W.T. Stace (PhD Edit)

W.T. Stace (PhD Edit) 

Preface

Stace was cited limitedly within my PhD thesis, but I have quoted this source often because it is so accurate and useful.

W.T Stace: Determinism & Soft determinism

W.T. Stace (1952)(1976) explains that moral responsibility is consistent with determinism in the context of soft determinism and requires it. Stace (1952)(1976: 29). If human actions are uncaused then reward or punishment would be unjustified. Stace (1952)(1976: 29). Stace reasons that there must be at least some human cause within human actions to make them morally responsible. Stace (1952)(1976: 30). If human actions were coerced or forced with hard determinism, persons could not be held morally responsible. Pojman (1996: 596). 

At the same time, if human beings are not at least a secondary cause (Stace (1952)(1976: 30)), of actions primarily caused by God, then human actions would be morally insignificant. Stace (1952)(1976: 30). If one reasons that human actions are random and uncaused, and there is no primary or secondary cause to human actions, meaning neither determinism/hard determinism or compatibilism/soft determinism exists, this would make human actions amoral and morally irrelevant and insignificant.

POJMAN, LOUIS P. (1996) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company. 

STACE, W.T. (1952)(1976) Religion and the Modern Mind, in John R. Burr and Milton Goldinger (eds.), Philosophy and Contemporary Issues, London, Collier Macmillan Publishers.

---

W.T. Stace (1886-1967): Works

Works by W.T.Stace

Cited 

The Philosophy of Hegel (1924) 

The Teachings of the Mystics (1960) 

Mysticism and Philosophy (1960) 

A Critical History of Greek Philosophy (1920)

Religion and the Modern Mind (1952) 

The Concept of Morals (1937) 

Time and Eternity (1952) 

The Theory of Knowledge and Existence (1932)

The Destiny of Western Man (1942) 

The Meaning of Beauty (1929) 

Man against darkness, and other essays 

Critical History of Greek Philosophy (Papermacs) (1967) 

Hegel Üzerine (2019) 

Mysticism and Philosophy by W. T. Stace (1960-06-01) 

A History of Greek Philosophy (2018) 

The Philosophy of Hegel by Walter Terence Stace (1955-06-26) 

Mysticism and human reason 

The Nature of the World: An Essay in Phenomenalist Metaphysics (1969) 

HEGEL ÜSTÜNE 

---

Incompatibilism/Indeterminism

Indeterminism is also equated with incompatibilism which states that God, or any other being, cannot cause by force or coercion any human action, nor can any action be simultaneously willed by God or any other being, for the human action to remain significantly free. Feinberg (1994: 60). Compatibilism (soft determinism), which I hold to, would agree with incompatibilism that God or any other being cannot cause by force or coercion any significantly free human action, but contrary to incompatibilism states that God can simultaneously will significantly free human actions. Feinberg (1994: 60). God as the primary cause can cause a human action that is not significantly free, but there is only significant moral human responsibility when there is significant free human action as a secondary cause.

An entity that is forced or coerced into conscious, thoughts, will, choices, acts and actions is not morally responsible, where these are done without significant freedom. Of course, only the infinite God is an infinitely accurate, moral judge of guilt or not, in regards to the deeds of a finite entity. (God judges deeds, post-mortem, Revelation 20, also 21-22, 2 Corinthians 5, 2 Peter 3, as some key examples) Significant, human free will, of any kind, would be viewed an incompatible with any form of hard determinism. 

Philosopher Tim Mawson reasons that incompatibilism, which is also known as libertarianism or libertarian free will, in regard to human free will, states that true human free will must be uncaused by preceding states. Mawson (1999: 324). In other words, no external force must cause a legitimate and truly free act of the human will. Within incompatibilist theory, a human action would never truly be free because God or an another external force (non-deistic view, my add) would have willed and determined it, before being simultaneously willed to a given person. Mawson (1999: 324). Pre-determined before committed by the human being. The external force could hypothetically be a first cause within non-theistic theory. The Biblical concept theologically being that God is infinite and is therefore limitless; God is eternal and therefore has always existed (Genesis 1). This concept is connected to philosophical views of first cause. 

