Those emotional appeals...

This week

PIRIE, MADSEN (2006)(2015) How To Win Every Argument, Bloomsbury, London.

Emotional appeals as fallacy occur when 'it becomes the means of deciding the soundness of an argument.' (87). Emotions being used to influence what is determined as fact.

This fallacy can be triggered by a person (s) abusing the emotions of the determined audience. To play on the emotional disposition of such an audience. (88).

The author writes that 'sentimens is a clever fallacy.' (89). Perhaps this should be documented as 'sentiments'; a more common usage.

If someone does not play along with this sentimental philosophical approach, he or she may be considered 'cold'. (89). This can lead to an abandonment of reason. (89).

In contrast, emotional fallacy should be abandoned. Not emotions, but the abuse of emotions should not be used in attempts to determine reasonable arguments and truth.

I have written articles on this website noting the dangers of sentimental theology. See Blogger search, top right.

Blackburn is helpful here noting on emotion. (117).

'Each indicates a state of some kind of arousal, a state that can prompt some activities and interfere with others.' (117).

Emotion should not interfere with reasonable, intellectual activity that decides soundness of arguments and truth.

Those emotional appeals can influence thought on academic and personal levels. A counter, I suggest, is a reasonably open-minded review of different views that oppose heartfelt ones. Even if these opposing views are not accepted it keeps one's own views sharper.

From a Christian, biblical perspective, one should seek God (and God the Father) through the incarnation of his Son, Jesus Christ who in eternal truth and the Holy Spirit, also a member of the eternal trinity (John 14).

Although the Scripture is not specific philosophy, philosophy of religion or scientific text, it can be reasoned that 'all truth is God's truth', and God should be sought for both biblical and extra-biblical knowledge. I am not meaning primarily (obviously!) an emotional religious, spiritual appeal to God, but one that encompasses the human experience of emotion and intellect.

BLACKBURN, SIMON, (1996) The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford University Press, Oxford

PIRIE, MADSEN (2006)(2015) How To Win Every Argument, Bloomsbury, London.

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Not to say more than is essential

Pinterest: Symbolic logic: I have never considered myself a nerd. Why? Because I understand many social norms but reject some of them. Whereas a nerd is often socially inept. The terms non-conformist and not anti-establishment would fit me better.

LANGER, SUSANNE K (1953)(1967) An Introduction to Symbolic Logic, Dover Publications, New York.

~=false or not

 ∃=sometimes or better

~ a fm a (fm is fellowman or in fellowship with).

It is false or not true that a is the fellowman of a, or is in fellowship with a. (94).

Universally, one cannot be the fellowman of self. (94).

However, one case to the contrary 'destroys the right to state it always holds.' (94). In this case the equation would therefore be:

(∃a): A fm a. Sometimes a is the fellowman of a. (94).

'For some value or values of a, 'A fm a' holds'. (94). It is true in at least one case. (94-95).

This reads as an exception clause within philosophy. 'It is essential in logic, not to say more than is essential. In this respect logicians are very prudent.' (94). The symbol should mean the least it can possibly mean. (94).

In my academic writing, both formal and website work, I have lived by the idea of careful use of words. To allow for exceptions. This was enforced especially within the British academic system. This does lead to careful revisions. The (∃a) symbols serves as a quantifier. Something is universally true but there may be at least one exception, the particular quantifier. (96).

Perhaps with ∃a: a (Russ) fm a (Russ) are two different person's named Russ.

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John S. Feinberg: Incompatibilism & Compatibilism (PhD Edit)

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According to Google, my two Blogger websites set my own personal record for approximately 67, 000 pageviews in September. The Stat Counter statistics were similar. I would personally, very much love to thank you all for the support in making that happen...But, in reality the views are mostly due to my template change to dynamic and resulting Googlebots. Again as per United Kingdom PhD academic standards, citations are primarily in my own words. This is re-presented material in a new form. The PhD is Russell Norman Murray, Theodicy and Practical Theology (2010), The University of Wales, Trinity Saint David, Lampeter.
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John S. Feinberg, who has written extensively on the concepts of free will and determinism, explains incompatibilism is defined as the idea within free will theodicy or defence that a person is free in regard to an action if he or she is free to either commit, or refrain from committing the action. Feinberg (1994: 64). 

There can be no antecedent[1] conditions or laws that will determine that an action is committed or not committed. Feinberg (1994: 64).

Feinberg writes that for this view, freedom is incompatible with contingently sufficient nonsubsequent conditions of an action. The contingently sufficient nonsubsequent actions would be God making people in such a way that they only freely did one thing or another. Feinberg (1994: 60). 

Feinberg importantly writes that just as the incompatibilist does not claim that all actions are significantly free,  the compatibilist also does not attach significant freedom to all acts. Feinberg (2001: 637).

I reason, for example, God as primary cause, and in some cases secondary causes, can force or coerce human actions. But when actions are committed by a human being without significant freedom, there is not moral responsibility. For example, a person being forced or coerced to commit crimes under mind control, may not have significant moral responsibly for thoughts and actions.

