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| Parked in a traffic jam: Downtown Vancouver, June 2017 |
God cannot move a parked car
Preface
Originally a Sunday, June 18, 2017 article, significantly updated on Monday, September 4, 2023 for an entry on academia.edu.
Logic
God cannot move a parked car
Note, that it is not illogical for God to move a parked car, so according to God's omnipotence, God can logically move a parked car. But God's omnipotence is not the primary topic within this article. However...
God's omnipotence = God can move a parked car (equals)
God's omnipotence : God can move a parked car (equals)
God's omnipotence ⊨ God can move a parked car (entails)
God's is omnipotent ∴ God can move a parked car (therefore)
Incompatibilism
God cannot move a parked car
I have heard and read this statement and like within the evangelical church. It is often in the context of salvation, dating and marriage and seeking employment.
This statement assumes incompatibilism. Libertarian free will is usually viewed as a form of indeterminism. The concept in libertarian free will is that a person is able to perform another action in the place of one that has been committed. This action cannot be predetermined by any circumstance or desire. There can be no antecedent (prior) conditions or laws that will determine that an action is committed or not committed. Feinberg (1994: 64). With this view, freedom is incompatible with contingently sufficient nonsubsequent conditions of an action. The contingently sufficient nonsubsequent actions would be God making people in such a way that they only freely did one thing or another. Feinberg (1994: 60).
Philosopher Tim Mawson reasons that incompatibilism, which again, is also known as libertarianism or libertarian free will, in regard to human free will, believes that true human free will must be uncaused by preceding states. Mawson (1999: 324). In other words, no external force must cause a legitimate and truly free act of the human will. Within incompatibilist theory, a human action would never truly be free because God or an another external force (non-deistic view) would have willed and determined it, before being simultaneously willed to a given person. Mawson (1999: 324).
This statement assumes incompatibilism. Libertarian free will is usually viewed as a form of indeterminism. The concept in libertarian free will is that a person is able to perform another action in the place of one that has been committed. This action cannot be predetermined by any circumstance or desire. There can be no antecedent (prior) conditions or laws that will determine that an action is committed or not committed. Feinberg (1994: 64). With this view, freedom is incompatible with contingently sufficient nonsubsequent conditions of an action. The contingently sufficient nonsubsequent actions would be God making people in such a way that they only freely did one thing or another. Feinberg (1994: 60).
Philosopher Tim Mawson reasons that incompatibilism, which again, is also known as libertarianism or libertarian free will, in regard to human free will, believes that true human free will must be uncaused by preceding states. Mawson (1999: 324). In other words, no external force must cause a legitimate and truly free act of the human will. Within incompatibilist theory, a human action would never truly be free because God or an another external force (non-deistic view) would have willed and determined it, before being simultaneously willed to a given person. Mawson (1999: 324).
David M. Ciocchi describes the incompatibilist idea as being God can determine that an agent commit action x, but he cannot determine that an agent commit action x freely. Ciocchi (2002: 46). The theory is that significantly free human will and actions cannot be caused by an external force. This external force would include a first cause. This external force would include God.
Norman Geisler mentions a form of incompatibilism which he, calls self-determinism. Moral choices are not caused or uncaused by another being, but are self-caused. Incompatibilists, therefore, do not deny there are outside forces that influence significantly free human actions; however, they do not accept any notion that a free act can be caused in a determined sense by one being upon another and remain a significantly free act. An act cannot be determined or simultaneously determined and remain truly free within incompatibilism. Geisler (1986: 75).
Moral Responsibility
Feinberg importantly writes that just as the incompatibilist does not claim that all actions are significantly free, the compatibilist also does not attach significant freedom to all acts. Feinberg (2001: 637). I reason, for example, God as primary cause, and in some cases, other secondary causes, can force or coerce human actions. But when actions are committed by a human being without significant freedom, there is not moral responsibility. For example, a person being forced or coerced to commit crimes under mind control, may not have significant moral responsibly for thoughts and actions. I state may not because in my finitude, I leave ultimate judgement of persons, post-mortem, up to God (Revelation 20).
