A Little Philosophy: Kant
A version of this article placed on academia.edu on May 20, 2023
SZUDEK, ANDY & TORSLEY, SARAH
(2018) The Little Book of Philosophy, Landau Cecile (Ed), London,
DK Publishing.
Preface
'Kant wants to demonstrate that there
is an external, material world, and that its existence cannot be denied.'
(102).
The text states that Kant's argument
reasons that for something to exist it must be determinable in time. (102), as
in it must be known when it exists and for how long, (102). But how does this
proof affect a human consciousness? (102).
Rightly in my mind, Kant acknowledged
the scientific progress that had been made over the previous two centuries.
(103). Empiricists, notably John Locke and David Hume '...argued that there is
no knowledge except that which comes through our experience of the world.'
(103).
This idea is connected to scientism...
Scientism
Blackburn:
Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy
Scientism:
A pejorative term for the concept that only the methods of natural science and related categories form the elements for any philosophical or other enquiry. Blackburn (1996: 344).
From The Concise Oxford Dictionary Scientism: 1 a a method or doctrine regarded as characteristic of scientists b the use of practice of this. 2 often derogatory, an excessive belief in or application of scientific method. Oxford (1995: 1236).
Oxford Science
Empiricism: 'Denotes a result that is
observed by experiment or observation rather than by theory.' (287). I view
empiricism as a legitimate academic approach in reasonable contexts.
The text under review explains that
Kant argues that empiricism and scientific knowledge provides vital answers but
is not 'the whole answer' (104). The text explains: 'That a true empiricist
would argue against Kant that all acquaintances come from experience,
in other words, nothing is apriori.' (104-105).
The idea of God creating the world, is
an apriori concept. (105).
The next section is from my PhD (and as
well, edited website entries), and to use make use of Kant as primary source as
this textbook is a very fine, secondary source:
2010 Theodicy and Practical Theology: PhD
thesis, the University of Wales, Trinity Saint David, Lampeter
In his Inaugural Dissertation[1] of 1770,[2] Kant provides the idea
that persons can only have a priori knowledge of space and
time by the use of forms of the mind, which are imposed by human experience.[3] Kantian scholars Paul
Guyer and Allen Wood (1999) with the Introduction to Kant’s Critique of
Pure Reason, note that a priori knowledge originates
independently of senses and experience.[4] According to Pojman the
word a priori is the latin for preceding and
is considered knowledge that is not based on empirical experience, but is known
by the meaning of words or definitions.[5]
In the Critique of Pure
Reason of 1781 and revised in 1787, Kant explains that the forms of
appearance from which sensations can be understood are not themselves the
empirical sensations.[6] Human experience will
determine the method and forms by which particular things are understood by
what Kant calls pure intuition.[7] Concerning human
experience, Kant reasoned categories are applied to objects not because the
objects make the categories possible, but rather because categories
themselves provide and constitute necessary conditions for the representation
for all possible objects of experience.[8]
Therefore any human understanding of
metaphysical reality would not be comprehended by empirical knowledge in a
posteriori sense.[9] Guyer and Wood point out
that Kant was not an empiricist,[10] as while Kant criticized
and limited the scope of traditional metaphysical thought,[11] he also sought to defend
against empiricism’s claim of the possibility of universal and necessary
knowledge which he called a priori [12] knowledge,[13] because no knowledge
derived from experience, a posteriori [14] knowledge, could justify
a claim to universal and necessary validity.[15]
Guyer and Wood explain that Kant sought
to defend the scientific approach to the acquisition of knowledge against
skeptics that dismissed rigorous arguments in favor of ‘common sense.’[16] Kant critiqued the
dogmatism of certain metaphysicians negatively,[17] and he also negatively
noted as dogmatists those that would be intellectually indifferent to
