Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) Edited from PhD
Posted on academia.edu: May 20, 2023
Preface
This post which is edited work from my PhD demonstrates where Philosophy/Philosophy of Religion can work with Theology and Biblical Studies.
There would be areas of agreement and disagreement with Christian theology and worldview.
The philosophical arguments of Kant are often used by critics of theism and Christianity and therefore at times need to be dealt with by those Christians interested in theological defences, apologetics, and I would suggest at times even evangelism and missions.
One can see why my Doctorate is in both Theology and Philosophy of Religion.
Kantian philosophy
Kantian philosophy originates from philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). Kant like some other prominent philosophers of the Enlightenment era, such as Jonathan Edwards is a sophisticated writer.[1] It would take years of research to become a scholar of Kant, and it should be noted he is not a major player within theodicy discussion.
In his Inaugural Dissertation of 1770, Kant provides the idea that persons can only have a priori knowledge of space and time by the use of forms of the mind, which are imposed by human experience.[2] Kantian scholars Paul Guyer and Allen Wood (1999) with the Introduction to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, note that a priori knowledge originates independently of senses and experience.[3] According to Pojman the word a priori is the Latin for preceding and is considered knowledge that is not based on empirical experience, but is known by the meaning of words or definitions.[4]
In the Critique of Pure Reason of 1781 and revised in 1787, Kant explains that the forms of appearance from which sensations can be understood are not themselves the empirical sensations.[5] Human experience will determine the method and forms by which particular things are understood by what Kant calls pure intuition.[6] Concerning human experience, Kant reasoned categories are applied to objects not because the objects make the categories possible, but rather because categories themselves provide and constitute necessary conditions for the representation for all possible objects of experience.[7]
Therefore any human understanding of metaphysical reality would not be comprehended by empirical knowledge in a posteriori sense.[8] Guyer and Wood point out that Kant was not an empiricist,[9] as while Kant criticized and limited the scope of traditional metaphysical thought,[10] he also sought to defend against empiricism’s claim of the possibility of universal and necessary knowledge which he called a priori [11] knowledge, because no knowledge derived from experience, a posteriori [12] knowledge, could justify a claim to universal and necessary validity.[13] Guyer and Wood explain that Kant sought to defend the scientific approach to the acquisition of knowledge against skeptics that dismissed rigorous arguments in favor of ‘common sense.’[14]
Kant critiqued the dogmatism of certain metaphysicians negatively,[15] and he also negatively noted as dogmatists those that would be intellectually indifferent to metaphysical inquiry.[16] Kant wished to limit the pretensions of dogmatic empiricists while defending metaphysical theories as a science and necessary in terms of practical reason.[17] Basically, Kant defended metaphysics as important and necessary,[18] but was sympathetic to the empiricists view that certain metaphysical questions were insoluble.[19]
Kant noted that a priori is relational without its own inherent content.[20] It is synthetic and incapable of serving as metaphysical proof.
A priori is relative to an experience only capable of producing appearances, and so a priori is factual as experience which it conditions.[21] Kant reasons objects that were present in empirical human experience were in the phenomena realm, while objects outside were the noumena realm.[22] He writes that the contingent things experienced by persons are phenomena.[23] These are things that could be experienced empirically and would be reasonably accepted as reality.[24] The noumena realm was not available to empirical senses.[25]
Kant explains in a follow up work entitled The Critique of Practical Reason from 1788, that the noumena is the theoretical department of knowledge denied, while the phenomena is one’s own empirical consciousness.[26] All positive speculative knowledge should be disclaimed for the noumena realm according to Kantian thought.[27] Kant concludes The Critique of Practical Reason by noting that the phenomena realm is the external realm where consciousness has existence.[28] The noumena realm is invisible and has true infinity where Kant believes one can reason that contingent personality is dependent on the universal and necessary connection to the invisible world.[29]
Importantly Kant thought it legitimate for one to postulate the noumena realm in a ‘negative sense’ meaning things as they may be independently or how they are represented,[30] but not noumena in the ‘positive sense’ which would be things based on pure reason alone.[31] Instead, noumena categories were only useful by applying them to empirical data structured in forms of intuition.[32]
The concept of noumena, according to Kant, was bound to the limit of pretension of sensibility and reason, and therefore only negative noumenon was of intellectual use.[33] Noumena in its negative sense are that which is not an object of sense intuition.[34] Kant rejects concepts of positive noumena based on pure reason[35] because, according to T.C. Williams (1987), noumenal concepts are not determinate knowledge of anything and must be based on a sense of sensible intuition.[36] Kant rejects the positive use of the term as it postulates objective knowledge of a metaphysical realm.[37] The positive sense of the term noumena is therefore fully rejected by Kant.[38] He explains that the noumenal in the negative sense is equivalent to the thing itself and alone is involved in the concept.[39] Kant’s view leads to a moral theology which has a doctrine of God and immortality postulated, along with theories of human free will and morality.[40] His moral theology is postulated and is not dogmatic, rational metaphysics.[41]
The nature of the noumenal realm described by Kant would, to John Hick, cause those who profess natural theology to lower their expectations from proving God’s existence to merely making it probable at best.[42] Hick thinks that these probabilities are based on personal estimates of likelihood and are arbitrary.[43] Kantian philosophy postulates that any reality which existed beyond what can be empirically experienced is not knowable, and therefore God is placed beyond the realm of science based experience.[44] God and morality could not be affirmed as actual or possible concepts, although Kant states that they can be assumed as possibilities.[45] Hick takes this idea of Kant’s and deduces that when it comes to religious doctrine, the noumenal realm that stands behind the phenomena realm may have little in common with corresponding phenomena. I do not disagree with the Kantian view that the noumena realm is not empirically knowable,[46] and I readily admit that God as spirit is not empirically[47] or scientifically provable.[48]
Jesus stated that God is spirit in John 4:24 and therefore God is not of a material nature and cannot be proven by the use of matter or scientific experiment.
