Monday, July 24, 2017

Opines on Philosophy of Religion and Apologetics

Yesterday
Opines on Philosophy of Religion and Apologetics

Originally published July 24, 2017, edited for an entry on academia.edu for July 1, 2023.
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Preface

At church yesterday (2017) a Christian apologist was a guest speaker. He stated (paraphrased) that he was a Christian apologist that presented philosophy, but later stated he was not heavily academic with his use of philosophy.

I realize there are significantly academic apologists that use philosophy/philosophy of religion, but his example had me consider the differences between apologetics and philosophy of religion. I found this blog article below on my mobile during the church service.

I will admit, that I considered the differences between philosophy theology, philosophy of religion and apologetics when pursuing PhD options, and I favoured philosophy theology and philosophy of religion for my career and ministry. Theistic, philosophy of religion, I have found often has significant agreement with philosophical theology, within the Reformed tradition on key points.

Philosophy of Religion and Apologetics


Updated


April 12, 2012 This Post is Old! 

The post you are reading is 11 years old and may not represent my current views. I started blogging around the time I first began to study philosophy, age 17. In my view, the point of philosophy is to expose our beliefs to rational scrutiny so we can revise them and get better beliefs that are more likely to be true. That's what I've been up to all these years, and this blog has been part of that process. For my latest thoughts, please see the front page. 


Kenny Pearce received his PhD in philosophy from the University of Southern California in 2014. Kenny is currently Professor of Philosophy at James Madison University.

Citations and my comments from this work from a philosopher...

'Philosophy of religion, as practiced by religious believers, is often confused with apologetics. (Perhaps it is even so confused, on occasion, by some of its practitioners.) Indeed, if we use the term ‘apologetics’ more broadly, to include not just the giving of an apologia (defense) of religion, but of just any belief system, then we could say that philosophy in general is often confused with apologetics. This is, I think, a serious mistake. The philosopher, qua philosopher, is up to something quite different than the apologist, qua apologist. The ‘qua’ clauses are necessary, because of course the same person may engage in both philosophy and apologetics and, as will emerge, it is even possible to do both at the same time, but as activities they have fundamentally different aims.'
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End citation = ---      

As many readers will know, I studied theodicy, problems of evil, free will, determinism and the nature of God in the United Kingdom, mostly distance learning, from 1999-2010. I have continued with this work and with biblical studies on my website and since 2004. I would define my academic priorities as mainly philosophical theology, philosophy of religion and biblical studies, pretty equally. My approach with philosophical theology reviewed and used moderate conservative, biblical views leading to a Reformed theological approach within my MPhil/PhD work. My approach with philosophy of religion reviewed and used non-biblical, not by definition, always anti-biblical, views within my theses. I reviewed philosophical theological views in agreement and disagreement and I reviewed philosophy of religion views in agreement and disagreement.

But I was not, in my opinion, advised by my British academic tutors to provide apologetics for the Christian faith, but rather to provide 'breadth' and 'depth' in views. I was allowed some academic freedom at the University of Wales, where I earned my two degrees, to present my Reformed theodicy views using philosophy theological and philosophy of religion concepts as support. My tutors were Christians but within secular Universities.

Citation

'Let’s start with apologetics. What the apologist would really like to do is to give arguments which will actually convince a particular audience who does not already believe the conclusion that the conclusion is true. This, of course, is a tall order, especially when it comes to anything so contentious and practically and emotionally important as religion.'
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From listening to the apologist at church, Sunday and other apologists, I would reason that in the general, the goal is to provide a defence of the Christian faith. The speaker, yesterday, did not prioritize a presentation, that was of 'breadth' and 'depth', that was similar to what I was expected to do within British academia. Rather, he emphasized presenting an apologetic with Christian character. 

Frankly, I agree with the speaker on Christian character, but myself would aim to present rational and true theological and philosophical arguments. I would work to present rationally challenging premises and conclusions. Even if some of these views did not support classically held, evangelical views, but in reality, my biblical approach in within the Reformed tradition. My view are within orthodox, biblical, Christianity. But, clearly my approach is as an academic theologian and theistic, philosopher of religion. To defend this speaker, context is key as he was speaking in an evangelical church and not in a University or academic setting.

