Dubai
Within thekingpin68 blog, I have shared concepts from my PhD work. I thought for something different I would share two sections from my MPhil dissertation degree, which was also concerning the problem of evil. I realize that C.S. Lewis is quite popular and I reviewed his work on the problem of evil for my 2003 dissertation degree, which is like a mini-PhD in the United Kingdom academic system. I present two sections of my review and the second section concerns the topic of total depravity.
The entire MPhil can be found in the January 2006 archives and the link below:
http://thekingpin68.blogspot.com/2006/01/mphil-wales-2003.html
C.S. Lewis and total depravity
British born, Clive Staples Lewis (1898-1963) was a world renowned British writer whose theological literary works have been influential within Christian apologetics. Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, describes Lewis’ beginnings and places of study.
Anglican scholar-novelist and Christian Apologist, perhaps best known for his literary fantasies that explore theological concepts. Born near Belfast in Northern Ireland, he received his B.A. from University College, Oxford, in 1924, and was fellow and tutor in English literature at Magdalen College, Oxford, from 1925 until 1954. He then accepted the Chair of Medieval and Renaissance English at Cambridge. Hein (1996: 630).
Lewis pointed out some definite examples of human wickedness in his era and culture; however, he rejected the idea of Total Depravity. He stated:
This chapter will have been misunderstood if anyone describes it as a reinstatement of the doctrine of Total Depravity. I disbelieve the doctrine, partly on the logical grounds that if our depravity were total we should not know ourselves to be depraved, and partly because experience shows us much goodness in human nature. Lewis (1940)(1996: 61).
I can see the logic of Lewis’ point of view; however, I don’t agree with his conclusions. I will first give the comments of C.C. Ryrie and then explain my perspective.
The concept of total depravity does not mean
(1) that depraved people cannot or do not perform actions that are good in either man’s or God’s sight. But no such action can gain favor with God for salvation. Neither does it mean
(2) that fallen man has no conscience which judges between good and evil for him. But that conscience has been effected by the fall so that it cannot be a safe and reliable guide. Neither does it mean
(3) that people indulge in every form of sin or in any sin to the greatest extent possible.
Positively total depravity means that the corruption has extended to all aspects of man’s nature, to his being: and total depravity means that because of that corruption there is nothing man can do to merit saving favour with God. Ryrie (1996: 312).
I would think Lewis did not significantly understand the doctrine. Ryrie’s first point answers Lewis’ objection. The doctrine is not about humanity being so evil that no good is possible. The point is that these good works can in no way earn salvation. As well, with Ryrie’s second point, humanity could acknowledge the existence of sin and evil in them because they still had a conscience, although it was scarred. Also, the depravity is not total in the sense of every aspect of evil in people being maximized, it means instead that humanity is corrupt to the point where salvation cannot be merited.
I think Ryrie explains the concept well, and understands it, unlike Lewis. However, I wonder if human beings can commit truly good acts, like both men suggest. I would think since humanity is totally depraved that no true human good is possible. If true goodness is found in perfection, as is God, then we cannot obtain that good. Even as Christians that attempt to perform the will of God with the help of the Holy Spirit, would there not be just a little taint of sin in all our actions? It is my view that human good is likely an absence of a complete maximization of our total depravity. I, for example, may appear to be humanly good compared to a serial murderer; however, that is because the murderer has been found out as someone who has committed heinous crimes, where as Lewis pointed out with an individual, my evil can be hidden in public persona.
HEIN, R. (1996) C.S. Lewis, in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books.
LEWIS, C.S. (1940)(1996) The Problem of Pain, San Francisco, Harper-Collins.
RYRIE, C.C. (1996) Total Depravity, in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books.
Dubai
Dubai
http://satireandtheology.blogspot.com/2008/02/recent-short-comments-on-society.html
Valentines went well for the Mrs.
ReplyDeleteand I except that she's in Europe
and I'm in North America...
Thanks for your visit...
Yes, I remember you mentioning awhile back that she would be staying there for some time. Absence makes the heart grow fonder?
