Notes on the Incarnation

Kassel, Germany (trekearth.com)

Introduction

December 19, 2005

My first post with my new notebook.

This is a repost with edits of a post from the blog when it was called thekingpin68 and I did not receive many comments. The original features a classic troll attack in comments from someone from California. I will share here to be nice and save you from clicking if you wish...

'what an absolute perfect blog of spiritual self indulgence...
I have NEVER read so much INTELLECTUAL TWADDLE in my LIFE [ and i have beem around a LONG time.
whew!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! you are TRULY a legend in your own mind!!!!!!
thanks for sharing.'

For those of that read my work and are not too sure about me, yes I am a legend in my own mind, I told me so. Actually, I still have a lot to learn as a child of God.

The California troll of course propelled me to write for the next 7 years.;)

Thank you.

The notes with revisions...

A pastor at church asked me for some notes for his upcoming sermon.

Colossians 2:9

MARSHALL, ALFRED (1975)(1996) The Interlinear KJV-NIV, Grand Rapids, Zondervan.

2:9 ὅτι ἐν αὐτῶ κατοικεῖ πᾶν τὸ πλήρωμα τῆς θεότητος σωματικῶς,
Because in him dwells the fullness of the Godhead bodily.

WRIGHT, N.T. (1989) Colossians and Philemon, Grand Rapids, IVP.

'Bodily form' can be translated as actually or in solid reality. p.103.

The Greek word theotes (Deity) is to be distinguished from theiotes (divinity). The term for divinity could be of a lesser being than God, and Jesus is called Deity. p.103.

There is thus no need for Christian to pay homage to lesser supernatural beings. p.103.

Christ is not a second Deity. p.103.

ASHBY, E G. (1986) 'Colossians' in The International Bible Commentary, Grand Rapids, Zondervan.

Colossians 2:9

He mentions that Lightfoot thinks that the term bodily form refers to both the incarnate and glorified Christ. Others see fullness of Deity not being as much corporeally, but corporately. p.1456.

There are of course three distinctions or persons within the Trinity, but if the first interpretation is correct, somehow the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit all work together within the incarnate and glorified body of Christ. Since God has one nature (Christ has nature of Father, Hebrews 1:3) even with the distinctions within the Trinity, the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, work together in all things including the literal body of Christ.

MARTINS, RALPH P. (1987) Philippians, Grand Rapids, IVP.

Philippians 2:6

Christ being in very nature God, refers to his pre-incarnate existence. p.100.

Being in a form of God could mean the essential attributes of God. p.101.

Concerning equality with God, one view is that the pre-incarnate God already had equality with God and chose not to cling to it. p.101.

Another view is that it that the pre-incarnate Christ could have claimed equality for himself but refused to do so. p.101.

I would think that the first view is the Biblical one in light of Christ being the eternal word in John 1, and claiming the eternal nature and the name of God for himself in John 8:58 (I AM).

The second view does not do justice to the Biblical text. p.101.

Perhaps although Christ was and is fully God, there was hierarchy in the Trinity before the Incarnation.

Christ was proclaimed as being equal with God by accepting his position as the incarnated, humiliated one. p.103.

HEWLETT, H.C. (1986) 'Philippians' in The International Bible Commentary, Grand Rapids, Zondervan.

Philippians 2:6

The participle 'hyparchon', means that Christ was already in existence. p.1444.

Christ was in very nature God and could not be Deity without being fully God. p.1444.

Not grasping at equality was not concerning nature, but state and circumstance according to Gifford. p.1444.

Christ would not exploit his Deity for his own advantage. p.1444.

He was concerned instead with submitting to the will of his Father in order to complete the atoning work, resurrection and culmination of the Kingdom of God.

ERICKSON, MILLARD J. (1994). Christian Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

Implications of Christ’s Deity

Persons can have real knowledge of God when we see Christ. p.703.

Redemption is available through his death. p.703.

God and humanity can be reunited. p.704.

Persons can worship Christ. p.704.

Implications of Christ’s humanity

Jesus as a human had limited knowledge. p.711.

Some heresies

Docetism

Jesus only seemed to be human, because matter is evil, influenced by Platonic thought. p.713.

Apollinarianism

Denied the fullness of Christ’s humanity. It assumed that if Jesus had two natures that he must have both a human soul and a divine one. He saw this as absurd and thus denied that Christ had a human soul. p.714.