David M. Ciocchi describes the incompatibilist idea as being God can determine that an agent commit action x, but he cannot determine that an agent commit action x freely. Ciocchi (2002: 46). The theory is that significantly free human will and actions cannot be caused by an external force. This would include a first cause. This would include God. For Norman Geisler, he describes a form of incompatibilism which he, calls self-determinism. Moral choices are not caused or uncaused by another being, but are self-caused. Incompatibilists, therefore, do not deny there are outside forces that influence significantly free human actions; however, they do not accept any notion that a free act can be caused in a determined sense by one being upon another and remain a significantly free act. An act cannot be determined or simultaneously determined and remain truly free within incompatibilism. Geisler (1986: 75). 

Feinberg, who has written extensively on the concepts of free will and determinism, explains incompatibilism is defined as the idea within free will approaches that a person is free in regard to an action if he or she is free to either commit, or refrain from committing the action. Feinberg (1994: 64). There can be no antecedent (there can be no prior) conditions or laws that will determine that an action is committed or not committed. Feinberg (1994: 64). Feinberg importantly writes that just as the incompatibilist does not claim that all actions are significantly free, the compatibilist also does not attach significant freedom to all acts. Feinberg (2001: 637). Feinberg then admits that it is difficult for compatibilists to determine intellectually if certain acts were done by an individual with significant freedom, or with the use of some type of compulsion. Feinberg (2001: 637). He then states that this intellectual difficulty does not disprove compatibilism. 

Compatibilism/Soft determinism 

Significant, limited free will (limited free will, my term and human, limited free will, in this context) would be viewed as compatible with at least some forms of soft determinism. Louis P. Pojman explains the difference between determinism, which is also known as hard determinism, and compatibilism, which is also known as soft determinism. Pojman (1996: 596). Within determinism or hard determinism, God (or an external force) causes an act and no created being is responsible for his or her moral actions, while for compatibilism or soft determinism, although God causes actions, created beings are responsible where they act voluntarily. Pojman (1996: 596). It could be stated that human secondary causes, through a theoretical chain of human nature, human will and human choice, embrace what has been caused and chosen by God, the first and primary cause, directly or indirectly. The human being could also be influenced by other secondary causes, such as other persons and angelic beings, for example. 

P.S. Greenspan writes that compatibilism holds to free will and determinism being compatible. Greenspan (1998: 1). Pojman, defines compatibilism as the concept that an act can be entirely determined and yet be free in the sense that it was done voluntarily and without compulsion. Pojman (1996: 596). Feinberg explains that compatibilism does not allow for coercion or force, but holds that God, or some outside force, can simultaneously determine with the use of persuasion, that an action will or will not take place. Feinberg (1986: 24). Again with Feinberg, he writes that certain nonconstraining conditions could strongly influence actions, in conjunction with human free will performing these actions. Feinberg (1994: 60). With this viewpoint, there will be no contradiction in stating that God would create human beings who were significantly free, unconstrained, and yet committed actions that God willed. Feinberg (2001: 637). 

Limited free will 

This is not the ability to choose otherwise, as in middle knowledge and versions of libertarian free will. In my compatibilistic model, at least, through a theoretical chain of human nature, human will and human choice, a person embraces as secondary cause, what was caused, willed and allowed by the primary cause. This in regard to human conscious thoughts, will, choices, acts and actions. This first cause would be God in a biblical view. During my British studies I looked for the term limited free will in texts and online and did not see it. Eventually I heard, Dr. Charles Stanley also use it. I highly doubt I invented it, but at least it is somewhat original. I/we have significant moral responsibility in my/our conscious, thoughts, will, choices, acts and actions, that are not significantly forced or coerced. 

Note that human nature, leading to human conscious thoughts, will, choices, acts and actions is not only finite, but is also corrupted and sinfully imperfect due to a human fall (see Genesis 1-3, Romans, Hebrews, as some key examples). According to the New Testament, the post-mortem fix of sin and sinfulness is resurrection (1 Corinthians 15, Revelation 20-22, as examples) within the salvation process, as the atoning and resurrection work of God the Son, Jesus Christ is applied to those in Christ. The spiritually regenerate (John 3, Titus 3, 1 Peter 1) are enlightened, and convinced of salvation, justified and sanctified, leading to eventual post-mortem resurrection. The human nature remains everlastingly finite, but also everlastingly sinless.

