Preface
Photo: Is an abstract photo from a Munich bus tour I took, 20250406.
This Blogger version of this article is for an entry on academia.edu, 20250621. This includes PhD and website work. Short and non-exhaustive.
This Blogger version of this article is for an entry on academia.edu, 20250621. This includes PhD and website work. Short and non-exhaustive.
Greg Welty on sinless humanity III (PhD Edit)
Welty rejects Plantinga’s idea that God cannot create a world containing
moral good and no moral evil,[1] and
raises the objection that God brought Christ into the world as a sinless human
being.[2] Welty’s
point here is that every human being could have therefore been sinless[3] and
the world could contain good and no evil with significantly free human beings
that would not commit wrong actions.[4] I have a similar objection to Welty’s,[5] which
was discussed in Chapters Two and Three of my PhD thesis. Within my
theodicy, I reason that God could have, if he wished, made significantly free
human beings, or human like beings who would have been perfectly morally good
and would not commit wrong actions.[6] God’s
choice not to create such beings, in my mind is not a sign of a lack of power,
or moral failure, but rather the use of his own perfect and significantly free
will for good purposes.
[1] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 30). Welty
(1999: 1).
[2] Welty (1999: 1).
[3] Welty (1999: 1).
[4] Welty (1999: 1).
[5] Welty (1999: 1).
[6] This is an aspect of compatibilism, which
shall be primarily defined and discussed in Chapters Two and Three.
Saturday, September 19, 2020
PhD Full Version PDF: Theodicy and Practical Theology 2010, Wales TSD Website work
I make the theological deduction that biblically, the loyal angels of God, that did not turn from God, had (have) significantly free natures, which includes desire and will. These angels have not committed wrong actions. I reason significantly free beings can be made perfect, holy and good gaining knowledge of good and evil and do not choose evil and do not require the option to choose evil. Therefore, fallen humanity as is and the atonement and resurrection work of Christ as applied to those chosen and elect in Christ is part of God’s sovereign plans. As is the culminated Kingdom of God with the new heaven and new earth (Revelation 20-22).
It is an eternal plan of God that some within humanity will be regenerated (notably John 3, Titus 3, 1 Peter 1), justified (the righteousness of Christ applied to believers) and sanctified (set apart in holiness) in salvation and some will not. This being God's perfect will. Christ is the lamb slain from the foundation (foundations also works theologically) of the world (Revelation 13: 8, see also Revelation 5 for related).
Revelation 3: 5
English Standard Version (ESV) 5 The one who conquers will be clothed thus in white garments, and I will never blot his name out of the book of life. I will confess his name before my Father and before his angel
The gospel and the applied atoning and resurrection work of Jesus Christ, are part of God's eternal plans, as are those whose names are within the book of life.
Ephesians 1: 3-4
Ephesians 1:3-4 New American Standard Bible (NASB) 3 Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who has blessed us with every spiritual blessing in the heavenly places in Christ, 4 just as He chose us in Him before the foundation of the world, that we would be holy and blameless before [a]Him. In love Footnotes: (a) Ephesians 1:4 Or Him, in love
God's eternal plan as the first and primary cause, included a human sin, fall and rebellion. This implies significantly free creatures that will sin, is the eternal plan which makes sense as Christ is the lamb slain from the foundation/foundations of the world, in other words, the atoning and resurrection work of God the Son, Jesus Christ, applied to those chosen is an eternal triune, plan. Persons are morally accountable for sin as secondary causes, as long as they are not forced or coerced to do so, and therefore those not within the Kingdom of God, post-mortem, with limited free will, embrace their exclusion.
God's perfect will is that this temporal, temporary realm exists, but to be clear, I still reason that many human sinful, acts and actions are allowed within his permissible will.
God's eternal plan as the first and primary cause, included a human sin, fall and rebellion. This implies significantly free creatures that will sin, is the eternal plan which makes sense as Christ is the lamb slain from the foundation/foundations of the world, in other words, the atoning and resurrection work of God the Son, Jesus Christ, applied to those chosen is an eternal triune, plan. Persons are morally accountable for sin as secondary causes, as long as they are not forced or coerced to do so, and therefore those not within the Kingdom of God, post-mortem, with limited free will, embrace their exclusion.
God's perfect will is that this temporal, temporary realm exists, but to be clear, I still reason that many human sinful, acts and actions are allowed within his permissible will.
I reason that Welty's argument is very strong for compatibilism versus incompatibilism. Jesus Christ as incarnate was both infinite God and finite man. As finite man he lived in sinless life and yet had significant freedom, and successfully faced and rejected temptation. Christ completed his atoning and resurrection work for those in Christ, via a divine gospel plan with persons as is within this present realm.
The angels that did not fall (Revelation 12) are non-physical beings reasoned to have remained sinless and yet have significant freedom, as they are judged (1 Corinthians 6, fallen angels in Revelation 20). The divine judgement for thoughts and actions of a secondary cause requires moral accountability, otherwise this is hard determinism, where only God the primary cause would be morally responsible, although with perfect and holy motives. This is not soft-determinism/compatibilism.
God, as infinite and eternal has never contradicted his divine nature (logically cannot) and sinned and yet has significant freedom. In the cases of the human nature of Jesus Christ, the finite nature of angels that stayed true to God and the infinite nature of God, there is a significant, reasonable understanding of evil (God's being infinite) but not an ontological/nature requirement of embracing evil and sin as an option. If one's nature is perfectly good, finitely or infinitely, it is logically possible and reasonable to stay in that nature while understanding evil. An entity can be finitely morally perfect and remain so, it does not the require the option to turn from God, although it remains a logical possibility. It is not logically possible for the infinite God to contradict his infinite nature. God cannot contradict God in nature.
The angels that did not fall (Revelation 12) are non-physical beings reasoned to have remained sinless and yet have significant freedom, as they are judged (1 Corinthians 6, fallen angels in Revelation 20). The divine judgement for thoughts and actions of a secondary cause requires moral accountability, otherwise this is hard determinism, where only God the primary cause would be morally responsible, although with perfect and holy motives. This is not soft-determinism/compatibilism.
God, as infinite and eternal has never contradicted his divine nature (logically cannot) and sinned and yet has significant freedom. In the cases of the human nature of Jesus Christ, the finite nature of angels that stayed true to God and the infinite nature of God, there is a significant, reasonable understanding of evil (God's being infinite) but not an ontological/nature requirement of embracing evil and sin as an option. If one's nature is perfectly good, finitely or infinitely, it is logically possible and reasonable to stay in that nature while understanding evil. An entity can be finitely morally perfect and remain so, it does not the require the option to turn from God, although it remains a logical possibility. It is not logically possible for the infinite God to contradict his infinite nature. God cannot contradict God in nature.
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