Brief On Job 38:3

Monaco-trekearth

Nice Spring day, although I am recovering from night shift, yesterday.

New American Standard Bible

38 Then the Lord answered Job out of the whirlwind and said,

2 “Who is this that darkens counsel By words without knowledge?

3 “Now gird up your loins like a man, And I will ask you, and you instruct Me!

English Standard Version

38 Then the Lord answered Job out of the whirlwind and said:

2 “Who is this that darkens counsel by words without knowledge?

3 Dress for action[a] like a man; I will question you, and you make it known to me.

Browning explains the book of Job is a major text of wisdom literature (p.204) in the Hebrew Bible. The authorship is reasoned to not be certain and was likely written after the exile. Browning (1997: 204). Clines states that the story of Job was present many centuries before the Old Testament book was completed. Clines (1986: 521). This would include oral form, I reason. The story goes back to the second millennium BC and the book written between the seventh and third centuries BC. Clines (1986: 521).

This is deduced based on literary form. Clines (1986: 521).

The fact that Job is mentioned in Ezekiel 14: 14 demonstrates the antiquity of events. Job is mentioned with Noah and Daniel. Clines (1986: 521).

Interestingly listed after the other two Biblical greats. Does this have chronological significance?

La Sor and company state Job is referenced in ancient texts circa 2000 BC (Egypt) and Amarna (Egypt) 1350 BC, meaning the story may very well be of an actual sufferer who was later documented in a setting by a poet. (p. 560). However, the academic text reasons the story still has Biblical value regardless of historical setting and that it was not seriously questioned in the Hebrew Bible canon. (pp. 560-561).

Acceptance in Hebrew Bible canon strongly suggests historicity and relevant historical value.

My short term academic adviser at Manchester University, Professor David Pailin, informed me that because of these issues with Job, that the book was basically mythology, but I do not think that conclusion is warranted.

He was attempting to demerit the book in regard to its use with my theodicy and problem of evil research.

It is according to these sources an ancient historical story documented in the Hebrew Bible at a deduced significantly later date.

I have also come across statements, including pastoral, in my academic career from those that study scholarship that speculate Job may have been written much closer to the occurrence of events, although admittedly not present from my documented sources and seemingly not the more accepted scholarly position.

Further...

The justice of God is questioned. Browning (1997: 204).

Job scholar David J. A. Clines writes that Yahweh's first speech takes place at Job 38: 1-40: 2, and the second speech Job 40: 6-41: 34. Clines (1986: 545-548).

The first speech is largely a series of questions addressed by God to Job. Not intended to 'humiliate Job by exposing his ignorance and inability to answer God, nor are they designed to be such a display of God's wisdom and omnipotence as to require Job to leave off his attempt to understand what is happening to him'. Clines (1986: 545).

Instead Job is challenged to reconsider, even while in a state of much suffering, his knowledge in regard to God and creation. Clines (1986: 545). Job is to consider, natural order, the animal kingdom and the mysteries of life, from a human perspective. Clines (1986: 545).

In Job 38, Job finally has a reply from God and it is divinely pointed out 'how far beyond Job's range are the questions of the governance of the universe'. Clines (1986: 546).

This is theologically and philosophically no surprise as God is infinite and with unlimited knowledge and ability, outside of contradiction of nature and character.

This in contrast with finite human nature also tainted by sinfulness.

God is not 'aloof from Job's sufferings but will meet where he is and reveal himself to him'. Clines (1986: 546).

Job's lack of insight into divine plans of deity made the plans of God, 'dark and made God's dealing seem arbitrary'. Clines (1986: 546).

This can be tied back to concepts from my MPhil and PhD work as in the infinite, sovereign and yet holy and good God, causing and willing evil, as first cause, yet for the good. And for the good for those in Christ that love him called according to his divine purpose (Romans 8).

Many times from a human perspective God's plans and actions seem dark, harsh and cruel and from a human perspective this is true to a point, I admit academically and from personal experience, as human beings do suffer at times in terrible ways, even while acknowledging the goodness of God without sin. And God as holy (Isaiah 6).

