Utopia/Dystopia (Briefly)

NASA

Blackburn

Utopia

From the Greek. It is philosophically considered an ideal place or state of life. (388).

The term arises from the text Utopia by Thomas More (1516). (388). Over time utopian views have been expressed within certain political movements.

Blackburn explains utopian views are problematic, as they imply overly simplistic views on human nature. (388).

Indeed, a Biblical and Reformed view on human nature based largely on the New Testament book of Romans (Chapters 1-6 especially), portrays human beings as universally corrupted by a fall from God's direct benevolent rule (Genesis 3) to sinful private, corporate and national independence. The applied atoning and resurrection work of Jesus Christ as both eternal God and perfectly holy man, being the remedy for those that are regenerated to belief (Titus 3:5).

Within my MPhil/PhD work on theodicy and the problem of evil, I do not recall the New Testament and Revelation concepts of new heaven and new earth being defined as utopia. Perhaps this is because utopia is a more modern term with negative political associations, and as well the noted problematic assumptions in regard to the actual state of human nature. Modern political utopias embrace incorrect premises and conclusions in regard to political systems.

Dystopia

Blackburn explains that this a negative utopia where instead of all things politically considered to be going well, things are not going well. Blackburn's listed examples are Aldous Huxley's Brave New World, and George Orwell's 1984 within fiction.(113). Communism and Nazism would be noted non-fictional attempts at utopia, that misunderstood (misunderstand) human nature to the negative, as forms of dystopia.

From a Biblical and New Testament perspective, any human attempt at utopia, would to some degree be a dystopia, because human nature and societies have not been transformed to be Christ-like which will take place within the culminated Kingdom of God, for those who are within that Kingdom (Revelation).

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Oxford Dictionary of Science, (2010), Sixth Edition, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Apostasy (Briefly)

The book review continues:

WALLACE TOM Jr. (2015) Refuting Islam, The Christian Patriots Guide to Exposing the Evils of Islam, Bellingham, Fundamental Publishers.

Chapter 14: Islam Imprisons Its Adherents

Mr. Wallace comments on Islam and apostasy. (109). The author cites of Reliance of the Traveller which is a classic manual of Islamic law. See photos below.

For a different perspective within academia...

Jonathan Brown

 According to

Dr. Jonathan A. C. Brown is a Director of Research at Yaqeen Institute, and an Associate Professor and Chair of Islamic Civilization at Georgetown University. He is the editor in chief of the Oxford Encyclopedia of Islam and the Law, and the author of several books including Misquoting Muhammad: The Challenges and Choices of Interpreting the Prophet's Legacy.

Cited

The way that the early Muslim community seems to have understood apostasy differs strikingly from the decisive rulings of the later schools of law. This is most clear in the rulings of the Prophet ﷺ himself. There is no reliable evidence that the Prophet ﷺ ever executed anyone for apostasy, as was observed by the famous scholar of Cordoba, Ibn al-Ṭallāʿ (d. 1103).[30] When one of the Companions, ʿUbaydallāh bin Jaḥsh left Islam and became Christian while the Muslims were seeking refuge in Ethiopia, the Prophet ﷺ did not order him punished.[31] The Treaty of Ḥudaybiyya, which the Prophet ﷺ concluded with the Quraysh, stated that if anyone decided to leave the Muslim community in Medina no harm would befall them. There was no mention of a punishment for apostasy. In fact, when a man who had come to the Prophet ﷺ just the day before to pledge his loyalty to Islam wanted to be released from his oath, the Prophet ﷺ let him go.[32] Imam al-Shāfiʿī himself notes how, during the Prophet ﷺ’s time in Medina, “Some people believed and then apostatized. Then they again took on the outer trappings of faith. But the Messenger of God did not kill them.”[33] 

This is equally clear in the conduct of the early caliphs. When six men from the Bakr bin Wā’il tribe apostatized during a campaign in southern Iran, the leaders of the army had them killed. When the caliph Umar was informed of this, he upbraided the commanders. Had he been making the decision, the caliph explained, he would have offered the men “a way back in from the door they took out,” or he would have put them in prison.[34] When the pious Umayyad caliph ʿUmar bin ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz (d. 720) was told that a group of recent converts to Islam in northern Iraq had apostatized, he allowed them to revert to their previous status as a protected non-Muslim minority.[35] 

Even the worst examples of patience and tolerance in the early Islamic period, the Kharijite extremists, seem to have been at least partially misunderstood by later scholars on the apostasy issue. Their policy of killing any other Muslims whom they saw as having committed grave sins is usually explained by them having concluded that these people were apostates (their supposed reasoning: if sinners really believed in God, would they commit sins?). But according to an early Kharijite source, the Kharijites seem to have done so more because they viewed their opponents as having egregiously defied God’s law than because they were seen as apostates pure and simple.[36] After the Muslim armies conquered the city of Bukhara in 673-4 CE, its inhabitants kept converting to Islam and then returning to their previous faith of Zoroastrianism as soon as the Arab armies left town. The army had to keep returning to reestablish discipline. At no point was anyone killed for this.[37] 