Hard determinism 

Simon Blackburn comments that this is the doctrine that human action has no influence on events. Blackburn (1996: 137). Blackburn gives the opinion that fatalism is wrongly confused with determinism, which by itself carries no implications that human actions have no effect. Blackburn (1996: 137).

Tomis Kapitan notes that determinism is usually understood as meaning that whatever occurs is determined by antecedent (preceding cause) conditions. Kapitan (1999: 281). Pojman states that hard determinism holds that every event is caused and no one is responsible for actions, whereas soft determinism holds that rational creatures can be held responsible for determined actions as long as they are done voluntarily and without force or coercion. Pojman (1996: 586). Hard determinism denies secondary causation.

Bibliography   

AUGUSTINE (388-395)(1964) On Free Choice of the Will, Translated by Anna S.Benjamin and L.H. Hackstaff, Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall. 

        

AUGUSTINE (398-399)(1992) Confessions, Translated by Henry Chadwick, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

AUGUSTINE (400-416)(1987)(2004) On the Trinity, Translated by Reverend Arthur West Haddan, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Series One, Volume 3, Denver, The Catholic Encyclopedia.

AUGUSTINE (421)(1998) Enchiridion, Translated by J.F. Shaw,  Denver, The Catholic Encyclopedia.

AUGUSTINE (426)(1958) The City of God, Translated by Gerald G. Walsh, Garden City, New York, Image Books.

AUGUSTINE (427)(1997) On Christian Doctrine, Translated by D.W. Robertson Jr., Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall.

AUGUSTINE (427b)(1997) On Christian Teaching, Translated by R.P.H. Green, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

BEROFSKY, BERNARD (1996) ‘Determinism’, in Robert Audi, (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

BLOESCH, D. (1996) ‘Fate, Fatalism’, in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books.

BAUER, WALTER. (1979) A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament, Translated by Eric H. Wahlstrom, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press.

CALVIN, JOHN (1539)(1998) The Institutes of the Christian Religion, Book II, Translated by Henry Beveridge, Grand Rapids, The Christian Classic Ethereal Library, Wheaton College.

CALVIN, JOHN (1539)(1998) The Institutes of the Christian Religion, Book IV, Translated by Henry Beveridge, Grand Rapids, The Christian Classic Ethereal Library, Wheaton College. http://www.ccel.org/ccel/calvin/institutes.html 

CALVIN, JOHN (1543)(1996) The Bondage and Liberation of the Will, Translated by G.I. Davies, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

CIOCCHI, DAVID M. (2002) ‘The Religious Adequacy of Free-Will Theism’, in Religious Studies, Volume 38, pp. 45-61. Cambridge.

CRANFIELD, C.E.B. (1992) Romans: A Shorter Commentary, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1729)(2006) Sovereignty of God, New Haven, Connecticut, Jonathan Edwards Center, Yale University. 

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1731-1733)(2006) Law of Nature, New Haven, Connecticut, Jonathan Edwards Center, Yale University. 

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1754)(2006) Freedom of the Will, Flower Mound, Texas. Jonathanedwards.com. http://www.jonathanedwards.com 

ERICKSON, MILLARD (1994) Christian Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House. 

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, David Basinger and Randall Basinger (eds.), Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press. 

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (2001) No One Like Him, John S. Feinberg (gen.ed.), Wheaton, Illinois, Crossway Books.

FOULKES, FRANCIS (1989) Ephesians, Grand Rapids, Inter-Varsity Press.

FLEW, ANTONY, R.M. HARE, AND BASIL MITCHELL (1996) ‘The Debate on the Rationality of Religious Belief’, in L.P. Pojman (ed.), Philosophy, The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.

FLEW, ANTONY AND A.MACINTRYE (1999) ‘Philosophy of Religion’, in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press Ltd. 

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1975) Philosophy of Religion, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House. 

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1978) The Roots of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House. 

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1996) ‘Freedom, Free Will, and Determinism’ in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books. 

GEIVETT, R. DOUGLAS (1993) Evil and the Evidence for God, Philadelphia, Temple University Press.

