Tuesday, January 03, 2012

C.S. Lewis and Thoughts on Total Depravity


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Usually I present one post a month, but since the response has been good for the December/January post I present a second short January article. I did state that I would consider this as an option in the past based on comments/interaction/emails/pageviews. Cheers. Blessings in 2012.

The article C.S. Lewis and total depravity was presented February 2, 2008. I have added a new section.

Lewis and Depravity

The entire MPhil can be found in the January 2006 archives and the link below:

MPhil 2003

C.S. Lewis and Thoughts on Total Depravity

British born, Clive Staples Lewis (1898-1963) was a world renowned British writer whose theological literary works have been influential within Christian apologetics. Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, describes Lewis’ beginnings and places of study.

Anglican scholar-novelist and Christian Apologist, perhaps best known for his literary fantasies that explore theological concepts. Born near Belfast in Northern Ireland, he received his B.A. from University College, Oxford, in 1924, and was fellow and tutor in English literature at Magdalen College, Oxford, from 1925 until 1954. He then accepted the Chair of Medieval and Renaissance English at Cambridge. Hein (1996: 630).

Lewis pointed out some definite examples of human wickedness in his era and culture; however, he rejected the idea of Total Depravity. He stated:

This chapter will have been misunderstood if anyone describes it as a reinstatement of the doctrine of Total Depravity. I disbelieve the doctrine, partly on the logical grounds that if our depravity were total we should not know ourselves to be depraved, and partly because experience shows us much goodness in human nature. Lewis (1940)(1996: 61).

I can see the logic of Lewis’ point of view; however, I don’t agree with his conclusions. I will first give the comments of C.C. Ryrie and then explain my perspective.

The concept of total depravity does not mean

(1) that depraved people cannot or do not perform actions that are good in either man’s or God’s sight. But no such action can gain favor with God for salvation. Neither does it mean

(2) that fallen man has no conscience which judges between good and evil for him. But that conscience has been effected by the fall so that it cannot be a safe and reliable guide. Neither does it mean

(3) that people indulge in every form of sin or in any sin to the greatest extent possible.

Positively total depravity means that the corruption has extended to all aspects of man’s nature, to his being: and total depravity means that because of that corruption there is nothing man can do to merit saving favour with God. Ryrie (1996: 312).

I would think Lewis did not significantly understand the doctrine. Ryrie’s first point answers Lewis’ objection. The doctrine is not about humanity being so evil that no good is possible. The point is that these good works can in no way earn salvation. As well, with Ryrie’s second point, humanity could acknowledge the existence of sin and evil in them because they still had a conscience, although it was scarred. Also, the depravity is not total in the sense of every aspect of evil in people being maximized, it means instead that humanity is corrupt to the point where salvation cannot be merited.

I think Ryrie explains the concept well, and understands it, unlike Lewis. However, I wonder if human beings can commit truly good acts, like both men suggest. I would think since humanity is totally depraved that no true human good is possible. If true goodness is found in perfection, as is God, then we cannot obtain that good. Even as Christians that attempt to perform the will of God with the help of the Holy Spirit, would there not be just a little taint of sin in all our actions? It is my view that human good is likely an absence of a complete maximization of our total depravity. I, for example, may appear to be humanly good compared to a serial murderer; however, that is because the murderer has been found out as someone who has committed heinous crimes, where as Lewis pointed out with an individual, my evil can be hidden in public persona.

HEIN, R. (1996) C.S. Lewis, in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books.

LEWIS, C.S. (1940)(1996) The Problem of Pain, San Francisco, Harper-Collins.

RYRIE, C.C. (1996) Total Depravity, in Walter A. Elwell (ed.),Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books.

January 3, 2012

That section from MPhil was written in 2003 and prior, obviously prior to me being a Doctor.

‘However, I wonder if human beings can commit truly good acts, like both men suggest. I would think since humanity is totally depraved that no true human good is possible. If true goodness is found in perfection, as is God, then we cannot obtain that good. Even as Christians that attempt to perform the will of God with the help of the Holy Spirit, would there not be just a little taint of sin in all our actions? It is my view that human good is likely an absence of a complete maximization of our total depravity.’

It is my deduction even as of 2012 that one in Christ would at least have to be out of the sinful flesh, as in being in spirit form in Paradise, assuming it as some type of literal actual place (Luke 23, 2 Corinthians 12 and Revelation 2), and eventually be in resurrected form (1 Corinthians 15), to be free from this taint. John Calvin makes the point in the Bondage and Liberation of the Will that purity is spoiled by a tiny blemish and implies that sin is included in every good work (in this present realm). Calvin (1543)(1996: 27). Therefore I still support those MPhil conclusions.

CALVIN, JOHN (1543)(1996) The Bondage and Liberation of the Will, Translated by G.I. Davies, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.


