Brief on random, meaningless philosophy

Today, on foot after a work related meeting

Please note: Blogger changed some normal font to small, without my permission. Will attempt fix...

Another friendly reminder of who really owns this site...

Langer explains: 'Obviously one cannot introduce any relation, at random, into any universe whatever; for instance once cannot say that 2 is older than 3, or that one house is wiser than another. Such statements would be neither true no false; they would simply be meaningless.' (69-70). 

Meaningless philosophy. A logical and reasonable, universe of discourse is a means of preventing philosophical error. This can of course be translated into religious studies and theology work.

'to the North of' (70). This is symbolized by 'nt2''. (70).  But a small font 2 is used. Langer adds this one dyadic (mathematical) relation to a previously presented example in the text. This I reason is why a small 2 is added to 'nt'.

We need to be careful not to read anything into the 'nt2' not intended in this context of universal discourse. The use of numbers to letters complicates matters, but then again it serves as a lesson that with propositions and conclusions, terms and terminology must be understood and evaluated in context to avoid error.

'This is the only relation admitted to the formal context; all propositions must be made solely out of elements A, B, C, D and the relation 'nt'. (70).

She calls 'a relation which belongs to the formal context', a 'constituent relation of discourse'. (70)

Basically the propositions in this constituent relation of discourse are considered legitimate. (70).

'K=int 'houses'' (69).

int=identified with

Logicians generally denote the universe of discourse with the letter K. (69).

Cited: 'K (A, B, C, D,)' (69).

'K (A, B, C, D,) nt2' (70-71).

The four houses are north of...

My add:

K (A, B, C, D,) st2

The four houses are south of...

I am a trained philosopher of religion and not a major in mathematics. I did work with statistics with United Kingdom, academic surveys.  But this review is as much about my learning as my teaching.

The equations are becoming more complex and I will work through them to make sure I have a correct understanding and then share where relevant.

I put together the possible propositions A nt B, B nt A, etcetera and arrived at twelve, thankfully before seeing that Langer also had twelve. (77). She states that combined with 'nt' there are sixteen propositions. This is not in my opinion adequately explained, but I would gather A nt A, B nt B, C nt C, D nt D  are included (71). She points out that these four all fail as not true. Something cannot be north of itself.

LANGER, SUSANNE K (1953)(1967) An Introduction to Symbolic Logic, Dover Publications, New York.

Short Video: Supporting biblical teaching ministry, even without complete agreement

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Revised today

I am not stating in the video for biblical Christians to support everyone claiming to teach the Bible accurately. I am quite aware there is false teaching, 2 Peter 2, I John, Jude, Galatians, Deuteronomy as non-exhaustive examples. A biblical Christian should not support those that biblically would be considered false teachers.

A non-exhaustive argument:

The biblical gospel is taught by a teaching ministry.

The central theology is sound from the teaching ministry.

The secondary theology is significantly sound from the teaching ministry.

There is significant learning received from the teaching ministry.

There is significant concern for God's love from the teaching ministry.

There is significant concern for God's truth and justice from the teaching ministry.

Therefore:

Support for such a teaching ministry should be considered, not necessarily financial support.
The support may be prayerful support or online support; even when there is some significant theological and philosophical disagreements with that teaching ministry.

This shows significant humility in Christ, in that one is not insisting on agreement with his/her own views in virtually every area, before considering public support for a teaching ministry.

I mention 'Catholic' in the video. I could support a Roman Catholic ministry in a limited way only, due to my Reformed faith and philosophical views. Particularly, in regard to salvation by grace through faith alone, scripture being primary over any church tradition, the sacraments and church governance. Roman Catholic theologian Alan Schreck writes: '...justification and salvation are free gifts or graces of God that are not earned by any work of man, even faith. (26). There is a disagreement on what grace through faith, alone means between Reformed and Roman Catholic views, but I can grant that his Roman Catholic position, at least, is not, works righteousness. In the past, I have linked with very few Roman Catholic bloggers based on limited agreement, yet in Christ. However, the linking era with websites now seems rather obsolete.

COURSON, JON (2005) Application Commentary, Thomas Nelson, Nashville.

