Apriorism

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PIRIE, MADSEN (2006)(2015) How To Win Every Argument, Bloomsbury, London.

The facts should be allowed to test principles. (44) (of truth my add).

To start with the principles from the first (a priori) and to use them for the basis for accepting or rejecting facts is the 'wrong way around'. (44).

The fallacy of apriorism. (44).

The author explains that too much primacy is given to principles so that they might not be modified by what is observed. (44).

Is other words, principles are not allowed to be modified by observable evidence and facts.

Unwarranted presumptions are rejecting relevant evidence and facts. (44).

The author cites 'My mind's made up. Don't confuse me with the facts.' (45).

Not only could many religious persons be accused of holding such an approach but many non-religious persons as well....

Pirie wisely writes that this fallacy is 'unproductive' (45). Facts and truth being dismissed.

Vancouver

Louis P. Pojman explains that the term a priori comes from the Latin “preceding” and is knowledge that is not based on sense experience but is innate or known to human beings by the meanings of words and definitions. Pojman (1996: 595).

Arthur Pap defines a priori knowledge as being independent of experience. Pap (1973: 666).

Simon Blackburn notes that a proposition is knowable a priori if it can be known without experience of a certain set of events in the actual world. Blackburn allows for some experience to be obtained in order for a priori knowledge to occur. Blackburn (1996: 21). He explains that this type of knowledge is very controversial and it is not clear how pure thought without the use of experience can lead to any true knowledge at all. Blackburn (1996: 21). Some empiricists have attempted to deny that any real knowledge can be obtained from a priori means. Blackburn (1996: 21).

Pojman writes that a posteriori comes the Latin “the later” and is knowledge that is obtained from human sense experience only, as in the five senses. Pojman (1996: 595).

Blackburn reasons that something can be known a posteriori when it cannot be known a priori. Blackburn (1996: 21-22).

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) ‘A priori/A posteriori’, in Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, p. 21-22. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

EDWARDS, PAUL AND ARTHUR PAP (1973) (eds), ‘A priori knowledge: Introduction’, A Modern Introduction To Philosophy, New York, The Free Press.

POJMAN, LOUIS P. (1996) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.

Antiquitam, argumentum ad

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Antiquitam, argumentum ad

Preface

This article is part of a website review of entries within the Pirie text.

PIRIE, MADSEN (2006)(2015) How To Win Every Argument, Bloomsbury, London.

Antiquitam, argumentum ad

It is the fallacy of assuming something is good or right simply because it is old. (42).

A possible objection to Christian orthodoxy and Biblical orthodoxy arises; that is the assumption that this type of fallacious reasoning is used in preserving these doctrines over progressive alternatives.

I will not write (speak) for others but antiquity is not primary in my reasoning in holding to Biblical, Christian doctrines.

Those doctrines are primarily held to because Scripture is supported by thousands of manuscript copies in the Hebrew Bible and New Testament. Certain scribes and writers within these religious communities were inspired by God to write supernaturally revealed, consistent, reasonable, theological messages from Genesis to Revelation, from creation and the fall to the atonement and resurrection work of Christ to the last things. The Scripture is reasonable and sound religious history that leads to sound theology and is paralleled by sound, theistic, philosophy of religion in support.

The antiquity and support of history and the Church Father, in itself is not sufficient reason by itself alone, for Christian faith and philosophy. It can lend support, but when reasonable through argument.

Yes, every worldview has its difficulties. Theodicy and the problem of evil, which I dealt with for twelve years academically (I believe successfully, although I do not have infinite knowledge) being a primarily Christian worldview example, but I also examined other worldviews and find the Christian worldview least problematic.

Back to Pirie:

He comments that there is 'nothing in the age of belief or an assertion which alone makes it right.' (42).

I would agree, because the soundness of arguments, the quality of premises and conclusions is far more important than antiquity. In this realm we have several old religions, of say more that one hundred years old, that contradict each other on several major points.

Contrary to what many state, these religions cannot all be essentially true in regard to the nature of God and salvation due to contradictions. For example, Biblical Christianity claiming the exclusivity of Christ for salvation in relation to the Father (John 8, 10, 14, 1 John). The deity of Christ, as God the Son within the Trinity, and his atonement and resurrection work for salvation alone by grace through faith, notably contrasting Christianity with Islam, for example, which denies these.

Pirie states that this fallacy economizes thought and eliminates difficult decision making. (42).

He writes that to hold to the old way of doing things does not make it right and does not make it wrong, even if this reasoning has taken place for thousands of years. (43).

It is fallacious to place too much emphasis on antiquity in deciding whether or not the old way is right or if it is wrong.

CALVIN, JOHN (1539)(1998) The Institutes of the Christian Religion, Book II, Translated by Henry Beveridge, Grand Rapids, The Christian Classic Ethereal Library, Wheaton College. 

CALVIN, JOHN (1539)(1998) The Institutes of the Christian Religion, Book IV, Translated by Henry Beveridge, Grand Rapids, The Christian Classic Ethereal Library, Wheaton College. 

CALVIN, JOHN (1543)(1996) The Bondage and Liberation of the Will, Translated by G.I. Davies, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1729)(2006) Sovereignty of God, New Haven, Connecticut, Jonathan Edwards Center, Yale University. 

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1731-1733)(2006) Law of Nature, New Haven, Connecticut, Jonathan Edwards Center, Yale University. 

