Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (PhD Edit)

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Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (PhD Edit)

Edited and revised for another version of this work posted on academia.edu on August 20, 2022

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Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (July 1, 1646 – November 14, 1716)

Leibniz was a vital secondary exemplar in my United Kingdom/European theses work, especially the PhD. I have edited sections from my Doctorate to summarize his contributions to my work.

The term theodicy arose from G.W. Leibniz’ book in 1710 entitled Theodicy.[1]  Robert M. Adams (1996) notes that the word theodicy is from the Greek, as theos is God and dike is justice.[2]  Theodicy is a defence of the justice of God in the face of objections arising from the problem of evil in the world.[3]

The Eighteenth century[4] was when Leibniz’ book Theodicy[5] was published as was previously noted, and this era of history was when much of the modern debate concerning the problem of evil and theodicy began[6] 

Leibniz reasons God always chooses what is best, freely within his nature and is vindicated within his creation, even though it contains evil.[7]  God co-operates in all the actions of his creatures, and yet is not the author of sin.[8] 

He made it clear that human beings must be free, even though human freedom may appear incompatible with divine nature, as persons must have freedom in order to be considered worthy of punishment for wrong actions.[9]

Leibniz writes that the holy God co-operates in human evil.[10]  Leibniz has a different view than Thiessen,[11] which would be incompatibilistic, that is deterministic and reasons that foreknowledge has to do with God’s determined will and is not dependent on free human actions.[12]  This predetermination should not be understood as by necessity eliminating all human choice.[13]

Leibniz noted that evil itself only comes from privation.[14] Privation has been discussed on this blog, please see archives.

Leibniz believes God had an infinite number of worlds to choose from to create, and chose the best possible world.[15] 

He explains that God permits and promotes evil without distracting from divine holiness and supreme goodness.[16]  Modified rationalism would oppose the best possible world concepts of Leibniz from the Enlightenment era, and Mackie from the modern era.[17]

In Theodicy, God’s knowledge of future events in itself does not make them determinate, rather because certain things will occur, God foreknows them.[18]  This concept means that God can foresee human rebellion as he knows all human souls, but he does not force or coerce persons to oppose him.[19]  However, since I accept that God is an infinite and omnipotent deity,[20] I think it reasonable that he has the ability to influence through circumstances certain individuals to commit wrong actions, but I would consider it possible for God to remain pure in nature as his motives remain good, as Luther and Calvin noted.[21] 

For Leibniz, God has the ability to allow angelic and human sin and the suffering it promotes, yet God can promote and use sinful evil for the greater good.[22]  Leibniz’ approach would be within a traditional Christian perspective,[23] as are many free will and sovereignty approaches, although as discussed in the theoretical Chapters in my Doctorate, Plantinga and Feinberg would deny Leibniz’ claim that God could create a best possible world and would,[24] instead, hold to ‘Modified Rationalism’ which states God, freely and without necessity, created a good world that was one of many he could create.[25]            

I too hold to Modified Rationalism.

Leibniz reasoned that God had very good reasons for his election and dispensation of grace to some persons and recognized that these reasons were unknown to persons in any detail.[26]

ADAMS, ROBERT. M. (1996) ‘Theodicy’, in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

AUGUSTINE (426)(1958) The City of God, Translated by Gerald G. Walsh, Garden City, New York, Image Books.

CALVIN, JOHN (1539)(1998) The Institutes of the Christian Religion, Book IV, Translated by Henry Beveridge, Grand Rapids, The Christian Classic Ethereal Library, Wheaton College.

CALVIN, JOHN (1543)(1996) The Bondage and Liberation of the Will, Translated by G.I. Davies, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

ERICKSON, MILLARD (1994) Christian Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

ERICKSON, MILLARD (2003) What Does God Know and When Does He Know It?  Grand Rapids, Zondervan. 

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, in David Basinger and Randall Basinger (eds.), Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press. 

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (2001) No One Like Him, John S. Feinberg (gen.ed.), Wheaton, Illinois, Crossway Books.

FLEW, ANTONY, R.M. HARE, AND BASIL MITCHELL (1996) ‘The Debate on the Rationality of Religious Belief’, in L.P. Pojman (ed.), Philosophy, The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.

FLEW, ANTONY AND A.MACINTRYE (1999) ‘Philosophy of Religion’, in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press Ltd.

HILLE, ROLF (2004) ‘A Biblical-Theological Response to the Problem of Theodicy in the Context of the Modern Criticism of Religion’, in Evangelical Review of Theology, Volume 28, Number 1, pp. 21-37. Carlisle, UK, Evangelical Review of Theology.