He further adds:

Of course, some people were executed for apostasy in the early Islamic period. Yet, in instances where details are provided, what stands out is their public nature. The apostasy occurs not in private but comes with a very public announcement by the person in question. This is exemplified in the famous story of the caliph Ali (ra) reportedly executing a man named al-Mustawrad al-ʿIjlī for converting to Christianity. Although reports of this event overall are unreliable according to most Muslim scholars, what seems to have condemned al-Mustawrad was not converting but rather rubbing this in Ali’s face publicly.[38] 

And also:

Reconsidering Apostasy in the Modern Period 

The tremendous changes in how the role of religion is viewed in societies strongly influenced by nationalism and Western secularism have led some Muslim scholars to investigate the Shariah heritage on apostasy. The notion that the crime of apostasy in Islam was more a matter of protecting a state and social order than of policing individual beliefs was articulated in the 1940s by the South Asian Muslim activist intellectual Abul Ala Mawdudi (d. 1979). Modern scholars such as the Egyptians Maḥmūd Shaltūt (Shaykh al-Azhar, d. 1964) and Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī, as well as the late Iraqi-American scholar Ṭāhā Jābir al-ʿAlwānī (d. 2016), have reconsidered how apostasy should be viewed in contexts in which religious identity is not a state matter.[42] They have concluded that what was criminal about apostasy was its public dimension and the threat it posed to a public order built on confessional identity. It is this public element, they argue, not the question of a person’s private decision to follow their conscience in changing their religion, that Islamic law should focus on. 

Far from being hidden or unrealized in Islamic legal history, it was precisely this aspect of apostasy-as-public-threat that explained why Muslim jurists and states had so little interest in people’s private religious choices. It also explains why centuries of Muslim jurists all affirmed a ruling that seems to clash so clearly with the Qur’an’s repeated statements on the freedom of religious choice. The Qur’an warns those who abandon Islam after embracing it that their good deeds will mean nothing in this life or the next (Qur’an 2:217). It mentions no worldly punishment. Even “those who believe, then disbelieve and then (again) believe, then disbelieve, and then increase in disbelief” are not given any earthly punishment by the Qur’an. Instead, God warns only that He “will never pardon them, nor will He guide them unto a way” (Qur’an 4:137). The Qur’anic verse that strikes the most stridently dissonant note with the death penalty for apostasy is the declaration that, “There is no compulsion in religion. Wisdom has been clearly distinguished from falsehood” (Qur’an 2:256).

He appears to conclude that:

In the Shariah, the aim of punishing apostasy from Islam is to protect the communal faith and social order of a Muslim state. If punishing apostasy severely is driving Muslims away from their religion, then this policy is undermining its own purpose. It’s not clear what ‘order under heaven’ maintaining harsh punishments for apostasy would be upholding in our troubled world.
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In contrast, Mr. Wallace reasons that 'The only reason Islam exists today is because Muslims are threatened to death if they leave their faith'. (111). This seems an extreme viewpoint. I would reason that like with any significant culturally-based religion, Islam exists largely because in certain societies, both where Muslims are a majority and minority, there is a shared Islamic worldview.

Based on the writings of Dr. Brown, I would deduce that he reasons that historically that much of the executions due to apostasy have taken place to protect (in my words) the Islamic religion-state and religion-culture union that has been discussed in website entries within this book review.

So, apostasy would typically lead to death if it is deemed by this religion-state leadership as threatening its own existence and the overall Islamic culture, as opposed to execution typically occurring via apostasy from an individual (s) that was Muslim and then renounced his/her religious faith and philosophy.

page 109

page 110

General canons, but not Bible

Peter Twele: Facebook

Neymar would be the player that is rolling and rolling...

LANGER, SUSANNE K (1953)(1967) An Introduction to Symbolic Logic, Dover Publications, New York. (Philosophy)

Continuing with the review of this text and my learning more symbolic logic.

Philosopher Langer, explains that symbolic logic contains certain principles of logical reasoning. (210). Although her teaching has its complexities, the reader should take comfort that principles of logical reasoning are also contained within the academic disciplines of philosophy, philosophy of religion and theology. If these disciplines are done correctly!

In symbolic logic, the method by which all propositions in a system are produced rests on 'general canons of logic procedure'. (210) These are 'universally known, though seldom explicitly stated'. (210). This lack of the explicit contributes to the complexity and philosophical challenge of symbolic logic.

Principles

Principle of substitution

It is assumed that whenever two terms are identical, and are the names for the same element, either symbol may be used in the place of the other. (210). Langer explains that if a = b then a x c could also be written as b x c (210), as example.

