The importance of theodicy

Las Vegas 

Yes, I know one could state: The impotence of theodicy, but I just used it. Well, I am leaving for my Vancouver-Phoenix-Los Angeles-Phoenix-Las Vegas-Salt Lake City-Vancouver trip next week. I will only be going to the airports at Vegas and Salt Lake, and so I will not be attempting to verbally spar with gamblers and Latter-Day Saints. Too bad, as I know it would help with material for the satire blog, but maybe something will come up in Phoenix and Los Angeles. I aim to have my last post of November an on tour posting for satire and theology. So, since I will not be around in a bit, here is my final academic posting on this blog for the month of November. I will try and check my blog Dashboard on the road and ask Chucky to check as well so please keep commenting and I will keep publishing. Thank you. 

The importance of theodicy 

Some dismiss theodicy entirely and some view it as only having limited value. Hille reasons that a satisfactory self-coherent answer to the question of the justice of God cannot be found in theology or philosophy. Hille (2004: 26). Ferraiolo explains that many critics of theism would claim the existence of gratuitous evil makes a theodicy a difficult thing to establish in our present world filled with evil. He concludes his article by noting it is not obvious that human suffering is reconcilable with theism. Ferraiolo (2005: 1). Pereboom writes that despite some important work within theodicy over the last thirty years, the problem of evil still remains the greatest challenge to theistic belief. Pereboom (2005: 33). Lindsley notes that many persons are unimpressed by Christian attempts at theodicy. He suggests that theodicy must be careful not to portray itself in a way that it is speaking for God. Lindsley (2003: 3). I fully admit and reason that theodicy is a speculative exercise to a degree, and any person writing on the subject should with humility approach it very carefully. 

Marcel Sarot comments that many feminist theologians see theodicy as dominated by white males, and these feminists reject notions of God’s omniscience, omnipotence, and perfect goodness. Sarot (1997: 29). An important point here is that it needs to be remembered that each writer of theodicy is approaching the subject from theological assumptions. Many theodicy views are written by men and some of these male writers may not adequately portray female and feminist perspectives on the problem of evil. Theologian Carl Henry writes that empirical and philosophical considerations devoid of revelation cannot vindicate God in this evil world. Henry (1983: 282). I can accept Henry’s point, as from a traditional Christian perspective, Biblical revelation is viewed as explaining God’s workings in his creation, although this revelation does not exhaustively discuss the problem of evil. Henri Blocher notes theodicy are failures in themselves and must have ideas within that square with Biblical revelation in order to be true and beneficial. Blocher (1994: 84). I do not agree that all theodicy are failures in themselves, but can grant a Christian theodicy needs the support of Scripture, which connects the reader to the salvific work of Christ. 

It should be noted that a theodicy written from a sovereignty perspective, to be very valuable, needs to focus on how God’s divine plans and purposes are accomplished through the development of human beings. Erlandson explains that many theodicy are fatally flawed since they are too focused on the idea of God creating a world for the best possible state of human beings. Erlandson (1991: 1). The ideas of Erlandson are in line with sovereignty theodicy, which places greater emphasis on God’s perfect and holy plans in willingly allowing the problem of evil to exist in creation, than does free will theodicy. 

Scudder comments that if the sovereignty of God is stressed, and evil is still considered to be reality, then this logically leads to the idea that God causes evil and it is part of a predetermined plan. Scudder (1940: 248). I agree with this notion, but Scudder deduces that a strong view of God willing evil for the greater good means evil could be understood as not really being evil. Scudder (1940: 248). I can understand how a scholar could come to such a conclusion, but a Reformed influenced sovereignty theodicy does not need to agree with this idea which is foreign to both traditional Reformed and conservative theology. 

Robert H. Mounce explains that God directs the affairs in life, for those who love him, for the greater good. Mounce (1995: 187). C.E.B. Cranfield comments that although God can will grievous and evil things to occur, God in Christ works these things towards the greater good, in particular in the context of salvation for those that know Christ. Cranfield (1992: 204). Evil and sin are not to be confused with goodness and obedience within Reformed traditions, but as God willingly allows evil things to occur, his purposes and motives are pure. 

David Ray Griffin critically disagrees with this concept of John Calvin and others, but correctly defines the idea that God’s will must be regarded as righteous, even when we as human beings cannot fully understand the rightness of his judgments, since God is the definition of righteousness. Griffin (1976: 129). Wright reasons the problem of evil can be solved in a straightforward manner by proposing that God predestines evils to occur for a particular purpose, and that persons do not have an answer back for God. Wright (1996: 197). This comment from Wright is accurate from a Reformed perspective. I can interject and state that academically solving the logical and gratuitous problems of evil by tying them back to God is an ultimate intellectual solution, but there are still practical ramifications to deal with, such as why certain evils occur. The fact that a sovereignty theodicy can logically and reasonable solve its problem of evil, does not mean that suffering often comes with an explanation. 