HUME, DAVID (1739-1740)(1973) ‘A Treatise of Human Nature’, in Paul Edwards and Arthur Pap (eds.), A Modern Introduction To Philosophy, New York, The Free Press.

HUME, DAVID (1779)(2004)  Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Digireads.com/Neeland Media LLC, Lawrence, Kansas.

LEIBNIZ, G.W. (1710)(1998) Theodicy, Translated by E.M. Huggard Chicago, Open Court Classics.

LUTHER, MARTIN. (1525)(1972) ‘The Bondage of the Will’, in F.W. Strothmann and Frederick W. Locke (eds.), Erasmus-Luther: Discourse on Free Will, New York, Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., INC.

MACKIE, J.L. (1955)(1996) ‘Evil and Omnipotence’, in Mind, in Michael Peterson, William Hasker, Bruce Reichenbach, and David Basinger (eds.), Philosophy of Religion, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

MACKIE, J.L. (1971)(1977)(2002) ‘Evil and Omnipotence’, in The Philosophy of Religion, in Alvin C. Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids. Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

PETERSON, MICHAEL (1982) Evil and the Christian God, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

PHILLIPS, D.Z. (1981) Encountering Evil, Stephen T. Davis (ed.), Atlanta, John Knox Press.

PHILLIPS, D.Z. (2005) The Problem of Evil and the Problem of God, Fortress Press, Minneapolis.

PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1977)(2002) God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 

PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1982) The Nature of Necessity, Oxford, Clarendon Press. 

POJMAN, LOUIS P. (1996) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.

SCHELLING, F.W.J. (1845)(1936) Schelling, Of Human Freedom, Translated by James Gutmann, The Open Court Publishing Company, Chicago.

THIESSEN, HENRY C. (1956) Introductory Lectures in Systematic Theology, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

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[1] Leibniz, G.W. (1710)(1998) Theodicy.

[2] Adams (1996: 794).

[3] Adams (1996: 794).  David Hume in Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion explains that geniuses over the ages have continued to look for proofs and arguments concerning God.  Hume (1779)(2004: 2).  Theodicy would involve demonstrating that God exists and is good even as the problem of evil exists.

[4] Hille (2004: 22). 

[5] Leibniz, G.W. (1710)(1998).

[6] Hille (2004: 22).

[7] Leibniz (1710)(1998: 61).

[8] Leibniz (1710)(1998: 61).

[9] Leibniz (1710)(1998: 123).

[10] Leibniz (1710)(1998: 123).

[11] Thiessen (1956: 126).

[12] Leibniz (1710)(1998: 147).

[13] Leibniz (1710)(1998: 147).

[14] Leibniz (1710)(1998: 219).  Schelling also discusses this view of Leibniz.  Schelling (1845)(1936: 45).   

[15] Leibniz (1710)(1990).

[16] Leibniz (1710)(1998: 61).

[17] Leibniz (1710)(1990).  Mackie (1971) in Plantinga (1977)(2002: 32-33).

[18] Leibniz (1710)(1998: 144).  Augustine (426)(1958: 106).

[19] Leibniz (1710)(1998: 144).

[20] This is discussed primarily within Chapter One.

[21] Luther (1525)(1972: 130).  Calvin (1543)(1996: 37-40).

[22] Leibniz (1710)(1998: 61).

[23] Leibniz would likely be the equivalent of a modern day compatibilist.  Leibniz (1710)(1998: 61).

[24] Feinberg (1994: 36).

[25] Feinberg (1994: 36).

[26] Leibniz (1710)(1998: 165).

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Can God Create A Rock So Heavy He Cannot Lift It? (PhD Edit)

Can God Create A Rock So Heavy He Cannot Lift It?

Preface

Originally published on Blogger, 202130520, this is the main article sourced for an entry on academia.edu, 20250614.

I have never viewed this question as a serious intellectual threat to theism or Christianity…

From my PhD

Saturday, September 19, 2020 PhD Full Version PDF: Theodicy and Practical Theology 2010, Wales TSD

Humanist Simon Blackburn, from a non-theistic critical perspective, reasons there are difficulties with the concept of an omnipotent God not being able to make a stone so heavy he could not lift it, as this would make God possibly contradictory[1] but does explain that the classic explanation is that God cannot commit the logically impossible.[2]

            
Baptist and Reformed theologian Millard Erickson writes that God cannot do any arbitrary thing he desires,[3] as he can only accomplish what is logical and not illogical and contradictory.[4]  Erickson also reasons, interestingly, that God cannot undo the past,[5] although he may take away the effects and memory of it.[6] God cannot logically violate his own nature[7] or fail to live up to a promise.[8]  Otto Weber suggests God has unlimited capacity[9] and unrestricted will.[10]  God is unrestricted in what he determines within self and outside of self.[11] Presbyterian theologian John M. Frame admits the term omnipotence is not in Scripture,[12] but reasons the concept is Biblical.[13]  He deduces that based on the Bible, it is impossible for anything to occur outside of what God has willed to happen.[14] 