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1754)(2006) Freedom of the Will, Flower Mound, Texas. Jonathanedwards.com. 

ERICKSON, MILLARD (1994) Christian Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House. 

ERICKSON, MILLARD (2003) What Does God Know and When Does He Know It?, Grand Rapids, Zondervan. 

KREEFT, PETER AND RONALD K. TACELLI (1994) Handbook of Christian Apologetics, Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press. 

PIRIE, MADSEN (2006)(2015) How To Win Every Argument, Bloomsbury, London.

SHEDD, WILLIAM G.T. (1874-1890)(1980) Dogmatic Theology, Volume 1, Nashville, Thomas Nelson Publishers. 

SHEDD, WILLIAM G.T. (1874-1890)(1980) Dogmatic Theology, Volume 2, Nashville, Thomas Nelson Publishers. 

WEBER, OTTO (1955)(1981) Foundations of Dogmatics, Volumes 1 and 2, Translated and annotated by Darrell L. Guder, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

THIESSEN, HENRY C. (1956) Introductory Lectures in Systematic Theology, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

Brief On Matthew 7: 21-23: Theology Always Matters

Vancouver

Brief On Matthew 7: 21-23: Theology Always Matters

Preface

December 12 2015 article revised for an entry on academia.edu, October 9, 2023

Matthew 7:21-23: Introduction

Ellison writes that preaching and even miracles are not necessarily indication of seeking and serving the true God. Ellison (1986: 1129). Works performed need to be considered in light of the character of those that perform them. (1129).

France explains that superficial discipleship is ultimately rejected by God and Christ. France (1985: 148). It is not indicated as necessarily insincere discipleship, but it does not meet the divine standards. (148).

Good works do not qualify a disciple that does not meet God and Christ's criteria for entrance into the Kingdom of God. The New Testament teaches that those in Jesus Christ are saved, justified, sanctified through the applied atoning and resurrection work of Jesus Christ, being applied to them through regeneration (John 3, in particular Titus 3, 1 Peter 1).

Regeneration

3824. paliggenesia: Bible Hub παλιγγενεσία, ας, ἡ 

Cited

'Strong's Concordance 

paliggenesia: regeneration, renewal 

Original Word: παλιγγενεσία, ας, ἡ 

Part of Speech: Noun, Feminine Transliteration: paliggenesia

Phonetic Spelling: (pal-ing-ghen-es-ee'-ah)

Definition: regeneration, renewal 

Usage: a new birth, regeneration, renewal.'

'Titus 3:5 

N-GFS GRK: διὰ λουτροῦ παλινγενεσίας καὶ ἀνακαινώσεως 

NAS: by the washing of regeneration and renewing 

KJV: the washing of regeneration, and INT: through [the] washing of regeneration and renewing'

Matthew 7: 21-23: Lord, Lord

English Standard Version (ESV)

21 “Not everyone who says to me, ‘Lord, Lord,’ will enter the kingdom of heaven, but the one who does the will of my Father who is in heaven.

22 On that day many will say to me, ‘Lord, Lord, did we not prophesy in your name, and cast out demons in your name, and do many mighty works in your name?’

23 And then will I declare to them, ‘I never knew you; depart from me, you workers of lawlessness.’ 

New American Standard Version (NASB)

21"Not everyone who says to Me, 'Lord, Lord,' will enter the kingdom of heaven, but he who does the will of My Father who is in heaven will enter.

22 Many will say to Me on that day, 'Lord, Lord, did we not prophesy in Your name, and in Your name cast out demons, and in Your name perform many miracles?'

23 And then I will declare to them, 'I never knew you; depart from Me, you who practice lawlessness.'

This passage from Matthew 7 was preached on by the pastor at church in 2015:

He opined that the persons under judgement knew God, but God did not know them. They had accepted Christ, but God and Christ did not have Lordship over them. Those under judgement were relying on works righteousness as opposed to trusting in God and Christ as Lord and Saviour. The pastor then stated that the theology of the persons under judgement was not a key issue as in they had proper theology because they knew of the Biblical God and Jesus Christ.

However, I reason that theology is always in a sense a key issue. Theology always matters.

The judged persons had a knowledge of the Biblical God and Jesus Christ; enough that they could in this supernatural realm of judgement described, recognize Jesus Christ as Lord, which is technically correct. They called him Lord, but Jesus Christ denied he was their Lord.

These false disciples appeal to works righteousness.

The pastor correctly pointed out that in the judging presence of God any kind of works righteousness approach by humanity to God is error. But, I would add that is it also clearly theologically in error.

Romans 1-9, describes the universal sinfulness of humankind, by nature and choice and that only the atoning and resurrection work of Christ for sin, applied to believers as justification (righteousness) will save any one for the Kingdom of God.

Galatians (2) states that man is not justified by works of the Law but through faith in Jesus Christ.

In other words, faith in his atoning and resurrection work applied to persons in Christ.

Ephesians 1-2

New American Standard Bible

Ephesians 1 explains that those in Christ are chosen by God; therefore God knows who he has chosen.

4 just as He chose us in Him before the foundation of the world, that we would be holy and blameless before [d]Him. In love

5 [e]He predestined us to adoption as sons through Jesus Christ to Himself, according to the [f]kind intention of His will,

6 to the praise of the glory of His grace, which He freely bestowed on us in the Beloved.

Ephesians 2: 1-10

Ephesians 2 explains that those in Christ are saved by grace through faith unto good works, and not by works or works righteousness.