Within hard determinism God (theistic model) would be the only cause of human actions,[2] while with soft determinism God would be the primary cause of human actions and persons the secondary cause.[3] Compatibilism, like incompatibilism, holds to free will but in a limited form. Pojman (1996: 596).

Feinberg, a noted compatibilist, describes compatibilism as stating certain nonconstraining conditions could strongly influence actions in conjunction with human free will performing these actions.

Feinberg (2001) explains that with this viewpoint, there will be no contradiction in stating God would create human beings who were significantly free, unconstrained, and yet committed actions that God willed. Feinberg (2001: 637).

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996)  Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy,  Oxford, Oxford University Press.

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, in David Basinger and Randall Basinger (eds.), Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids,  Zondervan Publishing House.

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (2001) No One Like Him, John S. Feinberg (gen.ed.), Wheaton, Illinois, Crossway Books.

POJMAN, LOUIS P. (1996) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.

STACE, W.T. (1952)(1976) Religion and the Modern Mind, in John R. Burr and Milton Goldinger (eds.), Philosophy and Contemporary Issues, London, Collier Macmillan Publishers. 

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[1] In his article entitled ‘Conditional’ Simon Blackburn writes that an antecedent exists if  p causes  q.  P  is the antecedent or prior cause of  q  which is the conditional and the consequence.  Blackburn (1996: 73-74).

[2] Pojman (1996: 596). 

[3] Stace (1952)(1976: 30).

Calvin & Compatibilism: (MPhil/PhD)

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As per United Kingdom, MPhil and PhD standards, most citations are in my own words.

I consider myself more so Reformed as opposed to a Calvinist. I, for example, am joining a Mennonite Brethren, believer’s baptism church.

In modern, but not Reformation era terms, Calvin could be considered a compatibilist and explains that those who committed wrong actions performed them willfully and deliberately. Calvin (1543)(1998: 37).

God was working his good purposes through the evil conduct of people, but Calvin pointed out that God’s motives in willing these deeds were pure while those who committed wrong had wicked motives. Calvin (1543)(1998: 37).

Calvin suggests outward human preaching ‘strikes only the ears’ while the inward instruction of the Holy Spirit is how a person is enlightened in Christ. Calvin (1543)(1996: 233).

Human preaching is valuable in that it works at times in conjunction with the Holy Spirit transforming individuals. Calvin (1543)(1996: 233).

Humanity has nothing on its own, but depends totally on God. God bestows on humanity what he wills. Calvin (1539)(1998: Book II, Chapter 1: 2).

Calvin did not believe that God would eliminate human impulse, but rather God would have the impulse of a person he desired subject to the spirit of God. Calvin (1543)(1996: 225).

Preaching and teaching the word of God impacts a person to believe in Christ. Calvin (1543)(1996: 34).

God’s motives remain pure in the simultaneous willing of human actions that are sinful and evil. Calvin (1543)(1996: 37-40).

Human beings and their actions were the secondary causes of primary causes willed by God. Calvin (1543)(1996: 38).

God’s motives in willing an action would work toward the greater good even while human beings freely sinned. Calvin (1543)(1996: 37-40).

‘For we do not say that the wicked sin of necessity in such a way as to imply that they sin without wilful and deliberate evil intent. The necessity comes from the fact that God accomplishes his work, which is sure and steadfast, through them.’ Calvin (1543)(1996: 37).

'At the same time, however, the will and purpose to do evil which dwells within them makes them liable to censure. But, it is said, they are driven and forced to this by God.’ Calvin (1543)(1996: 37).

‘Indeed, but in such a way that in a single deed the action of God is one thing and their own action is another. For they gratify their evil and wicked desires, but God turns this wickedness so as to bring his judgements (judgments) to execution.’ Calvin (1543)(1996: 37).

The incompatibilist thinks if someone freely refrains from an action, they must not have been causally determined or significantly influenced to do so. Pruss (2003: 216).

The compatibilist thinks if someone refrains from an action, they have the power to do this and were not constrained from doing the action by an outside force. Pruss (2003: 216).

Incompatibilism denies that any outside influence can significantly will any action, or impose itself on a significantly free being for a truly free action to occur. Pruss (2003: 216).

CALVIN, JOHN (1539)(1998) The Institutes of the Christian Religion, Book II, Translated by Henry Beveridge, Grand Rapids, The Christian Classic Ethereal Library, Wheaton College.

CALVIN, JOHN (1539)(1998) The Institutes of the Christian Religion, Book IV, Translated by Henry Beveridge, Grand Rapids, The Christian Classic Ethereal Library, Wheaton College.

CALVIN, JOHN (1543)(1996) The Bondage and Liberation of the Will, Translated by G.I. Davies, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

PRUSS, ALEXANDER R. (2003) ‘A New Free-Will Defence’, in Religious Studies, Volume 39, pp. 211-223. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

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