GREENSPAN, P.S. (1998) Free Will and Genetic Determinism: Locating the Problem (s), Maryland, University of Maryland. http://www.philosophy.umd.edu/Faculty/PGreenspan/Res/gen2.html

GRENZ, STANLEY J., DAVID GURETZKI and CHERITH FEE NORDLING (1999) Pocket Dictionary of Theological Terms, Downers Grove, Ill., InterVarsity Press. 

HASKER, WILLIAM (1989) God, Time, and Knowledge, Ithaca, Cornell University Press.

HASKER, WILLIAM (1993) ‘C. Robert Mesle, John Hick’s Theodicy: A Process Humanist Critique’, in Philosophy of Religion, Volume 34, Number 1, pp. 55-56. Dordrecht, Netherlands, Philosophy of Religion.

HASKER, WILLIAM (1994) ‘Can Philosophy Defend Theology?’, in Faith and Philosophy, Volume 11, Number 2, April, pp. 272-278.  Wilmore, Kentucky, Asbury College.

HASKER, WILLIAM (1996) ‘Middle Knowledge’, in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

HASKER, WILLIAM (2000) ‘The Problem of Evil in Process Theism and Classical Free Will Theism’, in Process Studies, Volume. 29, Number 2, Fall-Winter, pp. 194-208. Claremont, California, Religion Online.

HASKER, WILLIAM (2003) ‘Counterfactuals and Evil’, in Philosophia Christi, Volume 5, Number 1, pp. 235-249. La Mirada, California, Biola University.

HASKER, WILLIAM (2003) ‘Is Free-Will Theism Religiously Inadequate? A Reply to Ciocchi’, in Religious Studies, Volume 39, Number 4, December, pp. 431-440. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 

HASKER, WILLIAM (2007) ‘Peter van Inwagen, The Problem of Evil’, in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, Notre Dame, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. 

HICK, JOHN (1970) Evil and The God of Love, London, The Fontana Library.

HICK, JOHN (1978) ‘Present and Future Life’, Harvard Theological Review, Volume 71, Number 1-2, January-April, Harvard University.

HICK, JOHN (1981) Encountering Evil, Stephen T. Davis (ed.), Atlanta, John Knox Press.

HICK, JOHN (1993) ‘Afterword’ in GEIVETT, R. DOUGLAS (1993) Evil and the Evidence for God, Philadelphia, Temple University Press.

HICK, JOHN (1993) The Metaphor of God Incarnate, Louisville, Kentucky, John Know Press.

HICK, JOHN (1994) Death and Eternal Life, Louisville, Kentucky, John Knox Press.

HICK, JOHN (1999) ‘Life after Death’, in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press.

HUGHES, PHILIP, EDGCUMBE (1990) A Commentary On The Epistle To The Hebrews, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

HUGHES, PHILIP, EDGCUMBE (1996) ‘Grace’ in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books. 

KAPITAN, TOMIS (1996) ‘Free Will Problem’, in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

MACKIE, J.L. (1955)(1996) ‘Evil and Omnipotence’, in Mind, in Michael Peterson, William Hasker, Bruce Reichenbach, and David Basinger (eds.), Philosophy of Religion, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

MACKIE, J.L. (1971)(1977)(2002) ‘Evil and Omnipotence’, in The Philosophy of Religion, in Alvin C. Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids. Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

MAWSON, TIM (1999) ‘The Problem of Evil and Moral Indifference’, in Religious Studies, Volume 35, pp. 323-345. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

MOUNCE, ROBERT H. (1990) The Book of Revelation, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

MOUNCE, R.H. (1995) The New American Commentary: Romans, Nashville, Broadman & Holman Publishers. 

PAYNE. DAVID F.(1986) ‘2 Peter’, in F.F. Bruce, (ed.), The International Bible Commentary, Grand Rapids, Marshall Pickering/Zondervan.

PETERSON, MICHAEL (1982) Evil and the Christian God, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House. 

PETERSON, MICHAEL (1998) God and Evil, Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press.