John Frame and D.Z. Phillips

           
The ‘all things’[15] God can accomplish does come with some need to interpret.[16]  Frame explains that God cannot perform logically contradictory actions,[17] as in making a square circle,[18] committing that which is immoral and sinful,[19] and interestingly, God cannot commit actions ‘appropriate only to finite creatures.’[20]  This would include ‘buying shoes’ and ‘taking medicine for a cough.’[21]  Philosopher, D.Z. Phillips within The Problem of Evil and The Problem of God, disagrees with this basic notion and writes that since God cannot commit the actions of finite creatures such as ‘riding a bicycle’[22] he is not omnipotent.[23]  Phillips reasons it is not logically contradictory for one to ride a bicycle and therefore God should be able to do it and yet he cannot.[24]  Therefore, God is not omnipotent.[25]

            
One approach to Phillip’s argument[26] is to admit that God, as non-finite, cannot commit finite actions[27] and is therefore not omnipotent[28] as classically reasoned by many within traditional thought.[29]  A second approach is in agreement with Frame’s point that even though God cannot by nature commit the actions of finite creatures,[30] this does not disqualify God as being omnipotent within his infinite nature.[31] God’s lack of finiteness is actually a strength.[32] Frame states God could commit the type of finite actions discussed if he so desired by taking human form.[33]  I reason God could take human form to accomplish the task of riding a bicycle, as for example, God is stated in Genesis[34] to have walked and spoken[35] in the Garden of Eden.[36] Although I do not reason this is a ridiculous suggestion to deduce God could take bodily form[37] to walk or ride a bicycle,[38] it certainly would not be within God’s nature to typically ride a bicycle.[39]

            
Philips summarizes his view on God’s omnipotence in three points.[40]  One, God would only be omnipotent if he could do anything that can be explained that is done without contradiction.[41]  Two, he then reasons there are many countless activities that God without contradiction cannot do.[42]  Three, his conclusion is that God is not omnipotent.[43]  Philips’ view can be accepted as reasonable and for some God’s omnipotence would need to be redefined.[44]  However, I reason Frame’s explanation adequately offers the points that God can only do what is logically possible[45] and as well what is not contrary to his infinite and spiritual nature.[46]

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996)  Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy,  Oxford, Oxford University Press.

CAUTHEN, KENNETH (1997) ‘Theodicy’, in Frontier.net, Rochester, New York, Kenneth Cauthen, Professor of Theology, Emeritus, Colgate Rochester Crozer Divinity School.

GRENZ, STANLEY J., DAVID GURETZKI AND CHERITH FEE NORDLING  (1999) Pocket Dictionary of Theological Terms, Downers Grove, Ill., InterVarsity Press.

ERICKSON, MILLARD (1994) Christian Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

ERICKSON, MILLARD (2003) What Does God Know and When Does He Know It?,  Grand Rapids, Zondervan. 

FRAME, JOHN M. (1999) ‘The Bible on the Problem of Evil: Insights from Romans 3:1-8,21-26; 5:1-5; 8:28-39’, IIIM Magazine Online, Volume 1, Number 33, October 11 to October 17, Fern Park, Florida, Third Millennium.

FRAME, JOHN M. (2002) The Doctrine of God, P and R Publishing, Phillipsburg, New Jersey.

PHILLIPS, D.Z. (1981) Encountering Evil, Stephen T. Davis (ed.),  Atlanta, John Knox Press.

PHILLIPS, D.Z. (2005)  The Problem of Evil and the Problem of God, Fortress Press, Minneapolis.

HAMILTON, VICTOR P. (1988) Handbook on the Pentateuch, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

HUME, DAVID (1739-1740)(1973) ‘A Treatise of Human Nature’, in Paul Edwards and Arthur Pap (eds.), A Modern Introduction To Philosophy, New York, The Free Press.

HUME, DAVID (1779)(2004)  Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Digireads.com/Neeland Media LLC, Lawrence, Kansas. 

LA SOR, WILLIAM SANFORD, DAVID ALLAN HUBBARD, AND FREDERIC WILLIAM BUSH. (1987) Old Testament Survey, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

SHEDD, WILLIAM G.T. (1874-1890)(1980) Dogmatic Theology,  Volume 1, Nashville, Thomas Nelson Publishers. 

SHEDD, WILLIAM G.T. (1874-1890)(1980) Dogmatic Theology,  Volume 2, Nashville, Thomas Nelson Publishers. 