metaphysical inquiry.[18] Kant wished to limit
the pretensions of dogmatic empiricists while defending metaphysical theories[19] as a science[20] and necessary in terms
of practical reason.[21] Basically, Kant
defended metaphysics as important and necessary,[22] but was sympathetic to
the empiricists view that certain metaphysical questions were insoluble.[23]
Kant noted that a priori is
relational without its own inherent content.[24] It is synthetic
and incapable of serving as metaphysical proof.[25] A priori is
relative to an experience only capable of producing appearances, and so a
priori is factual as experience which it conditions.[26] W.H. Walsh
explains if human beings had no experience whatsoever, they would have no
concept of knowledge, not even a priori knowledge. [27] No ideas or items
concerning knowledge are literally to be considered innate.[28]
Kant reasons objects that were present
in empirical human experience were in the phenomena realm, while objects
outside were the noumena realm.[29] He writes that the
contingent things experienced by persons are phenomena.[30] These are things that
could be experienced empirically and would be reasonably accepted as reality.[31] The noumena realm was
not available to empirical senses.[32]
Therefore, according to Mario Derksen
(2006) who wrote ‘Kant and the Question of Noumenal Ontology’ claims of
metaphysical knowledge[33] would not be certain as
would be any resulting doctrines.[34] Kant explains in a
follow up work entitled The Critique of Practical Reason from
1788, that the noumena is the theoretical department of knowledge denied, while
the phenomena is one’s own empirical consciousness.[35] All positive
speculative knowledge should be disclaimed for the noumena realm according to
Kantian thought.[36] Kant concludes The
Critique of Practical Reason by noting that the phenomena realm is the
external realm where consciousness has existence.[37] The noumena realm is
invisible and has true infinity where Kant believes one can reason that
contingent personality is dependent on the universal and necessary connection
to the invisible world.[38]
Importantly Kant thought it legitimate
for one to postulate the noumena realm in a ‘negative sense’ meaning things as
they may be independently or how they are represented, [39] but not noumena in the
‘positive sense’ which would be things based on pure reason alone.[40] Instead, noumena
categories were only useful by applying them to empirical data structured in
forms of intuition.[41] The concept of noumena,
according to Kant, was bound to the limit of pretension of sensibility and
reason, and therefore only negative noumenon was of intellectual use.[42] Noumena in its negative
sense are that which is not an object of sense intuition.[43]
Kant rejects concepts of positive
noumena based on pure reason[44] because, according to
T.C. Williams (1987), noumenal concepts are not determinate knowledge of
anything and must be based on a sense of sensible intuition.[45] Kant rejects the
positive use of the term as it postulates objective knowledge of a
metaphysical realm.[46] The positive sense of
the term noumena is therefore fully rejected by Kant.[47] He explains that the
noumenal in the negative sense is equivalent to the thing itself and alone is
involved in the concept.[48] Kant’s view leads to a
moral theology which has a doctrine of God and immortality postulated, along
with theories of human free will[49] and morality.[50] His moral theology is
postulated and is not dogmatic, rational metaphysics.[51]
[1] Blackburn (1996:
205). See also Karl Ameriks. Ameriks (1996: 399).
[2] Blackburn (1996: 205).
Ameriks (1996: 399).
[3] Blackburn (1996: 205).
[4] Guyer and Wood in Kant
(1781)(1787)(1998: 2).
[5] Pojman (1996: 595).
[6] Kant
(1781)(1787)(1929)(2006: 66). Rowan Williams writes that for Kant, the ‘real
contains no more than the merely possible.’ Williams (2007: 205).
[7] Kant
(1781)(1787)(1929)(2006: 66).
[8] Guyer and Wood in Kant
(1781)(1787)(1998: 3).
[9] Kant
(1781)(1787)(1929)(2006: 66).
[10] Guyer and Wood in Kant
(1781)(1787)(1998: 2). Norman Kemp Smith within A Commentary to Kant’s
‘Critique of Pure Reason’ writes that empiricists eliminate a
priori principles, appealing to sense experience only, therefore
eliminating distinctions between inductive inference and expectation.
