More pizza!

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Quote

'The zero sum game in itself is not a fallacy.' (112).

It denotes something that is limited in supply and that the share enjoyed by one person effects the share held by other persons. (112). It is a pizza-like assumption, states the author. (112).

If there are essentially eight equal slices of pizza and one entity takes five pieces of pizza, the majority, then there is less pieces of pizza, a minority of pieces, left for everyone else.

Pirie correctly states that the fallacy is assuming that as one entity has more pieces of pizza, that everyone else will receive less. (112).

This fallacy overlooks the fact that more pizza (s) can be made. (112).

Not to be too political, this is not a political website, but instantly my mind thinks that in at least some general terms, socialism assumes there is one pizza and that everyone must receive their fair share. Whereas, although not intrinsically against types of fairness, conservative-libertarian, capitalistic approaches would emphasis the need for more pizzas to be produced.

Pirie reasons the fallacy occurs when people think that a value in a deal is fixed. (112).

He opines that sharing wealth does not make the poorer countries richer, rather greater economic trade increases wealth for poorer countries. (112-113). Economically, rather than trying to divide up one pizza equally, it is better for the richer and poorer alike to make more pizzas. This is an economic truth, from my moderate conservative position.

The author explains that this fallacy appeals to human  envy. (113). But human envy is sin.

Galatians 5: 16-24 New American Standard Bible

16 But I say, walk by the Spirit, and you will not carry out the desire of the flesh. 17 For the flesh [g]sets its desire against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the flesh; for these are in opposition to one another, so that you may not do the things that you [h]please. 18 But if you are led by the Spirit, you are not under the Law. 19 Now the deeds of the flesh are evident, which are: [i]immorality, impurity, sensuality, 20 idolatry, sorcery, enmities, strife, jealousy, outbursts of anger, disputes, dissensions, [j]factions, 21 envying, drunkenness, carousing, and things like these, of which I forewarn you, just as I have forewarned you, that those who practice such things will not inherit the kingdom of God. 22 But the fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, 23 gentleness, self-control; against such things there is no law. 24 Now those who [k]belong to Christ Jesus have crucified the flesh with its passions and desires.

'The zero sum game in itself is not a fallacy.' (112).

It would not be fallacious to state that if x marries y (drrnm), y (drrnm) would no longer be romantically available.

However, I suppose I could be hypothetically cloned...

PIRIE, MADSEN (2006)(2015) How To Win Every Argument, Bloomsbury, London.

Your form defines your class?

Not again, yet...

LANGER, SUSANNE K (1953)(1967) An Introduction to Symbolic Logic, Dover Publications, New York.

I continue with the review of the Langer philosophical text, as I am also reviewing the Pirie philosophical text in entries.

Concepts and classes

A class is a class of so and so's, as in each member of the class has a certain character. (115). Langer uses the following example, bear in mind this was written in the 1950s and 1960s: A man belongs in the class of politicians, only if he is a politician. Being a politician equals being in the class of politician. (115).

Being a theologian would place one in the class of theologian.

T=Theologian
C=Class of theologian
B=Bible scholar
⊃ = means the same as
⊨ = entails
˜ = not

T ⊃ C (A theologian means the same as the class of theologian.)
T ⊨ C (A theologian entails the same as the class of theologian.)
T ˜ B  (A theologian is not the same as a bible scholar.)

And the two classes would be different.

T ˜ B would be true strictly speaking. It could be stated that a theologian is not necessarily a bible scholar. But of course many theologians are bible scholars, but not all as my Dead Sea Scrolls scholar professor at Trinity Western University would often state of himself:  'I am not a theologian'.

I do consider myself a bible scholar, but as I am not a linguist or archaeologist; my main academic concentrations would be biblical theology, philosophical theology and philosophy of religion.

In a similar way some theologians are philosophers of religion and some are not. My view is that it is a significant intellectual handicap to be a theologian and not a philosopher of religion, or a biblical theologian and not a philosopher of religion, but that is my take. This based on the availability of less cumulative facts and knowledge to formulate truth.

I also view it as more of a significant handicap than being a biblical theologian, philosophical theologian or philosopher of religion that is not a linguist. I reason it is more straightforward to reference linguistic terms at least. I am not stating that being a linguist is easier. Not at all! I am not as natural at languages than at theological and philosophical work. I am stating that it is more straightforward to reference Hebrew and Greek words and meanings than it is to learn philosophy and philosophy of religion. But it is debatable. However to be clear, I am by no means including learning archaeology!

Defining forms of classes

Langer uses the proposition x must die (116).

If

Socrates is mortal and/or Socrates must die

Plato is mortal and/or Plato must die

Aristotle is mortal and/or Aristotle must die (116).

These are members of the same class being:

 x must die (116).

