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September 24, 2011
A. Plantinga’s Free Will Defence
Incompatibilism
Plantinga, like Augustine,[1] is assuming a form of incompatibilism with his free will defence.[2] Augustine assumes God cannot be blamed for creating free creatures that have a choice to follow temporal or eternal laws, and then choose to disobey God by following temporal laws leading to evil.[3] Plantinga believes, for human beings to have significant freedom they must be able to commit or refrain from actions without the interference of any cause, including God.[4] So Plantinga did not see the concept in terms of laws but,[5] like Augustine, he saw the need for human beings to commit, or refrain from committing, actions in order to have the possibility to perform right or wrong actions that are in line with God's original intentions in creation.[6] Plantinga notes that an action is only morally significant when it can be understood whether an action is right or wrong, and this requires significant freedom in the area of thought.[7]
To Plantinga, God is not to blame for evil because no antecedent conditions or laws from an outside force, including God, can coerce, force or simultaneously determine human actions.[8] If this is done, significant freedom cannot exist.[9] Since this is the case,[10] the fact that God is omnipotent does not mean it is possible for God to create significantly free beings without at least the potential for rebellion.[11] Augustine states no true human goodness can be performed except by a free choice of the human will.[12] Plantinga concludes in a similar fashion significant free will is required for humanity because a world containing significantly free creatures that perform more good actions than evil ones, is more valuable to God than a world containing no free creatures.[13]
Definition of Plantinga’s Defence
Plantinga postulates since a world containing significantly free creatures where good outweighs evil is more valuable than a world with automatons or robots,[14] it is logically possible and plausible God could not have created free creatures and, at the same time, guarantee they would only commit right actions.[15] If God had done that, he would have eliminated the significant freedom within these creatures, and they would not be acting freely.[16] This idea is in line with Augustine’s view that a human being cannot act rightly unless he/she wills to do so.[17] Augustine thought if God had created creatures that only did right actions, then these creatures would not have the option to commit wrong actions against God’s will.[18] Thus their obedience to God would be meaningless and not truly righteous or, to Augustine, worthy of membership in the Kingdom of God.[19]
Plantinga believes it apparent some of the creatures God has created make wrong decisions and commit moral evil.[20] Sadly human freedom was misused.[21] To Plantinga, the fact this occurs, and free creatures sometimes do wrong actions,[22] is not to be counted against God, his omnipotence or his goodness.[23] God could only have avoided the possibility of moral evil by removing the possibility of moral good, and by removing significant freedom from the creatures.[24]
Plantinga speculates the problem of evil is unfortunate but worthwhile because it is possibly the only way God could create truly good creatures.[25] Without the use of significant freedom, creatures could not choose to be morally good and thus could not please God.[26]
Plantinga speculates the problem of evil is unfortunate but worthwhile because it is possibly the only way God could create truly good creatures.[25] Without the use of significant freedom, creatures could not choose to be morally good and thus could not please God.[26]
Antony Flew’s Objection
Plantinga, living some fifteen hundred years after Augustine, has a greater number of critics of free will approaches to deal with. Plantinga has dealt with Antony Flew’s atheistic objection,[27] but the criticism of Flew could be equally applied to Plantinga’s or Augustine’s approach.[28] Flew’s article from 1955 ‘Divine Omnipotence and Human Freedom’ in New Essays within Philosophical Theology states it is reasonable God could have created free creatures who are free to do what is right or wrong, but are causally determined by God to do only what is right.[29] Persons could be constituted to always act uprightly.[30] Feinberg notes that for Flew, unconstrained determined free will is an option instead of incompatibilist free will.[31] Plantinga suggests Flew’s objection is utterly impossible,[32] and it is implausible for Flew to suppose God could make free creatures, and then cause and guarantee these persons only do what was right at all times.[33]
Andrew Eshleman (1997) in his article ‘Alternative Possibilities and the Free Will Defence’ explains Flew’s arguments against free will incompatibilism[34] have merit, but it is not true that belief in God hangs in the balance.[35] In other words, even if Flew’s theory is true, atheism is not necessarily true by default.[36] Eshleman notes that if Flew is correct, the free will defence simply needs to become more robust.[37] It seems sensible there is room for greater depth with free will approaches,[38] particularly in light of the incompatibilism, compatibilism debate. I agree with Eshleman[39] that rejecting incompatibilism for compatibilism does not mean one should logically hold to atheism.