SCHRECK, ALAN (1984) Catholic and Christian, Servant Books, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

Conclusion which denies premises & fallacy of inconsistency

Last week

Conclusion which denies premises & fallacy of inconsistency

Edited for an entry on academia.edu on February 4, 2023

PIRIE, MADSEN (2006)(2015) How To Win Every Argument, Bloomsbury, London.

This is the conclusion that denies its own premises. (66).

Pire writes that this type of argument maintains one thing in the premises and then denies that same thing in the conclusion. (66).

This is a fallacy of inconsistency. (67).

From Elements of Reasoning:

Validity in deductive arguments is a technical term in logic. Elements (1997: 33).

The concept of true premises and false conclusion would be 'inconceivable in a valid argument'. Elements (1997: 33).

Validity is a set of premises supporting a conclusion. Technically in logic the premises do not have to be true, simply valid. Elements (1997: 33). Therefore a valid deductive argument can have

False premises and a true conclusion (FT)

False premises and a false conclusion (FF)

True premises and a true conclusion (TT)

However

True premises and a false conclusion (TF) is invalid.

Valid arguments with all true premises are called sound arguments. These also have true conclusions.

Pirie explains that a conclusion must be consistent with the arguments present in support of it. (66).

A conclusion must be reasonably and legitimately supported by propositions/premises.

Based on certain religious argumentation presented in history, Pirie then states: 'But if everything must have a cause, how can there be such a thing as an uncaused cause?' (67). The author opines that throughout history, 'first cause' is an example of this fallacy. (67). To avoid this problem. he reasons, attempts have usually led to examples that  'beg the question' and 'subvert the argument', being used.

'Everything' is a key term in his example.

I do not see fallacious means as being required, such as circular reasoning or unreasonable assumption, or unreasonable avoidance.

A key here is to eliminate the term 'everything' when discussing 'first cause'. To differ from the author's sceptical perspective, one could state with various propositions that the universe, time, space and matter are finite. The finite has origin. Therefore there is an infinite first cause.

This is not a fallacious or illogical argument.

A new concept is being introduced into the conclusion that is not 'everything' noted in Pirie's example. Of course the concepts are related as the propositions are supposed to support and prove the conclusion.

Further, hypothetically, based on the same propositions, the conclusion for example, could assume vicious regress, or that there is no cause and we have mystery.

Pirie does not mention and avoids the issue of vicious regress in this entry. If there is not a first cause and instead there is a supposedly an implied, infinite regress of causes, it is a vicious regress (an infinite regress that does not solve its own problem). As I have noted in a recent post, there is debate on whether or not a vicious regress is illogical, but I state that it is certainly unreasonable, in this context, because it does not solve its own problem.

Appealing to mystery, may occur because of lack of significant cumulative evidences. It is often an intellectual cop-out as pointed out to me by Dr. William Kay, Wales, one of my United Kingdom, academic tutors. Mystery too, does not solve its own problem. I am not stating therefore that it is always error to state 'I do not know'.

I have discussed vicious regress on this site with the assistance of the work of Simon Blackburn and others. I reason this miss on this entry in the Pirie text, is a much larger philosophical problem than the misuse of the term 'everything' Pirie raised, although I appreciate this entry and the text, therefore the review.

Pirie seems critical that a divine being would be the exception to the rule, but 'everything' other than God in existence would be finite and God would be infinite, therefore to make a separation and distinction is not fallacious. I disagree with Pirie (67) and reason it is obviously true that an infinite, first cause, God, would be categorically different than everything finite in context. Even a non-theist could reason this theoretically without belief. I agree with the author that the universe is the universe (67), but it is finite. In significant contrast, God is infinite and eternal as transcendent as well as being immanent while being in sovereign control over finite creation.

From this entry I can appreciate Pirie for making it apparent that in regard to this issue theists need to use clear and concise premises and arguments. These type of critiques are a reason secular philosophy and philosophy of religion are intellectually valuable academic disciplines. This type of reading was consistently required in my British MPhil and PhD research theses.

BLACKBURN, S. (1996) 'First Cause Argument', in Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

BLACKBURN, S. (1996) ‘Regress’, in Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

BRADLEY, RAYMOND D. (1996) ‘Infinite Regress Argument’, in Robert Audi, (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

CONWAY DAVID A. AND RONALD MUNSON (1997) The Elements of Reasoning, Wadsworth Publishing Company, New York.

