale University.

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1731-1733)(2006) Law of Nature, New Haven, Connecticut, Jonathan Edwards Center, Yale University.

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1754)(2006) Freedom of the Will, Flower Mound, Texas. Jonathanedwards.com. http://www.jonathanedwards.com

ERICKSON, MILLARD (1994) Christian Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, in David Basinger and Randall Basinger (eds.), Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (2001) No One Like Him, John S. Feinberg (gen.ed.), Wheaton, Illinois, Crossway Books.

FLEW, ANTONY, R.M. HARE, AND BASIL MITCHELL (1996) ‘The Debate on the Rationality of Religious Belief’, in L.P. Pojman (ed.), Philosophy, The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.

FLEW, ANTONY AND A.MACINTRYE (1999) ‘Philosophy of Religion’, in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press Ltd.

FOULKES, FRANCIS (1989) Ephesians, Grand Rapids, Inter-Varsity Press.

FRANCE, R.T. (1985) Matthew, Grand Rapids, IVP, Eerdmans.

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1975) Philosophy of Religion, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1978) The Roots of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1996) ‘Freedom, Free Will, and Determinism’ in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books.

HARPUR, GEORGE (1986) Ephesians in The International Bible Commentary, Grand Rapids, Zondervan.

HASKER, WILLIAM (1996) ‘Middle Knowledge’, in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

HASKER, WILLIAM (1989) God, Time, and Knowledge, Ithaca, Cornell University Press.

HASKER, WILLIAM (1993) ‘C. Robert Mesle, John Hick’s Theodicy: A Process Humanist Critique’, in Philosophy of Religion, Volume 34, Number 1, pp. 55-56. Dordrecht, Netherlands, Philosophy of Religion.

HASKER, WILLIAM (1994) ‘Can Philosophy Defend Theology?’, in Faith and Philosophy, Volume 11, Number 2, April, pp. 272-278. Wilmore, Kentucky, Asbury College.

HASKER, WILLIAM (2000) ‘The Problem of Evil in Process Theism and Classical Free Will Theism’, in Process Studies, Volume. 29, Number 2, Fall-Winter, pp. 194-208. Claremont, California, Religion Online.

HASKER, WILLIAM (2003) ‘Counterfactuals and Evil’, in Philosophia Christi, Volume 5, Number 1, pp. 235-249. La Mirada, California, Biola University.

HASKER, WILLIAM (2003) ‘Is Free-Will Theism Religiously Inadequate? A Reply to Ciocchi’, in Religious Studies, Volume 39, Number 4, December, pp. 431-440. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

HASKER, WILLIAM (2007) ‘Peter van Inwagen, The Problem of Evil’, in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, Notre Dame, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.

HICK, JOHN (1970) Evil and The God of Love, London, The Fontana Library.

HICK, JOHN (1978) ‘Present and Future Life’, Harvard Theological Review, Volume 71, Number 1-2, January-April, Harvard University.

HICK, JOHN (1981) Encountering Evil, Stephen T. Davis (ed.), Atlanta, John Knox Press.

HICK, JOHN (1993) ‘Afterword’ in GEIVETT, R. DOUGLAS (1993) Evil and the Evidence for God, Philadelphia, Temple University Press.

HICK, JOHN (1993) The Metaphor of God Incarnate, Louisville, Kentucky, John Know Press.

HICK, JOHN (1994) Death and Eternal Life, Louisville, Kentucky, John Knox Press.

HICK, JOHN (1999) ‘Life after Death’, in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press.

HOCKING, DAVID (2014) The Book of Revelation, Tustin, California, HFT Publications.

KAPITAN, TOMIS (1996) ‘Free Will Problem’, in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

LANGER, SUSANNE K (1953)(1967) An Introduction to Symbolic Logic, Dover Publications, New York. (Philosophy).

MAWSON, TIM (1999) ‘The Problem of Evil and Moral Indifference’, in Religious Studies, Volume 35, pp. 323-345. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

MOUNCE, ROBERT H. (1990) The Book of Revelation, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

MOUNCE, ROBERT H. (1995) The New American Commentary: Romans, Nashville, Broadman & Holman Publishers.

PIRIE, MADSEN (2006)(2015) How To Win Every Argument, Bloomsbury, London.

PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1977)(2002) God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1982) The Nature of Necessity, Oxford, Clarendon Press.

PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (2000) Warranted Christian Belief, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

POJMAN, LOUIS P. (1996) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.

PORTER, LAURENCE.E. (1986) ‘Luke’, in F.F. Bruce (gen.ed.), The International Bible Commentary, Grand Rapids, Marshall Pickering/ Zondervan.

STACE, W.T. (1952)(1976) Religion and the Modern Mind, in John R. Burr and Milton Goldinger (eds.), Philosophy and Contemporary Issues, London, Collier Macmillan Publishers. The Orthodox Study Bible, New Testament and Psalms, (1993) Saint Athanasius Orthodox Academy, Thomas Nelson Publishers, Nashville, Tennessee.