If Flew’s theory is correct, it would simply disprove most incompatibilist free will approaches;[40] however, there would still be compatibilist theodicy approaches to review before totally disregarding theism, not to overlook other types of theistic theodicy.[41] Plantinga’s criticism of Flew seems plausible,[42] but if Flew is stating that God with the use of soft determinism[43] can create people in a way they always act freely without being forced or coerced, then I view his understanding as tenable.[44] God could seemingly create beings that freely always did what was right,[45] but if by causally determining people to do what is right Flew’s system requires God to use force or coercion, then clearly human actions will not have been done freely. Flew’s objection is seemingly outright contradiction if he uses hard determinism,[46] which would see God as the only cause of human actions.[47] His atheistic determinism would not be in line with much of theistic compatibilism,[48] which would view God as the cause of circumstances and events by which the human will would be determined, but without compulsion.[49] Flew (1983)(1996) within his view, does not grant that God is guiding humanity.[50] On the contrary, he reasons, the idea of God’s divine work cannot be demonstrated in any convincing way and is meaningless.[51] He states concepts such as God having a plan, or God having created the world,[52] are mere assertions that are unlikely to succeed in becoming orthodox or effective because they cannot be proven empirically true or false.[53] Flew’s concept which has God determining no human beings commit a wrong act at any time,[54] is not reasonable according to Plantinga;[55] however, my objection to Flew would come if he uses a form of hard determinism[56] and yet claims human beings would still act freely.[57] This seemingly would require God to have human beings commit actions without the use of any type of free will.[58]
Michael Peterson supports Plantinga’s view against Flew’s compatibilism.[59] Peterson states Flew’s concept produces an illogical, impossible state of affairs, which is not reasonable.[60] If Plantinga and Peterson are correct, then Flew’s compatibilism is not really compatibilism at all, but simply hard determinism.[61] Flew’s view would be a nonsensical[62] equivalent of stating that God can have people non-freely, freely do what he wants them to, avoiding wrong actions.
J. L. Mackie and the Best Possible World Objection
The next objection Plantinga deals with is Mackie’s atheistic compatibilism[63] which, in part, assumes a perfectly good God[64] should have created, if he exists, a best possible world.[65] Leibniz believes God had an infinite number of worlds to choose from to create, and chose the best possible world.[66] Mackie’s ‘Evil and Omnipotence’ in Mind (1971) removes the possibility of hard determinism and postulates God could have made free creatures that only do what is right.[67] They do not have to be determined because God could have made people in a way they freely always chose what was right[68] even though, unlike Flew’s determinism,[69] wrong actions would be a technical possibility.[70] Plantinga admits it is logically possible, in a broad sense, there could be a world containing creatures that only do what is right.[71] Plantinga explains and rejects Mackie’s concept of possible worlds and does this with two main objections.[72] First, no matter how wonderful a world appears to be, no matter how many incredibly happy people there are, it is always possible there is an even better world containing more people who are even happier.[73] Plantinga’s reasoning appears sound as any finite world God would create could always be better.[74] Only an infinite world would be the best possible world, and it is debatable and unlikely God could create an infinite world. The fact that a world is created means it is not infinitely old or eternal, and so this would seemingly make the concept of a created infinite world untenable.
Plantinga’s second objection to Mackie’s best possible world idea concerns the concept of human free choice.[75] Plantinga describes Paul (1) accepting an offer, or (2) rejecting an offer.[76] Whichever choice Paul makes, either (1) or (2), God would not be able to actualize that world.[77] If Paul would make a wrong choice at any point, the problem of evil would occur, and the world would no longer be the best possible as Mackie describes.[78] To Plantinga, the result of God creating significantly free creatures is that their decisions did impact which type of world God created, and how much evil it would contain.[79] God’s omnipotence, to Plantinga, could not guarantee a best possible world free from evil, because there is always a possibility of human decisions that are contrary to what God would have desired.[80] Since significantly free creatures exist, it is never up to God alone in regard to which world is actualized.[81]
Augustine, like Plantinga, seemingly did assume free creatures will eventually make one wrong decision, this making Mackie’s idea that human beings could always freely choose the right seem untenable to these free will proponents.[82] At the same time, both Augustine and Plantinga would reject Mackie’s notion that if God is understood and accepted, as in traditional Christian theism, he should have created a best possible world filled with perfect creatures that never do wrong actions,[83] and because God did not do this atheism would be the preferred philosophy to adopt. Both free will advocates have stated that significantly free creatures by definition could not be guaranteed by God to avoid wrong actions,[84] and thus when wrong actions occur it is because of the human abuse of free will only.[85] God is not to be blamed for creating a good thing, that being free will, which is willfully turned towards something evil by his human creation.[86]
[1] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 33).