Hard determinism
Feinberg importantly writes that just as the incompatibilist does not claim that all actions are significantly free, the compatibilist also does not attach significant freedom to all acts. Feinberg (2001: 637). I reason, for example, God as primary cause, and in some cases, other secondary causes, can force or coerce human actions. But when actions are committed by a human being without significant freedom, there is not moral responsibility. For example, a person being forced or coerced to commit crimes under mind control, may not have significant moral responsibly for thoughts and actions. I state may not because in my finitude, I leave ultimate judgement of persons, post-mortem, up to God (Revelation 20).
Hard determinism
Within hard determinism, God (theistic model) would be the only cause of human thoughts and actions, while within soft determinism/compatibilism, God would be the primary cause of human thoughts and actions and persons the secondary cause. Stace (1952)(1976: 30).
(A non-theistic hard determinism could state as examples, fate, chance or the unknown as a possible first cause)
Louis P. Pojman explains the difference between determinism, which is also known as hard determinism, and compatibilism, which is also known as soft determinism. Pojman (1996: 596). Within determinism or hard determinism, God (or an external force) causes an act and no created being is responsible for his or her moral actions, while for compatibilism or soft determinism, although God causes actions, created beings are responsible where they act voluntarily. Pojman (1996: 596). In other words, hard determinism holds that every event is caused and no one is responsible for actions, whereas soft determinism holds that rational creatures can be held responsible for determined actions as long as they are done voluntarily and without force or coercion. Pojman (1996: 586).
Simon Blackburn comments that this is the doctrine that human action has no influence on events. Blackburn (1996: 137). Blackburn gives the opinion that fatalism is wrongly confused with determinism, which by itself carries no implications that human actions have no effect. Blackburn (1996: 137). Tomis Kapitan notes that determinism is usually understood as meaning that whatever occurs is determined by antecedent (preceding cause) conditions. Kapitan (1999: 281).
Soft determinism/Compatibilism
Compatibilism, like incompatibilism, holds to free will but in a limited form. Pojman (1996: 596). It is also possible for angelic and fallen angelic beings to be secondary causes, significantly influencing human thought and action. Feinberg describes compatibilism as stating certain nonconstraining conditions could strongly influence actions in conjunction with human free will performing these actions. Feinberg explains that with this viewpoint, there will be no contradiction in stating God would create human beings who were significantly free, unconstrained, and yet committed actions that God willed. Feinberg (2001: 637). Within compatibilism, human beings can be simultaneously influenced to commit significantly free thoughts and actions, within incompatibilism, they cannot. These are classic definitions from my British theses work. Assuredly there are definitions and views that vary slightly.
P.S. Greenspan writes that compatibilism holds to free will and determinism being compatible. Greenspan (1998: 1). Feinberg explains that compatibilism does not allow for coercion or force, but holds that God, or some outside force, can simultaneously determine with the use of persuasion, that an action will or will not take place. Feinberg (1986: 24).
W.T. Stace (1952)(1976) explains that moral responsibility is consistent with determinism in the context of soft determinism and requires it. Stace (1952)(1976: 29). If human actions are uncaused then reward or punishment would be unjustified. Stace (1952)(1976: 29). Stace reasons that there must be at least some human cause within human actions to make them morally responsible acts. Stace (1952)(1976: 30).
It could be stated that human secondary causes, through a theoretical chain of human nature, human will and human choice, embrace what has been caused and chosen by God, the first and primary cause, directly or indirectly. The human being could also be influenced by other secondary causes, such as other persons and angelic beings, for example.
Limited free will
Based on my MPhil/PhD research and online research, my use of the term is definitively, compatibilistic. This is not the ability to choose otherwise, as in middle knowledge and versions of libertarian free will. In my compatibilistic model, at least, through a theoretical, non-exhaustive chain of human nature, human will and human choice, a person embraces as secondary cause, what was caused, willed and allowed by the primary cause. This in regard to human conscious thoughts, will, choices, acts and actions. This first cause would be God in a biblical view. During my British studies I looked for the term limited free will in texts and online and did not see it. I/we have significant moral responsibility in my/our conscious, thoughts, will, choices, acts and actions, that are not significantly forced or coerced.
