Prayer that works

I, in particular appreciate Dr. Stanley's premise (paraphrased) that a personalized god is fictional, and therefore cannot answer prayer.

Within a speculative theistic model, prayer is not provided to the God of religious, Scriptural, history. Biblical Christianity is not dependent on sentimental theology. Millard Erickson writes that natural theology deduces that God can be understood objectively through nature, history, and human personality. Erickson (1994: 156). But, it should be stated that although natural theology can perhaps bring a person to a limited knowledge of God, it does not provide revealed information concerning salvation or everlasting life for human beings. Erickson explains that Biblical revelation views God as taking the initiative to make himself known to followers. Erickson (1994: 198).

The Hebrew Bible and New Testament present historical persons that experienced the supernatural God and supernatural occurrences. Some will accept the historicity of these persons, but deny the supernatural aspects of the Bible, but according to the New American Standard Bible presented by Charles Caldwell Ryrie and the Lockman Foundation, approximately 40 authors wrote the Biblical texts over a period of approximately 1600 years. Ryrie (1984: xv).

Encountering The New Testament (2013) documents that there are copying mistakes in biblical manuscripts (11). I would add, that it is obvious to anyone that compares different manuscript versions, in New Testament Greek, that they are not always identical. But the New Testament is the 'best-attested writing in antiquity.' (11). There are close to six thousand biblical manuscripts with at least fragments for the New Testament. (11). There is also a brief time lapse between gospel events and their documentation as originals as autographs to copies. (11).

The Encountering texts states that transition was not perfect, but it was more than reliable enough for us to have little doubt in what the New Testament writers first wrote.' (12). There are no grounds for any serious theological doubts. (12). The New Testament is internally consistent. It is near 100% certainty of accuracy. (12).

Original scriptural autographs were not protected by a supernatural force field, but the documentation has been accurately maintained as has the theological message.

Praying to the Biblical God is a reasonable, historical practice.

ELWELL, WALTER AND YARBROUGH, ROBERT W., Third Edition (2013) Encountering The New Testament, Grand Rapids, Baker Academic.

ERICKSON, MILLARD (1994) Christian Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

RYRIE, CHARLES, CALDWELL (1984) The New American Standard Version Bible, Iowa Falls, Iowa, World Bible Publishers.

More pizza!

Pinterest: Guess what I would like to eat now...

Quote

'The zero sum game in itself is not a fallacy.' (112).

It denotes something that is limited in supply and that the share enjoyed by one person effects the share held by other persons. (112). It is a pizza-like assumption, states the author. (112).

If there are essentially eight equal slices of pizza and one entity takes five pieces of pizza, the majority, then there is less pieces of pizza, a minority of pieces, left for everyone else.

Pirie correctly states that the fallacy is assuming that as one entity has more pieces of pizza, that everyone else will receive less. (112).

This fallacy overlooks the fact that more pizza (s) can be made. (112).

Not to be too political, this is not a political website, but instantly my mind thinks that in at least some general terms, socialism assumes there is one pizza and that everyone must receive their fair share. Whereas, although not intrinsically against types of fairness, conservative-libertarian, capitalistic approaches would emphasis the need for more pizzas to be produced.

Pirie reasons the fallacy occurs when people think that a value in a deal is fixed. (112).

He opines that sharing wealth does not make the poorer countries richer, rather greater economic trade increases wealth for poorer countries. (112-113). Economically, rather than trying to divide up one pizza equally, it is better for the richer and poorer alike to make more pizzas. This is an economic truth, from my moderate conservative position.

The author explains that this fallacy appeals to human  envy. (113). But human envy is sin.

Galatians 5: 16-24 New American Standard Bible

16 But I say, walk by the Spirit, and you will not carry out the desire of the flesh. 17 For the flesh [g]sets its desire against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the flesh; for these are in opposition to one another, so that you may not do the things that you [h]please. 18 But if you are led by the Spirit, you are not under the Law. 19 Now the deeds of the flesh are evident, which are: [i]immorality, impurity, sensuality, 20 idolatry, sorcery, enmities, strife, jealousy, outbursts of anger, disputes, dissensions, [j]factions, 21 envying, drunkenness, carousing, and things like these, of which I forewarn you, just as I have forewarned you, that those who practice such things will not inherit the kingdom of God. 22 But the fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, 23 gentleness, self-control; against such things there is no law. 24 Now those who [k]belong to Christ Jesus have crucified the flesh with its passions and desires.

