Enlightenment?

Gold Coast, Australia 

From my MPhil 

MPhil 

I realize I used some variant, but correct versions of words from British English back in 2003. 6. Enlightenment? In his sixth chapter, entitled Suffering and the God of the Philosophers, McGrath pointed out that suffering was nothing new in the world. He did state, however, that the philosophical way in which suffering was now discussed, had been changed. He noted: Indeed, I spent many years working through most of the major works on Christian theology written between the twelfth and sixteenth centuries, and cannot recall any of them treating the reality of suffering as a serious obstacle to Christian faith. McGrath (1992: 40). 

McGrath noted that the change took place beginning in the seventeenth century which led to the era of the Enlightenment. It shifted the defence of the gospel from revelation and Scripture to philosophy. The view was: "To defend the Christian faith, it was advisable to set aside traditional ways of justifying it, and instead to rely upon the wisdom of philosophy." McGrath (1992: 40). 

McGrath was critical of this approach which overlooked revelation and Scripture, and instead looked to philosophy. It changed the God represented from a personal God of Scripture to a perfect philosophical God. He was particularly critical of seventeenth century philosopher Rene Descartes. McGrath thought that the " . . .enormous emphasis which came to be placed upon the perfection of God by Descartes was totally compromised by the undeniable fact of the existence of evil and suffering. How could a perfect being allow such imperfection to exist?" McGrath (1992: 41). 

McGrath believed that this type of thinking, which he described as creating the god of philosophers, put so much emphasis on God’s perfect attributes that it took away from God’s actual experience in suffering as Christ. So when modern critics were criticizing God, they often criticised this perfect, aloof God whom they thought represented Christianity, whereas the God of revelation and Scripture suffered personally on earth. He died for the sins of humanity, was resurrected and will restore creation. Seventeenth century revision of Christian thought was known as the Age of Reason, which led to the Enlightenment. Colin Brown described the Enlightenment as follows: The Age of Enlightenment (German Die Aufklarung) covers roughly the eighteenth century. It is sometimes identified with the Age of Reason, but the latter term covers both the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Although the Enlightenment had some of its roots in seventeenth century rationalism, the ideas which characterize the Enlightenment went far beyond the rationalism of Descartes, Spinoza, and the thinkers of their time. Brown (1996: 355). So from Brown’s idea, the roots of the Enlightenment started with philosophers like Descartes, but went beyond those men. 

Basically the ideas McGrath was discussing took place in the Enlightenment - Age of Reason. David A. Pailin, of Manchester University, stated: The Enlightenment’s criticism of the authority of tradition led to increasing secularization in attitudes and ideas. Nature is seen as an ordered whole rather than as a stage for divine interventions and supernatural happenings. So far as religious beliefs are concerned, claims to revelation are acceptable only when they are rationally justified and their contents subject to reason’s judgement. Biblical stories and accepted doctrines are not immune from criticism. Works like Bayle’s Historical and Critical Dictionary and Voltaire’s Philosophical Dictionary highlight the faults of revered figures and the questionability of standard doctrines. Historical and literary investigations into the Bible develop. Reports about miracles, especially that of the resurrection, give rise to considerable discussion. There is great hostility to priestcraft and suspicion of ecclesiastical pretensions to guide human understanding. Pailin (1999: 180). 

David Pailin’s comments demonstrate some of the modern assumptions made by philosophers of religion concerning Christianity. As McGrath indicated, there is a distrust of revelation and Scripture. As Pailin pointed out, revelation and ecclesiastical pretensions would often face great hostility philosophically. I agree with the Enlightenment approach to review Christian claims through reason, but it appears that more faith is put in the Enlightenment critics of Christianity than in the people who wrote the original work. Enlightenment thinking is committed to ". . . reason as the proper tool and final authority for determining issues." Pailin (1999: 179). 

Enlightenment thinking has human reason as the final authority, whereas traditional Christianity uses human reason, but it assumes that human nature is fallen and God must reveal himself to that reason. Enlightenment thinking, in my view, rests on the faulty idea that finite man should be able to be the final judge regarding ideas about God. Enlightenment era thinking, which is still prominent in liberal circles today, believes that man has the ability to reason out who God is, whereas traditional Christianity believes that God must reveal himself in order for human beings to come to some understanding of who he is. So the Enlightenment puts greater emphasis on the human mind comprehending God, whereas traditional Christianity puts emphasis on Scripture inspired by God, which must teach human beings about God. Two problems come to mind concerning the human mind’s ability to know God. First, the human mind is finite, God is infinite. It could be said that human beings could only understand God in a limited way. This is not to say that the limited human understanding was in error or without logic, but simply limited. 

For this reason, I think in this relationship God would have to take the initiative in presenting himself to humanity for greater understanding, and this would lead to revelation. Second, I believe there is significant evidence in Scripture and everyday life, that humanity is imperfect and sinful, and in a spiritual condition where they would have to be transformed in order to have a relationship with God. I am not saying that human beings cannot understand things about God without revelation, but I am stating that revelation is required for a changed spirit which could lead to a relationship with God. I, therefore, do not think that human reason outside of revelation should be our final authority in theology. 

BROWN, C. (1996) The Enlightenment, in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books. 

McGRATH, A. (1992) Bridge-Building, Leicester, Inter-Varsity Press. 

McGRATH, A. (1992) Suffering, London, Hodder and Stoughton Limited. 