PETERSON, MICHAEL, WILLIAM HASKER, BRUCE REICHENBACH, AND DAVID BASINGER (1996)(eds.), ‘Introduction: Saint Augustine: Evil is Privation of Good’, in Philosophy of Religion, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

PHILLIPS, D.Z. (1981) Encountering Evil, Stephen T. Davis (ed.), Atlanta, John Knox Press.

PHILLIPS, D.Z. (2005) The Problem of Evil and the Problem of God, Fortress Press, Minneapolis.

PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1977)(2002) God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 

PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1982) The Nature of Necessity, Oxford, Clarendon Press.

PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (2000) Warranted Christian Belief, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

POJMAN, LOUIS P. (1996) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company. 

REED, HOLLY (2004) ‘Jonathan Edwards’, in The Boston Collaborative Encyclopedia of Modern Western Theology, Boston, The Boston Collaborative Encyclopedia of Modern Western Theology. 

STACE, W.T. (1952)(1976) Religion and the Modern Mind, in John R. Burr and Milton Goldinger (eds), Philosophy and Contemporary Issues, London, Collier Macmillan Publishers.

STORMS, SAM (2006) 'Jonathan Edwards on the Will', Kansas City, Missouri. Enjoying God Ministries. Enjoyinggodministries.com http://www.enjoyinggodministries.com/article.asp?id=368 

STRONG, J. (1890)(1986) Strong's Exhaustive Concordance of the Bible, Burlington, Welch Publishing Company.

TCHIVIDJIAN, W. TULLIAN, (2001) ‘Reflections on Jonathan Edwards’ View of Free Will, in IIIM Magazine Online, Volume 3, Number 51, December 17 to December 23, Fern Park, Florida, IIIM Magazine Online.

The Orthodox Study Bible, New Testament and Psalms, (1993) Saint Athanasius Orthodox Academy,Thomas Nelson Publishers, Nashville, Tennessee.

THIESSEN, HENRY C. (1956) Introductory Lectures in Systematic Theology, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.   

---

Photo 1: Sunset At Cabo San Lucas Beach, Mexico g+ 

Photo 2: Rheinstein Castle, Rhineland-Palatinate, Germany-Amz Places g+

John K. Roth And Human Repentance Needing To Be Matched By God? (PhD Edit)

John K. Roth And Human Repentance Needing To Be Matched By God (PhD Edit)

Photo from a British Isles recent trip: 20240402

Preface

Reformatted 20240601.

2010 Theodicy and Practical Theology: PhD thesis, the University of Wales, Trinity Saint David, Lampeter

Saturday, September 19, 2020: PhD Full Version PDF: Theodicy and Practical Theology 2010, Wales TSD

John K. Roth

John K. Roth (1981) also explains within ‘A Theodicy of Protest’[1] that the finite, limited God of William James offered him some intellectual appeal.[2] He reasons that to deny God completely would be going too far, but to affirm God’s total goodness and to apologize for a weak God in anyway would also be going too far.[3] Roth’s theodicy of protest puts God on trial,[4] and any human repentance will have to be matched by God.[5] Stephen Davis (1981) suggests that Roth has given up the notion that God is ‘perfectly morally good.’[6] Roth insists that most theodicy approaches very wrongly legitimize evil.[7] They can attempt to make suffering all deserved, and/or create happy endings due to God’s ultimate goodness.[8] There is within this view ‘no legitimation of evil to acknowledge its existence.’[9] The excessive amount of evil that exists in human history demonstrates that there is an evil side to God which willingly allows it.[10] Davis explains that for Roth, God is not really omnipotent as God does not possess the perfect goodness to redeem all evil.[11] Human beings lack the ability to envision how God could use all the evil within world history for the greater good.[12] Roth, in contrast to Davis, states that he actually shares with Davis a belief in God’s omnipotence.[13] Davis speculates that Roth’s approach weakens a view on God’s omnipotence,[14] but Roth’s claim that he holds to omnipotence should be taken seriously.[15] Roth’s interpretation makes sense, as if Roth sees God as all-powerful then the evil God willingly allows that cannot all be used for greater good, is not redeemable[16] and therefore God should repent of his evil.[17]