8 For by grace you have been saved through faith; and [ag]that not of yourselves, it is the gift of God;

9 not as a result of works, so that no one may boast.

10 For we are His workmanship, created in Christ Jesus for good works, which God prepared beforehand so that we would walk in them.

December 6, 2015: Prior to attending 007 film with several video outages
and the end of the film being without audio (wind storm).
Good public relations from Cineplex Odeon  providing two free movie tickets.

----

BAUER, WALTER. (1979) A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament, Translated by Eric H. Wahlstrom, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press. 

ELLISON, H.L. (1986) ‘Matthew’, in F.F. Bruce (ed.), The International Bible Commentary, Grand Rapids, Zondervan.

ERICKSON, MILLARD (1994) Christian Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House. 

FRANCE, R.T. (1985) Matthew, Grand Rapids, IVP, Eerdmans.

GRENZ, STANLEY J., DAVID GURETZKI AND CHERITH FEE NORDLING (1999) Pocket Dictionary of Theological Terms, Downers Grove, Ill., InterVarsity Press. 

GUNDRY, ROBERT (1981) A Survey of the New Testament, Grand Rapids, Zondervan. 

KLEIN, WILLIAM W., CRAIG, C. BLOMBERG, AND ROBERT L. HUBBARD, JR. (1993) Introduction to Biblical Interpretation, London, Word Publishing.

NUTE, ALAN G. (1986) in 'Titus', The International Bible Commentary, F.F. Bruce, General Editor, Grand Rapids, Zondervan/Marshall Pickering. 

STRONG, J. (1890)(1986) Strong's Exhaustive Concordance of the Bible, Burlington, Welch Publishing Company. 

THE GREEK NEW TESTAMENT (1993) Stuttgart, United Bible Societies.

More On Accident Fallacy

Scotland From The Roadside: Edinburgh Castle

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.  

PIRIE, MADSEN (2006)(2015) How To Win Every Argument, Bloomsbury, London. 

I have been pondering on, as in examples, Accident Fallacy.

This is definitely challenging philosophical material with plenty of revision, but when thought out, it once again demonstrates how philosophy (philosophy of religion, theology) has practical aspects.

I recently wrote 'Accident Fallacy' on this site and have further thoughts.

'a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter' Blackburn (7).

From the qualified statement (limited statement my add) to the unqualified (unlimited statement, my add). (7).

The fallacy of taking out a needed qualification. (7).

Also known as 'converse fallacy of the accident'. (7).

'If it is always permissible to kill in war (qualified and limited statement), then it is always permissible to kill' (unqualified and unlimited statement). (7).

However, for the example listed, it is not always permissible to kill because warfare operates with a different set of legal and ethical rules than does non-warfare.

A controversial example and topic (not a primary agenda for this post, it was just the best one that came to mind) I have blogged on would be for Accident Fallacy:

If some women prefer large age gaps in marriage (qualified and limited statement), then it is always permissible for there to be large age gaps in marriage (unqualified and unlimited statement).

A major needed qualification is for example:

Most women do not prefer large age gaps in marriage.

This would alter a conclusion to qualified and limited.

Blackburn writes that the accident fallacy is

'a dicto simpliciter ad dictum secundum quid ' (7).

From the unqualified statement to the statement qualified. (7).

Blackburn writes that is an (alleged) fallacy. (7).

Arguing from the general case to the specific, particular case. (7).

He lists as example: 'If some snakes are harmless (unqualified and unlimited statement) then some snakes in this bag are harmless.' (qualified and limited statement) (7).

I take it that philosophically, one should be careful in the diagnosis of accident fallacy, as it may not always be so.

Pirie explains that this fallacy assumes the 'freak features of an exceptional case are enough to accept rejection of the general rule'. (33).

Almost every generalization could be rejected because of a possible accidental case it does not cover. 

But to always maintain this is the fallacy of accident. (33).

The author states that it is a fallacy that appeals to anarchists because it appears to overturn general rules. (33). General rules with a few exceptions.

However..

Women do not prefer large age gaps in marriage (unqualified and unlimited statement), therefore some women should not prefer large age gaps in marriage (qualified and limited statement).

Is also accident fallacy (alleged as Blackburn notes).

The exception should not be the general rule.

The rule should not rule out the exception.

Accident Continued

Reality Pod: Reminds me of Pink Panther films.

Business Insider & The Bible

The video presents a somewhat negative view of Scripture from Business Insider.

However, I was aware of these and other Bible difficulties within my first seven years of Canadian Christian academia and from my own research.

This was before I worked on secular research theses only degrees in England and Wales, for twelve years. Ending with a Doctorate.

Business Insider admits there are related scholarly debates.

In other words, this is not really new news.

More so this type of information works against a fundamentalist dictation theory of Scripture and that God maintains Scripture within a dictation theory model.

But one could observe I did not hold to dictation theory, years ago on my sites.

However, the type of information does not work against a view of the Scripture, the original autographs, as inspired by God and God the Holy Spirit through writers associated with Christ, that were Apostles and Disciples and associated scribes, written without theological error and with inerrancy.

God did not place a supernatural force field of protection around the original Biblical autographs.

God did not place a supernatural force field of protection around copies of the Scripture to maintain accuracy.

Rather the Scripture has been maintained through ancient and modern scholarship with the use of thousands of manuscripts in whole and part, critical thinking and reasoning with God's guidance.