ReplyDeleteRuss;)
It's hard for me to believe that Lewis, being the genius that he was, did not understand the doctrine of Total Depravity. He was a learned scholar, after all. I wonder if there are any other quotes by him, other than the phrase you posted, on his response to the doctrine of Total Depravity. I would have liked to hear him explain his position more fully.
ReplyDeleteI'm certain that Lewis would agree that we have a conscience and that we know what is right (in "The Case For Christianity," a must-read for any Atheist/Agnostic IMO, he addresses this issue, at least in a basic sense). As far as whether Lewis would agree that our 'good' works are not truly good, I'm not certain, but I would assume that he would agree that all of our works fall short of God's holiness.
Maybe 'Total' Depravity is a misnomer, since, if taken to the extreme, it would mean as Lewis took it to mean (??) (Sort of like the term "a spirit-filled church" is a misnomer...at least IMO.)
On the other hand, as far as all our works being tainted by evil, Isaiah 64:6 does say that our righteousness (i.e., the very best 'good' works that we could ever do) is as (in the original language...and I apologize for being so crude, but this is how it is originally stated) a woman's menstruating rags. The Bible says "there is none that is good, no, not one." So the Bible agrees that none of our so-called 'good' works are truly good. Comparing our works to God's holiness is like looking at a filthy, dirty toilet (alas, again I am being crude) in the dark, and concluding that it is clean (i.e., this would represent our 'good' works); and then turning a bright spotlight on it, and being shocked at how wrong we were (this would represent how lacking in holiness our works really are).
Thanks, Jeff.
ReplyDeleteI appreciate the Isaiah verse and your continued contributions.
I can grant the Lewis offered some very good insights, but there are others I would personally favour for theological writing. Lewis does state that there is much goodness in human nature and this would seem to work with a rejection of total depravity. I do not know if he would think that human goodness is tainted. But, one that reasons that human beings are less than perfectly good, should qualify what they mean by human goodness. Both Lewis and Ryrie may hold to human goodness always being tainted, but it is not clearly explained in what I cited.
I disbelieve the doctrine, partly on the logical grounds that if our depravity were total we should not know ourselves to be depraved, and partly because experience shows us much goodness in human nature. Lewis (1940)(1996: 61).
The concept of total depravity does not mean
(1) that depraved people cannot or do not perform actions that are good in either man’s or God’s sight. But no such action can gain favour with God for salvation. Neither does it mean...Ryrie (1996: 312).
Lewis
Richard John Neuhaus
First Things
In discussions of the universally human, the universal is frequently pitted against the particular, but this was not the case with Lewis. This is underscored by Gilbert Meilaender, one of the most insightful readers of Lewis, in a recent essay, "The Everyday C. S. Lewis"
Meilaender notes that in his religious writings Lewis frequently drops the aside that he is not a theologian and that what he says is subject to correction by real theologians. Meilaender suggests that we should "recognize this for what it is: a smart rhetorical strategy that gets the reader on his side over against the presumably elitist theologians." He notes that, in fact, Lewis had read more theology than many theologians but, nonetheless, his writing is better described as "religious" than as "theological." Religious language, he notes, is closely related to poetic language, as distinct from both "ordinary" language and "scientific" language. I do not disagree with Meilaender on that, but there is a trap here that should be clearly marked.
I am not expert on Lewis. Besides the MPhil work, I studied him a bit for my BA. My professor stated that Bonhoffer was a much better intellect than Lewis. I thought at the time it was a harsh statement, and perhaps it was, however, from reading Lewis' work on the problem of evil, I conclude he was not a theologian, but a literary writer and apologist. From my years of research I would not place him ahead of most conservative theologians I have read, in regard to knowledge, or ahead of many liberal scholars. Lewis I reason would take stabs at issues and knew he was not a theologian and did think that some work should be left to theologians. To me, he took a stab at total depravity and did not have the background with the subject that Ryrie possessed.
I also have some difficulties with Lewis' acceptance of apparent free will defence/theodicy which is a view I have reviewed and disagreed with somewhat in my MPhil and PhD work. I am considering writing an article on Lewis and free will. I hold to sovereignty theodicy.
