August 31, 2006 article, edited for an academia.edu entry on August 2, 2022.
Introduction
Theologian, Jonathan Edwards (1703-1758)[1] wrote a treatise in 1754, known as ‘Freedom of the Will’, but the actual name is ‘A Careful and Strict Inquiry into the Modern Prevailing Notions of that Freedom of the Will, which is Supposed to be Essential to Moral Agency, Virtue, and Vice, Reward and Punishment, Praise, and Blame’.[2] I think the shorter title shall suffice!
I looked at this work from both a philosophical and theological perspective and realized it had similarities to aspects of J.S. Feinberg’s sovereignty theodicy, and the related sovereignty theodicy that I have been working on in my MPhil and PhD work. My review is primarily theological.
Libertarian Free Will and Incompatibilism
Libertarian free will is usually viewed as a form of indeterminism. The concept in libertarian free will is that a person is able to perform another action in the place of one that has been committed. This action cannot be predetermined by any circumstance or desire. Norman Geisler explains that indeterminism is defined as the idea that there are no antecedent (preceding conditions) or simultaneous (at the same time) causes of human actions. All human actions are free if a person could have done otherwise.[3] Indeterminism is also equated with incompatibilism which states that God, or any other being, cannot cause by force or coercion any human action, nor can any action be simultaneously willed by God or any other being, for the human action to remain significantly free. Compatibilism, which I hold to, would agree with incompatibilism that God or any other being cannot cause by force or coercion any significantly free human action, but contrary to incompatibilism thinks that God can simultaneously will significantly free human actions.[4]
In regard to this article, I reject incompatibilism for two main reasons:
1. Due to the universal sinful nature of humanity described in Romans, Chapter 3, where it is mentioned that there are none righteous in verse 10, and none that seek God in verse 11. C.E.B. Cranfield states that this passage (vv. 10-18) indicates that without exception, all people are sinners.[5] Cranfield further writes that the idea being put across is that human beings live as if they have no reckoning with God, and are practical, even if not actual atheists.[6] Robert H. Mounce notes concerning this passage that although some may seek a religious experience, it is not the same as seeking the true God.[7] To Mounce, God seeks the Christian believer, and not the other way around.[8] Therefore with this interpretation of the Romans passage, if libertarian free will was true, no one would ever come to Christ through the gospel, because God would not simultaneously will that a person believe it.
In Ephesians, Chapter 1, believers in Christ are said to be chosen by God in verse 4, and predestined in adoption in verses 5 and 11. Francis Foulkes thinks that God’s sovereign will here in choosing people is not opposed to free will.[9] However, it seems because God’s sovereignty is involved this is not the concept of libertarian free will, or a type of hard determinism in which God coerces or forces human beings to believe in him, rather people are chosen and destined to be with God by believing and trusting in Christ. Bernard Berofsky writes that free will is an illusion within the concept of determinism.[10] This would not be the idea of compatibilism, as within compatibilism God is transforming previously rebellious sinners into people open to the gospel. The human free will would not be viewed as an illusion for compatibilism, but rather a will from a nature corrupted by sin that is in need of divine influence in order to freely accept the gospel. This requires God through the use of irresistible grace[11] to mould, change and persuade a person in order to accept the gospel, which they never could do on their own. Irresistible grace does consist of God determining that a person be saved, but this is through the use compatibilism or soft determinism and not compulsion. For a human being to be transformed by belief in the gospel in no way means that a human being is contributing to their merit for salvation.
2. The infinite (unlimited) nature of God who has definite goals and plans for his creation would require that he simultaneously influence the actions of finite (limited) human and angelic beings alike. God in the Bible has established plans and made prophecies which seemingly require a compatibilistic divine influence.
I therefore reject incompatibilism, in favour of compatibilism on the point of free will.