Smith (1930: xxvii). Blackburn suggests Kant made a strong break from
eighteenth century empiricism. Blackburn (1996: 206). Kant was not
an empiricist as was David Hume that within (1779)(2004) Dialogues
Concerning Natural Religion, notes that for ‘ignorant ages’ persons
including geniuses have ambitiously tried to produce new proofs and arguments
for natural theology and God. Hume (1779)(2004: 2). Hume also
reasoned that the supposed Supreme Being’s infinite divine attributes would be
‘totally incomprehensible’ and that human nature would not have ideas that
would correspond to the attributes of this divine being. Hume
(1779)(2004: 21). Hume’s degree of scepticism of God and natural theology
and dependence on empiricism alone was not the same view as Kant. Kant
(1788)(1997: 11). Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 3).
[11] Kant was opposed to
speculative views of indefensible rationalism. Blackburn (1996:
206). Cornelius Van Til suggests Kant reasons God is not a law giver to
humanity, God cannot reveal himself through nature or human constitution with
the image of God. The intellect of human beings makes no positive
assertions concerning God. Kant rejects notions of theoretical knowledge
of God and, instead, appeals to practical reason and faith. Van Til
(1977: 246-247). Plantinga writes that it is suggested by many
commentators Kant demonstrated there are insurmountable problems with the idea
that the traditional Christian God exists. Plantinga (2000: 7).
[12] Kant called cognitions
independent of all experience and the impressions of the senses a
priori. Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 136).
[13] Guyer and Wood in Kant
(1781)(1787)(1998: 2).
[14] Empirical experiences
are called a posteriori. A posteriori knowledge
is empirical knowledge through experience. Kant (1781)(1787)(1998:
136).
[15] Kant argued that
inductive inference from data and experience was only possible based upon prior
acceptance of views of rational principles established
independently. Therefore experience does not validate these principles.
Smith (1930: xxvii). Ameriks suggests Kant rejected unjustifiable
metaphysical claims in place of principles of theory which are the
conditions by which persons orientate themselves within experience. These
principles are ‘necessary and discoverable’ therefore defeating empiricism and
scepticism concerning reasonable metaphysical claims, and contrasting
traditional rationalism and dogmatism. Ameriks (1996:
399).
[16] Guyer and Wood in Kant
(1781)(1787)(1998:
2).
[17] Guyer and Wood in Kant
(1781)(1787)(1998: 3).
[18] Guyer and Wood in Kant
(1781)(1787)(1998: 3). Kant notes in ‘Critique of Practical Reason’
empiricism needs to be contrasted by the necessity of rational a priori principles.
Kant (1788)(1997: 11).
[19] Plantinga reasons that
for Kant the intellectual problem is not that persons cannot think about God
but that persons cannot come to speculative metaphysical knowledge of
God. Plantinga (2000: 9).
[20] John R. Franke suggests
that ‘scientific’ knowledge within Kantian thought is limited to the realm of
experience shaped by rational structures of the mind. This means
knowledge of God through pure reason is impossible. Franke (2005: 58-59).
[21] Guyer and Wood in Kant
(1781)(1787)(1998: 3). Ameriks writes, for Kant practical reason is that which
determines rules for the faculty of desire and will as opposed to the faculty
of cognition and feeling. Ameriks (1996: 399).
[22] Ameriks (1996:
399).
[23] Guyer and Wood in Kant
(1781)(1787)(1998: 3).
[24] Guyer and Wood in Kant
(1781)(1787)(1998: 3).
[25] Smith (1930:
xxxvi). Ameriks (1996: 400).
[26] Kant
(1781)(1787)(1929)(2006: 43). Smith (1930: xxxvi). Blackburn (1996:
205).
[27] Walsh (1976: 6).
[28] Walsh (1976: 6).