Thank you for an insightful read about the problem of evil and its connection to human nature. A very respectful and interesting critique of C.S. Lewis and his speculations of good, evil, and human depravity.
ReplyDelete-Always Learning-
I like the funky-looking blue house in the 2nd picture...
ReplyDeleteThanks, A.L., I am trying to be fair.
ReplyDeleteCheers, Chucky, it is a cool looking house and unique architecture is shared in these photos.
Russ, two elements in this discussion: One is the suggestion, at least partly brought forward by Ryrie, that the Image of God on mankind is not erased as indicated by a classically Calvinistic viewpoint, but rather effaced in that (for instance) we do have an innate recognition of "goodness" though we have no empirical categories for it, and goodness is not always seen as beneficial.
ReplyDeleteThe other, most crucial, element which needs to be considered is the work of the Holy Spirit Who, by God's helping ("prevenient") grace enlightens our hearts (John 1:9), arouses our consciences (16:7-11) and "draws" us to Him (12:32) so that, of course, we may obey the Gospel, and be saved.
The hazard is found when we set our sights on sin and human agency, when sin, being conquered, is only a factor if we allow it, and the strength and wisdom of man has been equally embarrassed in the Cross.
Thanks, Robert for the insightful comments. You make me work a little, but it is good for me.:) I hope your Sunday is going well.
ReplyDeleteCalvinism is of course filled will some diversity of opinions. Calvinist theologian Millard Erickson writes that the image of God has not been lost as a result of sin or specifically the fall. The image is inseparably connected with humanity, Erickson (1994: 513). Erickson reasons that Calvin thought a relic of the image of God remained in persons after the fall. Erickson (1994: 501). In The Bondage and Liberation of the Will, Calvin states that the freedom which is dealing with the image of God needs to be restored by the power of the Holy Spirit and therefore the freedom associated with this image has been erased and corrupted. Calvin (1543)(1996: 72). From the index this is the only time image of God is mentioned in the 1543 text, and the comments are somewhat unclear. If freedom dealing with the image of God has been completely erased, there is nothing left to be corrupted, and so perhaps Erickson's interpretation of Calvin is correct.
From Calvin, Institutes on the Christian Religion 1, part 13) Chapter 15
Institutes
It cannot be doubted that when Adam lost his first estate he became alienated from God. Wherefore, although we grant that the image of God was not utterly effaced and destroyed in him, it was, however, so corrupted, that any thing which remains is fearful deformity; and, therefore, our deliverance begins with that renovation which we obtain from Christ, who is, therefore, called the second Adam, because he restores us to true and substantial integrity.
Calvin views the image of God as not destroyed, but corrupted and a deformity.
I reason we have a corrupted image of God, but of course the meaning of image is debated by theologians and philosophers. However, it does tie in nicely with a concept that human beings are not perfectly good and therefore actions shall be tainted. To me, one can hold to Total Depravity without reasoning that the image of God is erased or completely destroyed.
P.E. Hughes explains that prevenient grace precedes all human decision. Hughes (1996: 480). It sees God as taking the initiative. Hughes (1996: 480). I am not in disagreement with this aspect of prevenient grace, but as Erickson states, Arminians recognizing the human inability to respond to the gospel introduced the idea of prevenient grace. Erickson (1994: 925). Erickson explains that there is no clear and adequate basis in Scripture for this concept of universal enablement to believe. Erickson (1994: 925). I agree with Erickson that prevenient grace is an appealing concept. Erickson (1994: 925). However, I reason that Biblically when God predestines someone as in Ephesians 1, he regenerates a person that shall believe. God simultaneously has the individual person, with a limited human free will, willingly accept the gospel message in the regeneration process. I suppose therefore, I hold to a form of irresistible, but not forced or coerced, grace.
Institutes of the Christian Religion, Volume 1 (1999):
A New Translation by Henry Beveridge, Esq. Volume First. Edinburgh: Printed for the Calvin Translation Society, M.DCCC.XLV-M.DCCC.XLVI. Book First: Of the Knowledge of God the Creator
CALVIN, JOHN (1543)(1996) The Bondage and Liberation of the Will, Translated by G.I. Davies, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.