Ultimately, Christ’s atoning work and resurrection leads to a culminated Kingdom of God (Revelation 21-22) with resurrected citizens. That is the solution to the problem of evil within the realm that God intended human beings to have dominion over. A critic can rightly state that everlasting hell and therefore, in a sense, the problem of evil, will still exist. My reply is that an actual everlasting realm of hell, as a place of punishment is not intended for human beings to have dominion over and therefore there is no certain need for a remedy for evil within it. 

BLOCHER, HENRI. (1994) Evil and the Cross, Translated by David G. Preston, Leicester, InterVarsity Press. 

CRANFIELD, C.E.B. (1992) Romans: A Shorter Commentary, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 

ERLANDSON, DOUG (1991) ‘A New Perspective on the Problem of Evil’, in Doug Erlandson PhD Philosophy, Reformed.org, Orange County, Covenant Community Church of Orange County. 

FERRAIOLO, WILLIAM (2005) ‘Eternal Selves and The Problem of Evil’, in Quodlibet Journal, Volume 7, Number 2, April-June, Evanston, Illinois, Quodlibet Journal. 

GRIFFIN, DAVID RAY (1976) God, Power, and Evil, Philadelphia, The Westminster Press. 

HENRY, CARL (1983) God, Revelation and Authority: Volume 6: God Who Stands and Stays, Waco, Word Books. 

HILLE, ROLF (2004) ‘A Biblical-Theological Response to the Problem of Theodicy in the Context of the Modern Criticism of Religion’, in Evangelical Review of Theology, Volume 28, Number 1, pp. 21-37. Carlisle, UK, Evangelical Review of Theology. 

LINDSLEY, ART (2003) ‘The Problem of Evil’, Knowing & Doing, Winter, Springfield, Virginia, C.S. Lewis Institute. 

MOUNCE, ROBERT H. (1995) The New American Commentary: Romans, Nashville, Broadman & Holman Publishers. 

PEREBOOM, DERK (2005) ‘The Problem of Evil’, in The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Religion, William E. Mann, (ed.), Oxford, Blackwell Publishing. 

SAROT, MARCEL (1997) ‘Evil, Tragedy and Feminist Theology: New Impulses for Theodicy’, in Theology Digest, Volume 44, Number 1, Spring, pp. 29-33. St. Louis, Missouri, Theology Digest. 

SCUDDER, DELTON, LEWIS (1940) Tennant’s Philosophical Theology, London, Oxford University Press. 

WRIGHT, R.K.McGREGOR (1996) No Place for Sovereignty, Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.

   

Jeff posted this on Facebook. I had a German Shepherd-Husky and Domestic Cat at the same time that looked colour wise a fair bit like these two, but back in the 1980s. They were not 'best buds'!

Edgar Sheffield Brightman and the finite god

Bosphorus Bridge, Istanbul, Turkey

Europe on the left, Asia on the right.

This will be my first attempt at date publishing an article in the month after actually posting. So it is October 27 and I will place the date as November 1. Blogger only recently has allowed the dates of my articles to be moved ahead. I tried previously on several occasions.

This is good for me as I will have to go away to Arizona and California in November or December and I still want a consistent two postings per blog per month.

Edgar Sheffield Brightman (1884-1953) is a philosopher and theologian noted for believing in a finite God. Lavely (2007: 121). John H. Lavely (2007) explains that Brightman ‘carved out’ a concept of ‘theistic finitism.’ Lavely (2007: 121). Brightman within A Philosophy of Religion (1940) calls God the ‘finite-infinite controller of the given.’ Brightman (1940: 336). Lavely (2007: 122). He developed an original view on the finite God different than John Stuart Mill, William James (both discussed in earlier posts on this blog) and Alfred North Whitehead. His view features a shift from traditional theism, but this is not a rejection of the Christian faith from his perspective. He offers from this perspective, a true Christian expression within a more reasonable approach to traditional supernaturalism. Lavely (2007: 124). Doubts concerning concepts of God within Christian theism need to be contemplated and discussed. Brightman (1930: 9).

Brightman explains in The Problem of God (1930) the new concept of God has not confined the divine creative work to a single week, and God does not cease to produce and maintain newer life forms. Brightman (1930: 68). As there is scientific evolution and progression in the material realm, he reasons there can be expansion with God as in more far reaching goals and development for the physical realm than persons had previously realized. Brightman (1930: 68). He reasons that God is not fixed but is still growing and expanding. Brightman (1930: 70). He questions traditional concepts that God is a metaphysical unity that is perfectly at peace with self, as in no struggle, instead God may not be so separate from the physical world and the struggles that go with it. Brightman (1930: 94). Brightman reasons there are struggles within the divine being and God has genuine problems to deal with in the physical realm as a finite and limited God. Brightman (1930: 94). The expansion of God means he must lack some knowledge and power, and this view contradicts those within theology that place a strong emphasis on God’s sovereignty, as does Calvinism. Brightman (1930: 102).

