Natural Evils (PhD Edit)
Preface
20110313 article from my PhD work with revisions for a posting for academia.edu, 20240520
Augustine’s Perspective
Philip L. Quinn (1996) defines natural evils as the bad consequences of impersonal forces operating in nature, and this is a good secular definition.[1] Feinberg explains the concept of natural evils is often considered to be missing from Augustine’s theodicy;[2] however, ideas taken from Augustine can shed light on his leanings.[3] Feinberg notes the fact Augustine does not deal specifically with natural evils is not a devastating problem. To Feinberg, Augustine’s work is successful because the free will theodicy is logically presented without contradiction, and solves the moral problem of evil presented within Augustine’s work. It accomplishes its purpose as natural evil is not the same as moral evil, and Augustine does not need to deal with natural evils in order for his theodicy to be successful. Augustine wrote that humanity is in bondage to the prince of the world, Satan, who makes people subject to him through persuasion.[4] Augustine understood humanity as losing its dominion over creation,[5] and that dominion has been awarded substantially to Satan who he calls the prince of this world.[6] Feinberg points out that natural evils are not specifically explained by Augustine.[7] Natural evils will be discussed further in this Chapter in the context of Plantinga.
Saturday, September 19, 2020: PhD Full Version PDF: Theodicy and Practical Theology 2010, Wales TSD
Plantinga’s Perspective
Plantinga, although a modern philosopher, postulated the existence of satanic beings that were involved in causing the problem of evil.[8] He emphasized cautiously that significantly free actions of non-human persons/devils were quite possibly responsible for natural evils,[9] so his theory would be in line with basic assumptions of Augustine, and were likely influenced by Augustine.[10] Certainly, such beings as devils would be difficult, if not impossible, to prove empirically.[11] However, it seems Augustine’s and Plantinga’s beliefs that demonic beings could be involved in natural evils are plausible for at least the following reasons: (1) If material human beings were made significantly free[12] and rebelled against an immaterial God[13] then it is logical and reasonable God could create significantly free immaterial beings[14] that could rebel against him. (2) A traditional approach to Biblical interpretation tends to lead to an acceptance of the existence of satanic beings.[15] Erickson explains these beings are understood as Biblical, literal, and historical.[16] Roman Catholic scholar Peter Kreeft, working with Ronald K. Tacelli, states Satan is a deceiver of humanity,[17] and this implies the assumption that Satan has personality.[18] There is of course a debate between those of traditional conservative perspectives and those of liberal, progressive, mainline perspectives on the existence of satanic beings.[19] It would be far beyond the scope of this thesis to exhaustively debate the strengths and weaknesses of arguments of both sides.[20] The conservative, traditional position claims that the context of the Scripture allows for Satan and his demons to be understood as literal, historical beings, and referencing Greek scholars such as Strong,[21] which was done previously, allows this as an academic and intellectual possibility.[22]
Plantinga’s Perspective
Plantinga, although a modern philosopher, postulated the existence of satanic beings that were involved in causing the problem of evil.[8] He emphasized cautiously that significantly free actions of non-human persons/devils were quite possibly responsible for natural evils,[9] so his theory would be in line with basic assumptions of Augustine, and were likely influenced by Augustine.[10] Certainly, such beings as devils would be difficult, if not impossible, to prove empirically.[11] However, it seems Augustine’s and Plantinga’s beliefs that demonic beings could be involved in natural evils are plausible for at least the following reasons: (1) If material human beings were made significantly free[12] and rebelled against an immaterial God[13] then it is logical and reasonable God could create significantly free immaterial beings[14] that could rebel against him. (2) A traditional approach to Biblical interpretation tends to lead to an acceptance of the existence of satanic beings.[15] Erickson explains these beings are understood as Biblical, literal, and historical.[16] Roman Catholic scholar Peter Kreeft, working with Ronald K. Tacelli, states Satan is a deceiver of humanity,[17] and this implies the assumption that Satan has personality.[18] There is of course a debate between those of traditional conservative perspectives and those of liberal, progressive, mainline perspectives on the existence of satanic beings.[19] It would be far beyond the scope of this thesis to exhaustively debate the strengths and weaknesses of arguments of both sides.[20] The conservative, traditional position claims that the context of the Scripture allows for Satan and his demons to be understood as literal, historical beings, and referencing Greek scholars such as Strong,[21] which was done previously, allows this as an academic and intellectual possibility.[22]