Hick states that natural theology can only at best demonstrate that God is probable;[49] however, I hold that Peter D. Klein’s definition of certainty[50] could possibly be applied to natural theology.[51] Klein (1996) in ‘Certainty’ describes the idea as being that a proposition is true if there are no legitimate grounds whatsoever for doubting it.[52] This is a reasonable concept, and I support the similar idea that a proposition is certain if there are no counter propositions that are superior.[53]
Natural theology therefore would never be 100% certain,[54] but could hypothetically at least be philosophically certain as long as arguments that supported natural theology were true beyond any reasonable doubt,[55] or the arguments for natural theology were superior to those opposing them.
As for Kant, his view allows for the concept of negative noumena.[56] The idea of noumena, according to Kant, was bound to the limit of pretension of sensibility and reason, and therefore only negative noumena was of intellectual use.[57] The use of positive noumena which trusts in pure reason is rejected.
Conclusion
Christian scholarship does not rely primarily on natural theology, which would be considered by certain scholars to simply use pure reason which some also think Kant had demolished.[58]
Revelation from God in Scripture and resulting claims made within could perhaps be tied to Kantian concepts and intuition arising from empirical sensations.[59] This is not a difficulty for a Reformed and some other approaches to Christianity, which do not rely primarily on philosophical deductions, but in supernatural revelation of God through empirical sensations, such as prophets, Christ, the apostles and scribes. My conclusion here, which I realize some will debate, is that Scripture is not primarily metaphysical speculation about God as discussed, but is rather coming through the authors and players within his Bible, which are reasoned to be divinely guided by God.
In other words:
Natural theology at points can be reasonable philosophically as secondary support for theism and Christianity.
Natural theology does not reveal the God of the Bible specifically.
Revelation and Scripture reveals the God of the Bible.
Therefore, Christianity is not primarily based on metaphysical speculation or pure reason.
[1] Blackburn rightly suggests there is a ‘notorious difficulty of reading Kant, made worse by his penchant for scholastic systemization and obscure terminology.’ Blackburn (1996: 206). I would suggest this difficulty will lead to inevitable differences in interpreting Kant.
[2] Blackburn (1996: 205).
[3] Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 2).
[4] Pojman (1996: 595).
[5] Kant (1781)(1787)(1929)(2006: 66).
[6] Kant (1781)(1787)(1929)(2006: 66).
[7] Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 3).
[8] Kant (1781)(1787)(1929)(2006: 66).
[9] Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 2). Norman Kemp Smith within A Commentary to Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’ writes that empiricists eliminate a priori principles, appealing to sense experience only, therefore eliminating distinctions between inductive inference and expectation. Smith (1930: xxvii). Blackburn suggests Kant made a strong break from eighteenth century empiricism. Blackburn (1996: 206). Kant was not an empiricist as was David Hume that within (1779)(2004) Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, notes that for ‘ignorant ages’ persons including geniuses have ambitiously tried to produce new proofs and arguments for natural theology and God. Hume (1779)(2004: 2). Hume also reasoned that the supposed Supreme Being’s infinite divine attributes would be ‘totally incomprehensible’ and that human nature would not have ideas that would correspond to the attributes of this divine being. Hume (1779)(2004: 21). Hume’s degree of scepticism of God and natural theology and dependence on empiricism alone was not the same view as Kant. Kant (1788)(1997: 11). Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 3).
[10] Kant was opposed to speculative views of indefensible rationalism. Blackburn (1996: 206). Cornelius Van Til suggests Kant reasons God is not a law giver to humanity, God cannot reveal himself through nature or human constitution with the image of God. The intellect of human beings makes no positive assertions concerning God. Kant rejects notions of theoretical knowledge of God and, instead, appeals to practical reason and faith. Van Til (1977: 246-247). Plantinga writes that it is suggested by many commentators Kant demonstrated there are insurmountable problems with the idea that the traditional Christian God exists. Plantinga (2000: 7).