ERICKSON, MILLARD (1994) Christian Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.
HUGHES, P.E. (1996) 'Grace', in Walter A. Elwell (ed.). Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books.
I have posted selected scammer email on satire and theology, sometimes in an article and usually in comments, but I reason that the one below belongs with this blog.
ReplyDeleteIt is from Reverend Coffin.
Russ;)
My Dear Beloved,
My name is Rev.Fr.Adam Coffin. I am 74 years old now. I have been suffering in the sick bed for the past 7 years at Queen Elizabeth Hospital , woolwich. Now I believe that my time has come to join my ancestors in heaven. I got your email address from the Internet, as the spirit of Almighty God directed me to contact you for this charity work. I have US$11.1M deposited in a safe location in Europe , which I want you to claim on my behalf for an important charitable project. Can you honestly do this for me?
Remain bless in the Lord.
Rev.Fr.Adam Coffin.
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Russ, you were saying,
ReplyDeleteI agree with Erickson that prevenient grace is an appealing concept. Erickson (1994: 925). However, I reason that Biblically when God predestines someone as in Ephesians 1, he regenerates a person that shall believe. God simultaneously has the individual person, with a limited human free will, willingly accept the gospel message in the regeneration process. I suppose therefore, I hold to a form of irresistible, but not forced or coerced, grace.
I would offer that, though Hermann may have coined the term, "prevenient grace" in his apologia, the concept itself has been around a lot longer than he, as had the whole idea of a relationship-based salvation. So there's no shame in using a later term if it aptly describes a Biblical concept! Rapture, Trinity, Contextualisation...
Also, in view of the rest of Scripture, exhortations to sinners to turn, and to Believers to press on, does a deterministic interpretation of the word, "predestinate" really stand up? Or, in another way, how do you have a saving grace that is irresistible, but not coercive, and if coercive, then how is it grace?
Also, in view of the rest of Scripture, exhortations to sinners to turn, and to Believers to press on, does a deterministic interpretation of the word, "predestinate" really stand up? Or, in another way, how do you have a saving grace that is irresistible, but not coercive, and if coercive, then how is it grace?
ReplyDeleteThanks, Robert.
Free will and determinism is a major focus of my MPhil/PhD research. Salvation is given in grace by God's favour and is undeserved. I have written on this subject within the links below and I will repost some of the text here for you and others, Robert. I know it is long, but explains a fair amount. Sinners are to turn I agree, but this cannot be done by human means alone with free will and prevenient grace which allows a human out. God uses human preaching and Scripture in the process of regenerating persons. Predestination within a compatibilistic framework is far less problematic than incompatibilism which I explain below. Irresistible grace does not mean forced or coerced, but God chooses to regenerate a corrupted nature and person and changes and persuades this individual to believe. This is not an annihilation of the human will, as a believer still sins until resurrected, (and will not sin in the Lord's presence in spirit after death) but the work of the Holy Spirit influences those God's chooses to believe and follow him.
From:
link 1
Arminians generally believe that God's grace is not irresistible, and that believers can fall away from God. Grider (1996: 80). A problem I see here is although Arminians believe in original sin, and total depravity, they state that people can reject God's salvific grace. Grider (1996: 80). I would think an understanding of original sin and the resulting fallen human nature, as described by Paul in Romans 1-3, for example, would view God's salvific grace to those who are totally depraved and corrupt, as having to be in a sense irresistible, although not forced or coerced. God would instead persuade and mould human beings he has predestined in order that they freely believe. God would have to change a human being that previously could not believe, so that he/she would follow God and Christ. In other words, from my Biblical perspective, human beings with a fallen human nature that were totally depraved would always reject God's prevenient grace, so for the Arminian to say that sometimes the grace is accepted and sometimes it is not, is to assume that the fallen human being has the ability to accept God's grace, despite total depravity. From my perspective this Arminian view does not present a fallen nature incapable of following God, but one that could possibly follow God if God provided prevenient (preceding) grace. So, an Arminian view is not Pelagian, but it presents a less than perfect nature that is seen as totally depraved, but still able to accept Christ with the help of God's grace. This idea was expressed by my Arminian influenced, Mennonite, Book of Romans professor who did not believe in a sinful nature, but that all human beings of less than perfect nature eventually took a sinful position against God.