BARNHART, J.E. (1977) ‘Theodicy and the Free Will Defence: Response to Plantinga and Flew’, Abstract in Religious Studies, 13, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
BEEBE, JAMES R. (2006) ‘The Logical Problem of Evil’, in The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Buffalo, University at Buffalo.
ESHLEMAN, ANDREW (1997) ‘Alternative Possibilities and the Free Will Defence’, in Religious Studies, Volume 33, pp. 267-286. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
FLEW, ANTONY, R.M. HARE, AND BASIL MITCHELL (1996) ‘The Debate on the Rationality of Religious Belief’, in L.P. Pojman (ed.), Philosophy, The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.
FLEW, ANTONY AND A.MACINTRYE (1999) ‘Philosophy of Religion’, in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press Ltd.
GEIVETT, R. DOUGLAS (1993) Evil and the Evidence for God, Philadelphia, Temple University Press.
HOWARD-SNYDER, DANIEL AND JOHN O’LEARY-HAWTHORNE (1998) ‘Transworld Sanctity and Plantinga’s Free Will Defence’, in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Volume 44, Number 1, August, Springer, Netherlands, Publisher International Journal for Philosophy of Religion.
LAFOLLETTE, HUGH (1980) ‘Plantinga on Free Will Defence’, in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 11, The Hague, Martimus Nijhoff Publishers.
MACKIE, J.L. (1955)(1996) ‘Evil and Omnipotence’, in Mind, in Michael Peterson, William Hasker, Bruce Reichenbach, and David Basinger (eds.), Philosophy of Religion, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
MACKIE, J.L. (1971)(1977)(2002) ‘Evil and Omnipotence’, in The Philosophy of Religion, in Alvin C. Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids. Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.
PETERSON, MICHAEL (1982) Evil and the Christian God, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.
PHILLIPS, D.Z. (1981) Encountering Evil, Stephen T. Davis (ed.), Atlanta, John Knox Press.
PHILLIPS, D.Z. (2005) The Problem of Evil and the Problem of God, Fortress Press, Minneapolis.
PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1977)(2002) God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.
PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1982) The Nature of Necessity, Oxford, Clarendon Press.
POJMAN, LOUIS P. (1996) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.
[2] Plantinga (1982)(166-167). Howard-Snyder and O’Leary-Hawthorne (1998: 1). J.E. Barnhart mentions that even as Plantinga is from a Reformed tradition, he does not write a Calvinistic theodicy. Barnhart (1977: 2). In my view, Plantinga’s presentation is not Reformed in a classic sense, but has more in common with modern evangelical free will perspectives. I reason this is demonstrated with questionnaire results.
[3] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 33).
[5] Plantinga took a more philosophical perspective.
[6] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 29-30).
[7] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 29-30).
[8] Plantinga (1982: 166-167).
[9] Plantinga (1982: 166-167).
[10] Plantinga (1982: 166-167).
[11] Plantinga (1982: 167). Moral evil must exist in order for moral good to exist. LaFollette (1980: 1)
[12] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 78).
[14] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 30).
[15] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 30). Significant incompatibilist freedom requires that there are no prior/antecedent conditions that an action will or will not be performed. Howard-Snyder and O’Leary-Hawthorne (1998: 3).
[17] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 36). Plantinga (1977)(2002: 30).
[18] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 36). Plantinga (1977)(2002: 30).
[19] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 78).
[20] Plantinga (1982: 167).
[26] Plantinga (1982: 167). Without significant human freedom, God would remove the possibility of moral good. Howard-Snyder and O’Leary-Hawthorne (1998: 3).
[27] Geivett notes Flew questions the existence of an infinitely good God and his divine omnipotence in light of the problem of evil. Geivett (1993: 9).
[28] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 31).
[29] Flew (1955: 150-153). Plantinga (1977)(2002: 31). Human nature is somewhat determined in order that freedom does not lead to random actions. Geivett (1993: 189).
[30] Geivett (1993: 159).
[31] Feinberg (1994: 61). Flew holds to a type of determinism, as a human being is only free within certain parameters. Geivett (1993: 189).
[32] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 32).
[33] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 32). The view being God could guarantee persons always act freely and rightly. Geivett (1993: 189).
[34] Flew (1955: 150-153).
[35] Eshleman (1997: 286). There are compatibilistic sovereignty theodicy approaches in existence, such as Feinberg’s presentation.
[36] Eshleman (1997: 286).
[37] Eshleman (1997: 286).
[38] Eshleman (1997: 286).
[39] Eshleman (1997: 286).
[40] This would make Plantinga’s free will approach very likely untrue.