I share with Roth an intellectual and personal frustration with the evil that God willingly allows.[18] A theodicy of protest is not completely unmerited as all persons have suffered by the hand of God that is ultimately responsible, logically, as he is all-powerful.[19] Within my Reformed sovereignty theodicy view which I explain within Chapter Three in particular (of my PhD), I reason God does use all evil for the greater good with pure motives.[20] This view accepts a traditional view of omnipotence.[21] Roth does have hope as he looks for a resurrection of the dead in the future, and in the present realm hopes that somehow ‘the waste’ as in unnecessary evil, will be placed in check.[22] He views the traditional concept of God that Davis has as a God that is ‘hidden, absent, even non-existent.’[23] A trust and hope in any type of God is risky, but he reasons that the hope does not completely die.[24] I question whether an omnipotent God with less than perfect motives that would will so much evil, not for the greater good throughout history, would ever change his ways or be convinced by finite creatures to do so.[25]

---

[1] Within Encountering Evil, Stephen T. Davis (ed.)

[2] Roth (1981: 9).

[3] Roth (1981: 10). I can agree that if God is indeed weak, it should be pointed out as such, and not defended.

[4] Roth (1981: 10). And God’s supposed omnipotence as well, I would suggest could naturally be challenged.

[5] Roth (1981: 10). Roth’s position assumes that God has moral weakness which finite human beings could intellectually detect. God would have to share the blame for the problem of evil. Phillips (2005: 116-117).

[6] Davis (1981: 22). Phillips writes that Roth’s analysis leads to the idea that God is not perfectly good. Phillips (2005: 27).

[7] Roth (1981: 19).

[8] Roth (1981: 19).

[9] Roth (1981: 19).

[10] Davis (1981: 22).

[11] Davis (1981: 23).

[12] Davis (1981: 23). There is certainly a degree of truth to the idea that the evil God allows often cannot be reasonably understood by persons. This could, however, be due as much, or even more, to finite human nature and reasoning as opposed to a moral deficiency or lack of omnipotence with God.

[13] Roth (1981: 32). Phillips verifies this as well. Phillips (2005: 22).

[14] Davis (1981: 23).

[15] Roth (1981: 32).

[16] Roth (1981: 19). Davis (1981: 23).

[17] Roth (1981: 10).

[18] Roth (1981: 8-10).

[19] Roth (1981: 32).

[20] Gratuitous evil is also reviewed and discussed in Chapter Four.

[21] Kreeft and Tacelli (1994: 96). Bavinck (1918)(2006: 233 Volume 2). Weber (1955)(1981: 440).

[22] Roth (1981: 35). Phillips dislikes the use of the term ‘waste’ in regard to humanity and evil and suffering and reasons a loss and gain approach in regard to individual persons is not reasonable.  Phillips (2005: 70-71). This is an important point, for the loss suffered by a single individual should never be underestimated for the sake of many persons that do not suffer in the same way and may in some way possibly gain from the suffering of one.

[23] Roth (1981: 35).

[24] Roth (1981: 35).

[25] It is also possible that given God’s omnipotence as Roth accepts, what he and others with similar views understand as evil within God’s nature is simply all goodness. Roth (1981:32). This is not my Reformed view which views evil as separate from good, and not part of God’s nature, but is a reasonable deduction based on Roth’s assumptions on the all-powerful nature of God.
---

Bibliography from PhD

BAVINCK, HERMAN (1918)(2006) Reformed Dogmatics Volume 2: God and Creation, John Bolt (gen.ed.), Translated by John Vriend, Baker Academic, Grand Rapids.

BAVINCK, HERMAN (1918)(2006) Reformed Dogmatics Volume 3: Sin and Salvation in Christ, John Bolt (gen.ed.), Translated by John Vriend, Baker Academic, Grand Rapids.

DAVIS, STEPHEN T. (1981)(ed.), Encountering Evil, Atlanta, John Knox Press.

JAMES, WILLIAM (1892-1907)(1969) The Moral Philosophy of William James, John K. Roth (ed.), Thomas Y. Crowell Company, New York. 

JAMES, WILLIAM (1893)(2004) William James and a Science of Religions, Wayne Proudfoot (ed.), Columbia University Press, New York. 

JAMES, WILLIAM (1902-1910)(1987) Writings 1902 – 1910, The Library of America, New York. 