I do not view God's plans and actions as arbitrary, whatsoever, instead viewing God with sovereign, providential plans in creation. God being demonstrated in the New Testament as predestining events whether the crucifixion, atonement, resurrection, salvation, second advent and restored creation.

My main focus for this short post is:

Job being told to 'brace yourself like a man'. Clines (1986: 545). A verse I have been pondering on for years. Cline reasons the literal 'gird up your loins' like a man has 'overtones of 'warrior''. Clines (1986: 545). As if in preparation for battle. Cline (1986: 545).

Job is encouraged to 'use all his mental strength to understand the message God will convey to him in indirect fashion'. Cline (1986: 545).

I agree with the Christian theological assertions and argumentation that God should not be challenged outside of faith, for that would be sinful and repentance needed.

But there is Biblically a concept of questioning God in faith and this in light of problems of evil and suffering that God indeed wills, for good divine purposes, is very intense serious business.

Warrior like as Clines states.

In other words, I conclude that not all Christian interaction with God in faith need necessarily be classic evangelical 'God is wonderful' worship type of approach we see in Sunday morning worship songs and written and audio devotional materials, for example.

Not all Christian interaction with God necessarily be evangelistic as in 'sales pitch' for those inside and outside of the Church, of how good God is and how much he loves us. True God is good and does love humanity (John 1, John 15), especially those he chooses in Christ (Ephesians 1-2), but there is also respectful, faithful dialogue in tension with God in regard to serious issues that also needs to occur at times.

A secondary conclusion I arrive at from Job 38: 3 and related is that if human beings are to be respectfully and reasonably firm with God in dialogue with tension, this should also be done in human to human contexts as in the example of employment and relationships.

BROWNING, W.R.F. (1997) Dictionary of the Bible, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

CLINES, DAVID J. A. (1986) Job, The International Bible Commentary, Grand Rapids, Zondervan.

CLINES, DAVID J. A. (1986) Proverbs, The International Bible Commentary, Grand Rapids, Zondervan.

LA SOR, WILLIAM SANFORD, DAVID ALLAN HUBBARD, AND FREDERIC WILLIAM BUSH. (1987) Old Testament Survey, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

Brief On Consent (MPhil Edit)

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I am @ home between shifts here and so this shall be short and hopefully sweet, as opposed to sweat, but I have been pondering on this the last few days.

From 2003 The Problem of Evil: Anglican and Baptist Perspectives: MPhil thesis, Bangor University

'Woods mentioned Playboyism, and stated of Hugh Hefner, Publisher of Playboy Magazine: "Hefner rejects any philosophy that holds a man must deny himself for others. The Playboy outlook says a man should love himself preeminently and pursue only his own pleasure." Woods (1974)(1982: 108).

Considering Playboy, where women are viewed as objects sexually by both Hefner and the willing women participating, this magazine brings its participants money, fame and sexual gratification, but the Playboy philosophy represented in the magazine, through mass media influence, also causes women in society to be viewed as objects by many men. This can cause many women to be overlooked for their intellect, and looked upon more for their sexual beauty.

So, in a subtle fashion, the Playboy philosophy can bring pain to many people in society because Playboy Magazine exploits sexuality when, in reality, sexuality belongs in the context of marriage/committed relationship where the inner beauty of the person is more important than their outer image. With the Playboy philosophy, the outer beauty is far more important than the inner beauty.'

April 7, 2014

Related

Consent in secular Western society in regard to intimate matters seems to often be the philosophical and moral/ethical bottom line in judging thoughts, acts and actions as permissible or not.

I understand this is how these moral/ethical issues are often dealt with in democratic, Western societies.

In this fallen world from a Biblical view, and certainly, imperfect from a secular view, where religion has been politically corrupted in the past, present and will be in the future, I am no supporter of theocracy or theonomy in this present realm.

Religious rule to govern sexual ethics.

The only theocracy I support theologically and philosophically in one ruled by God and Christ in a restored realm explained in part in Revelation and 2 Peter.

