The problem of evil: Defence vs. Theodicy

Tofino, BC (photo from trekearth.com)

Restoration Why Later 

I had the vitrectomy and lens replacement please see section D of post above. June 21, 2012 Before I discuss my work of the problem evil, I will explain that I have decided after over a year and a half of research, and discussing my vitreous floaters with seven ophthalmologists and my local general practitioner, not to pursue the vitrectomy and the related cataract and lens replacement surgery. A major problem is that with my amblyopic, long eye, by the surgeon’s standards, there is a significant risk of retinal detachment at 5% to 15% with the vitrectomy, and a significant risk of retinal detachment with the cataract surgery as well. I do not want to risk blindness in one eye, or having my eye end up in a jar. The doctors have mentioned these risks to me. I have decided to wait and see if the floaters do eventually sink below my line of sight, or if in the next few years there is a new and better treatment for severe floaters, such as eye injections which one surgeon suggested. 

In the meantime, I have purchased a pair of polarized Ray-Bans (Black: RB3293) to wear while typing on the computer and for bright room, and future public speaking. The Ray-Bans block out much light and the floaters are significantly less noticeable. I am now the Bono, or Ringo of theological blogging. Don’t hate me because I look cool, it is just floaters! So, I have skipped the opportunity to, while under local anesthetic, have a portion of the back of my eye scraped away, while hopefully not dislodging the retina that is a bit back further in the eye. I suppose some of you are disappointed that since the vitrectomy will not take place, I will not be posting photos.;) Please let me know your disappointment. Remember, in a previous posting concerning vitreous floaters, a commenter stated that he would be pursing the vitrectomy soon, but he may not have an amblyopic eye and therefore faces less risks. www.dvra.net/dvra_vitrectomy.jpg

 

If one studies the problem of evil thoroughly he/she will come across the issue of a defence in regard to the problem, and a theodicy that deals with the problem. Theodicy is the explanation of how the infinite, omnipotent, and perfectly good God accomplishes his plans within his creation where the problem of evil exists. Alvin C. Plantinga differentiates between his own free will defence and a free will theodicy. Plantinga (1977)(2002: 28). He states that his defence is mainly a logical presentation, attempting to maintain logical consistency, whereas theodicy is more dogmatic in approach, Plantinga (1977)(2002: 28). Within my MPhil and PhD dissertations, I view defence and theodicy as equally speculative. Philip L. Quinn notes that Plantinga’s view of a defence in contrast to theodicy means Plantinga does not speculate on God’s reasons for permitting evil, but merely argues that God’s existence is logically consistent with the problem of evil. Quinn (1996: 611). I agree with Quinn, somewhat. Plantinga is mainly arguing that God’s existence can be shown as logical in regard to the problem of evil with his defence; however, Plantinga as does every scholar with any type of explanation for the topic of the problem of evil, speculates within his defence. Plantinga (1977)(2002: 45-59). This type of speculation is perhaps not done as forcefully as some in theodicy. Plantinga (1977)(2002: 28). 

I therefore reason that a defence can be reviewed under the umbrella of theodicy and do so within my PhD dissertation. Theodicy is by nature somewhat speculative and therefore, theodicy, like a defence, is also dealing with a possible reason for God to permit evil. A theodicy may be more dogmatic than Plantinga’s defence in its assertions and arguments, but it is still speculative, as is my own work on theodicy. Plantinga comments that one who writes a theodicy assumes that it is true, while one who writes a defense is stating that it is possibly true. Plantinga (1982: 192). However, even a person writing the theodicy does not have exhaustive knowledge of God and his reasoning in regard to the problem, and I therefore conclude that theodicy and defence are both equally speculative, although perhaps not equally dogmatic. 

PLANTINGA, ALVIN.C. (1977)(2002) God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 

PLANTINGA, ALVIN.C. (1982) The Nature of Necessity, Oxford, Clarendon Press. 

QUINN, PHILIP L. (1996) ‘Philosophy of Religion’, Robert Audi (ed.), in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.