Greek scholar, Walter Bauer (1979) in agreement with Strong,[23] describes ‘Satan’ or ‘Satanas’ as the Adversary, enemy of God and those who belong to God.[24] Bauer goes on to note that Revelation, Chapter 2, verse 13, is describing Satan as persecuting the Church.[25] It appears by studying the Greek copies of the New Testament and assuming a type of contextual, literal hermeneutical method of examining Scripture, it is possible to view satanic beings as literal and historical beings,[26] and this makes Augustine’s and Plantinga’s deduction that satanic beings may be involved in natural evils as at least an intellectual possibility to consider academically.[27] The liberal, progressive, mainline perspectives can point out that there is no empirical evidence for such satanic beings,[28] and that it is not a satisfactory explanation for evil.[29] I can also understand how some within a mainline tradition in the post Enlightenment era,[30] would view it as more beneficial to deal with the empirical human problem of evil,[31] as opposed to a hypothetical satanic one.[32] Erickson writes that it would be wrong to too quickly credit physical and psychological phenomena with satanic beings.[33] I agree with this assertion and the human problem of evil should be the main focus of Christian churches and ministries as opposed to a possible satanic problem.[34]
[1] Quinn (1996: 610).
[2] Feinberg (1994: 58).
[3] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 111).
[4] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 111).
[5] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 111).
[6] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 111).
[7] Feinberg (1994: 58). Feinberg (1994: 80).
[8] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 58). The existence of satanic beings are a logical possibility for Plantinga.
[9] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 58).
[10] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 58). Augustine (388-395)(1964: 111). Natural evils for Plantinga could be caused by immoral actions of superhuman fallen angels.
[11] Phillips documents the idea that Plantinga does at times demonstrate a desire to deal with the problem of evil practically and not just with abstract philosophy. Phillips (2005: 56). Plantinga’s comments on natural evils may be an indicator that he at least intellectually can admit that empirical natural evils are a serious concrete problem.
[12] As within both theistic compatibilism and incompatibilism.
[13] God is spirit, as noted in John 4: 24. Erickson (1994: 267).
[14] Sharing God’s immaterial nature.
[15] Within that Biblical worldview which accepts the possibility of fallen angels, for Plantinga natural evils are as compatible with the existence of God as are moral evils.
[16] Erickson (1994: 445-451).
[17] Kreeft and Tacelli (1994: 294).
[18] Kreeft and Tacelli (1994: 294).
[19] Richardson (1999: 521-522).
[20] Richardson (1999: 521-522).
[21] Strong (1890)(1986: 152).
[22] Strong (1890)(1986: 152).
[23] Strong (1890)(1986: 152).
[24] Bauer (1979: 744).
[25] Bauer (1979: 745).
[26] Strong (1890)(1986: 152). Bauer (1979: 744).
[27] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 111).
[28] Richardson (1999: 521-522).
[29] Richardson (1999: 521-522).
[30] Richardson (1999: 521-522).
[31] And to deal with everyday human problems based in science and psychology, along with Scripture.
[32] Richardson suggests demonic beings provide a pictorial description of evil in the universe. Richardson (1999: 521-522). Demonic beings would serve as metaphor.
[33] Erickson (1994: 450).
[34] I therefore do not hold to a fundamentalistic position on demonology. In other words, I am not ‘looking for Satan around every corner.’
Additional, March 13, 2011
Augustine and Plantinga have some good points. I grant in light of the book of Job for example that God willingly allows/wills demonic beings to participate in certain evil acts.