[29] Kant
(1781)(1787)(1929)(2006: 482). Guyer and Wood note that the phenomena
realm is the category applied to appearances whereas things in themselves are
the noumena realm, which might be thought of but not known. Guyer and
Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 10). The phenomena realm is that which
appears and is therefore empirical.
[30] Kant
(1781)(1787)(1929)(2006: 482).
[31] Kant
(1781)(1787)(1929)(2006: 482).
[32] Kant
(1781)(1787)(1929)(2006: 393).
[33] John M. Frame suggests
that within Kantian philosophy humanity replaces God as the ultimate source and
interpreter of reality. Frame deduces this based on the idea that the
noumena realm is beyond human experience and is unknowable. Frame (2002:
112).
[34] Derkson (2006: 9).
From Kant’s perspective I would reason that metaphysical doctrines could be
questioned and not considered dogmatic truth, but would not necessarily be
considered meaningless. Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 3).
[35] Kant (1788)(1898)(2006:
3).
[36] Kant (1788)(1898)(2006:
26).
[37] Kant (1788)(1898)(2006:
100).
[38] Kant (1788)(1898)(2006:
100).
[39] Guyer and Wood in Kant
(1781)(1787)(1998: 13).
[40] Guyer and Wood in Kant
(1781)(1787)(1998: 13).
[41] Guyer and Wood in Kant
(1781)(1787)(1998: 13). Ameriks (1996: 400).
[42] Kant (1781)(1787)(1998:
350).
[43] Smith (1930: 413).
Ameriks (1996: 400).
[44] Smith (1930: 413).
Ameriks (1996: 400).
[45] Williams (1987: 149).
[46] Williams (1987: 150).
[47] Williams (1987: 151).
[48] Smith (1930: 413).
[49] Kant notes free
submission of the human will to law combined with the restraints of law put
upon human inclination by human reason, is respect for the law. This law
demands respect and inspires, it is moral law. Kant (1788)(1997:
68-69). Lewis White Beck explains Kant theorized that human actions were
both free and predictable. He reasons, law can only obligate a really
free being to act. Human beings demonstrate free will through choice to
obey or disobey law. Beck (1963: 31-32).
[50] Kant (1788)(1898)(2006:
846). Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 14). Beck explains
that Kant postulated the existence of God in order that through such agency
effect may be given to moral laws. Beck (1963: 273). Kant’s ethical
system included associated human freedom with the potential for self control
and self rule, and the need to think in terms of a just God sustaining moral
order. Blackburn (1996: 206).
[51] Guyer and Wood in Kant
(1781)(1787)(1998: 14).
AMERIKS, KARL (1999) ‘Kant, Immanuel’, in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
BECK, LEWIS WHITE (1963) A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
DERKSEN, MARIO (2006) ‘Kant and the Question of Noumenal Ontology’, in Catholic Apologetics Information, North Strathfield, New South Wales, Australia, Catholic Apologetics Information. http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Rhodes/3543/kant.htm
FRAME, JOHN M. (1999) ‘The Bible on the Problem of Evil: Insights from Romans 3:1-8,21-26; 5:1-5; 8:28-39’, IIIM Magazine Online, Volume 1, Number 33, October 11 to October 17, Fern Park, Florida, Third Millennium. http://www.thirdmill.org/files/english/html/th/TH.h.Frame.ProblemofEvil.htm
FRAME, JOHN M. (2002) The Doctrine of God, P and R Publishing, Phillipsburg, New Jersey.
GUYER, PAUL AND ALLEN W, in KANT, IMMANUEL (1781)(1787)(1998) Critique of Pure Reason, Translated and edited by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
HUME, DAVID (1739-1740)(1973) ‘A Treatise of Human Nature’, in Paul Edwards and Arthur Pap (eds.), A Modern Introduction To Philosophy, New York, The Free Press.
HUME, DAVID (1779)(2004) Dialogues
Concerning Natural Religion, Digireads.com/Neeland Media LLC, Lawrence,
Kansas.