God's has a sovereign and providential role in this theologically.

And God is the first cause in all things, philosophically. He wills and sanctions all things.

I could add to the type of points made in the video that there are various versions of texts in the New Testament Greek and various English Bible versions (for example), but with minor differences. However central, orthodox theology and the Gospel remains consistent in message.

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Satire And Theology October 31, 2006

Cited and edited from my second blog

The divine inspiration of Scripture was noted as important.

The New Testament is not full of mythological stories of clearly fictional characters, but actual people that existed. The same group of people discussed within the New Testament, is also the group that produced the Scripture. Therefore, the New Testament is historically grounded on eyewitness testimony, and associates of eyewitnesses.

Since every manuscript contains scribal errors, we can conclude the copies are not equal to the original inspired letters. This does not mean that we have to abandon the Biblical idea of inspired Scripture. I firmly hold to the concept of 2 Timothy 3:16 that all Scripture is inspired by God for teaching, and training. I think we can deduce that scribal errors do not equate with theological errors, and therefore scribal errors do not eradicate or change the New Testament’s essential doctrines.

There are enough New Testament documents extant that scholars would know if certain schools of manuscripts contained serious differences in theology from other schools. This is why as Christians we do not need to take seriously the claims of critics that state that lost or hidden New Testament era documents from the group of eyewitnesses contradict the ones found in the New Testament.

The manuscript evidence supports the fact that there are scribal errors in the documents, but does not support the idea of major theological differences between different groups of manuscripts.

My theory of inspiration would include the idea that God inspired the original New Testament documents written by those within the group of Christ and the Apostles.

Since the documents would eventually physically disintegrate, God would have to use supernatural means to maintain the original documents. The idea of God using some kind of supernatural force field to maintain the documents as good as new does not seem in line with how God works in our world over a long period, and so it is not surprising that God allowed the originals to be destroyed or lost, and instead maintained his Scripture through copying.

The copying mistakes did not affect any major doctrine, but we do have related issues like with the ending of Mark. Mark 16: 9-20 does not appear in Codex Vaticanus (B),or Codex Sinaiticus (Sin), the two oldest groups of manuscripts. Marlowe (2006: 1).

The manuscripts have Mark ending at 16: 8. However, 16: 9-20 does appear in Codex Alexandrinus (A), which is a slightly newer manuscript. Miller (2005: 1).

It is possible a scribe or scribes added 16: 9-20, which became part the majority of New Testament texts, but it does not change the essential message of the Gospel or New Testament. We have copies from the two older groups of manuscripts which allow scholars to speculate that it is possible that Mark 16: 9-20 was not written by Mark, but written by a scribe at a later date.

God has therefore not allowed a corruption of New Testament theology at its core even if he did allow an uninspired scribe to write 16: 9-20 and allowed it to become part of the majority text.

It is also possible that Mark died and God inspired an associate who had known Mark to complete the book which appears in the majority text. This view held to by my Mark Biblical Studies professor, at Seminary, for example.

My essential Christian theology is not changed whether or not Mark ends at 16: 8 or 16: 9-20. If Mark died and the book ended at 16: 8, I do not see any need to place demands upon the Markan text and state that it had to have contained an actual resurrection appearance. The ending of the book does make it clear that Christ was no longer in the tomb and was resurrected. The tomb was empty, and a man, likely of supernatural origin in 16: 6-7 made it clear that Christ had risen.

My hope is that a scribe or scribes did not think that the lack of a resurrection appearance and an abrupt ending meant that another ending had to be created.

My New American Standard Bible has two different additional endings after 16: 8. However, if endings were added by scribes, God has still provided the Church with evidence of this from Codex Vaticanus (B),and Codex Sinaiticus (Sin). The Church could therefore take anything stated in these verses as less than Biblically authoritative, but these verses do not influence major Christian doctrines.

I therefore can view our present New Testament as an essentially accurate copy of the original inspired word of God.

Inspiration and inerrancy of the original autographs can be reasonably held to theologically; as can the view God has accurately maintained his Scripture.

But admittedly, this a moderate conservative position and not a fundamentalist one, but may evidence lead and not pre-set assumptions.

Marlowe, Michael D. (2006) ‘Mark 16: 9-20’, Bible-Researcher.com, Ohio. http://www.bible-researcher.com/endmark.html

Miller, Dave (2005) ‘Is Mark 16: 9-20 Inspired?’, Apologetics Press.org, Montgomery, Alabama. http://www.apologeticspress.org/articles/2780

Amphiboly

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CONWAY DAVID A. AND RONALD MUNSON (1997) The Elements of Reasoning, Wadsworth Publishing Company, New York.

PIRIE, MADSEN (2006)(2015) How To Win Every Argument, Bloomsbury, London.

WALTON, DOUGLAS (1996) ‘Informal Fallacy’, in Robert Audi, (ed), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Examples from Pirie

I met the ambassador riding his horse. He was snorting and steaming, so I gave him a lump of sugar.' (38)

'FOR SALE: Car by elderly lady with new body and spare tyre. (38)

Note

I now just realize this is how 'tyre' is spelled in British English. I wrote my MPhil and PhD theses with British English, but 'tyre' is still new to me.

(Canadian and American English is 'tire')

Amphiboly is the fallacy of ambiguous construction. (37)

The fallacy occurs often when one fails to consider alternate readings. (38)

This could be due to mistakes in punctuation and grammar.