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Sunday, January 01, 2012

John Hick on Hell (PhD Edit)


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December 24, 2011

Hell

John Hick strongly disagrees with the Augustinian tradition of an everlasting hell.[1] Within this approach, the idea that significantly free persons reject God and do not repent and follow the creator,[2] leads to a conclusion that God will issue post-mortem punishment of these people.[3] Hick reasons such a view is a product of religious imagination.[4] He writes that the everlasting hell idea has served the Christian Church well throughout history because it demonstrated the cosmic drama that separates humankind from God and Christ.[5] Hick, however, sees the fatal flaws within the view of everlasting hell as necessarily leading those who study theodicy in the modern era to reject such a doctrine.[6] He notes since everlasting punishment would not assist in soul-making that it would be unconstructive, constituting the largest part of the problem of evil.[7] Since the universe would forever contain the evil of rebellious persons, God’s creation would permanently be spoiled and ultimately a failure.[8] Clark Pinnock (1992) describes a conditional immortality view within the Four Views on Hell text by William V. Crockett.[9] Pinnock explains that reconciliation and redemption would be questionable within heaven if evil existed in hell forever.[10] Surely God would have to abolish all evil in his new creation postulates Pinnock.[11] The subject of everlasting punishment is not central,[12] and therefore as seen within this thesis is not reviewed within the theodicy work of Augustine, Plantinga, or Feinberg. Everlasting hell was connected by Hick to Augustinian and Reformed thought,[13] but arguments for or against everlasting hell are not directly related to free will or sovereignty theodicy.[14]


December 24, 2011

In contrast

I was wisely advised by my adviser not to go deeply into the subject in my PhD thesis as it would be too controversial and dangerous in the secular setting of UK/European academia. I have however discussed this subject in other posts on both blogs.

In the annihilation article on satire and theology I presented an argument against the annihilation of unregenerate post-mortem persons. This is not exhaustive and is an argument, not the argument. I have used Erickson as a source to support my premises and conclusion.

God is perfectly holy.

Erickson writes that God is totally separate from his creation. Erickson (1994: 284).
Erickson lists Exodus 15: 11, 1 Samuel 2: 2 and Isaiah 57: 15.
God is absolutely pure and good; God is not evil. Erickson (1994: 285).
Erickson lists Job 34: 12, Habakkuk 1: 13 and James 1: 13

Human beings are sinful. Due to the fall.

Jeremiah 17: 9, Romans Chapter 1-3, Romans 3: 23, Romans 6: 23.

Sin must be atoned.

God is the administrator of justice and cannot justly simply forgive sins. Erickson (1994: 816). God is equally the God of love and justice. Justice is therefore not ignored for the sake of love, as a holy God must be just.

Christ as infinite God outlasted finite sin in the atonement.

As God, Christ’s death has infinite worth. Erickson (1994: 804). As God he can atone for all finite human sin.

Christ as a perfect man was sacrificed for imperfect persons in the atonement.

As a human, Christ could redeem other humans. Erickson (1994: 804). Christ redeemed all of human nature through the atonement. Erickson (1994: 804).

Therefore:

Those outside of Christ cannot justly be annihilated as their sins are never atoned.

Further, Biblically, all persons exist port-mortem (Revelation, Chapter 20). Unfortunately, it could be reasoned that everlasting punishment exists as finite unregenerate persons continue to attempt to, in a sense, atone for their sins in hell, but can never fully cover their sins without Christ. Therefore they cannot justly be annihilated. Earthly sins are not covered, and post-mortem sins (rejecting God and related) in disembodied and resurrection states also remain uncovered.

BROWNING, W.R.F. (1997) Oxford Dictionary of the Bible, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

CROCKET, WILLIAM (1992) Four Views On Hell, William Crocket (ed.),Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.

ERICKSON, MILLARD (1994) Christian Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

HICK, JOHN (1970) Evil and The God of Love, London, The Fontana Library.


[1] Hick (1970: 284).
[2] Hick (1970: 284).
[3] Hick (1970: 284).
[4] Hick (1970: 284).
[5] Hick (1970: 284).
[6] Hick (1970: 284-285).
[7] Hick (1970: 377). It can be deduced that everlasting hell is a realm that is not an aspect of God’s creation intended for human development. It would not have to be free from the problem of evil. Our present universe would be restored through Christ and the problem of evil ended. Any everlasting hell would not constitute, in our context, the largest aspect of the problem of evil.
[8] Hick (1970: 378).
[9] Pinnock in Crockett (1992: 154).
[10] Pinnock in Crockett (1992: 154).
[11] Pinnock in Crockett (1992: 154). Browning suggests everlasting hell concepts such as Hades may relate to the Christian, New Testament use of ancient myths that consisted of the ‘decent of deities to the underworld,’ such as Orpheus, Eurydice and Persephone. Christ may be understood to have descended here after his death (First Peter 3: 19). Browning (1997: 168).
[12] It is a related issue to the study of theodicy.
[13] Hick (1970: 284).
[14] Hick (1970: 284).


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