Principle of application

This is the assumption that a statement about to any element applies to each element. (210). Therefore quote:

'(a, b) . a + b = b + a' (210)

If this is true of r and m then r + m = m + r

Principle of inference

It has been recognized in academic literature (in regard to symbolic logic, my add), that if a proposition many be granted (known as true), if another proposition us implied, that second proposition may also be accepted and asserted. (210-211). Langer's explanation below. Since the first propositions means the same as (⊃) the second proposition, both can be logically asserted within symbolic logic.

page 211

Key symbols ≡df = Equivalence by definition : = Equal (s) ε = Epsilon and means is ⊃ = Is the same as ⊨ is Entails ˜ = Not ∃ = There exists ∃! = There exists ∴ = Therefore . = Therefore < = Is included v = a logical inclusive disjunction (disjunction is the relationship between two distinct alternatives). x = variable = Conjunction meaning And 0 = Null class cls = Class int = Interpretation

Briefly John 8 31-36: What kind of free?

East Maple Ridge

John 8:31-36

New American Standard Bible (NASB)

31 So Jesus was saying to those Jews who had believed Him, “If you continue in My word, then you are truly disciples of Mine; 32 and you will know the truth, and the truth will make you free.” 33 They answered Him, “We are Abraham’s descendants and have never yet been enslaved to anyone; how is it that You say, ‘You will become free’?” 34 Jesus answered them, “Truly, truly, I say to you, everyone who commits sin is the slave of sin. 35 The slave does not remain in the house forever; the son does remain forever. 36 So if the Son makes you free, you will be free indeed.

I recently listened to short July 4 sermon from the United States of America, where Pastor Jon Courson, that is a fine exegete, implies (paraphrased) that the concept of 'free' in John 8 means that America has liberty and political freedom because it is significantly Christian.

Let us briefly exegete John 8 in regard to being 'free':

From Strong...

1658 ἐλεύθερος 1659 ἐλευθερόω

Please see iPhone images:

8: 32 which is 1659: To liberate, deliver, make free. (34). So, knowing the truth will liberate someone giving them freedom.

8: 33 which is from 1658: Strong defines 1658 as unrestrained (as a citizen, as an example), not a slave, free within liberty. (34)

8: 36: Knowing the Son of God, Jesus Christ, will make you truly free (1659), and this person shall be free (1658) indeed. The person has liberty and freedom within the truth, and is unrestrained and not a slave.

Bauer documents that ἐλεύθερος is in regard to '1. of political and social freedom' (250), and references John 8: 33 noting that this will be the opposite of slavery with this section (1). This definition is in agreement with Strong.

In regards to ἐλευθερόω: Bauer documents that 8: 32 is in regard to moral matters. (251). Again a consistency with the work of Strong.

Courson in his commentary, explains that (paraphrased) the Pharisees were blind as they could not admit that they lacked political freedom under the occupation of the Roman Empire in 8: 33. (509).

But the core problem was still Pharisees rejection of Jesus Christ (the gospel message, his deity and work, my add). (509). Ellis takes the view that the Jews were not denying historical facts, but were stating that in each historical situation they had aspects of freedom. (1247). Importantly, it was the Pharisees that brought the concept of political freedom into the discussion with Jesus Christ.

Jesus does acknowledge, seemingly this political freedom, although secondarily in importance in verse 36.
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34 Jesus answered them, “Truly, truly, I say to you, everyone who commits sin is the slave of sin. 35 The slave does not remain in the house forever; the son does remain forever. 36 So if the Son makes you free, you will be free indeed.

The primary context is spiritual in John 8. We can reason this as sin is primary thing documented against freedom (34-36), and in the gospel context the atoning and resurrection of God the Son, Jesus Christ in conjunction with the Trinity is the remedy to sin.

Pastor Courson is correct, I would reason as secondary context that this includes political freedom and liberty. Again, supported by Greek scholars Strong and Bauer.

Theologically, although I agree with the Lord Jesus Christ that spiritual freedom should lead to political freedom, clearly it is not the case with every 'free' in Christ, Christian believer. For example, there are Christians in orthodox and radical Islamic countries that have state and society limited freedoms. However, in the culminated Kingdom of God, spiritual freedom will lead to political freedom as the government and its citizens under God the Son and the Triune God, will live this out.

Pastor Courson made the classic claim (paraphrased) on his July 4, 2018 sermon that the United States of America is the freest nation on earth because it is Christian. Acknowledging his correctness from John 8 in a secondary context, there would still be a very significant intellectual, philosophical and political debate on which Western nation actually is the most free! There is no obvious answer in my view.

The massive size of the United States government, civilian and military and its power to oversee all citizens is at least one philosophical premise that can provide substantial doubt on Pastor Courson's claim, at least in some contexts.

A premise is support of his view is the large size of the Christian Church and Christian publishing, in the United States of America.

page 498

page 34

page 42

BAUER, WALTER. (1979) A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament, Translated by Eric H. Wahlstrom, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press.

COURSON, JON (2005) Application Commentary, Thomas Nelson, Nashville.

ELLIS, DAVID J. (1986) 'John' in F.F. Bruce (gen.ed.), The International Bible Commentary, Grand Rapids, Marshall Pickering/ Zondervan.

STRONG, J. (1890)(1986) Strong's Exhaustive Concordance of the Bible, Burlington, Welch Publishing Company.