Theocracy and theonomy is this present age is bound is be in disagreement with my views and the views of other scholars on many points.

A religious scholar, as one example, could end up breaking the law.

When some segments of Western society view certain thoughts, acts and actions morally and ethically not permissible, there is often an assumption that consent is not possible or not granted by one or more parties involved.

The sex trade industry as an example.

Sometimes this will clearly be an accurate view and sometimes the issue is unclear.

With the sex trade industry, some persons very immorally are forced and/or coerced into it clearly without possibility of consent, as with underage.

I am not going to debate underage consent here philosophically, but will acknowledge and accept it morally, ethically and legally.

Some adults are within the industry, immorally without consent, by force and/or coercion.

At times the issue of consent is clouded in the case of adult professional sex trade industry workers.

The philosophical impression I receive from reading and media is that some anti-sex trade industry advocates, from the left and right, as opposed to primarily the documented writings of a certain writer or scholar per say, admittedly to be clear, reason no one in the adult sex trade industry is providing consent other than the proprietors and clients.

My view can be seen implied in the MPhil work where I stated:

'Considering Playboy, where women are viewed as objects sexually by both Hefner and the willing women participating,'

And yes, I realize there is a wide-range of sex trade industry work and that Playboy is considered on the soft side on the industry.

Pornography by some, erotica by others. Or perhaps both by some.

I do not write as an expert here, but philosophically, morally and ethically, this understanding that no one in the adult sex trade is providing consent other than the proprietors and clients, seems too simplistic. I state this cautiously and in humility but I reason that the corrupt nature of humanity described in Romans and implied elsewhere in Ephesians for example, means that all persons make sinful choices via sinful nature.

A sinful choice certainly is made at times through sinful nature (Romans) to willingly consent to work within the sex industry.

There are many moral, ethical and social negatives associated with the sex trade industry.

A Biblical position, in contrast, prohibits adultery and fornication, Exodus 20: 14 and coveting Exodus 20: 17.

Adultery and fornication of the heart (mind) that can lead to sinful acts and actions is viewed as sinful in Matthew 5 and the solution is Biblical marriage from 1 Corinthians 7, if one is not content being single.

And therefore, it is philosophically, morally and ethically error to primarily judge the adult sex trade industry permissible, or not based on consent.

I am not stating Scripture does not acknowledge the need for consent in matter of sexuality or that it is not vital. In context, Biblical marriage, for example, implies the consent of man and woman in a covenantal relationship.

I also of course do not claim moral perfection in order to judge, rather by the guidance of the Holy Spirit I seek to live by Biblical concepts.

WOODS, B.W. (1974) Christians in Pain, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

From email

Henry C.Thiessen (PhD Edit)

Henry C.Thiessen (PhD Edit) 

Preface 

Photo, May 2025. This work from my PhD was originally published on Blogger, 20140403, revised for an entry on academia.edu, 20250726. 

Henry Clarence Thiessen (1884-1947)

I bought Thiessen’s 1956 theology textbook used while an undergrad at Columbia Bible College. I find his work useful even though he takes an incompatibilist position in contrast to my compatibilist one. 

A Biblical Studies Professor at Columbia Bible College was quite dismissive of Thiessen stating, paraphrased that ‘Thiessen was a dispensationalist’. One of my local unofficial Doctoral, PhD advisers stated, Thiessen was basically a compiler of information and not very original. Also dismissive. Based on this limited work I shall let you form your own opinion.  

Naturalism 

Wheaton professor, Henry Clarence Thiessen (1956) explains that since naturalism holds that nature is the whole of reality, everything that occurs is due to the laws of nature.[1]  He comments Scripture recognizes the existence of the laws of nature, but it is reasoned they do not operate independently of God.[2] God concurs with the laws he has established,[3] and Thiessen reasons that miracles and revelation can occur when God operates outside of laws he established.[4]  

Incompatibilism 

Thiessen writes God knows the future,[5] and that is defined as foreknowledge.[6]  He also points out that God’s prescience does not mean God predetermined these actions.[7]  Thiessen is noting that human acts within God’s prescient foreknowledge are still significantly free.[8] 