JAMES, WILLIAM (1902)(2002) The Varieties of Religious Experience, Prometheus Books, Amherst, New York. 

JAMES, WILLIAM (1904) ‘Does ‘Consciousness’ Exist?’, in Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods, Volume 1, pages 477-491. New York, Columbia University. 

JAMES, WILLIAM (1907) Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking, Longman and Green Company, New York. 

KREEFT, PETER AND RONALD K. TACELLI (1994) Handbook of Christian Apologetics, Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.

PHILLIPS, D.Z. (1981) Encountering Evil, Stephen T. Davis (ed.), Atlanta, John Knox Press.

PHILLIPS, D.Z. (2005) The Problem of Evil and the Problem of God, Fortress Press, Minneapolis.

ROTH, JOHN K. ‘Introduction’ (1892-1907)(1969) in The Moral Philosophy of William James, John K. Roth (ed.), Thomas Y. Crowell Company, New York.

ROTH, JOHN K. (1981) Encountering Evil, Stephen T. Davis (ed.), Atlanta, John Knox Press.

WEBER, OTTO (1955)(1981) Foundations of Dogmatics, Volumes 1 and 2, Translated and annotated by Darrell L. Guder, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

March 15, 2014

The philosophical concept that 'any human repentance will have to be matched by God is presented.'

It has God philosophically and theologically being placed in the docks. The idea of God being in the docks was a criticism of theodicy work from the internal, Wales reviewer, a Roman Catholic philosopher of religion at my PhD Viva. In agreement I do not think God belongs in the docks.

There is historical religious history from Scripture, both the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament that presents God directly and implied as eternal and infinite, existing prior to divine creation of matter in Genesis 1. God has sovereign, providential control. God repeatedly in Scripture claims to be holy as in Exodus 3. Humanity on the other hand is created, finite and sinful (Genesis, Romans, Galatians, Ephesians, Hebrews, James, 1 John, Revelation as some sources). Therefore God is not in need of repenting of how he deals with humanity.

God has also by the grace through faith (Ephesians 1-2) chosen and saved those in Christ from sin/sins for good works. A new resurrection body free from sin and suffering is the end for those in Christ (1 Corinthians 15, Revelation 20-22).

On the other hand, in fairness to critics of theism and Christianity, I, as someone that suffers with sin and finiteness as does all of humanity, can very much understand frustration with God, or a theistic concept. Life is not near what it could be as far as fulfillment for many in humanity. Life is often not one of peace and happiness for many. Seemingly many times God could do much more to assist persons.

Those in the Church do not act in very good ways to assist others, or love others at times. And for those that do have a significantly fulfilling, happy life, it ends in death. At times evangelical answers for the problem of evil and suffering are overly-spiritualized and simplistic. Overly-spiritualized as in downplaying the importance of present life in favour of the next life and realm.

The importance of the next realm and everlasting/eternal life in contrast to this present temporal realm does have its Biblical foundation as can be seen in the writings of the Apostles and words of Christ.

Example

New American Standard Bible

Romans 8: 18-25

18For I consider that the sufferings of this present time are not worthy to be compared with the glory that is to be revealed to us.

19For the anxious longing of the creation waits eagerly for the revealing of the sons of God.

20For the creation was subjected to futility, not willingly, but because of Him who subjected it, in hope

21that the creation itself also will be set free from its slavery to corruption into the freedom of the glory of the children of God.

22For we know that the whole creation groans and suffers the pains of childbirth together until now.

23And not only this, but also we ourselves, having the first fruits of the Spirit, even we ourselves groan within ourselves, waiting eagerly for our adoption as sons, the redemption of our body.

24For in hope we have been saved, but hope that is seen is not hope; for who hopes for what he already sees?

25But if we hope for what we do not see, with perseverance we wait eagerly for it.

I do not deny Paul and the Scripture in context, whatsoever.

I am reasoning that where with God's help, there is with the use of theology, philosophy and other intellectual and practical, reasonable means ways of alleviating the problem of evil and suffering in the present realm, to contentment and/or blessing; this is preferable for those in the Church along with the Biblical hope of everlasting/eternal life, to an overly-spiritualized approach which often does not seriously deal with serious temporal issues in order to perhaps find solutions.