My view would require God to enlighten, persuade and mould an enslaved will, but without the use of force or coercion. This enslaved will would prior to salvation not be free to choose God and commit good actions pleasing to God in regard to salvation, but simultaneously in the salvation process the limited free will of a fallen human being would be enlightened, persuaded and moulded to believe in Christ. There must be a limited free will present in the salvation process or else hard determinism is taking place that is force or coercion. My view requires a sinful corrupt human nature, which is totally depraved, as in unable to freely choose God as is, without a divine spiritual alteration, whereas the Arminian view requires human beings to have sinned and be less than perfect, but to have the ability within their nature to accept God's prevenient grace with the use of free will. My view sees limited free will as allowing God to restore the elect to him by salvation via an alteration of the person, but is not libertarian free will which through prevenient grace allows people to choose or reject Christ. In my understanding the fallen human being has a limited free will that freely rejects God, and through the salvation process God enables the believer to freely follow Christ. By limited free will I accept the idea that a fallen human being is free in the sense that he/she can be restored by God if elected, but not free in a way the he/she could be saved through prevenient grace.
John Calvin in my view held to a concept of free will similar to my own, and he has influenced my theology. He wrote in 1543 in The Bondage and Liberation of the Will.
If freedom is opposed to coercion, I both acknowledge and consistently maintain that choice is free and I hold anyone who thinks otherwise to be a heretic. If, I say, it were called free in this sense of not being coerced nor forcibly moved by an external impulse, but moving of its own accord, I have no objection. Calvin (1543)(1996: 68).
For Calvin although God must elect and restore an individual for salvation to occur, it is not done by force or coercion, but through the use of soft determinism as human beings are converted to a belief in Christ through the Holy Spirit.
CALVIN, JOHN (1543)(1996) The Bondage and Liberation of the Will, Translated by G.I. Davies, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.
ERICKSON, MILLARD (1994) Christian Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.
GRIDER, J.K. (1996) 'Arminianism', in Walter A. Elwell (ed.). Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books.
link 2
Libertarian Free Will and Incompatibilism
Libertarian free will is usually viewed as a form of indeterminism. The concept in libertarian free will is that a person is able to perform another action in the place of one that has been committed. This action cannot be predetermined by any circumstance or desire. Norman Geisler explains that indeterminism is defined as the idea that there are no antecedent (preceding conditions) or simultaneous (at the same time) causes of human actions. All human actions are free if a person could have done otherwise.[3] Indeterminism is also equated with incompatibilism which states that God, or any other being, cannot cause by force or coercion any human action, nor can any action be simultaneously willed by God or any other being, for the human action to remain significantly free. Compatibilism, which I hold to, would agree with incompatibilism that God or any other being cannot cause by force or coercion any significantly free human action, but contrary to incompatibilism thinks that God can simultaneously will significantly free human actions.[4]
In regard to this article, I reject incompatibilism for two main reasons:
1. Due to the universal sinful nature of humanity described in Romans, Chapter 3, where it is mentioned that there are none righteous in verse 10, and none that seek God in verse 11. C.E.B. Cranfield states that this passage (vv. 10-18) indicates that without exception, all people are sinners.[5] Cranfield further writes that the idea being put across is that human beings live as if they have no reckoning with God, and are practical, even if not actual atheists.[6] Robert H. Mounce notes concerning this passage that although some may seek a religious experience, it is not the same as seeking the true God.[7] To Mounce, God seeks the Christian believer, and not the other way around.[8] Therefore with this interpretation of the Romans passage, if libertarian free will was true, no one would ever come to Christ through the gospel, because God would not simultaneously will that a person believe it.