THIESSEN, HENRY C. (1956) Introductory Lectures in Systematic Theology, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

WEBER, OTTO (1955)(1981) Foundations of Dogmatics, Volumes 1 and 2, Translated and annotated by Darrell L. Guder, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

WRIGHT, R.K.McGREGOR (1996) No Place for Sovereignty,  Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.

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[1] Blackburn (1996: 268).

[2] Blackburn (1996: 268).  William T. Shedd explains that God cannot do what is ‘absurd and self-contradictory’.  Shedd (1874-1890)(1980: 359 Volume 1).

[3] Erickson (1994: 277).

[4] Erickson (1994: 277). For Shedd a logical impossibility is a nonentity and God could not create a nonentity.  Shedd (1874-1890)(1980: 359-360 Volume 1).

[5] Erickson (1994: 277).

[6] Erickson (1994: 277).  The implication being that God could hypothetically change all the results of a past occurrence, but could not logically make the past occurrence to have not occurred, even if only he had any ultimate knowledge of it.

[7] Erickson (1994: 277).  Thiessen (1956: 126).  Weber (1955)(1981: 440).

[8] Erickson (1994: 277).

[9] Weber (1955)(1981: 440).

[10] Weber (1955)(1981: 440).

[11] Weber (1955)(1981: 440).

[12] Frame (2002: 515).

[13] Frame (2002: 515).

[14] Frame (2002: 518). Weber (1955)(1981: 440).

[15] Frame (2002: 518).

[16] Frame (2002: 518).

[17] Frame (2002: 518).  Erickson (1994: 277). Shedd (1874-1890)(1980: 359-360 Volume 1).

[18] Frame (2002: 518).  Thiessen (1956: 126).

[19] Frame (2002: 518).  Thiessen (1956: 126). Weber (1955)(1981: 440).

[20] Frame (2002: 520).

[21] Frame (2002: 520).

[22] Phillips (2005: 113).

[23] Phillips (2005: 113).

[24] Phillips (2005: 113).

[25] Phillips (2005: 113). For Philips, God’s inability to do finite things is a weakness making God less than all-powerful.  For Frame it is a strength which maintains God as omnipotent.  Frame (2002: 520). 

[26] Phillips (2005: 113).

[27] Frame (2002: 520).  Phillips (2005: 113).

[28] Phillips (2005: 113).

[29] Cauthen (1997: 1).  Grenz, Guretzki, and Nordling (1999: 85-86).  Wright (1996: 278).

[30] Frame (2002: 520).  Phillips (2005: 113).

[31] Frame (2002: 520).  A traditional perspective would not view the lack of finite nature of God as a negation, but God would be understood in the positive sense as not lacking power by being infinite.

[32] Frame (2002: 520).  With Phillips’ view, God could be considered less than omnipotent with my own example I provide here, because it is not illogical for a being to sleep, and God cannot sleep.  However, it could be stated that it is a strength for God to not need to sleep or be able to sleep.

[33] Frame (2002: 520).  Phillips would more than likely view this as an ‘absurd suggestion’ with no contextual warrant, as he describes similar attempts to counter his argument.  Phillips (2005: 113).

[34] Genesis 3: 8 in The New American Standard Version Bible Version (1984: 4). 

[35] Old Testament scholar Victor P. Hamilton reasons this could be taken from a literal (to some degree) reading. Hamilton (1982: 48).

[36] I realize there is debate on the creation story in Genesis concerning whether it is to be taken as plain literal, figurative literal, myth or a combination of approaches.  La Sor, Hubbard, and Bush reason there is definitely metaphorical language in Genesis. La Sor, Hubbard, and Bush (1987: 72).  My example does serve well as agreement with Frame’s point, however.  Aspects of Genesis will be further discussed within this thesis.

[37] Hamilton (1982: 48).

[38] Phillips (2005: 113).

[39] Phillips (2005: 113).

[40] Philips (2005: 11).

[41] Philips (2005: 11).

[42] Philips (2005: 11).  Frame (2002: 518-520).   I of course offered Frame’s response to this view, and my own. 

[43] Philips (2005: 11). 

[44] Traditional perspectives would still reason that God’s omnipotence need not be redefined as a lack of finiteness would demonstrate God’s lack of impotency.

[45] Frame (2002: 518).  Erickson (1994: 277). Shedd (1874-1890)(1980: 359-360 Volume 1).  Blackburn (1996: 268). 

[46] Frame (2002: 520).   Erickson (1994: 277).  Thiessen (1956: 126).  Weber (1955)(1981: 440).  David Hume within Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion questions this traditional understanding of an omnipotent supreme being as human limitations make God’s attributes ‘totally incomprehensible.’  Hume (1779)(2004: 21).