Erickson noted that orthodox, Biblical Christianity holds that Jesus had a human soul and divine one, yet was not two persons. In my mind this is a correct, yet difficult concept and Erickson admits that it is paradox. Jesus on the cross gave his spirit to the Father (John 19:30), so he possessed a human spirit and was fully human. My take is that in a sense there is one spirit that is a unity of both human and divine nature. It is one spirit that is a unity of two spirits, which do not mix yet work together as one place of personality. In the Incarnation, the divine nature of Christ was unified with a human spirit/nature. To say that Christ has two spirits or souls will perhaps lead some to the idea that Christ is two persons rather than one person with two natures. The human soul of Christ is unified with the divine soul of Christ, in such a way that the two natures do not mix, yet they work together as one spirit. Therefore when Christ died he did not give his spirits, but spirit. This one soul/spirit would allow Christ to be fully human, but without an active sinful nature.

So, Jesus as a human being would be like Adam before the fall. Sin would not have been within the nature of Christ, but it was not within Adam's nature before the fall either. Christ would have been tempted by sin as a human being, and if he would have been a perfect man alone he could have technically sinned. However, due to the fact the Christ was also God incarnate, and God cannot sin, I would conclude that Christ unlike Adam would not sin.

THEISSEN, HENRY, CLARENCE (1956) Introductory Lectures in Systematic Theology, Grand Rapids, Eerdmans.

Christ did not empty himself of his divine attributes but simply surrendered the exercise of them. p.296.

He quotes Strong who states that the incarnation purged depravity from Christ. p.305.

He did not have a sinful nature. Concerning Christ nature as God and man, Theissen quotes Hodge who states that Christ’s personality resides in the divine nature, not the human one. A divine person and not just a divine nature became incarnate. p.305.

This view would be contrasted by scholars such as Mounce and Cranfield:

Cranfield in his Romans commentary p.176, comments on the likeness of sinful flesh.

Cranfield states with what he thinks is the best explanation, that being that the Greek word for likeness is not to water down Christ's fallen human nature, as in being fully human, but is to draw attention that the fallen nature was assumed but Christ did not become a fallen human being.

So, unlike some views that reason Christ's sinful human nature was purged out at the incarnation, this view reasons it was there but because of his perfect obedience and I would reason deity, he did not become a fallen human being that sinned.

So, in a sense in the likeness of sinful flesh, he had fallen human nature.

In another sense in the likeness of sinful flesh, he did not have an active fallen human nature that would have led to sinful thoughts and choices.

Mounce in his Romans commentary sees it the same way on p.175-176, Christ took upon a fallen nature but did not become completely like us, as in sinners.

So, this could have occurred by having this fallen nature purged out of him at the incarnation or he could have kept the nature, but remained via the Father and Holy Spirit the perfect man and of course God and therefore essentially did not have a fallen nature which allowed him to be the perfect sacrifice.

So he would not have a sinful nature.

REYMOND, R.L. (1996) 'Incarnation' in Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books.

Essential that the divine Logos did not take himself into union with a human person, otherwise he would become two persons, with two centers of self-consciousness. p.556.

HEBBLETHWAITE, BRIAN, 'Incarnation' in A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, London, SCM Press.

Liberal.

In modern times the doctrine of the Incarnation has been challenged by Unitarians, by deists of the enlightenment, and by liberal protestants. It is seen as mythical, and a barrier to other faiths in a pluralistic world. p.290-291.


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ASHBY, E G. (1986) 'Colossians' in The International Bible Commentary, Grand Rapids, Zondervan.

CRANFIELD, C.E.B. (1992) Romans: A Shorter Commentary, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

ERICKSON, MILLARD J. (1994) Christian Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

HEBBLETHWAITE, BRIAN, 'Incarnation' in A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, London, SCM Press.

MARSHALL, ALFRED (1975)(1996) The Interlinear KJV-NIV, Grand Rapids, Zondervan.

MARTINS, RALPH P. (1987) Philippians, Grand Rapids, IVP.

MOUNCE, R.H. (1995) The New American Commentary: Romans, Nashville, Broadman & Holman Publishers.

REYMOND, R.L. (1996) 'Incarnation' in Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books.

THEISSEN, HENRY, CLARENCE (1956) Introductory Lectures in Systematic Theology, Grand Rapids, Eerdmans.

WRIGHT, N.T. (1989) Colossians and Philemon, Grand Rapids, IVP.