He states that astrology makes good use of amphiboly as do fortune tellers and a prophet to 'hedge his bets' (38) and 'have it both ways. (38)

This would of course be a false prophet. A true prophet, receiving actual information from God would do no such thing and to hedge bets would risk death in error. Deuteronomy 13 and 18 both stating a false prophet within the Old Testament, Mosaic Law should be put to death.

In the New Testament context a false prophet is to be exposed as such by the Church. This minus the Mosaic Law. 2 Peter (false prophets and false teachers) and Jude (false teachers) are two notable New Testament books to expose false religionists. Jesus also mentioned false Christs and false prophets in Matthew 24.

I am not implying or indicating that all prophets use amphiboly, although to Pirie's credit, he points out a tool that can be used by false religionists.

'The Elements' text is useful considering vagueness and ambiguity in writing arguments.

Vagueness described as a term's lack of precision (176) and ambiguity allows for various possible meanings, each which may be precise. (176).

In Cambridge, Amphiboly is called '(double arrangement)' as traditional fallacy from Aristotle's list. (376). It is the use of 'syntactically ambiguous sentences.' (376).

trekearth

Affirming The Consequent Fallacy

From Google+ Eastern or Southern Europe?

Affirming The Consequent Fallacy

Originally published 2015-11-11. Revised with additions on 2023-11-17, for a posting on academia.edu.

Preface

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

PIRIE, MADSEN (2006)(2015) How To Win Every Argument, Bloomsbury, London.

Blackburn explains 'Any proposition of the form 'if p then q'. The condition hypothesized, p, is called the antecedent of the conditional, and q the consequent'. Blackburn (1996: 73).

According to Blackburn conditional equates to consequent.

Affirming The Consequent Fallacy

Pirie writes affirming the consequent fallacy is natural for those that confuse 'the order of horses and carts'. Pirie (2006)(2015: 35).

His example

'When cats are bitten by rabid hedgehogs they die. Here is a dead cat, so obviously, there is a rabid hedgehog about'. (35).

The author explains that there are other overlooked reasons for the death of the cat such as being hit by a vehicle or electrocuted. The death of the cat from a rabid hedgehog cannot be reasonably deduced as fact. (35).

It is proper to affirm the antecedent (p from Blackburn) to prove (q) the consequent, but not vice-versa. (35).

So, using his example, when cats are bitten by a rabid hedgehog they die (or when cats are infected by rabies, my add) (p), but the (q) cannot be affirmed to prove (p).

There are many possible reasons for a deceased feline.

Interestingly, Pirie notes that this fallacy is used in the legal system, the courts, as the basis for circumstantial evidence.

For example, based on his examples.

If John wanted to kill his wife Joan, he would have taken out an extra life insurance on Joan.

John did take out extra life insurance on Joan.

Or,

If John had wanted to poison Joan to death, he would have bought poison.

John did buy poison.

These both have alternate explanations (37) but when these mount up it becomes easier for a court to find someone guilty of a crime. (37).

Pirie writes that this fallacy under review, is used to impute motives to a person. (37). This could be committed in a legal and court context, or like to find guilt with someone.

Perhaps in truth, perhaps in error.

Logically fallacious: Affirming the Consequent 

Cited

'Description: An error in formal logic where if the consequent is said to be true, the antecedent is said to be true, as a result. 

Logical Form: If P then Q. Q. Therefore, P. Example #1: If taxes are lowered, I will have more money to spend. I have more money to spend. Therefore, taxes must have been lowered. 

Explanation: I could have had more money to spend simply because I gave up crack-cocaine, prostitute solicitation, and baby-seal-clubbing expeditions.'

'References: Jevons, W. S. (1872). Elementary lessons in logic: deductive and inductive : with copious questions and examples, and a vocabulary of logical terms. Macmillan.'

(Quite the examples from the website...)

Critical thinker academy: Affirming the Consequent

Cited

'“Affirming the Consequent” is the name of an invalid conditional argument form. You can think of it as the invalid version of modus ponens.

Below is modus ponens, which is valid:

1. If A then B

2. A

Therefore, B

Now, below is the invalid form that you get when you try to infer the antecedent by affirming the consequent:

1. If A then B

2. B

Therefore, A

No matter what claims you substitute for A and B, any argument that has the form of I will be valid, and any argument that AFFIRMS THE CONSEQUENT will be INVALID.

Remember, what it means to say that an argument is invalid is that IF the premises are all true, the conclusion could still be false. In other words, the truth of the premises does not guarantee the truth of the conclusion.

Here’s an example:

1. If I have the flu then I’ll have a fever.

2. I have a fever.

Therefore, I have the flu.

Here we’re affirming that the consequent is true, and from this, inferring that the antecedent is also true.

But it’s obvious that the conclusion doesn’t have to be true. Lots of different illnesses can give rise to a fever, so from the fact that you’ve got a fever there’s no guarantee that you’ve got the flu.'

(Yes, sadly I had the mumps and a fever as a child)

(Therefore a valid deductive argument can have: 

False premises and a true conclusion (FT) 

False premises and a false conclusion (FF) 

True premises and a true conclusion (TT) 

However... True premises and a false conclusion (TF) is invalid

Valid arguments with all true premises are called sound arguments

These also have true conclusions)

---

Cumulative evidences

In PhD thesis research, this fallacy connects to cumulative evidences. One evidence by itself may not lead to a reasonable conclusion, but the more cumulative evidences there are, the more reasonable a conclusion.