I tend to reason the laws of universe have remained the same since before the fall, but that is a deduction. Romans 8 speaks of in verse 20 creation being subject to futility. Mounce states the universe was frustrated by Adam's sin and there needs to be a new heaven and new earth of 2 Peter 3 and Revelation 21. Mounce (1995: 184-185). In this sense, at least, because of human sin the present universe is corrupted. Therefore, natural evils effect human beings harshly because persons are subject to death and decay because of the fall of Genesis 3.
I reason Quinn's definition is not incorrect if one sees impersonal forces as natural forces in scientific terms. Therefore, I would tend to generally place most Natural Evils in the category of natural forces due to the laws of the nature that overpower human beings subject to suffering, death and decay, as opposed to from Satanic beings, while always allowing that as a possibility as is a combination.
BRUCE, F.F. (1987) Romans, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.
[1] Quinn (1996: 610).
[2] Feinberg (1994: 58).
[3] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 111).
[4] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 111).
[5] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 111).
[6] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 111).
[7] Feinberg (1994: 58). Feinberg (1994: 80).
[8] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 58). The existence of satanic beings are a logical possibility for Plantinga.
[9] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 58).
[10] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 58). Augustine (388-395)(1964: 111). Natural evils for Plantinga could be caused by immoral actions of superhuman fallen angels.
[11] Phillips documents the idea that Plantinga does at times demonstrate a desire to deal with the problem of evil practically and not just with abstract philosophy. Phillips (2005: 56). Plantinga’s comments on natural evils may be an indicator that he at least intellectually can admit that empirical natural evils are a serious concrete problem.
[12] As within both theistic compatibilism and incompatibilism.
[13] God is spirit, as noted in John 4: 24. Erickson (1994: 267).
[14] Sharing God’s immaterial nature.
[15] Within that Biblical worldview which accepts the possibility of fallen angels, for Plantinga natural evils are as compatible with the existence of God as are moral evils.
[16] Erickson (1994: 445-451).
[17] Kreeft and Tacelli (1994: 294).
[18] Kreeft and Tacelli (1994: 294).
[19] Richardson (1999: 521-522).
[20] Richardson (1999: 521-522).
[21] Strong (1890)(1986: 152).
[22] Strong (1890)(1986: 152).
[23] Strong (1890)(1986: 152).
[24] Bauer (1979: 744).
[25] Bauer (1979: 745).
[26] Strong (1890)(1986: 152). Bauer (1979: 744).
[27] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 111).
[28] Richardson (1999: 521-522).
[29] Richardson (1999: 521-522).
[30] Richardson (1999: 521-522).
[31] And to deal with everyday human problems based in science and psychology, along with Scripture.
[32] Richardson suggests demonic beings provide a pictorial description of evil in the universe. Richardson (1999: 521-522). Demonic beings would serve as metaphor.
[33] Erickson (1994: 450).
[34] I therefore do not hold to a fundamentalistic position on demonology. In other words, I am not ‘looking for Satan around every corner.’
Additional, March 13, 2011
Augustine and Plantinga have some good points. I grant in light of the book of Job for example that God willingly allows/wills demonic beings to participate in certain evil acts.
I tend to reason the laws of universe have remained the same since before the fall, but that is a deduction. Romans 8 speaks of in verse 20 creation being subject to futility. Mounce states the universe was frustrated by Adam's sin and there needs to be a new heaven and new earth of 2 Peter 3 and Revelation 21. Mounce (1995: 184-185). In this sense, at least, because of human sin the present universe is corrupted. Therefore, natural evils effect human beings harshly because persons are subject to death and decay because of the fall of Genesis 3.
I reason Quinn's definition is not incorrect if one sees impersonal forces as natural forces in scientific terms. Therefore, I would tend to generally place most Natural Evils in the category of natural forces due to the laws of the nature that overpower human beings subject to suffering, death and decay, as opposed to from Satanic beings, while always allowing that as a possibility as is a combination.