According to Gordon Clark (1959) Brightman is also a noted empiricist and works out philosophy of religion along these lines. Clark (1959: 34). However, philosophical interpretations should be reasonably understood within human experience and should never be under the subordination of logic or empiricism. Every item of experience properly understood should point a person toward God and is evidence for the existence of God. Brightman (1930: 62). Persons were not to follow the logic of the rationalists, but a reasonable approach is to follow a set of empirical principles and concepts by which human beings organize their experience within the universe. Brightman subscribes to a view of ‘personalism’ as in the term referring to the ‘ultimate and irreducible unit of reality,’ and there exists no realities other than persons. Lavely (2007: 124). James Richmond (1999) notes it is the philosophical viewpoint which views human personality as the starting point, and this may include a personal God as a key to understanding the nature of the world. Richmond (1999: 443). Everything that is in existence, exists in the mind of a person, of some sort, on some level. Brightman (1958: 135). The concept of ‘person’ was a ‘concrete universal.’ Lavely (2007: 124). God was the uncreated creator of humanity, ‘the ground of all being’ and the one that sustains the universe. Lavely (2007: 124). God was also person. Personalism would include God’s creations and reality is a community of persons sustained by God, the Supreme Person. Lavely (2007: 124). The total view of human experience leads one to a belief in some sort of Supreme Being, who is also supremely good, beautiful and of reason. Brightman (1930: 63). Creation did not come ex nihilo from the hand of God, and matter is not something external from God. Lavely (2007: 124). Matter and the physical world is therefore not completely separate from God, and in a sense nature is a representation of the divine creator. God, in fact was capable of growth and can accomplish more within reality than he has presently.

Lavely reasons that Brightman’s view on omnipotence is ‘ambiguous’ and is difficult to explain within his overall description and understanding of God. Lavely (2007: 132). This is a reasonable point. Omnipotence may literally describe the quality of everything to God, in other words God is omnipotent, not in a traditional sense but rather God has all the power there is, and all the power that is available. Lavely (2007: 132). God is omnitemporal as opposed to unchanging. God is all-powerful in a sense, only within the finite realm and not beyond it, and God can also change and expand within that realm. God is ‘creative, supreme, and personal’ yet is limited and there are experiences which are eternally existent which he does not create. Nevertheless, God can control the experiences that he did not create. Any understanding of God as omnipotent would be ‘derived predominantly from abstract thought’ as the view and theory cannot be based on experience alone, although humanity does experience the power of God.

I view the finite God as logically possible but would still leave the need for the infinite first cause. Ultimately I reason that even if human beings were created by a finite God, the ultimate first cause is the one that human beings should ultimately appeal to as this being could overrule the lesser deity. I would make any appeal for everlasting life to the most powerful good being in existence.

Brightman's finite god is logically possible.

A finite god is not Biblical. Otto Weber suggests God has unlimited capacity and unrestricted will. Weber (1955)(1981: 440). God is unrestricted in what he determines within self and outside of self. Presbyterian theologian John M. Frame admits the term omnipotence is not in Scripture, but reasons the concept is Biblical. He deduces that based on the Bible, it is impossible for anything to occur outside of what God has willed to happen. Frame (2002: 518). Also Weber (1955)(1981: 440).

Genesis 1 begins with God that existed prior to his material creation. He therefore has power over finite creation and in that sense, at least it can be reasoned, is omnipotent and infinite.

It can be reasoned God existed prior to the creation of finite angelic creatures, and once again can be reasoned as omnipotent and infinite.

Brightman’s god is hyper-speculative.

BRIGHTMAN, EDGAR SHEFFIELD (1930) The Problem of God, New York, The Abingdon Press.

BRIGHTMAN, EDGAR SHEFFIELD (1940) A Philosophy of Religion, New York, Prentice-Hall.

BRIGHTMAN, EDGAR SHEFFIELD (1958) Person and Reality, New York, Ronald Press.

CLARK, GORDON C. (1959) ‘Special Divine Revelation as Rational’, in Carl F.H. Henry (ed.), Revelation and the Bible: Contemporary Evangelical Thought, London, The Tyndale Press.

FRAME, JOHN M. (2002) The Doctrine of God, P and R Publishing, Phillipsburg, New Jersey.

LAVELY, JOHN H. (2007) ‘Good-and Evil and Finite-Infinite God’, in The Boston Personalist Tradition in Philosophy, Social Ethics, and Theology, Macon, Georgia, Macon University Press.

RICHMOND, JAMES (1999) ‘Personalism’, in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Theology. Kent, SCM Press Ltd.

WEBER, OTTO (1955)(1981) Foundations of Dogmatics,Volumes 1 and 2, Translated and annotated by Darrell L. Guder, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

Here is an article somewhat related to this one from satire and theology:

atheistic praxis and other