Edwards on Libertarian Free Will
Edwards, from his understanding, disagrees with Arminian libertarian free will. He views Arminianism as inconsistent because if the Arminians assume that human free will is the cause of choice then the human will determines its own actions. He argues:
1. The Arminians speak of the will determining itself, meaning the soul is exercising the power of willing something.[12]
2. If the will determines its own free acts, it thus determines its own acts by choosing them.[13]
3. If the human will determines the will and resulting choices, and since every choice must have a cause, then a chain is established where a will and choice is determined by a preceding will and choice. Therefore, if the will determines its own free acts, then every free act of will and choice is determined by a preceding act of will and choice. If a preceding act of will also be of free choice, then that too was self-determined.[14] What Edwards is stating is that in the act of causing a free choice (choice1), the cause of that choice was also made freely (choice2), and the cause of that choice was made freely (choice3) and so on.[15] This becomes contradictory and Sam Storms states this type of concept goes on ad infinitum, meaning that the Arminian view on free will and choice is subject to infinite regress (goes on forever) and without solid intellectual foundation.[16] Edwards is therefore concluding that logically a free will and choice cannot be its own cause.
4. Edwards suggests that a way out of this contradiction is to come to the last act of will and choice and state that it is not self-determined, but is rather determined without the use of a will and choice. However, to Edwards, if the initial act of will and choice within the chain is not free, then none of the resulting willed choices can be free.[17] By stating that acts of the will occur without any cause at all is to render human choice random.[18] If human choices are made randomly it is difficult to establish any ethical value to acts which the human will had no part in causing.[19] If human acts are not caused by the will and choice, they must be caused by something within a person in order for them to not be random and to have ethical meaning.
5. Edwards rejects the idea that the human will chooses in the absence of any motive or desire.[20] He writes that it would be ridiculous for someone to insist that the human soul chooses one thing over another, and at the same time claim that the human will and choice is indifferent to either choice.[21]
Therefore to Edwards the Arminian view of libertarian free will is inconsistent.
True Human Freedom
Rejecting libertarian free will, Edwards thinks that people in their fallen state are freely able to choose what they most desire.[22] He believes that because of corrupted human nature human beings are free only to sin.[23] Human beings therefore freely choose within their sinful nature to disobey God. The choices of acts made by human beings do not depart from the motives and desires which fuel them as the motives and desires come from human nature.[24] Within Edwards' system God's sovereign grace would influence the nature of the elect in order that they would have motives and desires leading to a belief in Christ.
Storms point out that, for Edwards, corrupted human nature was not caused by natural necessity. Natural necessity would consist of external natural or environmental deterministic forces that would coerce or force someone to commit an act.[25] If this type of determinism took place, human beings would be freed from moral responsibility in choosing sinful acts. However, for Edwards, there is within corrupted humanity an internal moral necessity by which fallen and corrupted human beings freely and willfully, without force, coercion, or compulsion, through motives and desires, choose to sin.
This is in line with compatibilistic thought, as Feinberg views desires as preceding the human will in making choices.[26] I agree with both Edwards and Feinberg that human libertarian free will is not the cause of choice. I would cautiously deduce that behind human motives and desires is consciousness and self-awareness. This consciousness would be caused freely by God in the act of creation. God would give human beings within their nature consciousness and self-awareness, an understanding that they have identity as an individual. There would be in a sense significant, yet limited freedom present within the human consciousness to have an understanding of personal identity, apart from every other individual entity, but this in itself would not be free will or choice, and would not be libertarian free will. This idea does not fall prey to Edwards’ concept of infinite regression of will and choice. Human nature and consciousness does not choose to be as it is, but was created by God, and has been corrupt since the fall of humanity. From consciousness and self-awareness, human beings would develop motives and desires, and eventually make limited free will choices. The primary cause of human acts is determined by God who creates the human nature, and influences human choices. The secondary cause of human acts is the individuals that act according to nature, consciousness, motives, desires, and a limited free will influenced by God.
It may be correctly pointed out that what God determines and causes must necessarily (logically must occur) take place. However, I do not think that God coerces or forces individuals to commit actions. Some Calvinists suggest that human beings are not free in any respect, but have liberty to follow their motives and desires. A problem with the use of the term liberty, although I am in agreement with the basic theological concept, is that it is often academically defined as autonomy and/or freedom of choice, therefore confusing the issue for some not familiar with Reformed theology. With my use of the terms compatibilistic free will or limited free will I hope to provide a concept of human freedom that is clearly understood to be different than libertarian free will.