Cited

'This, I claim, is not the aim of the philosopher (qua philosopher). The philosopher aims instead to discover arguments which are such that people holding certain views (which real people do, or at least are likely to, hold) will, upon considering the arguments, be rationally obligated to endorse the conclusion.'
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I will admit here that based on my education and academic approach, an essential priority is to present rational premises and conclusions. My view is that there are strong rational premises and conclusions that rationally support a biblical, Reformed Christian view. This is within an evangelical church, context.

Cited

'Thus the philosopher differs from the apologist in two ways: first, in that the philosopher aims to discover arguments, rather than just to give them to people...'
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This was the academic approach I was guided to take within British academia.

Cited

'...and, second, the philosopher is not concerned with what will actually convince people, but only about what people rationally ought to be convinced by.'
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This is largely the truth in many cases. Within the evangelical church, this can make the theistic philosopher of religion seem 'out of touch' with the evangelical agenda at points.

My Reformed, compatiblist (soft determinism) views related to free will and determinism, in particular, were not as accepted publicly in MPhil and PhD surveys as were incompatibilist (non-determinism) views. But, I will admit, I was and am, far more concerned with what by God's guidance, is rationally true than with attempts to convince people. I  primarily, leave the convincing to the Lord, in regards to the gospel and spiritual issues.

Cited

'In sum, the apologist is engaged in what could (depending on one’s attitude to the apologist in question) be classified either as a public education campaign, or a propaganda campaign. The philosopher, on the other hand, is engaged in a research program. This difference is the fundamental one; it is for this reason that the apologist is concerned with whether people actually accept his arguments, but the philosopher is concerned only with whether people are rationally obligated to accept hers.'
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There is at least some truth to this distinction in general, as in many contexts, the apologist is providing a defence, whereas the philosopher of religion is engaged in a research program. My British work was far more a research program than a defence of my religious, theological, and philosophical views.

However, within my United Kingdom theses studies I was defending a biblical, Reformed theodicy, no question. Christian apologetics, done well, will certainly include a significant amount of research and this will (should) include views which do not support biblical Christianity or the apologist's version of biblical Christianity.

Cited

'Finally, what does this mean for the relationship between philosophy and apologetics? Well, the obvious answer is that, if the apologist adopts the principle of only trying to get people to be convinced by arguments they rationally ought to be convinced by, then the apologist is really a popularizer of philosophy.'
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I reason an apologist can research and present reasonable philosophy and philosophy of religion. Is this done with every instance, no. But, theology and philosophy is also, at times, presented in a more popularized and less academic form. In the You Tube format, for example.

Cited

'This, furthermore, is why I said earlier that it is possible to engage in both activities at once, especially if philosophers are the target of the apologia. That is, one may publish one’s arguments both as part of the cooperative research program and in the hope of actually convincing one’s fellow researchers. (Or, in an increasingly popular trend, one may publish a book in which one tries to address both one’s fellow philosophers and the educated public at once.) The fact that a particular individual has both aims may effect her mode of presentation, but this need not interfere with doing good philosophy.'
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Yes, I reason an apologist can present good philosophy.

Cited

'Although philosophy and apologetics may go together, it is comforting to the philosopher that they need not. Being concerned only with the rational force of arguments, the philosopher may ignore the vagaries of human psychology, or of social pressures regarding belief, because, if these are the reasons the argument is not accepted, then the philosopher may nevertheless have succeeded at her aim of giving an argument which rationally ought to be accepted.'
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I can support the author's aim of rational, philosophy of religion as being in agreement with at least, aspects, of my ministry objectives, but I also focus on philosophical theology and biblical studies. This I write without disparaging the potential for significant academic presentation from the Christian apologist.

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

CONWAY DAVID A. AND RONALD MUNSON (1997) The Elements of Reasoning, Wadsworth Publishing Company, New York. 

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, in David Basinger and Randall Basinger (eds.), Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press. 

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (2001) No One Like Him, John S. Feinberg (gen.ed.), Wheaton, Illinois, Crossway Books.

FLEW, ANTONY, R.M. HARE, AND BASIL MITCHELL (1996) ‘The Debate on the Rationality of Religious Belief’, in L.P. Pojman (ed.), Philosophy, The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company. 