From a Biblical perspective, historical Scriptural evidences for the existence of the triune God, Christ and the Gospel can be used, primarily in an attempt to demonstrate Christianity as a reasonable or most reasonable worldview, philosophy, theology.

Secondarily, theistic philosophical (philosophy of religion) evidences such as the idea as necessary for an infinite, eternal, first cause can also be used, although they do not prove the Biblical God, they support the existence of such a creator.

Therefore the secondary cumulative evidences can support the primary cumulative evidences.

But this should not be done affirming the consequent fallacy.

I would NOT state simply...

(A) An infinite, eternal, first cause, is necessary (antecedent)

(b) The eternal Biblical God is documented in scripture (consequent)

A to B exists (yes, both A and B exist)

Therefore 

B to A means B is A (affirming the consequent fallacy)

All is correct until the therefore...

More premises are required in support of B = A.

Deism and other forms of theism are other worldviews and philosophical and theological possibilities. But these propositions and evidences must be reasonably and accurately compared to the propositions, and conclusions, the evidences, for Biblical Christianity. Through my MPhil and PhD theses research, and my website research and articles, I have connected the historical, Scriptural God to philosophy of religion concepts. I do reason that within reasonable, but not absolute certainty, internally and externally the premises in support of Biblical Christianity as a worldview are superior to premises in support of any other worldview. Therefore Biblical Christianity is true. Note, from my archives, only the infinite God has absolute, 100% certainty.

But reviews of, and comparisons to, other worldviews have taken place. Even without admittedly complete objectivity, having been a biblical Christian from a very young age, this was done with the use of reasoning, prayer, considering propositions and then premises and conclusions as evidence.

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

CONWAY DAVID A. AND RONALD MUNSON (1997) The Elements of Reasoning, Wadsworth Publishing Company, New York.

LANGER, SUSANNE K (1953)(1967) An Introduction to Symbolic Logic, Dover Publications, New York. (Philosophy).

PIRIE, MADSEN (2006)(2015) How To Win Every Argument, Bloomsbury, London.

Accident Fallacy

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Accident Fallacy

Preface

A short but tricky article from 20151107, where I continued to review the Pirie text on fallacies. Slight revisions and additions for an entry on academia.edu 20240817.

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

PIRIE, MADSEN (2006)(2015) How To Win Every Argument, Bloomsbury, London.

Cited

Pirie explains that this fallacy assumes the 'freak features of an exceptional case are enough to accept rejection of the general rule'. (33). The features in question may be accidental and may be considered an unusual, allowable exception. (33). Almost every generalization could be rejected because of a possible accidental case it does not cover. But to always maintain this is the fallacy of accident. (33). 

It is fallacious to treat a general, qualified statement as if it is unqualified. (33). The author states that it is a fallacy that appeals to anarchists because it appears to overturn general rules. (33).

General rules with a few exceptions.

Clarification

In philosophy:

An unqualified statement is considered certain.

Unqualified = Certain

A qualified statement has levels of uncertainty.

Qualified = Uncertain    

Accident Fallacy

Blackburn writes that the accident fallacy is from the unqualified (certain my add) statement to the statement qualified (uncertain, my add). (7). Pirie explains that this fallacy assumes the 'freak features of an exceptional case are enough to accept rejection of the general rule'.

'a dicto simpliciter ad dictum secundum quid ' (7).

Blackburn writes that is an (alleged) fallacy. (7). Arguing from the general case to the specific, particular case, without recognizing some qualifying factors. (7).

He lists as example: 'If some snakes are harmless then some snakes in this bag are harmless.' (7).

I take it that philosophically, one should be careful in the diagnosis of accident fallacy, as it may not always be so.

My example: 

Florida won the 2024 Stanley Cup.

Florida will therefore will the next three Stanley Cups. 

Technically possible, but highly unlikely. There are 32 teams competing and the odds are Florida will not win the next three Stanley Cups. In a sense, it is an exception that any one particular team is that year's winner. It is always more likely that one of the other 31 teams will win the Stanley Cup, at least mathematically. Even a favoured team before the season would not likely even receive even odds to be champions from the odds makers.

We can see here why Blackburn calls it an alleged fallacy. My example could theoretically occur. A team can win four Stanley Cups in a row, but it has only be done by the Montreal Canadiens (2x) and New York Islanders (1x).

Converse Accident Fallacy

From the qualified (uncertain, my add) statement to the unqualified (certain, my add). (7).

'a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter' Blackburn (7).

The fallacy of taking out a needed qualification. (7).

Also known as 'converse fallacy of the accident'. (7).

'If it is always permissible to kill in war, then it is always permissible to kill'. (7).

My example:

I would question even the qualified (uncertain) statement in the example.

It is permissible to kill willing opposing combatants.

It is not permissible to kill unwilling opposing combatants (surrendered or injured).

It is not permissible to kill civilians.

Therefore, it is not always permissible to kill in war.

However, for the example listed, it is not always permissible to kill (answering the unqualified, certain premise) because warfare operates with a different set of legal and ethical rules than does non-warfare.

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BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

PIRIE, MADSEN (2006)(2015) How To Win Every Argument, Bloomsbury, London. 

Converse Accident: Hasty Generalization from Lander University 

Cited 

'Converse Accident: (hasty generalization) the fallacy of considering two few cases or certain exceptional cases and generalizing to a rule that fits them alone. (Note that the fallacy of converse accident is the opposite of the fallacy of accident.)'