Even prior to the fall of humanity, because of God’s infinite presence and simultaneous willing of acts, I would not see human free will as libertarian free will, but rather limited free will simultaneously influenced by God. After the fall of humanity, the corrupted nature of humanity would produce a corrupted consciousness, motives, and desires, which would lead to people freely choosing to embrace sin.
Norman Geisler on Edwards
Geisler disagrees with Edward’s view, which he calls theistic determinism for four reasons.
1. To view freedom as that which someone desires is inadequate because people sometimes commit acts which they do not desire. People also at times do not commit acts they desire to do.[27] I do not find this reasoning convincing. For example, I may not desire to get allergy injections because they are slightly painful and irritating, but I take them because I desire to overcome my allergies more than I desire not take the shots. So, even though I do not desire to receive injections, I take them because I desire to be healthy. I still am committing an act based on a conscious understanding of personal identity, leading to motives, desire, and limited free will. I may avoid certain things I would desire to do because of consequences. I won’t drive at 100 miles an hour even though it is fun, since in a greater way I do not desire to have a traffic accident and/or be given a ticket.
2. Geisler states that human beings can freely cause their own actions, but not their own being. Geisler does not think a self-caused will comes from nothing, but from itself.[28] Edwards’ argument showing that each will and choice must have preceding will and choice is not overcome here. The will and choice, must in my view, be at least connected to human nature, which is initially caused by God, and has been corrupted by sin.
3. Geisler writes that people are made in the image of God, and therefore have the ability to make choices. I agree with Edwards that the starting point is not will or choice, but in my view is human nature, consciousness, motives and desires.
4. Human freedom to Geisler is not contrary to God’s sovereignty.[29] I agree with Geisler if we are meaning a compatibilistic limited free will, but not libertarian free will, or self-determinism as Geisler calls it.[30] In my view libertarian free will is contrary to God’s sovereign ability to save corrupted sinners, who oppose God by nature and choice and contrary to God’s sovereign ability to complete his plan for creation. Geisler writes that it is not the will that makes a decision, but the person acting by the means of that will.[31] He then adds that it is useless to ask what the first cause is, because it comes from the person.[32] I do not agree that it is useless to look beyond human choice, because even if by Geisler’s definition with his first use of the word will, we understand it as nature, consciousness, motives, and desires, the Bible appears to indicate in Romans, Chapter 3, that these have been corrupted.
Practical Theology
Incompatibilistic systems which claim libertarian free will, in my view, fail to adequately deal with the Biblical problem of a fallen corrupted human nature. I realize as small children many of us are taught that every person can choose good or evil, and this makes some sense humanly speaking, as most people do some good things for others. To many it seems unjust that we human beings are born with sin natures, and cannot choose God on our own. However, Christianity is a faith of grace where God shows love to human beings through the atoning work and resurrection of Christ.[33] Human beings sin freely and willfully, but by God’s irresistible grace human beings can freely accept the gospel through the use of compatibilistic limited free will.
[1] Reed (2004:1).
[2] Storms (2006: 1).
[3] Geisler (1996: 429).
[4] Feinberg (1994: 60).
[5] Cranfield (1992: 66).
[6] Cranfield (1992: 67).
[7] Mounce (1995: 109).
[8] Mounce (1995: 109).
[9] Foulkes (1989: 55).
[10] Berofsky (1996: 198)
[11] P.E. Hughes defines irresistible grace as grace which a human being cannot reject. As a work this irresistible grace achieves its directed end. (1996: 481).
I do not believe it is irresistible in a sense of coercion or force, but that every person God chooses for salvation shall be saved.
[12] Edwards (1754)(2006: 2.1: 1).
[13] Edwards (1754)(2006: 2.1: 1).
[14] Edwards (1754)(2006: 2.1: 1-2).
[15] Edwards (1754)(2006: 2.1: 2).
[16] Storms (2006: 3).
[17] Edwards (1754)(2006: 2.1: 2).
[18] Storms (2006: 3).
[19] Storms (2006: 3).
[20] Storms (2006: 3).
[21] Edwards (1754)(2006: 2.7: 3).
[22] Tchividjian (2001: 1).
[23] Tchividjian (2001: 2).