God cannot move a parked car
From an incompatibilistic view, in a sense, God cannot move a parked car. A person will not be saved, date or marry, or be seeking employment, without deciding to do so autonomously, without being simultaneously influenced by God or another force, to do so. If God did so, this would be hard determinism.
From my compatibilistic view, even if God could be stated to merely allow a person to have thought leading to action, by allowing thought and action, God is causing and willing these things to occur. This is because, God, unlike any other entity is infinite, and omnipotent. God cannot, not be involved in anything.
If a person appears to be a parked car, it is because God has caused and willed it and the person has embraced the position, in thought and action as a secondary cause.
God can cause and will a car to stay parked, or God can cause and will a car to move. In either scenario, for significant moral accountability to exist within limited free will, the human being embraces what God has willed. God could force or coerce a car to stay parked or move, but then there is no moral, human, accountability.
Some would argue God can force or coerce thoughts and actions that human beings embrace. If this would be accepted, it is a different concept of embracing. In a related way, a lion can embrace killing its prey, in a sense, but I would not coin this as embracing within limited free will. A lion does not philosophize of theologize on the concept. It kills its prey by nature within what is a rationality that cannot know God, nor be morally responsible to God. A very limited rationality even in comparison to human, angelic and demonic, rational limitations. This would be hard determinism within the animal kingdom.
From a human perspective, we are to pray that God's will be done, as in the Lord's Prayer, Matthew 6, Luke 11. We should ask for things according to God's will, from I John 5, realizing God causes and wills all things in the life of the Christian, Ephesians 1-2, Romans 8-9. God causing all things to work together for good to those who love God, to those who are called according to His purpose.
The Christian should pray to be an obedient secondary cause in thought and action via a nature enlightened by the Holy Spirit through the salvific work of God through Jesus Christ.
Therefore, the title statement is false, but even so, pondering on the concepts involved, the Christian should seek to be obedient in all things.
AUGUSTINE (388-395)(1964) On Free Choice of the Will, Translated by Anna S.Benjamin and L.H. Hackstaff, Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall.
God cannot move a parked car
From an incompatibilistic view, in a sense, God cannot move a parked car. A person will not be saved, date or marry, or be seeking employment, without deciding to do so autonomously, without being simultaneously influenced by God or another force, to do so. If God did so, this would be hard determinism.
From my compatibilistic view, even if God could be stated to merely allow a person to have thought leading to action, by allowing thought and action, God is causing and willing these things to occur. This is because, God, unlike any other entity is infinite, and omnipotent. God cannot, not be involved in anything.
If a person appears to be a parked car, it is because God has caused and willed it and the person has embraced the position, in thought and action as a secondary cause.
God can cause and will a car to stay parked, or God can cause and will a car to move. In either scenario, for significant moral accountability to exist within limited free will, the human being embraces what God has willed. God could force or coerce a car to stay parked or move, but then there is no moral, human, accountability.
Some would argue God can force or coerce thoughts and actions that human beings embrace. If this would be accepted, it is a different concept of embracing. In a related way, a lion can embrace killing its prey, in a sense, but I would not coin this as embracing within limited free will. A lion does not philosophize of theologize on the concept. It kills its prey by nature within what is a rationality that cannot know God, nor be morally responsible to God. A very limited rationality even in comparison to human, angelic and demonic, rational limitations. This would be hard determinism within the animal kingdom.
From a human perspective, we are to pray that God's will be done, as in the Lord's Prayer, Matthew 6, Luke 11. We should ask for things according to God's will, from I John 5, realizing God causes and wills all things in the life of the Christian, Ephesians 1-2, Romans 8-9. God causing all things to work together for good to those who love God, to those who are called according to His purpose.
The Christian should pray to be an obedient secondary cause in thought and action via a nature enlightened by the Holy Spirit through the salvific work of God through Jesus Christ.
Therefore, the title statement is false, but even so, pondering on the concepts involved, the Christian should seek to be obedient in all things.
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2003 The Problem of Evil: Anglican and Baptist Perspectives: MPhil thesis, Bangor University