In Ephesians, Chapter 1, believers in Christ are said to be chosen by God in verse 4, and predestined in adoption in verses 5 and 11. Francis Foulkes thinks that God’s sovereign will here in choosing people is not opposed to free will.[9] However, it seems because God’s sovereignty is involved this is not the concept of libertarian free will, or a type of hard determinism in which God coerces or forces human beings to believe in him, rather people are chosen and destined to be with God by believing and trusting in Christ. Bernard Berofsky writes that free will is an illusion within the concept of determinism.[10] This would not be the idea of compatibilism, as within compatibilism God is transforming previously rebellious sinners into people open to the gospel. The human free will would not be viewed as an illusion for compatibilism, but rather a will from a nature corrupted by sin that is in need of divine influence in order to freely accept the gospel. This requires God through the use of irresistible grace[11] to mould, change and persuade a person in order to accept the gospel, which they never could do on their own. Irresistible grace does consist of God determining that a person be saved, but this is through the use compatibilism or soft determinism and not compulsion. For a human being to be transformed by belief in the gospel in no way means that a human being is contributing to their merit for salvation.
2. The infinite (unlimited) nature of God who has definite goals and plans for his creation would require that he simultaneously influence the actions of finite (limited) human and angelic beings alike. God in the Bible has established plans and made prophecies which seemingly require a compatibilistic divine influence.
I therefore reject incompatibilism, in favour of compatibilism on the point of free will.
Edwards on Libertarian Free Will
Edwards, from his understanding, disagrees with Arminian libertarian free will. He views Arminianism as inconsistent because if the Arminians assume that human free will is the cause of choice then the human will determines its own actions. He argues:
1. The Arminians speak of the will determining itself, meaning the soul is exercising the power of willing something.[12]
2. If the will determines its own free acts, it thus determines its own acts by choosing them.[13]
3. If the human will determines the will and resulting choices, and since every choice must have a cause, then a chain is established where a will and choice is determined by a preceding will and choice. Therefore, if the will determines its own free acts, then every free act of will and choice is determined by a preceding act of will and choice. If a preceding act of will also be of free choice, then that too was self-determined.[14] What Edwards is stating is that in the act of causing a free choice (choice1), the cause of that choice was also made freely (choice2), and the cause of that choice was made freely (choice3) and so on.[15] This becomes contradictory and Sam Storms states this type of concept goes on ad infinitum, meaning that the Arminian view on free will and choice is subject to infinite regress (goes on forever) and without solid intellectual foundation.[16] Edwards is therefore concluding that logically a free will and choice cannot be its own cause.
4. Edwards suggests that a way out of this contradiction is to come to the last act of will and choice and state that it is not self-determined, but is rather determined without the use of a will and choice. However, to Edwards, if the initial act of will and choice within the chain is not free, then none of the resulting willed choices can be free.[17] By stating that acts of the will occur without any cause at all is to render human choice random.[18] If human choices are made randomly it is difficult to establish any ethical value to acts which the human will had no part in causing.[19] If human acts are not caused by the will and choice, they must be caused by something within a person in order for them to not be random and to have ethical meaning.
5. Edwards rejects the idea that the human will chooses in the absence of any motive or desire.[20] He writes that it would be ridiculous for someone to insist that the human soul chooses one thing over another, and at the same time claim that the human will and choice is indifferent to either choice.[21]
Therefore to Edwards the Arminian view of libertarian free will is inconsistent.
True Human Freedom
Rejecting libertarian free will, Edwards thinks that people in their fallen state are freely able to choose what they most desire.[22] He believes that because of corrupted human nature human beings are free only to sin.[23] Human beings therefore freely choose within their sinful nature to disobey God. The choices of acts made by human beings do not depart from the motives and desires which fuel them as the motives and desires come from human nature.[24] Within Edwards' system God's sovereign grace would influence the nature of the elect in order that they would have motives and desires leading to a belief in Christ.
Storms point out that, for Edwards, corrupted human nature was not caused by natural necessity. Natural necessity would consist of external natural or environmental deterministic forces that would coerce or force someone to commit an act.[25] If this type of determinism took place, human beings would be freed from moral responsibility in choosing sinful acts. However, for Edwards, there is within corrupted humanity an internal moral necessity by which fallen and corrupted human beings freely and willfully, without force, coercion, or compulsion, through motives and desires, choose to sin.