CRAIG, WILLIAM LANE, (1991)(2006) ‘The Existence of God and the Beginning of the Universe’,Truth: A Journal of Modern Thought 3 (1991) 85-96. http://www.leaderu.com/truth/3truth11.html pp. 1-18. 

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1754)(2006) Freedom of the Will, Flower Mound, Texas.http://www.jonathanedwards.com 

GIJSBERS, VICTOR, (2006) ‘Theistic Arguments: First Cause’http://positiveatheism.org/faq/firstcause.htm pp. 1-2. 

KREEFT, PETER, (2006) ‘The First Cause Argument’ excerpted from Fundamentals of Faith.http://catholiceducation.org/articles/apologetics/ap0168.html pp. 1-5.

LANGER, SUSANNE K (1953)(1967) An Introduction to Symbolic Logic, Dover Publications, New York.

PIRIE, MADSEN (2006)(2015) How To Win Every Argument, Bloomsbury, London.

SKLAR, LAWRENCE, (1996) ‘Philosophy of Science’, in Robert Audi, (ed), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

TOLHURST, TOLHURST, WILLIAM (1996) 'Vicious Regress', in Robert Audi, (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Brief on superhumans solving the problem of evil (PhD Edit)

Vancouver: Instagram

Brief on superhumans solving the problem of evil

Edited for an entry on academia.edu, June 22, 2022

PhD Edit

Feinberg states that human beings are intended to always be finite and would not have the potential to become gods, superhuman, or subhuman. Feinberg (2001: 788).  

I would state that it is logically impossible for the finite to become infinite and vice-versa. This does not prohibit the infinite, God the Son, God the Word, from taking a finite human body within the incarnation.

To Feinberg, God would not eliminate  problems of evil by contradicting any of his plans just described, because it was a greater good for God to follow through with his original intent for humanity. Feinberg (1994: 126).

Feinberg’s approach is highly speculative as he attempts to reason out a divine plan. He theorized that for God to create human beings with no possibility of moral evil due to desires, they would have to quite likely be superhuman possessing great moral and intellectual ability to limit themselves to desires within God’s will, or God would have to supernaturally prevent immoral desires from taking place. Feinberg (1994: 132-133). If God created superhumans they would not be the same human beings in existence and it would contradict God’s plans. 

It seems apparent that if God would somehow create superhuman beings with greater intellectual and moral ability, one would think they would need at least the degree of freedom that human beings currently have, and it appears, with Feinberg’s scenario to prohibit the problem of evil, they would need to be limited by God and would have less freedom than human beings as we know them. Feinberg (1994: 132-133).

Also, if these superhuman beings were given significant freedom, and they did rebel against God, perhaps their potential for evil could be even more severe than the potential for evil in our current situation because of the greater intellect. Feinberg (1994: 132).

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July 1, 2016 

A thought I have dealt with recently is considering present human apprehension with God as direct ruler, in the future culminated Kingdom of God (Revelation 20-22).

According to Scripture and the New Testament, the triune God through Jesus Christ will directly deal and rule in human affairs. At that future point in that future realm, these citizens would be resurrected perfected human beings (1 Corinthians 15 and Revelation). Human beings would be translated into imperishable form (1 Corinthians 15: 42: New American Standard Version) and would be in a sense superhuman, in comparison to presently.

I state this not as a significant disagreement with what I presented from Feinberg. Feinberg, I reason was writing mainly in the context of this present fallen realm and I am pondering in this additional section on the finalized state.

Minus God’s direct rule in human affairs within this universe in what I reason is a compatibilistic (significant and limited human free will is compatible with God’s sovereignty and providence), I view the capacity for evil within future immortal humanity as far greater. This is prohibited by God’s Scriptural, eternal plans for humanity in Christ. If it was not prohibited by God's nature, plans, grace and love, I reason the potential greater problem of evil would be a far greater problem than potential lack of human autonomy because of God's divine rule.

In pop culture the problem of superhumans and the problem of evil can be seen in Batman v Superman: The Dawn of Justice and Captain America: Civil War.

This article also serves as friendly warning against views that reject the infinite and holy, biblical God in favour of supposed advanced alien beings that may 'save' humanity. These aliens would be finite and corruptible, if not already corrupted.

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FLEW, ANTONY AND A.MACINTRYE (1999) ‘Philosophy of Religion’, in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press Ltd. 

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