FLEW, ANTONY AND A.MACINTRYE (1999) ‘Philosophy of Religion’, in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press Ltd. 

GEIVETT, R. DOUGLAS (1993) Evil and the Evidence for God, Philadelphia, Temple University Press.

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1975) Philosophy of Religion, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House. 

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1978) The Roots of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press. 

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1996) ‘Freedom, Free Will, and Determinism’, in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books.

LANGER, SUSANNE K (1953)(1967) An Introduction to Symbolic Logic, Dover Publications, New York. (Philosophy). 

MACKIE, J.L. (1955)(1996) ‘Evil and Omnipotence’, in Mind, in Michael Peterson, William Hasker, Bruce Reichenbach, and David Basinger (eds.), Philosophy of Religion, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

MACKIE, J.L. (1971)(1977)(2002) ‘Evil and Omnipotence’, in The Philosophy of Religion, in Alvin C. Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids. Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

PIRIE, MADSEN (2006)(2015) How To Win Every Argument, Bloomsbury, London. 

PLANTINGA, ALVIN.C. (1977)(2002) God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

PLANTINGA, ALVIN.C. (1982) The Nature of Necessity, Oxford, Clarendon Press.

POJMAN, LOUIS P. (1996) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company. 

SANFORD, DAVID H. (1996) ‘Circular Reasoning', in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 

SAMPLES, KENNETH (2014) How to Evaluate an Abductive Argument, Reasons to Believe, Covina, California. 

SZUDEK, ANDY & TORSLEY, SARAH (2018) The Little Book of Philosophy, Landau Cecile (Ed), London, DK Publishing. 

Friday, July 21, 2017

Whitehead & The Infinite God


From Theodicy and Practical Theology, The University of Wales, Trinity Saint David. PhD, thesis. 

Whitehead explains that ‘It is not true that God is on all respects infinite.’ Whitehead (1926: 153). His Process theology is a philosophical approach that does not rely on any kind of divine revelation.Viney (2008: 1). Instead it relies on a process of change over time as a theory of metaphysics. Viney (2008: 1). God’s actual concrete nature is responsive and influenced by the processes that take in the world, and therefore God is limited.

Whitehead claims that if God was infinite in all ways this would make him as infinitely evil as he is good. I doubt logically and reasonably that an infinitely holy and good God could at the same time be infinitely evil and so I can grant Whitehead half a point here. However, God could still be infinite completely in nature and willingly allow evil to exist within his creation, which shall be discussed particularly in Chapter Three as a Reformed view. I definitely agree with Whitehead that an infinitely good and evil God would be a God of nothingness. Whitehead (1926: 153). I doubt this being could logically exist.

July 21, 2017 

What exists as necessary is good.

God exists as necessary.

Therefore, God is good.
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Evil, if it exists at all, it is a corruption of the good. For God to be proposed as infinitely good and infinitely evil, would mean that the infinite evil is not defined correctly as evil.

VINEY, DAVID (2008) ‘Process Theism’, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Palo Alto, California, Stanford University.

WHITEHEAD, ALFRED NORTH (1926) Religion in the Making, New York, The MacMillan Company.

WHITEHEAD, ALFRED NORTH (1927-1929)(1957) Process and Reality, New York, The Free Press/MacMillan Publishing Company, Incorporated.

WHITEHEAD, ALFRED NORTH (1967)(1986) ‘Adventures of Ideas’, in Forest Wood JR., Whiteheadian Thought as a Basis for a Philosophy of Religion, University of Southern Mississippi, Hattiesburg, University Press of America, Inc. http://www.religion-online.org/showchapter.asp?title=2736&C=2479

Thursday, July 20, 2017

Mistakes Columbo Villains Make

Columbo
Mistakes Columbo Villains Make

Preface

Slight revisions of this July 20, 2017 article for an entry on academia.edu on July 8, 2023

Non-exhaustive. I have not seen all Columbo episodes, but I have viewed a significant amount. I am not an expert on Columbo or any television program.

A non-typical, but yet philosophical, article from me...