[11] Kant called cognitions independent of all experience and the impressions of the senses a priori. Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 136).
[12] Empirical experiences are called a posteriori. A posteriori knowledge is empirical knowledge through experience. Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 136).
[13] Kant argued that inductive inference from data and experience was only possible based upon prior acceptance of views of rational principles established independently. Therefore experience does not validate these principles. Smith (1930: xxvii). Ameriks suggests Kant rejected unjustifiable metaphysical claims in place of principles of theory which are the conditions by which persons orientate themselves within experience. These principles are ‘necessary and discoverable’ therefore defeating empiricism and scepticism concerning reasonable metaphysical claims, and contrasting traditional rationalism and dogmatism. Ameriks (1996: 399).
[14] Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 2).
[15] Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 3).
[16] Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 3). Kant notes in ‘Critique of Practical Reason’ empiricism needs to be contrasted by the necessity of rational a priori principles. Kant (1788)(1997: 11).
[17] Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 3). Ameriks writes, for Kant practical reason is that which determines rules for the faculty of desire and will as opposed to the faculty of cognition and feeling. Ameriks (1996: 399).
[18] Ameriks (1996: 399).
[19] Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 3).
[20] Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 3).
[21] Kant (1781)(1787)(1929)(2006: 43).
[22] Kant (1781)(1787)(1929)(2006: 482). Guyer and Wood note that the phenomena realm is the category applied to appearances whereas things in themselves are the noumena realm, which might be thought of but not known. Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 10). The phenomena realm is that which appears and is therefore empirical.
[23] Kant (1781)(1787)(1929)(2006: 482).
[24] Kant (1781)(1787)(1929)(2006: 482).
[25] Kant (1781)(1787)(1929)(2006: 393).
[26] Kant (1788)(1898)(2006: 3).
[27] Kant (1788)(1898)(2006: 26).
[28] Kant (1788)(1898)(2006: 100).
[29] Kant (1788)(1898)(2006: 100).
[30] Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 13).
[31] Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 13).
[32] Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 13).
[33] Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 350).
[34] Smith (1930: 413). Ameriks (1996: 400).
[35] Smith (1930: 413). Ameriks (1996: 400).
[36] Williams (1987: 149).
[37] Williams (1987: 150).
[38] Williams (1987: 151).
[39] Smith (1930: 413).
[40] Kant (1788)(1898)(2006: 846).
[41] Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 14).
[42] Hick in Geivett (1993: 230-231).
[43] Hick in Geivett (1993: 230). In contrast I deduce Scriptural revelation would not necessarily be arbitrary estimates of God, but God and any revealed doctrines would be understood by a serious contextual evaluation of the Scripture.
[44] Kant (1788)(1898)(2006: 1).
[45] Kant (1788)(1898)(2006: 1). Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 14).
[46] Kant (1781)(1787)(1929)(2006: 393). Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 10). Smid (1999: 10).
[47] Kant (1781)(1787)(1929)(2006: 393).
[48] Kant (1781)(1787)(1929)(2006: 393).
[49] Hick in Geivett (1993: 230-231). Geivett (1993: 49).
[50] Klein (1996: 113).
[51] And Biblical theology as well.
[52] Klein (1996: 113). Blackburn explains that a proposition would be considered certain when there is no doubt concerning its truth. Blackburn (1996: 60).
[53] This would also accomplish the standard of a proposition being true as it is beyond (reasonable) doubt.
[54] In my view 100% certainty is impossible to grasp for a finite being that cannot have 100% knowledge. Absolute certainty could only belong to an infinite, omniscient being.
[55] Klein (1996: 113). Blackburn (1996: 60).
[56] Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 350).
[57] Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 350). Smith (1930: 413). Ameriks (1996: 400).
[58] Hick in Geivett (1993: 230). Weber (1955)(1981: 203). Geivett would not agree and considers it dangerous to completely dismiss natural theology. Geivett (1993: 69-89). Even after accepting Kant’s critique as reasonable and somewhat valuable, I still reason that philosophical truths about God can possibly be deduced without the use of direct divine revelation and a supernatural event and/or Scripture. Deductions and knowledge concerning a first cause and/or God, do not however qualify as equivalent to the knowledge of knowing God as a result of Scripture and the influence of the Holy Spirit. Philosophical deductions concerning God would not necessarily be of pure reason, and I can agree with Kant that any reasonable deduction and intuition must be tied back to empirical experience by which to make sense of these deductions. Kant (1781)(1787)(1929)(2006: 66). Blackburn (1996: 205).
[59] Kant (1781)(1787)(1929)(2006: 66). Blackburn (1996: 205).
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