Additional, May 20, 2024
Greek scholar, Walter Bauer (1979) in agreement with Strong,[23] describes ‘Satan’ or ‘Satanas’ as the Adversary, enemy of God and those who belong to God.[24] Bauer goes on to note that Revelation, Chapter 2, verse 13, is describing Satan as persecuting the Church.[25]
Again, Bauer writes that σαταν and σατανᾶς (744) is literally the adversary. In the original writing of my PhD thesis which was within a Theology Department, using mainly philosophical theology (Theology) and philosophy of religion (Philosophy), I was advised against using New Testament, Koine Greek as my work was technically not New Testament. Therefore, I add this information for my website.
Blue Letter Bible: Σατανᾶς
Cited
STRONGS G4567: σαταν indeclinable (2 Corinthians 12:7 R G (Tdf. in 1 Kings 11:14 accents σαταν (Lagarde leaves it unaccented))), ὁ, and ὁ σατανᾶς (i. e. with the article (except in Mark 3:23; Luke 22:3)), σατανᾶ (cf. Buttmann, 20 (18); Winer's Grammar, § 8, 1) ((Aram. סָטָנָא, stative emphatic of סָטָן.) Hebrew שָׂטָן), adversary (one who opposes another in purpose or act)
Hoffstadt Creek Bridge, Mount Saint Helens (trekearth.com). This was the original lead photo for this article on 20110313.
AUGUSTINE (388-395)(1964) On Free Choice of the Will, Translated by Anna S.Benjamin and L.H. Hackstaff, Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall.
BARCLAY, WILLIAM (1976) The Letters of James and Peter, Philadelphia, The Westminster Press.
BARCLAY, WILLIAM (1976) The Letters of James and Peter, Philadelphia, The Westminster Press.
BAUER, W. (1979) A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament, Translated by Eric H. Wahlstrom, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press.
BRUCE, F.F. (1987) Romans, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.
CRANFIELD, C.E.B. (1992) Romans: A Shorter Commentary, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.
DUNN, JAMES D.G. (1988) Romans, Dallas, Word Books.
ERICKSON, MILLARD (1994) Christian Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.
FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.
HOEHNER, HAROLD, ThD, PhD (1985) The Epistle To The Romans, Institute of Theological Studies. (Audio)
FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.
HOEHNER, HAROLD, ThD, PhD (1985) The Epistle To The Romans, Institute of Theological Studies. (Audio)
KREEFT, PETER AND RONALD K. TACELLI (1994) Handbook of Christian Apologetics, Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.
MOUNCE, ROBERT H. (1995) The New American Commentary: Romans, Nashville, Broadman & Holman Publishers.
PAYNE DAVID F.(1986) ‘2 Peter’, in F.F. Bruce, (ed.), The International Bible Commentary, Grand Rapids, Marshall Pickering/Zondervan.
MOUNCE, ROBERT H. (1995) The New American Commentary: Romans, Nashville, Broadman & Holman Publishers.
PAYNE DAVID F.(1986) ‘2 Peter’, in F.F. Bruce, (ed.), The International Bible Commentary, Grand Rapids, Marshall Pickering/Zondervan.
PHILLIPS, D.Z. (2005) The Problem of Evil and the Problem of God, Fortress Press, Minneapolis.
PLANTINGA, ALVIN.C. (1977)(2002) God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.
PLANTINGA, ALVIN.C. (1982) The Nature of Necessity, Oxford, Clarendon Press.
QUINN, PHILIP L. (1996) ‘Philosophy of Religion’, Robert Audi (ed.), in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
RICHARDSON, ALAN (1999) ‘Satan’, in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press Ltd.
STRONG, J. (1890)(1986) Strong’s Exhaustive Concordance of the Bible, Pickering, Ontario, Welch Publishing Company.
PLANTINGA, ALVIN.C. (1977)(2002) God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.
PLANTINGA, ALVIN.C. (1982) The Nature of Necessity, Oxford, Clarendon Press.
QUINN, PHILIP L. (1996) ‘Philosophy of Religion’, Robert Audi (ed.), in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
RICHARDSON, ALAN (1999) ‘Satan’, in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press Ltd.
STRONG, J. (1890)(1986) Strong’s Exhaustive Concordance of the Bible, Pickering, Ontario, Welch Publishing Company.
