Privation

Ciboure, Clocher, France (photo from trekearth.com)

Augustine is one of my exemplars dealing with the problem of evil and within his text Enchiridion discusses privation and the corruption of humanity. Augustine (421)(1998: Chapter 13: 8). The subject is also discussed in On Free Choice of the Will. What follows is a fairly short non-exhaustive article on a complex subject.

Augustine’s view of the corruption and privation of created matter and nature was that they were good things as created originally by God, but had become less than they were originally intended through rebellion against God. Augustine (388-395)(1964: 116-117). Augustine reasons that every nature, and by that he means substance that was finite (limited as angels and humans beings are) could be corrupted. Augustine (388-395)(1964: 116). The term substance, particularly in regard to God, is not necessarily physical substance but, instead, is the very core of a being. Augustine (388-395)(1964: 117). Each nature and substance that could become less good would still be good, and every nature would become less good when it was corrupted. Augustine (388-395)(1964: 116-117). With this view both physical matter and spiritual inner being could become corrupt. Rowan Greer indicates Augustine viewed privation as meaning that evil has no ontological status (meaning evil does not exist on its own). Greer (1996: 482). But from his writings Augustine does not necessarily state that as his view. Augustine dealt primarily with the idea of evil as negation, and I doubt he would fail to see that after corruption had taken place in creation that living, existing, beings committed evil acts, and in a sense evil beings existed. Augustine reasons that every human being that exists is good, but is evil where it is defective. Augustine (421)(1998: Chapter 13: 7).

Although privation seems true in a negative sense, a problem with the concept in creatures is that corruption and the resulting evil in creatures is not merely an absence of something good, but consists of its own positive, destructive quality, as private creatures not only lack the will to do what is good, but will to do evil. John Hick reasons that Augustine’s idea of privation fails to deal with the fact that corrupted persons do not always tend to disintegrate and cease to exist in will and personality. Hick (1970: 62). This would seem correct as a corrupted and evil entity can grow in intelligence and power, so a mere corruption of a being from original perfection does not appear to weaken it to that status of non-existence. Something is considered evil because it can be seen to have a diminished degree of goodness. This appears reasonable; however, the diminished goodness in a creature is not replaced by non-existence, but by an actual corrupted nature within the person. It should be noted that Augustine is quite difficult to read and understand and it is not surprising that he is interpreted in varying ways. His writing style makes interpretations difficult as well, in my opinion.

From a Biblical perspective the remaining goodness left in human beings after corruption is not sufficient for salvation. Romans 3:23 states that all have sinned and fallen short of the glory of God, and Romans 6:23 explains that the wages of sin are death, but the free gift of everlasting life is for those in Christ. Therefore even if privation is correct negatively, and everything that exists, no matter how evil it is, must contain some goodness, and evil does not exist on its own, human beings are still far from being perfectly morally good. God’s standards for salvation and entrance into the Kingdom of God that were originally broken in Genesis 3, included moral perfection and goodness in obedience to God, and fallen beings do not have perfect goodness. Human beings are therefore dependent on the atoning work and resurrection of Christ to deal with the results of sin and death, allowing those in Christ to obtain true moral perfection and goodness and entrance into the everlasting Kingdom of God.

AUGUSTINE (388-395)(1964) On Free Choice of the Will, Translated by Anna S.Benjamin and L.H. Hackstaff, Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall.

AUGUSTINE (421)(1998) Enchiridion, Translated by J.F. Shaw, Denver, The Catholic Encyclopedia.
http://www.knight.org/advent.

GREER, ROWAN A. (1996) ‘Augustine’s Transformation of The Free Will Defence’, Faith and Philosophy, Volume 13, Number 4, October, pp. 471-486. Wilmore, Kentucky, Asbury College.

HICK, JOHN (1970) Evil and The God of Love, London, The Fontana Library.