If those subjects are mortals, the proposition is true, if subjects are not mortals, the proposition is false. (116-117). Those subjects that are mortals would be in a class, as those that are not mortals would be in another class.

The form defines the class. (117).

Limited Free Will

Edited from a recent email

Human ability in conjunction with compatibilism

This is not the ability to choose otherwise, as in middle knowledge and versions of libertarian free will.

Middle Knowledge April 20, 2016

In my compatibilistic model, at least, through a theoretical chain of human nature and choice, a person embraces as secondary cause, what was caused, willed and allowed by the primary cause. This in regard to human thoughts, choice, acts and actions. This first cause would be God in a biblical view.

An example:

I like theology by nature.

In my nature I pursue by choice, theology.

I do not have an alternative possibility as a secondary cause, to not like theology. This was determined by the primary cause.

The resulting choices to seek a PhD in Theology and related Philosophy of Religion, was not left to alternative possibility.

In regard to liking theology, we could also claim other secondary causes, like by hereditary (I am adopted, but perhaps someone biologically related liked theology?) but there is still a primary cause.

I do not have incompatibilist free will or a form of libertarian free will, to not like theology or not to pursue it. I have compatibilist free will and the term I coined as limited free will. During my British studies I looked for the term in texts and online and did not see it.  Eventually I heard, Dr. Charles Stanley also use it. I highly doubt I invented it, but at least it is somewhat original.

I have significant moral responsibility in how I choose to deal with theology.

Limited Free Will June 29, 2015

God could have caused, willed and allowed me to not pursue my PhD, even though I like theology and then shown me the error of my ways. But I would have embraced the error as a secondary cause. I could understand the error at a later time and embrace the choice I should have made. But I am embracing my greatest desire at the time, so to speak.

As an adult, I did not initially pursue theological academia, but was eventually shown this to be error. I view it as not primarily a change of choice, but rather a divine molding of nature so I would pursue my natural interest in theology, as opposed to other interests, such as working and not being a student, being made more important. Within my soft determinism (not hard determinism) view, it was not that God gave me incompatibilist alternatives and I originally made an error; it was that God caused, willed and allowed my original view and then molded my nature in order that I would eventually, by nature, be different and therefore choose differently.

This is not to state that the sinful humanity both regenerate and unregenerate cannot have significant intellectual understanding of the alternative. I can very much understand by nature not liking theology. I can deduce a life without me studying theology. I know many that dislike theology, I can deduce it. I can deduce whether it is good or bad to be interested in theology. Therefore again, there is moral responsibility. As with Romans 1-3, a person can deduce truth about God without choosing or knowing God.

Indeterminism is equated with incompatibilism which states that God, or any other being, cannot cause by force or coercion any human action, nor can any action be simultaneously willed by God or any other being, for the human action to remain significantly free. Compatibilism would agree with incompatibilism that God or any other being cannot cause by force or coercion any significantly free human action, but contrary to incompatibilism thinks that God can simultaneously will significantly free human actions.

J.S. Feinberg explains that compatibilism does not allow for coercion or force, but holds that God, or some outside force, can simultaneously determine with the use of persuasion, that an action will or will not take place. Feinberg (1986: 24). Feinberg writes that certain nonconstraining conditions could strongly influence actions, in conjunction with human free will performing these actions. Feinberg (1994: 60). With this viewpoint, there will be no contradiction in stating that God would create human beings who were significantly free, unconstrained, and yet committed actions that God willed. Feinberg (2001: 637).

AUGUSTINE (388-395)(1964) On Free Choice of the Will, Translated by Anna S.Benjamin and L.H. Hackstaff, Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall.

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1729)(2006) Sovereignty of God, New Haven, Connecticut, Jonathan Edwards Center, Yale University.

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1731-1733)(2006) Law of Nature, New Haven, Connecticut, Jonathan Edwards Center, Yale University.

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1754)(2006) Freedom of the Will, Flower Mound, Texas. Jonathanedwards.com.

FEINBERG. JOHN S. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, David Basinger and Randall Basinger (eds.), Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House. 

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (2001) No One Like Him, John S. Feinberg (gen.ed.), Wheaton, Illinois, Crossway Books.

FLEW, ANTONY, R.M. HARE, AND BASIL MITCHELL (1996) ‘The Debate on the Rationality of Religious Belief’, in L.P. Pojman (ed.), Philosophy, The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.

FLEW, ANTONY AND A.MACINTRYE (1999) ‘Philosophy of Religion’, in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press Ltd.

MACKIE, J.L. (1955)(1996) ‘Evil and Omnipotence’, in Mind, in Michael Peterson, William Hasker, Bruce Reichenbach, and David Basinger (eds.), Philosophy of Religion, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

MACKIE, J.L. (1971)(1977)(2002) ‘Evil and Omnipotence’, in The Philosophy of Religion, in Alvin C. Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids. Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.  

PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1977)(2002) God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1982) The Nature of Necessity, Oxford, Clarendon Press.

POJMAN, LOUIS P. (1996) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.

STACE, W.T. (1952)(1976) Religion and the Modern Mind, in John R. Burr and Milton Goldinger (eds), Philosophy and Contemporary Issues, London, Collier Macmillan Publishers.

Deism & theism, atheism, agnosticism

Solva, Wales: trekearth.com

Theism and Deism: July 26 2008

Deism: April 17, 2007

My brief and former academic advisor at the University of Manchester, David. A. Pailin, defines deism as coming from the Latin word deus and parallels the Greek which is theos. Pailin (1999: 148).

In modern times deism is used to define a supreme being who is the ultimate source of reality, but does not intervene in the natural and historical processes through revelation or salvific acts. Pailin (1999: 148). Pailin writes that the common use of the term ‘theism’ does not carry the same negative implications. Pailin (1999: 148). He explains that historically deism is not so much a set of doctrines, but a movement, largely British, that became popular in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Pailin (1999: 148).

Many within deism will have doubts concerning concepts of supernatural religious doctrines, revelation and the authority of the Bible. Pailin (1999: 148). Pailin notes that some within deism desire to replace Christianity with a more ‘reasonable’ faith, and for others it is an attempt to produce a more ‘reasonable’ version of Christianity. Pailin (1999: 149).

William J. Wainwright explains that deism understands true religion as natural, as opposed to supernatural religion. Wainwright (1996: 188). He writes that some self-styled Christian deists accept revelation although they argue that the content is the same as natural religion. Wainwright (1996: 188). Most deists reject revelation as fiction, but many reason that God has ordained that human happiness is possible through natural means that are universally available. Wainwright (1996: 188). Salvation therefore does not come via divine revelation. Wainwright (1996: 188).

Henry Clarence Thiessen writes that for deism God is present in his creation by his power and not in his being and nature. He has endowed creation with certain invariable laws that he oversees in general terms. Theissen (1956: 74). God has created creatures and left them under invariable laws to their own destiny. Thiessen (1956: 74).

For Thiessen, the Christian world-view rejects deism because it accepts that God has revealed himself in creation through divine revelation, has providential control and does at times use miracles within his creation. Thiessen (1956: 75). Thiessen opines, a deistic God is not much better than no God at all for humanity. Thiessen (1956: 75). Thiessen has an excellent point, if deistic approaches reject a God who intervenes within his creation, then it allows, practically speaking, for human beings to expect to have the same end in life as if there is no God. Basically the same end result as atheism.

Wainwright deduces that God has ordained human happiness to all universally, but ultimately how happy can human existence be when physical death is the end result for every person? However, the meaning of life, human life is not substantially meaningful, if permanently terminated. People lose their consciousness and life accomplishments without everlasting life, and therefore life loses ultimate meaning and happiness does not result.

The deist can speculate that God can and perhaps shall provide everlasting life and ultimate continual meaning for life, but this is merely speculation devoid of any historically grounded revelation from God. Accepting that human nature is corrupt as described in Romans 1-3, it is very unlikely that the problem of evil would ever be solved but rather merely treated by humanity if deism is true. There would at no time be any solution for sin, death, and the problem of evil, since the infinite, omnipotent God would not interfere with his creation and regenerate and change individuals in order to eventually establish a Kingdom of God where the problem of evil does not exist. With a deistic universe seemingly sin, death, and the problem of evil continue to exist as long as humanity does. Deism seemingly does not offer any ultimate solution to the problem of evil.

Additional: February 18, 2017

This blog website entry is purposely limited in entry size. I have archived articles that support my view that the Hebrew Bible and New Testament are religious history inspired by God and without error in the original autographs. However, admittedly as I write philosophical theology and philosophy of religion, I am not a linguist and certainly not an archaeologist.

Manuscripts for New Testament: August 18, 2008

Encountering New Testament: August 21, 2013

Old Testament Apocrypha: July 15, 2014

Business Insider: November 21, 2015

Vicious Regress: October 2, 2006

Deism & theism, atheism, agnosticism

Problems related to first cause and vicious regress in my view are fatal flaws for non-theistic worldviews which in my mind make them untenable. I do not reason that atheism or agnosticism are the next most reasonable worldviews after Biblical Christianity, including the Hebrew Bible.

However, barring the gospel work of atonement, resurrection and restoration through the triune God, applied to those in Jesus Christ; the end result for humanity is most reasonably the same with deism and a related theism, as with atheistic or agnostic worldviews. That being postmortem human non-existence.

PAILIN, DAVID A. (1999) ‘Deism’, in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press Ltd.

THIESSEN, HENRY C. (1956) Introductory Lectures in Systematic Theology, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

WAINWRIGHT, WILLIAM J. (1996) ‘Deism’, in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Solva Wales: trekearth.com