PAILIN, D.A. (1999) Enlightenment, in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press Limited.

   

Re: Our after church lunch discussion, this photo is dedicated to Charles I, Charles II, and Trevor.

Wittgenstein and certainty

Wittgenstein and certainty

Preface

Lego church: I considered attending, but frankly it was just too small for me.

This article from my PhD work, was originally published on August 8, 2009, prior to my finalized PhD thesis. This presentation will be edited in September 2023 for an entry on academia.edu.

Wittgenstein and certainty

Ludwig Wittgenstein wrote On Certainty which is a classic philosophical work on the subject from the twentieth century.[1] Wittgenstein (1889-1951)[2] is an Austrian philosopher.[3] On Certainty deals with philosophical skepticism by postulating that knowledge exists, in a sense, but that this knowledge is dispersed and not completely dependable.[4] He notes that ‘I make assertions about reality, assertions which have different degrees of assurance.’[5] It is often general knowledge that is not generally doubted.[6] Skepticism cannot be refuted by claiming certain propositions are certain.[7] Argumentation cannot completely express metaphysical truths in particular.[8] He uses the example of a child taught either to be a theist or atheist, and the child will be able to produce evidence for either position depending on which one he or she is instructed to believe.[9] He does admit that there is in a sense objective truth,[10] but something would be objectively true only within a system of reason and knowledge through the understanding of reasonable persons.[11] His view allows for the logical possibility that something considered objective truth in one system, is not objective truth in another.[12] Philosophy should, therefore, not be understood as primarily making discoveries, as much a reminding persons of the issues that need to be dealt with when one turns to unfamiliar and uncertain issues.[13] Wittgenstein does act with certainty, but it is his own.[14] This does not in his mind justify his view as objective truth to others, it is simply belief.[15] He reasons that ‘knowledge and certainty belong in different categories.’[15] Obtaining knowledge is very important, and more vital than having certitude.[17] Knowledge and certainty are two different mental states.[18]

[1] Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1951)(1979) On Certainty, Basil Blackwell, Oxford.
[2] Blackburn (1996: 400). Sluga (1996: 859).
[3] Blackburn (1996: 400).
[4] Sluga (1996: 859). Wittgenstein (1951)(1979: 66).
[5] Wittgenstein (1951)(1979: 66).
[6] Sluga (1996: 859).
[7] Sluga (1996: 859).
[8] Sluga (1996: 859).
[9] Wittgenstein (1951)(1979: 107). I agree. Regardless of the truthfulness of either position, a child can be guided to have arguments for a taught philosophical viewpoint.
[10] Wittgenstein (1951)(1979: 108).
[11] Wittgenstein (1951)(1979: 108).
[12] Wittgenstein (1951)(1979: 108). This is reasonable. If the laws of science were not the same as this universe, in a vastly different realm, for example, then objective truth could be much different at several points.
[13] Blackburn (1996: 401).
[14] Wittgenstein (1951)(1979: 179).
[15] Wittgenstein (1951)(1979: 175).
[16] Wittgenstein (1951)(1979: 308).
[17] Wittgenstein (1951)(1979: 308).
[18] Wittgenstein (1951)(1979: 308). Knowledge and certainty are not the same thing for Wittgenstein.

My views on certainty

A definition of certainty which I would consider helpful would be along the lines of what I found in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. Peter D. Klein describes the Cartesian account of certainty as being that a proposition is true if there are no legitimate grounds whatsoever for doubting it. 

I embrace the similar idea that a proposition is certain if there are no counter propositions that are superior. Therefore in regard to the Christian faith and philosophy, and its belief in Scripture inspired by God, the atoning work of Christ, the resurrection, and everlasting life, applied to believers, these things could be viewed as certain provided there are no legitimate counter arguments that are superior. I reason that evidence shows Christianity is philosophically certain in this sense. In other words, I do not reason that there are superior external (non-biblical) or internal (biblical) propositions, premises/conclusions that counter the Christian worldview.

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

EELLS, ELLERY (1996) 'Probability', in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, pp. 649-650. Cambridge University Press.

KANT, IMMANUEL (1781)(1787)(1998) Critique of Pure Reason, Translated and edited by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

KANT, IMMANUEL (1781)(1787)(1929)(2006) Critique of Pure Reason, Translated by Norman Kemp Smith, London, Macmillan. http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~ppp/cpr/toc.html.

KANT, IMMANUEL (1788)(1997) Critique of Practical Reason, Translated by Mary Gregor (ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 

KANT, IMMANUEL (1788)(1898)(2006) The Critique of Practical Reason, Translated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott, London, Longmans, Green, and Co. http://philosophy.eserver.org/kant/critique-of-practical-reaso.txt 

KANT, IMMANUEL (1791)(2001) ‘On The Miscarriage of All Philosophical Trials in Theodicy’, in Religion and Rational Theology, Translated by George di Giovanni and Allen Wood, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

KLEIN, PETER D. (1996) ‘Certainty’, in Robert Audi, (ed), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

KLEIN, PETER D. (1998, 2005). ‘Epistemology’, in E. Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, London, Routledge.

SLUGA, HANS (1996) ‘Wittgenstein’, in Robert Audi, (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

WITTGENSTEIN, LUDWIG (1951)(1979) On Certainty, Basil Blackwell, Oxford.

 
Miniature city of London.