This is in line with compatibilistic thought, as Feinberg views desires as preceding the human will in making choices.[26] I agree with both Edwards and Feinberg that human libertarian free will is not the cause of choice. I would cautiously deduce that behind human motives and desires is consciousness and self-awareness. This consciousness would be caused freely by God in the act of creation. God would give human beings within their nature consciousness and self-awareness, an understanding that they have identity as an individual. There would be in a sense significant, yet limited freedom present within the human consciousness to have an understanding of personal identity, apart from every other individual entity, but this in itself would not be free will or choice, and would not be libertarian free will. This idea does not fall prey to Edwards’ concept of infinite regression of will and choice. Human nature and consciousness does not choose to be as it is, but was created by God, and has been corrupt since the fall of humanity. From consciousness and self-awareness, human beings would develop motives and desires, and eventually make limited free will choices. The primary cause of human acts is determined by God who creates the human nature, and influences human choices. The secondary cause of human acts is the individuals that act according to nature, consciousness, motives, desires, and a limited free will influenced by God.
It may be correctly pointed out that what God determines and causes must necessarily (logically must occur) take place. However, I do not think that God coerces or forces individuals to commit actions. Some Calvinists suggest that human beings are not free in any respect, but have liberty to follow their motives and desires. A problem with the use of the term liberty, although I am in agreement with the basic theological concept, is that it is often academically defined as autonomy and/or freedom of choice, therefore confusing the issue for some not familiar with Reformed theology. With my use of the terms compatibilistic free will or limited free will I hope to provide a concept of human freedom that is clearly understood to be different than libertarian free will.
Even prior to the fall of humanity, because of God’s infinite presence and simultaneous willing of acts, I would not see human free will as libertarian free will, but rather limited free will simultaneously influenced by God. After the fall of humanity, the corrupted nature of humanity would produce a corrupted consciousness, motives, and desires, which would lead to people freely choosing to embrace sin.
Norman Geisler on Edwards
Geisler disagrees with Edward’s view, which he calls theistic determinism for four reasons.
1. To view freedom as that which someone desires is inadequate because people sometimes commit acts which they do not desire. People also at times do not commit acts they desire to do.[27] I do not find this reasoning convincing. For example, I may not desire to get allergy injections because they are slightly painful and irritating, but I take them because I desire to overcome my allergies more than I desire not take the shots. So, even though I do not desire to receive injections, I take them because I desire to be healthy. I still am committing an act based on a conscious understanding of personal identity, leading to motives, desire, and limited free will. I may avoid certain things I would desire to do because of consequences. I won’t drive at 100 miles an hour even though it is fun, since in a greater way I do not desire to have a traffic accident and/or be given a ticket.
2. Geisler states that human beings can freely cause their own actions, but not their own being. Geisler does not think a self-caused will comes from nothing, but from itself.[28] Edwards’ argument showing that each will and choice must have preceding will and choice is not overcome here. The will and choice, must in my view, be at least connected to human nature, which is initially caused by God, and has been corrupted by sin.
3. Geisler writes that people are made in the image of God, and therefore have the ability to make choices. I agree with Edwards that the starting point is not will or choice, but in my view is human nature, consciousness, motives and desires.
4. Human freedom to Geisler is not contrary to God’s sovereignty.[29] I agree with Geisler if we are meaning a compatibilistic limited free will, but not libertarian free will, or self-determinism as Geisler calls it.[30] In my view libertarian free will is contrary to God’s sovereign ability to save corrupted sinners, who oppose God by nature and choice and contrary to God’s sovereign ability to complete his plan for creation. Geisler writes that it is not the will that makes a decision, but the person acting by the means of that will.[31] He then adds that it is useless to ask what the first cause is, because it comes from the person.[32] I do not agree that it is useless to look beyond human choice, because even if by Geisler’s definition with his first use of the word will, we understand it as nature, consciousness, motives, and desires, the Bible appears to indicate in Romans, Chapter 3, that these have been corrupted.