Calvin on Augustine (PhD Edit)

Calvin on Augustine (PhD Edit)

Arundel Castle, West Sussex (trekearth.com) January 26, 2012 

Preface

An interesting and somewhat controversial section from my PhD thesis below. I have noted previously I have found Augustine, at least translated into English, how I read him, difficult to read and quite repetitive to work through. I am not doubting his historical greatness as a philosopher and theologian, but I think my point stands. The confusion for the better part of 2, 000 years whether or not Augustine is a compatibilist like Calvin, Feinberg and me and many in the Reformed camp that hold to a very strong view on God's sovereignty, or is an incompatiblist like Plantinga and many evangelicals that hold to various forms of libertarian free will demonstrates this confusion. It should be pointed out that there is a good amount of agreement with these views on some points that could add to the confusion at times. This is because they are both, even though one uses compatibilism and the other incompatibilism, within Christian Biblical/theological orthodoxy, whereas John Hick's theodicy, for example, primarily would not be.

Definition of Incompatibilism/Compatibilism 

Libertarian free will is usually viewed as a form of indeterminism. The concept in libertarian free will is that a person is able to perform another action in the place of one that has been committed. This action cannot be predetermined by any circumstance or desire. Norman Geisler explains that indeterminism is defined as the idea that there are no antecedent (preceding conditions) or simultaneous (at the same time) causes of human actions. All human actions are free if a person could have done otherwise. Indeterminism is also equated with incompatibilism which states that God, or any other being, cannot cause by force or coercion any human action, nor can any action be simultaneously willed by God or any other being, for the human action to remain significantly free. Compatibilism, which I hold to, would agree with incompatibilism that God or any other being cannot cause by force or coercion any significantly free human action, but contrary to incompatibilism thinks that God can simultaneously will significantly free human actions. 

Calvin on Augustine 

I include this section because as Augustine is listed as a forefather of free will theodicy,[1] as his ancient view would be considered incompatibilistic according to modern philosophy.[2] Calvin, however, throughout The Bondage and Liberation of the Will claims that Augustine supports his case for a free will theory in which human beings are in bondage to sin, unable to follow God on their own.[3] As an academic I cannot, in good conscience, use both Augustine and Calvin in this thesis without dealing with this matter.[4] As Augustine wrote a free will theodicy,[5] which included the idea that human beings require the ability to freely choose or reject God, in order to please the Almighty.[6] A.N.S. Lane (1996) notes that one problem with Calvin and his use of Augustine was Calvin rejected the use of the term free choice.[7] Calvin did state that although he rejected the term,[8] he believed his views to be in line with Augustine on human free will, that the will was free in the sense that it was not coerced but voluntary and self-determined.[9] Lane states that after centuries of debates between Catholic and Protestant scholars, many concluded Calvin correctly understood Augustine.[10] 

When reading Augustine’s theodicy, it appears to be supporting incompatibilism as human beings are noted to have the ability to freely choose or reject God.[11] He states that a human being could not act rightly unless he/she willed to do so,[12] and to do that the person must have free will in order to act rightly.[13] Calvin notes that this concept of free choice by Augustine would not be applicable to a fallen will, and could only be applied to Adam and Eve before the fall in Genesis occurred.[14] This point by Calvin, however, was never clearly demonstrated in Augustine’s writings; instead, Augustine has been viewed historically as a theologian who held to free will theory[15] within incompatibilist freedom in modern terms, and a strong view of God’s sovereignty.[16] Feinberg believes that Augustine was not the ancient equivalent of a modern compatibilist,[17] but made the error of writing a theodicy, which featured free will and incompatibilist thought, and yet held to a theory of God’s sovereignty, which would necessitate some type of determinism.[18] It would seem Augustine either made a logical error in accepting the ancient equivalents of incompatibilist human free choice and compatibilist sovereignty for God,[19] or he simply failed to adequately explain the connection in particular whether or not his free will theodicy applied equally to pre-fall and post-fall humanity.[20] Lane points out that Calvin, in The Bondage and Liberation of the Will, lacked the library resources needed and loosely quoted Augustine.[21] Calvin was familiar with Augustine’s traditionally strong view of God’s sovereignty,[22] and perhaps he rightly or wrongly interpreted that sovereignty as applying to Augustine’s concept of free will.[23] I would postulate in agreement with Feinberg that Augustine’s free will theodicy appears to be incompatibilistic in regard to human free will and is likely compatibilistic in regard to God’s sovereignty.[24] The connection between the two concepts seems not to be adequately explained by Augustine.[25] 