Cited

'Converse accident fallacies arise since many different logical generalizations are consistent with a finite amount of data. But not all of those generalizations are consistent with each other.' 

webmaster@philosophy.lander.edu

Fallacy Of Accent

Maple Ridge (Home of Mr. Bobby Buff)

Blackwell Reference Online

Cited

'Fallacy of Accent

Logic

A fallacy originally noticed by Aristotle, in which an argument proceeds to a conclusion by changing the syllabic accent of a word and hence causing its meaning to be changed. Such an argument is, of course, invalid. It is later expanded to cover cases in which one argues by emphasizing different parts of a sentence hence changing its meaning. It is also called the fallacy of emphasis, and usually occurs in spoken language. “The fallacy of accent is committed whenever a statement is accented in such a way as to change its meaning, and is employed in an argument.” Carney and Scheer, Fundamentals of Logic.'

PIRIE, MADSEN (2006)(2015) How To Win Every Argument, Bloomsbury, London.

Cited

'The fallacy of accent defends for its effectiveness on the fact the meaning of statements can change, depending on the stress put on words. The accenting of words or phrases can give a meaning quite different from that intended, and can add implications which are not part of the literal meaning.' (31).

Example used

'Light your cigarette' (31).

a) Without accent it looks like an invitation. (31).
b) As opposed to lighting a tablecloth or something else. (31).
c) Instead of someone else. (31).
d) Instead of sticking it in your ear. (31).

The author notes that by changing the accent, the meaning can be changed. (31)

'Light your cigarette', reads like an invitation or instruction.

''Light your CIGARETTE', reads as if an instruction to light the cigarette instead of something else.

'Light YOUR cigarette' read like an instruction to light your own cigarette and not another's.

'LIGHT your cigarette' reads as an invitation, instead of sticking it in your ear.

The author states: 'The fallacy lies with the additional implications introduced by emphasis. (32).

For our Blog context, that being theology, philosophy of religion, philosophy and Bible, this following statement from Pirie is relevant and profound:

'Your most widespread use of the fallacy of accent can be to discredit opponents by quoting them with an emphasis they never indented'. (32).

He notes that Richelieu needed six lines by which to hang an honest man. (32).

I reason he is meaning Cardinal Richelieu of France. This would be a good historical example where Christianity was politicized and did not closely follow the Gospel of Jesus Christ and his disciples, the Apostles and scribes.

The use of accent in a fallacious manner can twist words for the purpose of a lie.

Another example provided:

'Samson was blinded by the king of the Philistines who had promised not to touch him'. (32).

One can promise not to touch you, but pay to have someone else blind you...

One should pay special attention to the educated and elite, whether in a political, corporate, religious or other context when he or she may be using the fallacy of accent to persuade the masses.

But of course the masses can use the fallacy as well.

From a Biblical, Christian perspective this type of fallacious reasoning, this type of twisting of the truth, for the sake of attempting to win an argument, is unethical and morally wrong.

If one cannot win an argument without using fallacy, or more importantly present a good argument, perhaps premises and conclusions need to be reconsidered.

Abusive Analogy

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Abusive Analogy

Preface

A section of the entry by entry review of the Pirie text. Originally published on Blogger 20151029, revised on Blogger 20250601 for a version on academia.edu.

PIRIE, MADSEN (2006)(2015) How To Win Every Argument, Bloomsbury, London.

Abusive Analogy

From Pirie

'The fallacy of abusive analogy is a highly specialized version of the ad hominem argument. Instead of the arguer being insulted directly, an analogy is drawn which is calculated to bring him into scorn or disrepute. The opponent or his behaviour is compared with something which will elicit an unfavourable response toward him from the audience.' (29).

Pirie provides the example:

'If science admits no certainties, then a scientist has no more certain knowledge of the universe than does a Hottentot running through the bush.' (29).

'(This is true, but is intended as abuse so that the hearer will be more sympathetic to the possibility of certain knowledge.) (29).'

This statement is not necessarily true, it is using hyperbole. Theoretically, a scientist could speculate on the existence of outer space, without being certain, while the Khoekhoe (more accurate term) may or may not, have an understanding of the concept of outer space, but also without certainty.

In other words, with Pirie's explanation, science using inductive reasoning, testing and empirical research may not claim certainty, at least in some cases, but there is still considerable, significant knowledge that has been obtained through the scientific method. A lack of certainty with inductive scientific reasoning, does not for example, by default make certain deductive philosophical and theological reasoning certain.

An analogy is not effective here as inductive and deductive reasoning succeeds or fails based on the trueness of premises and conclusions presented.

Blackburn explains that arguing by analogy is stating that since things are alike in some ways they will 'probably' (14) be alike in others. (14). The use of 'probably' here is key. Often arguing by analogy produces some similarities and some differences rendering the argument unsound.

If such an argument is used comparing only the things certainly alike it is reasonable.

However, Blackburn cites Wittgenstein, noting it can be irresponsible to generalize one case. (14).

In other words, generalizing by argument of analogy can be irresponsible. 