[24] Edwards (1754)(2006: 4.4: 3).
[25] Storms (2006: 5).
[26] Feinberg (1994: 128).
[27] Geisler (1996: 429).
[28] Geisler (1996: 429).
[29] Geisler (1996: 429).
[30] Geisler (1996: 430).
[31] Geisler (1996: 430).
[32] Geisler (1996: 430).
[33] Grenz, Guretzki, and Nordling (1999: 56).
AUGUSTINE (388-395)(1964) On Free Choice of the Will, Translated by Anna S.Benjamin and L.H. Hackstaff, Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall.
AUGUSTINE (398-399)(1992) Confessions, Translated by Henry Chadwick, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
AUGUSTINE (400-416)(1987)(2004) On the Trinity, Translated by Reverend Arthur West Haddan, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Series One, Volume 3, Denver, The Catholic Encyclopedia.
AUGUSTINE (421)(1998) Enchiridion, Translated by J.F. Shaw, Denver, The Catholic Encyclopedia.
AUGUSTINE (426)(1958) The City of God, Translated by Gerald G. Walsh, Garden City, New York, Image Books.
AUGUSTINE (427)(1997) On Christian Doctrine, Translated by D.W. Robertson Jr., Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall.
AUGUSTINE (427b)(1997) On Christian Teaching, Translated by R.P.H. Green, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
BARNHART, J.E. (1977) ‘Theodicy and the Free Will Defence: Response to Plantinga and Flew’, Abstract in Religious Studies, 13, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
BEEBE, JAMES R. (2006) ‘The Logical Problem of Evil’, in The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Buffalo, University at Buffalo.
BEROFSKY, BERNARD (1996) ‘Determinism’, in Robert Audi, (ed.),
The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
BLACKBURN, S. (1996) ‘Reductio ad Absurdum’,
Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
BOURKE, VERNON J. (1958) ‘Introduction’, in The City of God, Translated by Gerald G. Walsh, Garden City, New York, Image Books.
CALVIN, JOHN (1539)(1998) The Institutes of the Christian Religion, Book IV, Translated by Henry Beveridge, Grand Rapids, The Christian Classic Ethereal Library, Wheaton College. http://www.ccel.org/ccel/calvin/institutes.html
CALVIN, JOHN (1540)(1973) Romans and Thessalonians, Translated by Ross Mackenzie, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.
CALVIN, JOHN (1543)(1996) The Bondage and Liberation of the Will, Translated by G.I. Davies, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.
CALVIN, JOHN (1550)(1978) Concerning Scandals, Translated by John W. Fraser, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.
CALVIN, JOHN (1552)(1995) Acts, Translated by Watermark, Nottingham, Crossway Books.
CALVIN, JOHN (1553)(1952) Job, Translated by Leroy Nixon, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.
CALVIN, JOHN (1554)(1965) Genesis, Translated by John King, Edinburgh, The Banner of Truth Trust.
CHADWICK, HENRY (1992) ‘Introduction’, in
Confessions, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
CRANFIELD, C.E.B. (1992) Romans: A Shorter Commentary, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.
EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1729)(2006) Sovereignty of God, New Haven, Connecticut, Jonathan Edwards Center, Yale University. http://edwards.yale.edu/archive/documents/page?document_id=10817&search_id=&source_type=edited&pagenumber=1
EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1731-1733)(2006)
Law of Nature, New Haven, Connecticut, Jonathan Edwards Center, Yale University.
EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1754)(2006) Freedom of the Will, Flower Mound, Texas. Jonathanedwards.com.
http://www.jonathanedwards.com
ESHLEMAN, ANDREW (1997) ‘Alternative Possibilities and the Free Will Defence’, in Religious Studies, Volume 33, pp. 267-286. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, in David Basinger and Randall Basinger (eds.), Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.
FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.
FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (2001) No One Like Him, John S. Feinberg (gen.ed.), Wheaton, Illinois, Crossway Books.
FLEW, ANTONY, R.M. HARE, AND BASIL MITCHELL (1996) ‘The Debate on the Rationality of Religious Belief’, in L.P. Pojman (ed.), Philosophy, The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.