'The zero sum game in itself is not a fallacy.' (112).

It would not be fallacious to state that if x marries y (drrnm), y (drrnm) would no longer be romantically available.

However, I suppose I could be hypothetically cloned...

PIRIE, MADSEN (2006)(2015) How To Win Every Argument, Bloomsbury, London.

Your form defines your class?

Not again, yet...

LANGER, SUSANNE K (1953)(1967) An Introduction to Symbolic Logic, Dover Publications, New York.

I continue with the review of the Langer philosophical text, as I am also reviewing the Pirie philosophical text in entries.

Concepts and classes

A class is a class of so and so's, as in each member of the class has a certain character. (115). Langer uses the following example, bear in mind this was written in the 1950s and 1960s: A man belongs in the class of politicians, only if he is a politician. Being a politician equals being in the class of politician. (115).

Being a theologian would place one in the class of theologian.

T=Theologian
C=Class of theologian
B=Bible scholar
⊃ = means the same as
⊨ = entails
˜ = not

T ⊃ C (A theologian means the same as the class of theologian.)
T ⊨ C (A theologian entails the same as the class of theologian.)
T ˜ B  (A theologian is not the same as a bible scholar.)

And the two classes would be different.

T ˜ B would be true strictly speaking. It could be stated that a theologian is not necessarily a bible scholar. But of course many theologians are bible scholars, but not all as my Dead Sea Scrolls scholar professor at Trinity Western University would often state of himself:  'I am not a theologian'.

I do consider myself a bible scholar, but as I am not a linguist or archaeologist; my main academic concentrations would be biblical theology, philosophical theology and philosophy of religion.

In a similar way some theologians are philosophers of religion and some are not. My view is that it is a significant intellectual handicap to be a theologian and not a philosopher of religion, or a biblical theologian and not a philosopher of religion, but that is my take. This based on the availability of less cumulative facts and knowledge to formulate truth.

I also view it as more of a significant handicap than being a biblical theologian, philosophical theologian or philosopher of religion that is not a linguist. I reason it is more straightforward to reference linguistic terms at least. I am not stating that being a linguist is easier. Not at all! I am not as natural at languages than at theological and philosophical work. I am stating that it is more straightforward to reference Hebrew and Greek words and meanings than it is to learn philosophy and philosophy of religion. But it is debatable. However to be clear, I am by no means including learning archaeology!

Defining forms of classes

Langer uses the proposition x must die (116).

If

Socrates is mortal and/or Socrates must die

Plato is mortal and/or Plato must die

Aristotle is mortal and/or Aristotle must die (116).

These are members of the same class being:

 x must die (116).

If those subjects are mortals, the proposition is true, if subjects are not mortals, the proposition is false. (116-117). Those subjects that are mortals would be in a class, as those that are not mortals would be in another class.

The form defines the class. (117).

Limited Free Will

Edited from a recent email

Human ability in conjunction with compatibilism

This is not the ability to choose otherwise, as in middle knowledge and versions of libertarian free will.

Middle Knowledge April 20, 2016

In my compatibilistic model, at least, through a theoretical chain of human nature and choice, a person embraces as secondary cause, what was caused, willed and allowed by the primary cause. This in regard to human thoughts, choice, acts and actions. This first cause would be God in a biblical view.

An example:

I like theology by nature.

In my nature I pursue by choice, theology.

I do not have an alternative possibility as a secondary cause, to not like theology. This was determined by the primary cause.

The resulting choices to seek a PhD in Theology and related Philosophy of Religion, was not left to alternative possibility.

In regard to liking theology, we could also claim other secondary causes, like by hereditary (I am adopted, but perhaps someone biologically related liked theology?) but there is still a primary cause.