[3] Geisler (1996: 429).
[4] Feinberg (1994: 60).
[5] Cranfield (1992: 66).
[6] Cranfield (1992: 67).
[7] Mounce (1995: 109).
[8] Mounce (1995: 109).
[9] Foulkes (1989: 55).
[10] Berofsky (1996: 198)
[11] P.E. Hughes defines irresistible grace as grace which a human being cannot reject. As a work this irresistible grace achieves its directed end. (1996: 481).
I do not believe it is irresistible in a sense of coercion or force, but that every person God chooses for salvation shall be saved.
[12] Edwards (1754)(2006: 2.1: 1).
[13] Edwards (1754)(2006: 2.1: 1).
[14] Edwards (1754)(2006: 2.1: 1-2).
[15] Edwards (1754)(2006: 2.1: 2).
[16] Storms (2006: 3).
[17] Edwards (1754)(2006: 2.1: 2).
[18] Storms (2006: 3).
[19] Storms (2006: 3).
[20] Storms (2006: 3).
[21] Edwards (1754)(2006: 2.7: 3).
[22] Tchividjian (2001: 1).
[23] Tchividjian (2001: 2).
[24] Edwards (1754)(2006: 4.4: 3).
[25] Storms (2006: 5).
[26] Feinberg (1994: 128).
[27] Geisler (1996: 429).
[28] Geisler (1996: 429).
[29] Geisler (1996: 429).
[30] Geisler (1996: 430).
[31] Geisler (1996: 430).
[32] Geisler (1996: 430).
BEROFSKY, BERNARD (1996) ‘Determinism’, in Robert Audi, (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
BLACKBURN, S. (1996) ‘Reductio ad Absurdum’, Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
CRANFIELD, C.E.B. (1992) Romans: A Shorter Commentary, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.
EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1754)(2006) Freedom of the Will, Flower Mound, Texas. Jonathanedwards.com.
http://www.jonathanedwards.com
FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.
FOULKES, FRANCIS (1989) Ephesians, Grand Rapids, Inter-Varsity Press.
GEISLER, N.L. (1996) ‘Freedom, Free Will, and Determinism’ in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books.
GRENZ, STANLEY J., DAVID GURETZKI and CHERITH FEE NORDLING (1999) Pocket Dictionary of Theological Terms, Downers Grove, Ill., InterVarsity Press.
HUGHES, P.E. (1996) ‘Grace’ in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books.
MOUNCE, R.H. (1995) The New American Commentary: Romans, Nashville, Broadman & Holman Publishers.
REED, HOLLY (2004) ‘Jonathan Edwards’, in The Boston Collaborative Encyclopedia of Modern Western Theology, Boston, The Boston Collaborative Encyclopedia of Modern Western Theology.
STORMS, SAM (2006) 'Jonathan Edwards on the Will', Kansas City, Missouri. Enjoying God Ministries. Enjoyinggodministries.com
http://www.enjoyinggodministries.com/article.asp?id=368
TCHIVIDJIAN, W. TULLIAN, (2001) ‘Reflections on Jonathan Edwards’ View of Free Will, in IIIM Magazine Online, Volume 3, Number 51, December 17 to December 23, Fern Park, Florida, IIIM Magazine Online.
You about did throw the book at me, eh? I'll give that all a respectful read before getting back with you on it. Blessings on ya!
ReplyDeleteRobert
Ha ha.
ReplyDeleteWell, I basically answered you in a paragraph, but thought I would throw in some of my research for you to scan.
Cheers, Robert.
Russ
Hi Russ.
ReplyDeleteIt's good to have some time to do a bit of reading. You have been busy. Just a short comment Russ from my perspective is that we often know what we think but find it very hard to put into words. One line I mentioned in our counselling seminar in the Philippines was: "some can and some cannot." You have a gift mate so keep up the good work.
Russell.
Thanks, Russell.
ReplyDeleteYou have a gift of encouragement which I greatly appreciate.
Russ