Rowan A. Greer states that it was realized by Augustine there was a difficulty holding to free will theodicy and a strong view of God’s sovereignty.[26] Greer concluded that Augustine always maintained a free will approach,[27] and held that God had sovereign control in the universe to punish evildoers.[28] Greer thought Augustine’s solution to the problem that his free will theodicy perhaps contradicted his views on sovereignty, would be to restrict the concept of free will to Adam and Eve before the fall.[29] It should be pointed out that this is Greer’s assumption[30] and, although it agrees with Calvin’s idea,[31] Greer speculates that Augustine viewed his free will idea as appropriate for Adam and Eve before the fall, and not for humanity after it.[32] Greer however, like Calvin,[33] was not able to produce a distinct Augustine reference that stated this, and so in my mind this supports the idea that it is still unknown whether or not Augustine, when discussing this idea of human freedom, was including post-fall humanity in that concept.[34] It is therefore reasonable to deduce that Augustine quite possibly held that fallen humanity still had some ability to freely choose and reject God,[35] which would place him in the incompatibilism camp in regard to human free choice.[36] Regardless of Calvin’s views,[37] in modern scholarship Augustine and his free will theodicy are primarily reviewed within incompatibilist camp.[38] 

AUGUSTINE (388-395)(1964) On Free Choice of the Will, Translated by Anna S.Benjamin and L.H. Hackstaff, Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall. 

CALVIN, JOHN (1543)(1996) The Bondage and Liberation of the Will, Translated by G.I. Davies, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House. 

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House. 

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press. 

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1996) ‘Freedom, Free Will, and Determinism’ in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books. 

GREER, ROWAN A. (1996) ‘Augustine’s Transformation of The Free Will Defence’, in Faith and Philosophy, Volume 13, Number 4, October, pp. 471-486. Wilmore, Kentucky, Asbury College. 

LANE, A.N.S. (1543)(1996) ‘Introduction’, in The Bondage and Liberation of the Will, by John Calvin, Grand Rapids, Baker Books. 

MCCANN, HUGH J. (2001) ‘Sovereignty and Freedom: A Reply to Rowe’, in Faith and Philosophy, Volume 18, Number 1, January, pp. 110-116. Wilmore, Kentucky, Asbury College. 

PETERSON, MICHAEL, WILLIAM HASKER, BRUCE REICHENBACH, AND DAVID BASINGER (1996)(eds.), ‘Introduction: Saint Augustine: Evil is Privation of Good’, in Philosophy of Religion, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

[1] Peterson, Hasker, Reichenbach, and Basinger (1996: 231).

[2] McCann (2001: 115). Geisler (1986: 75).

[3] Calvin (1543)(1996: 95-96).

[4] Calvin (1543)(1996: 95-96).

[5] Peterson, Hasker, Reichenbach, and Basinger (1996: 231).

[6] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 37).

[7] Lane in Calvin (1543)(1996: xix).

[8] Lane in Calvin (1543)(1996: xix). Calvin (1543)(1996: 103).

[9] Calvin (1543)(1996: 103).

[10] Lane in Calvin (1543)(1996: xxiv).

[11] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 36).

[12] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 36).

[13] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 36).

[14] Calvin (1543)(1996: 95).

[15] Peterson, Hasker, Reichenbach, and Basinger (1996: 231).

[16] Feinberg (1994: 98).

[17] Feinberg (1994: 98).

[18] Feinberg (1994: 98).

[19] Feinberg (1994: 98).

[20] Feinberg (1994: 98).

[21] Lane in Calvin (1543)(1996: xxiii).

[22] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 3). Greer (1996: 481).

[23] Lane in Calvin (1543)(1996: xxiii).

[24] Feinberg (1994: 98).

[25] Feinberg (1994: 98). Lane in Calvin (1543)(1996: xxiii).

[26] Greer (1996: 481).

[27] Greer (1996: 481).

[28] Greer (1996: 481).

[29] Greer (1996: 481).

[30] Greer (1996: 481).

[31] Calvin (1543)(1996: 96).

[32] Greer (1996: 481). Calvin (1543)(1996: 96).

[33] Calvin (1543)(1996: 96).

[34] Greer (1996: 481). Calvin (1543)(1996: 96).

[35] Feinberg (1994: 98). Lane in Calvin (1543)(1996: xxiii).

[36] Feinberg (1994: 98).

[37] Calvin (1543)(1996: 96).

[38] Therefore Augustine is primarily reviewed as such.