I do not have incompatibilist free will or a form of libertarian free will, to not like theology or not to pursue it. I have compatibilist free will and the term I coined as limited free will. During my British studies I looked for the term in texts and online and did not see it.  Eventually I heard, Dr. Charles Stanley also use it. I highly doubt I invented it, but at least it is somewhat original.

I have significant moral responsibility in how I choose to deal with theology.

Limited Free Will June 29, 2015

God could have caused, willed and allowed me to not pursue my PhD, even though I like theology and then shown me the error of my ways. But I would have embraced the error as a secondary cause. I could understand the error at a later time and embrace the choice I should have made. But I am embracing my greatest desire at the time, so to speak.

As an adult, I did not initially pursue theological academia, but was eventually shown this to be error. I view it as not primarily a change of choice, but rather a divine molding of nature so I would pursue my natural interest in theology, as opposed to other interests, such as working and not being a student, being made more important. Within my soft determinism (not hard determinism) view, it was not that God gave me incompatibilist alternatives and I originally made an error; it was that God caused, willed and allowed my original view and then molded my nature in order that I would eventually, by nature, be different and therefore choose differently.

This is not to state that the sinful humanity both regenerate and unregenerate cannot have significant intellectual understanding of the alternative. I can very much understand by nature not liking theology. I can deduce a life without me studying theology. I know many that dislike theology, I can deduce it. I can deduce whether it is good or bad to be interested in theology. Therefore again, there is moral responsibility. As with Romans 1-3, a person can deduce truth about God without choosing or knowing God.

Indeterminism is equated with incompatibilism which states that God, or any other being, cannot cause by force or coercion any human action, nor can any action be simultaneously willed by God or any other being, for the human action to remain significantly free. Compatibilism would agree with incompatibilism that God or any other being cannot cause by force or coercion any significantly free human action, but contrary to incompatibilism thinks that God can simultaneously will significantly free human actions.

J.S. Feinberg explains that compatibilism does not allow for coercion or force, but holds that God, or some outside force, can simultaneously determine with the use of persuasion, that an action will or will not take place. Feinberg (1986: 24). Feinberg writes that certain nonconstraining conditions could strongly influence actions, in conjunction with human free will performing these actions. Feinberg (1994: 60). With this viewpoint, there will be no contradiction in stating that God would create human beings who were significantly free, unconstrained, and yet committed actions that God willed. Feinberg (2001: 637).

AUGUSTINE (388-395)(1964) On Free Choice of the Will, Translated by Anna S.Benjamin and L.H. Hackstaff, Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall.

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1729)(2006) Sovereignty of God, New Haven, Connecticut, Jonathan Edwards Center, Yale University.

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1731-1733)(2006) Law of Nature, New Haven, Connecticut, Jonathan Edwards Center, Yale University.

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1754)(2006) Freedom of the Will, Flower Mound, Texas. Jonathanedwards.com.

FEINBERG. JOHN S. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, David Basinger and Randall Basinger (eds.), Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House. 

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (2001) No One Like Him, John S. Feinberg (gen.ed.), Wheaton, Illinois, Crossway Books.

FLEW, ANTONY, R.M. HARE, AND BASIL MITCHELL (1996) ‘The Debate on the Rationality of Religious Belief’, in L.P. Pojman (ed.), Philosophy, The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.

FLEW, ANTONY AND A.MACINTRYE (1999) ‘Philosophy of Religion’, in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press Ltd.

MACKIE, J.L. (1955)(1996) ‘Evil and Omnipotence’, in Mind, in Michael Peterson, William Hasker, Bruce Reichenbach, and David Basinger (eds.), Philosophy of Religion, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

MACKIE, J.L. (1971)(1977)(2002) ‘Evil and Omnipotence’, in The Philosophy of Religion, in Alvin C. Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids. Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.  

PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1977)(2002) God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1982) The Nature of Necessity, Oxford, Clarendon Press.

POJMAN, LOUIS P. (1996) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.

STACE, W.T. (1952)(1976) Religion and the Modern Mind, in John R. Burr and Milton Goldinger (eds), Philosophy and Contemporary Issues, London, Collier Macmillan Publishers.