Leibniz has a different view than Thiessen,[9] that is deterministic and reasons that foreknowledge has to do with God’s determined will and is not dependent on free human actions.[10] This predetermination should not be understood as by necessity eliminating all human choice.[11]  Erickson takes a reasonable compatibilistic position and writes God with foreknowledge sees many possibilities and influences that will be present, and then acts accordingly to his will.[12]   

Thiessen from an incompatibilist position writes that God does not want to create automaton type beings with no choice in whether or not they would glorify God.[13] For Thiessen, humanity can only truly glorify God by choosing to do so while still having the opportunity to choose not to glorify God in disobedience.[14] This concept appears on the surface to be primarily in line with noted incompatibilism and free will approaches almost verbatim.[15]  

On Scripture 

Thiessen dismisses the idea of a dictation theory of Scriptural inspiration, as the writers of Scripture were not persons that merely had divine information dictated to them.[16] The writers of Scripture were not ‘mere secretaries’ that wrote words dictated to them by the Holy Spirit.[17] It can therefore be reasoned it is not the Holy Spirit’s grammar being used.[18] The distinctive style of Biblical writers based on the study of original languages makes the dictation theory quite unlikely.[19] The concept of Biblical inspiration, with the Holy Spirit serving as guidance for the Biblical writer, seems both orthodox and reasonable.[20] The Biblical authors had full use of their intellect and used their own grammar, but were guided to write God’s word without error and omission.[21] The Holy Spirit guided the thoughts of Biblical writers.[22] Shedd names this basic theory of Biblical inspiration as ‘plenary inspiration’ meaning writers were moved by the Holy Spirit in respect to thought and language and were kept from error.[23]   

Modern theology needs to correctly discern what the Spirit is stating through the Bible and this needs to be done through proper research techniques. 

ERICKSON, MILLARD (1994) Christian Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House. 

ERICKSON, MILLARD (2003) What Does God Know and When Does He Know It?  Grand Rapids, Zondervan.  

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1975) Philosophy of Religion, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House. 

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1978) The Roots of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House. 

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press. 

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1996) ‘Freedom, Free Will, and Determinism’, in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books. 

GEISLER, NORMAN, L (1999) ‘The Problem of Evil’, in Baker Encyclopedia of Apologetics, Grand Rapids, Baker Books. 

LEIBNIZ, G.W. (1710)(1998) Theodicy, Translated by E.M. Huggard Chicago, Open Court Classics. 

LINDSELL, HAROLD (1976) The Battle for the Bible, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House. 

PACKER, J.I. (1996) ‘Regeneration’ in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books. 

PACKER, J.I. (1973) Knowing God, Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.  

SHEDD, WILLIAM G.T. (1874-1890)(1980) Dogmatic Theology,  Volume 1, Nashville, Thomas Nelson Publishers.  

SHEDD, WILLIAM G.T. (1874-1890)(1980) Dogmatic Theology,  Volume 2, Nashville, Thomas Nelson Publishers.  

THIESSEN, HENRY C. (1956) Introductory Lectures in Systematic Theology, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 

---

 

[1] Thiessen (1956: 186).

[2] Thiessen (1956: 186).

[3] Thiessen (1956: 186).

[4] Thiessen (1956: 186).

[5] Thiessen (1956: 125).

[6] Thiessen (1956: 125).

[7] Thiessen (1956: 126).

[8] Thiessen (1956: 126).

[9] Thiessen (1956: 126).

[10] Leibniz (1710)(1998: 147).

[11] Leibniz (1710)(1998: 147).

[12] Erickson (1994: 360).

[13] Thiessen (1956: 248).

[14] Thiessen (1956: 248).

[15] Geisler (1986: 76-77).

[16] Thiessen (1956: 106).

[17] Lindsell (1976: 32).

[18] Thiessen (1956: 106).  People were not robotically inspired to write Scripture.

[19] Erickson (1994: 207).

[20] Thiessen (1956: 106).  Lindsell (1976: 30).