Wittgenstein 

Wittgenstein’s Generalisations About Generalisations: Medium-Dec 12, 2019

Paul Austin Murphy 

Cites

WITTGENSTEIN, LUDWIG (1912-1978) Ludwig Wittgenstein's Blue Book, University of Pittsburgh (depositor), University of Pittsburgh.

https://digital.library.pitt.edu/islandora/object/pitt%3A31735061817932

Digital Library

“Our craving for generality has [as one] source … our preoccupation with the method of science. I mean the method of reducing the explanation of natural phenomena to the smallest possible number of primitive natural laws; and, in mathematics, of unifying the treatment of different topics by using a generalization. Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes, and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics, and leads the philosopher into complete darkness. I want to say here that it can never be our job to reduce anything to anything, or to explain anything. Philosophy really is ‘purely descriptive’.” 

'I want to say here that it can never be our job to reduce anything to anything, or to explain anything. Philosophy really is ‘purely descriptive’.”'

A philosophical problem here, potentially at least, as this is just a small section of Wittgenstein's work and explanation, is of consistency. Wittgenstein is explaining something. He is not simply providing a description, but is offering an opinion. 

However, generalization within abusive analogy is fallacious because an ad hominem, personal attack, analogy, is concerned with attacking a person making the statement or premise (s) with a conclusion. When in contrast, what is important for accuracy is the trueness of a statement, or premise (s) and conclusion presented. Using an analogy with a generalization stating 'If science admits no certainties, then a scientist has no more certain knowledge of the universe than does a Hottentot running through the bush.' (29); this is generalizing the knowledge of the scientist within analogy. A lack of certainty does not equate to lack of knowledge, in the case of the scientist. The scientist may hold to many ideas as probably right, that may or may not, one day may be shown to be certainly right.

Wittgenstein: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Archive-Spring 2025 Edition 

By

Anat Biletzki 

Anat Matar

Cited 

'It is here that Wittgenstein’s rejection of general explanations, and definitions based on sufficient and necessary conditions, is best pronounced. Instead of these symptoms of the philosopher’s “craving for generality,” he points to ‘family resemblance’ as the more suitable analogy for the means of connecting particular uses of the same word. There is no reason to look, as we have done traditionally—and dogmatically—for one, essential core in which the meaning of a word is located and which is, therefore, common to all uses of that word. We should, instead, travel with the word’s uses through “a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing” (PI 66). Family resemblance also serves to exhibit the lack of boundaries and the distance from exactness that characterize different uses of the same concept. Such boundaries and exactness are the definitive traits of form—be it Platonic form, Aristotelian form, or the general form of a proposition adumbrated in the Tractatus. It is from such forms that applications of concepts can be deduced, but this is precisely what Wittgenstein now eschews in favor of appeal to similarity of a kind with family resemblance.'  

Generalities lead to error when they produce reasoning that fails to embrace true statements and or true premise (s) and conclusion. Better to specifically review and produce statements and or premise (s) and conclusion for accuracy in truth.

In regards to Wittgenstein rejecting definitions based on sufficient and necessary conditions: 

Texas State University/Department of Philosphy Confusion of Necessary with a Sufficient Condition 

Cited 

'A causal fallacy you commit this fallacy when you assume that a necessary condition of an event is sufficient for the event to occur. A necessary condition is a condition that must be present for an event to occur. A sufficient condition is a condition or set of conditions that will produce the event. A necessary condition must be there, but it alone does not provide sufficient cause for the occurrence of the event. Only the sufficient grounds can do this. In other words, all of the necessary elements must be there.' 

'Department of Philosophy

Dr. Craig Hanks, Chair'

I reason

Sufficient conditions mean all of the necessary conditions exist for an event

Wittgenstein: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Archive-Spring 2025 Edition 

My add below (PI):

• Philosophical Investigations, 1953, G.E.M. Anscombe and R. Rhees (eds.), G.E.M. Anscombe (trans.), Oxford: Blackwell.
• Philosophical Investigations (PI), 4th edition, 2009, P.M.S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte (eds. and trans.), Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
• ---

Primary sources noted on Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Archive 

Ludwig Wittgenstein

Bibliography 

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• Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C. K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
• Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 1961, D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness (trans.), New York: Humanities Press.
• The Voices of Wittgenstein: The Vienna Circle, 2003, Gordon Baker (ed.), Gordon Baker, Michael Mackert, John Connolly and Vasilis Politis (trans.), London: Routledge.
• Wiener Ausgabe [Vienna Edition, vols. 1, 2, 3, 5], 1993–1995, Michael Nedo (ed.), Vienna: Springer.
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• Wittgenstein: Lectures, Cambridge 1930–1933, From the Notes of G.E. Moore, 2016, David G. Stern, Brian Rogers, and Gabriel Citron (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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• Wittgenstein’s Lectures on Philosophical Psychology 1946– 47, 1988, P. T. Geach (ed.), London: Harvester.
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• The Collected Manuscripts of Ludwig Wittgenstein on Facsimile CD Rom, 1997, The Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Bibliography

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

LANGER, SUSANNE K (1953)(1967) An Introduction to Symbolic Logic, Dover Publications, New York. (Philosophy).

PIRIE, MADSEN (2006)(2015) How To Win Every Argument, Bloomsbury, London.

WITTGENSTEIN, LUDWIG (1912-1978) Ludwig Wittgenstein's Blue Book, University of Pittsburgh (depositor), University of Pittsburgh.

https://digital.library.pitt.edu/islandora/object/pitt%3A31735061817932

WITTGENSTEIN, LUDWIG (1951)(1979) On Certainty, Basil Blackwell, Oxford.

O'Conell Bridge, Dublin: trekearth

Fleet Street, London: trekearth