FLEW, ANTONY AND A.MACINTRYE (1999) ‘Philosophy of Religion’, in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press Ltd.
FOULKES, FRANCIS (1989)
Ephesians, Grand Rapids, Inter-Varsity Press.
GEISLER, N.L. (1996) ‘Freedom, Free Will, and Determinism’ in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books.
GEIVETT, R. DOUGLAS (1993) Evil and the Evidence for God, Philadelphia, Temple University Press.
GRENZ, STANLEY J., DAVID GURETZKI and CHERITH FEE NORDLING (1999) Pocket Dictionary of Theological Terms, Downers Grove, Ill., InterVarsity Press.
HASKER, WILLIAM (1989)
God, Time, and Knowledge, Ithaca, Cornell University Press.
HASKER, WILLIAM (1993) ‘C. Robert Mesle, John Hick’s Theodicy: A Process Humanist Critique’, in Philosophy of Religion, Volume 34, Number 1, pp. 55-56. Dordrecht, Netherlands, Philosophy of Religion.
HASKER, WILLIAM (1994) ‘Can Philosophy Defend Theology?’, in Faith and Philosophy, Volume 11, Number 2, April, pp. 272-278. Wilmore, Kentucky, Asbury College.
HASKER, WILLIAM (2000) ‘The Problem of Evil in Process Theism and Classical Free Will Theism’, in Process Studies, Volume. 29, Number 2, Fall-Winter, pp. 194-208. Claremont, California, Religion Online.
HASKER, WILLIAM (2003) ‘Counterfactuals and Evil’, in Philosophia Christi, Volume 5, Number 1, pp. 235-249. La Mirada, California, Biola University.
HASKER, WILLIAM (2003) ‘Is Free-Will Theism Religiously Inadequate? A Reply to Ciocchi’, in Religious Studies, Volume 39, Number 4, December, pp. 431-440. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
HASKER, WILLIAM (2007) ‘Peter van Inwagen, The Problem of Evil’, in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, Notre Dame, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
HOWARD-SNYDER, DANIEL AND JOHN O’LEARY-HAWTHORNE (1998) ‘Transworld Sanctity and Plantinga’s Free Will Defence’, in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Volume 44, Number 1, August, Springer, Netherlands, Publisher International Journal for Philosophy of Religion.
HUGHES, P.E. (1996) ‘Grace’ in Walter A. Elwell (ed.),
Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books.
JORDAN, MARK D. (1996) ‘Augustine’, in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, pp. 52-53. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
LAFOLLETTE, HUGH (1980) ‘Plantinga on Free Will Defence’, in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 11, The Hague, Martimus Nijhoff Publishers.
MACKIE, J.L. (1955)(1996) ‘Evil and Omnipotence’, in Mind, in Michael Peterson, William Hasker, Bruce Reichenbach, and David Basinger (eds.), Philosophy of Religion, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
MACKIE, J.L. (1971)(1977)(2002) ‘Evil and Omnipotence’, in The Philosophy of Religion, in Alvin C. Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids. Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company
MOUNCE, R.H. (1995)
The New American Commentary: Romans, Nashville, Broadman & Holman Publishers.
PETERSON, MICHAEL (1982)
Evil and the Christian God, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.
PHILLIPS, D.Z. (1981) Encountering Evil, Stephen T. Davis (ed.), Atlanta, John Knox Press.
PHILLIPS, D.Z. (2005) The Problem of Evil and the Problem of God, Fortress Press, Minneapolis.
REED, HOLLY (2004) ‘Jonathan Edwards’, in The Boston Collaborative Encyclopedia of Modern Western Theology, Boston, The Boston Collaborative Encyclopedia of Modern Western Theology.
STORMS, SAM (2006) 'Jonathan Edwards on the Will', Kansas City, Missouri. Enjoying God Ministries. Enjoyinggodministries.com
http://www.enjoyinggodministries.com/article.asp?id=368
TCHIVIDJIAN, W. TULLIAN, (2001) ‘Reflections on Jonathan Edwards’ View of Free Will, in
IIIM Magazine Online, Volume 3, Number 51, December 17 to December 23, Fern Park, Florida, IIIM Magazine Online.
PhD Full Version PDF