[21] Thiessen (1956: 106).  The Scripture was presented accurately via inspiration, states Erickson.  Erickson (1994: 199).  J.I. Packer reasons God and Christ sent the Holy Spirit to teach his people the truth and to save them from error.  Packer (1973: 61).  

[22] Erickson (1994: 215).

[23] Shedd  (1874-1890)(1980: 72 Volume 1).  

-------------------------------------------------------

20250726

Preface II

Compatibilism versus Incompatibilism has been discussed on various MPhil/PhD related articles and on my website work. Below is the MPhil/PhD link.

Saturday, September 19, 2020 PhD Full Version PDF: Theodicy and Practical Theology 2010, Wales TSD

Scripture has been discussed significantly on my website, with an increased use of New Testament Greek citations within Biblical Studies entries. For the revised version of this article, I wish to further discuss naturalism which has been less reviewed within my work overall.

Naturalism

For Thiessen, he reasoned 'naturalism holds that nature is the whole of reality...' Thiessen (1956: 186).

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Naturalism (2007-2020).

David Papineau (2020)

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy explains that 'The term “naturalism” has no very precise meaning in contemporary philosophy. Its current usage derives from debates in America in the first half of the last century.' This reads as true. 'Naturalism', when used seems to be encompassing a series of varied beliefs, rather than one distinct philosophy. There is philosophical agreement where it is reasoned, reality is based in nature and not in the supernatural. 

My findings over the years with reading, listening online and with in-person discussions, have been that a person may not describe self as a naturalist, but may state he/she believes in science, as opposed to the supernatural; or a person might state they are an empiricist and do not hold to a belief in the supernatural. Such a person is making a naturalistic division philosophically from that which is supernaturalistic. But this does not in many cases mean as certain that such a person is philosophically embracing the term 'naturalism', within his/her worldview. Seems to me the term 'naturalism' is often used by evangelicals to describe the worldview of those that do not believe in the supernatural. Therefore, again, the description from Stanford that “naturalism” has no very precise meaning in contemporary philosophy, rings true and has for years for me via my research.

Stanford states: 'So understood, “naturalism” is not a particularly informative term as applied to contemporary philosophers.' Agreed. Stanford further notes that 'The great majority of contemporary philosophers would happily accept naturalism as just characterized—that is, they would both reject “supernatural” entities, and allow that science is a possible route (if not necessarily the only one) to important truths about the “human spirit”.' I can agree that this is likely the position of many modern philosophers (and scientists), but I do not agree with the rejection of the supernatural. 

Further from Stanford: 'Even so, this entry will not aim to pin down any more informative definition of “naturalism”. It would be fruitless to try to adjudicate some official way of understanding the term. Different contemporary philosophers interpret “naturalism” differently. This disagreement about usage is no accident.' Agreed. It is fruitless to attempt to officially tag everyone that does not hold to supernaturalism as primarily a naturalist, as if 'naturalism' is one uniform philosophy.

Instead Stanford writes that in regards to their entry: 'It will outline a range of philosophical commitments of a generally naturalist stamp...' In agreement, this is how I have viewed naturalism as well.

Cited: 

'As indicated by the above characterization of the mid-twentieth-century American movement, naturalism can be separated into an ontological and a methodological component. The ontological component is concerned with the contents of reality, asserting that reality has no place for “supernatural” or other “spooky” kinds of entity. By contrast, the methodological component is concerned with ways of investigating reality, and claims some kind of general authority for the scientific method.'

Ontologically (existence and reality), I do not view the supernatural as 'spooky', but rather view the non-finite, non-eternal, therefore, infinite and eternal first cause, uncaused cause, as philosophically necessary with sufficient key premises of support. The first cause is sufficiently of infinity, eternality and perfect goodness. Finite, supernatural, non-natural entities can also exist if created by the first cause entity, but are unnecessary, as contingent entities.

Academically, I can support scientific, empirical methodology within scientific research and overlapping academic disciplines. This is inductive reasoning, but I do not reject deductive reasoning within academic disciplines where reasonable, especially within philosophy and theology.

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

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