Mistakes Columbo Villains Make: A man's got to know his limitations

Columbo Wikipedia

'Columbo is an unassuming police detective of Italian descent whose clothes are disheveled and whose trademarks include wearing a rumpled, beige raincoat over his suit, and smoking a cigar. He is consistently underestimated by his suspects who, while initially reassured and distracted by his circumstantial speech, become increasingly annoyed by his pestering behavior. Despite his unassuming appearance and apparent absentmindedness, he is extremely intelligent and shrewdly solves all of his cases and secures all evidence needed for a conviction. His formidable eye for detail and relentlessly dedicated approach, often become clear to the killer (and even the viewer) only late in the story line.'

The Columbo formula:

'In almost every episode the audience sees the crime unfold at the beginning and knows the identity of the culprit, typically an affluent member of society.'

End citations   

This 'typically an affluent member of society' is successful within the world system, and might often be considered an intellectual of sorts. A mistake typically made by the villains is to assume that his/her affluence, success and intellect, is at an extremely high level and therefore he/she can deceive the police and not be charged with murder.

Another related typical mistake made by these villains is to underestimate the intellectual ability of an expert detective, Lieutenant Columbo, to find enough evidence to legally charge him/her with the crime of murder, due to his greater knowledge and experience in crime solving. Because of how Columbo presents himself, as many times, not that smart, he in a sense catches the villain off guard, in most of the episodes I have viewed, it seems to me. Therefore, a lesson from Columbo is that intellectual superiority in the villain's area of expertise does not equate with intellectual superiority in an area where the villain is less familiar; crime solving.
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For the context of this website, this article serves as a reminder to those critics of biblical studies, theology, religious studies and philosophy of religion that have no significant training in these academic disciplines and yet assume these are pseudo-academic disciplines. The lesson is useful in many other instances as well. But, if I was transported into a fictional Columbo universe, I would not expect to get away with murder because I have a PhD. 

I state that I am finite and sinful...

Romans 6: 23 is appropriate here.

New American Standard Bible (NASB)

23 For the wages of sin is death, but the gracious gift of God is eternal life in Christ Jesus our Lord.
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The Kansas City Chiefs are the Super Bowl Champions, but would not be the favourites against a very good American high school, baseball team, playing in a baseball game.

Dirty Harry: Magnum Force (1973)

'A man's got to know his limitations.'

La Campagna: Italy, trekearth
BARCLAY, WILLIAM (1976) The Letters of James and Peter, Philadelphia, The Westminster Press.

BRUCE, F.F. (1987) Romans, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

CRANFIELD, C.E.B. (1992) Romans: A Shorter Commentary, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 

DUNN, JAMES D.G. (1988) Romans, Dallas, Word Books. 

MOUNCE, ROBERT H. (1995) The New American Commentary: Romans, Nashville, Broadman & Holman Publishers.

Wednesday, July 19, 2017

Refuting the example

Five places to teach abroad: Seoul

PIRIE, MADSEN (2006)(2015) How To Win Every Argument, Bloomsbury, London.

Refuting the example

Examples are often used in support of arguments. When critics attack the example and not the central thesis, it is considered fallacious and is known as refuting the example. (176).

Based on Pirie's example: (176).

'Teenagers are bad-mannered these days.' 'A teenager was running and bumped into me yesterday and did not apologize to me'

Pirie based reply:

'That is wrong, as the boy in question, was no longer a teenager.' (176).

The interjected complaint and example in regard to the incident with the former teenager does not support the central premise that 'teenagers are bad-mannered these days'. The young male mentioned in the example, is not a teenager.

Example premises:

'Right-wing, American fundamentalist, Christians do not regard science seriously enough.'

'Russ Murray on his blog, mentioned the Kingdom of God, which is not scientific.'

I am not right-wing, I am a moderate conservative, I am slightly right of centre, politically, and it would be a very debatable premise to call me right-wing, if the concept of far right is meant.

I am a moderate conservative, biblical Christian within the Reformed tradition. Incidentally, sadly, some within the University of Manchester, Religions and Theology Department committed the fallacy discussed, on this point, assuming I was an American, fundamentalist, Christian, or at least a Canadian of the same views.

According to my two passports, I am Canadian and British. I do not possess an American passport.

Discussing the Kingdom of God, academically, would make sense in the context of theology and biblical studies. I also do discuss science concepts at times with academic references.

The example does not support the premise.