2010 Theodicy and Practical Theology: PhD thesis, the University of Wales, Trinity Saint David, Lampeter

PhD Wales: 2010

2003 The Problem of Evil: Anglican and Baptist Perspectives: MPhil thesis, Bangor University

MPhil Wales: 2003

Saturday, April 08, 2023

Plato (PhD Edit)

Greece-Corfu from Earth Sciences

Plato (PhD Edit)

2010 Theodicy and Practical Theology: PhD thesis, the University of Wales, Trinity Saint David, Lampeter

Originally published on March 11, 2015, this article presented my very limited referencing of Plato, and related within my Wales, PhD.

I decided to add some material and republish on April 8 2023.

Platonic Philosophy

Platonic philosophy was largely created by Plato (427-347 B.C.).[1] Richard Kraut (1996) notes Plato was a preeminent Greek philosopher who conceived the observable world as an imperfect image of the realm of the unobservable and unchanging forms.[2] Plato, in Timaeus, written in 360 B.C, viewed these forms as divinely moved objects.[3]

Neoplatonism

Mark D. Jordan (1996) notes Augustine was primarily affected by Neoplatonism before his conversion to Christianity.[4] Augustine (398-399)(1992) states in Confessions he examined Platonist writings that supported his Biblical understanding of the nature of God.[5] Jordan states the Platonic writings helped Augustine to conceive of a cosmic hierarchy in the universe in which God was immaterial and had sovereign control over his material creation.[6] However, Jordan states Augustine saw philosophy alone as being unable to change his life as only God himself could do.[7] Augustine’s use of Plato does not in itself invalidate his understanding of Biblical writings where the two may happen to be in agreement.[8]

Platonic Demiurge

Mill theorized of a God that resembled the ‘Platonic Demiurge.’[9] A demiurge is a Greek term meaning ‘artisan’, ‘craftsman.’ It is a deity that develops the material world from ‘preexisting chaos.’ Plato introduced the concept and term in his text Timaeus. The perfectly good demiurge wishes to present his goodness and shapes the chaos as best he can, and the present world results. Wainwright (1996: 188). The demiurge is a limited, non-omnipotent God, that did not create original matter. Wainwright (1996: 188). Blackburn (1996: 98).

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Website work

Plato: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: First published Sat Mar 20, 2004; substantive revision Sat Feb 12, 2022

Cited

'Plato’s central doctrines '

'Many people associate Plato with a few central doctrines that are advocated in his writings: The world that appears to our senses is in some way defective and filled with error, but there is a more real and perfect realm, populated by entities (called “forms” or “ideas”) that are eternal, changeless, and in some sense paradigmatic for the structure and character of the world presented to our senses. Among the most important of these abstract objects (as they are now called, because they are not located in space or time) are goodness, beauty, equality, bigness, likeness, unity, being, sameness, difference, change, and changelessness. (These terms—“goodness”, “beauty”, and so on—are often capitalized by those who write about Plato, in order to call attention to their exalted status; similarly for “Forms” and “Ideas.”)

The most fundamental distinction in Plato’s philosophy is between the many observable objects that appear beautiful (good, just, unified, equal, big) and the one object that is what beauty (goodness, justice, unity) really is, from which those many beautiful (good, just, unified, equal, big) things receive their names and their corresponding characteristics. Nearly every major work of Plato is, in some way, devoted to or dependent on this distinction.' End citation

I personally do not find 'forms' as eternal as very helpful, philosophically. For me, philosophically and theologically, there is the infinite, which is of God, his attributes and his characteristics, and the finite, of which God created with logically, limited attributes and characteristics.

Citation

'Although these propositions are often identified by Plato’s readers as forming a large part of the core of his philosophy, many of his greatest admirers and most careful students point out that few, if any, of his writings can accurately be described as mere advocacy of a cut-and-dried group of propositions. Often Plato’s works exhibit a certain degree of dissatisfaction and puzzlement with even those doctrines that are being recommended for our consideration.' End citation

'cut-and-dried group of propositions'

I reason that for reasonable premise (s) and conclusion, there needs to be a clear distinction between the infinite and the finite. Although I have significant knowledge of the difference; I have no have exhaustive knowledge of either, and this shall remain so.

Citation

'There is no mechanical rule for discovering how best to read a dialogue, no interpretive strategy that applies equally well to all of his works. We will best understand Plato’s works and profit most from our reading of them if we recognize their great diversity of styles and adapt our way of reading accordingly. Rather than impose on our reading of Plato a uniform expectation of what he must be doing (because he has done such a thing elsewhere), we should bring to each dialogue a receptivity to what is unique to it. That would be the most fitting reaction to the artistry in his philosophy.' End citation

Plato is a key, historical, philosophical source, and significantly speculative.

Blackburn

Concerning Platonism, British Philosopher, Blackburn writes that this was especially developed in the 'middle dialogues' (289). Plato reasons that 'abstract objects' such as those in mathematics (289) or justice (289) are timeless and objective entities. (289). I can grant that God had/has infinite understanding of mathematics and justice, but that does not equate to a finite understanding of the same, that to various degrees would be the understanding of any significantly, conscious, rational, entities which would be able to ponder on such.

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PhD, Wales