KANT, IMMANUEL (1781)(1787)(1998) Critique
of Pure Reason, Translated and edited by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
KANT, IMMANUEL
(1781)(1787)(1929)(2006) Critique of Pure Reason, Translated by
Norman Kemp Smith, London, Macmillan.
http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~ppp/cpr/toc.html.
KANT, IMMANUEL (1788)(1997) Critique
of Practical Reason, Translated by Mary Gregor (ed.), Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge.
KANT, IMMANUEL (1788)(1898)(2006) The
Critique of Practical Reason, Translated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott,
London, Longmans, Green, and Co.
http://philosophy.eserver.org/kant/critique-of-practical-reaso.txt
KANT, IMMANUEL (1791)(2001) ‘On The
Miscarriage of All Philosophical Trials in Theodicy’, in Religion and
Rational Theology, Translated by George di Giovanni and Allen Wood,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
OXFORD DICTIONARY OF SCIENCE (2010) Oxford, Oxford University Press.
PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1977)(2002) God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.
PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1982) The Nature of Necessity, Oxford, Clarendon Press.
PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (2000) Warranted Christian Belief, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
POJMAN, LOUIS P. (1996) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.
SMITH, NORMAN KEMP (1930) A Commentary to Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’, MacMillan and Co., Limited, London.
THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY (1995) Della Thompson (ed.), Oxford, Clarendon Press.
VAN TIL, CORNELIUS (1969) A Christian Theory of Knowledge, Nutley, New Jersey, Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company.
VAN TIL, CORNELIUS (1977) Christianity and Barthianism, Nutley, New Jersey, Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company.
WILLIAMS, ROWAN (2000) On Christian Theology, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford.
WILLIAMS, ROWAN (2007) Wrestling with Angels, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, Grand Rapids.
WALSH, W.H. (1976) Kant’s
Criticism of Metaphysics, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
December 30, 2020: Comments
Scriptural Revelation in my view, is
not to be considered a source of the concept of pure reason as discussed by
Kant and reviewers. Scripture can be used as an
historical, traditional and authoritative source. Revelation from God in
Scripture and resulting claims made within could perhaps (and perhaps not) be tied to Kantian
concepts and intuition arising from empirical sensations. This is not a
difficulty for a Reformed and some other approaches to Christianity, which do not
rely primarily on philosophical deductions, but in supernatural revelation of
God through empirical sensations, such as prophets, Christ, the apostles and
scribes.
In disagreement with Kant, I reason
that the infinite, eternal, necessary, first and primary cause, God, can
communicate as in revelation, with his finite human creatures in a reasonable,
understandable way, truths. This was done so in particular through revealed,
divinely inspired scripture through human authors. But it could also be done by
other methods, supernaturally and naturally.
Also in disagreement with Kant, I do reason that theistic, philosophy of religion (or as some call it, natural theology), can with reasonable certainty, deduce within rationalism, certain knowledge and truths about God, including in a limited sense, divine nature and attributes.
While
at the same time this knowledge and these truths are not being supernaturally revealed and do not provide salvific knowledge.
In a sense, I agree with Kant as he rejected concepts of positive noumena (noumena or noumenal is the non-empirical realm) based on pure reason. I can reasonably apply this to pure reason and theological doctrines which would require a personal knowledge of God. I can agree that God cannot be known (to use more evangelical language) personally by pure reason.
God would reveal self and theology and doctrines that more closely, than through reason alone and philosophy of religion, define his divine nature and attributes. For example, the theology of the cross, the atoning and resurrection work God the Son, Jesus Christ, for believing humanity, Ephesians 1-2, Revelation 13, in eternity. This theology and related doctrines could not be known by humanity through pure reason. As well, God would not likely be deduced as triune through pure reason.
Negative noumena, I reason, allows for God and theology to be deduced intuitively. I would apply that and state that if a finite human being can deduce the infinite, I also reason the infinite can demonstrate self and aspects of noumena to the finite both through creation (Romans 1, but non-personal) and revelation.