[41] Besides sovereignty approaches, there are also soul making perspectives like that of John Hick. I also acknowledge there are non-Christian attempts at theodicy.
[42] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 32).
[43] Pojman (1996: 256).
[44] There have been intellectual attempts to understand how determinism may work with human free will. Blackburn (1996: 102). This is a reasonable intellectual pursuit.
[45] Flew (1955: 150-153).
[46] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 32).
[47] Pojman (1996: 256). Therefore denying the possibility of a human secondary cause in human actions.
[48] Or most Reformed perspectives which use compatibilism.
[49] Pojman (1996: 256).
[50] Flew (1983)(1996: 92).
[51] Flew (1983)(1996: 92).
[52] Flew (1983)(1996: 92).
[53] Flew (1983)(1996: 92).
[54] Flew (1955: 150-153).
[55] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 31-32).
[56] Pojman (1996: 256).
[57] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 31-32).
[58] Peterson (1982: 104).
[59] Peterson (1982: 104).
[60] Peterson (1982: 104).
[61] Peterson (1982: 104). Plantinga (1977)(2002: 32).
[62] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 32).
[63] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 32-34).
[67] Mackie (1971) in Plantinga (1977)(2002: 32-33). Mackie (1955)(1996: 250-253).
[69] Flew (1955: 150-153). Plantinga (1977)(2002: 31).
[70] Mackie (1971) in Plantinga (1977)(2002: 32-33). Mackie (1955)(1996: 250-253).
[71] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 32).
[72] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 32-64).
[73] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 34).
[74] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 34).
[76] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 40-42). There are possible worlds that God cannot actualize. LaFollette (1980: 3).
[77] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 42).
[78] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 42).
[79] Plantinga (1982: 180-181). Therefore, for Plantinga some worlds cannot be actualized. LaFollette (1980: 4).
[81] Geivett (1993: 196).
[82] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 3).
[83] Mackie (1971) in Plantinga (1977)(2002: 32-33). Mackie (1955)(1996: 250-253).
[84] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 3). Plantinga (1982: 189).
[85] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 3). Plantinga (1982: 189).
[86] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 33). Plantinga (1982: 170-171). The free will theist that reasons evil is adequately explained is left with the religious problem of individual suffering, according to LaFollette. LaFollette (1980: 1).
AUGUSTINE (388-395)(1964) On Free Choice of the Will, Translated by Anna S.Benjamin and L.H. Hackstaff, Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall.
BARNHART, J.E. (1977) ‘Theodicy and the Free Will Defence: Response to Plantinga and Flew’, Abstract in Religious Studies, 13, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
BEEBE, JAMES R. (2006) ‘The Logical Problem of Evil’, in The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Buffalo, University at Buffalo.
ESHLEMAN, ANDREW (1997) ‘Alternative Possibilities and the Free Will Defence’, in Religious Studies, Volume 33, pp. 267-286. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
FLEW, ANTONY, R.M. HARE, AND BASIL MITCHELL (1996) ‘The Debate on the Rationality of Religious Belief’, in L.P. Pojman (ed.), Philosophy, The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.
FLEW, ANTONY AND A.MACINTRYE (1999) ‘Philosophy of Religion’, in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press Ltd.
GEIVETT, R. DOUGLAS (1993) Evil and the Evidence for God, Philadelphia, Temple University Press.
HOWARD-SNYDER, DANIEL AND JOHN O’LEARY-HAWTHORNE (1998) ‘Transworld Sanctity and Plantinga’s Free Will Defence’, in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Volume 44, Number 1, August, Springer, Netherlands, Publisher International Journal for Philosophy of Religion.
LAFOLLETTE, HUGH (1980) ‘Plantinga on Free Will Defence’, in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 11, The Hague, Martimus Nijhoff Publishers.
MACKIE, J.L. (1955)(1996) ‘Evil and Omnipotence’, in Mind, in Michael Peterson, William Hasker, Bruce Reichenbach, and David Basinger (eds.), Philosophy of Religion, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
MACKIE, J.L. (1971)(1977)(2002) ‘Evil and Omnipotence’, in The Philosophy of Religion, in Alvin C. Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids. Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.
PETERSON, MICHAEL (1982) Evil and the Christian God, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.
PHILLIPS, D.Z. (1981) Encountering Evil, Stephen T. Davis (ed.), Atlanta, John Knox Press.
PHILLIPS, D.Z. (2005) The Problem of Evil and the Problem of God, Fortress Press, Minneapolis.
PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1977)(2002) God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.
PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1982) The Nature of Necessity, Oxford, Clarendon Press.
POJMAN, LOUIS P. (1996) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.
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