Bibliography additional

BRUCE, F.F. (1987) Romans, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 

CAIRD, GEORGE B. (1977) Paul's Letters from Prison Paperback, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

CALVIN, JOHN (1539)(1998) The Institutes of the Christian Religion, Book II, Translated by Henry Beveridge, Grand Rapids, The Christian Classic Ethereal Library, Wheaton College. 

CALVIN, JOHN (1539)(1998) The Institutes of the Christian Religion, Book IV, Translated by Henry Beveridge, Grand Rapids, The Christian Classic Ethereal Library, Wheaton College. 

CALVIN, JOHN (1543)(1996) The Bondage and Liberation of the Will, Translated by G.I. Davies, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House. 

COURSON, JON (2005) Application Commentary, Thomas Nelson, Nashville.

CRANFIELD, C.E.B. (1992) Romans: A Shorter Commentary, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 

ELWELL, WALTER AND YARBROUGH, ROBERT W., Third Edition (2013) Encountering The New Testament, Grand Rapids, Baker Academic. 

FOULKES, FRANCIS (1989) Ephesians, Grand Rapids, Inter-Varsity Press. 

GUNDRY, ROBERT (1981) A Survey of the New Testament, Grand Rapids, Zondervan. 

LIGHTFOOT, JOHN B. (1993) The Destination of the Epistle to the Ephesians in Biblical Essays, New York, Macmillan. 

MOUNCE, ROBERT H. (1990) The Book of Revelation, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 

MOUNCE, ROBERT H. (1995) The New American Commentary: Romans, Nashville, Broadman & Holman Publishers. 

SHEDD, WILLIAM G.T. (1874-1890)(1980) Dogmatic Theology, Volume 1, Nashville, Thomas Nelson Publishers. 

SHEDD, WILLIAM G.T. (1874-1890)(1980) Dogmatic Theology, Volume 2, Nashville, Thomas Nelson Publishers.

Greg Welty And Christ As Sinless Human Being (PhD Edit)

North Korea black out from Daily Mail and Facebook

Greg Welty And Christ As Sinless Human Being (PhD Edit)

Greg Welty rejects Plantinga’s idea that God cannot create a world containing moral good and no moral evil,^[1] and raises the objection that God brought Christ into the world as a sinless human being.^[2]  

Welty’s point here is that every human being could have therefore been sinless^[3] and the world could contain good and no evil with significantly free human beings that would not commit wrong actions.[4] 

I have a similar objection to Welty’s.^[5]  Within my theodicy, I reason that God could have, if he wished, made significantly free human beings, or human like beings who would have been perfectly morally good and would not commit wrong actions. God’s choice not to create such beings, in my mind is not a sign of a lack of power, or moral failure, but rather the use of his own perfect and significantly free will for good purposes. 

March 10, 2014

Note as well, the angels of God not fallen are deduced to be significantly free and have not committed wrong actions (Revelation 12).

I reason significantly free beings can made perfect, holy and good gaining knowledge of good and evil and do not choose evil and do not require the option to choose evil.

Therefore, fallen humanity as is and the atonement and resurrection work of Christ as applied to those chosen and elect in Christ is part of God’s sovereign plans. As is the culminated Kingdom of God with the new heaven and new earth (Revelation 20-22).

PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1977)(2002) God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1982) The Nature of Necessity, Oxford, Clarendon Press.

PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (2000) Warranted Christian Belief, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

WELTY, GREG (1999) ‘The Problem of Evil’, in Greg Welty PhD, Fort Worth, Texas.Philosophy Department, Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, http://www.ccir.ed.ac.uk/~jad/welty/probevil.htm

---

[1] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 30).  Welty (1999: 1).

[2] Welty (1999: 1).

[3] Welty (1999: 1).

[4] Welty (1999: 1).

[5] Welty (1999: 1).

https://drrnm.blogspot.com/2020/09/phd-full-version-pdf-theodicy-and.html

Brief On The Problem Of Evil, God & Violence

More snow today, and no I was not falling...Not a bad very quick amateur photo, it was raining, if I say so myself.

When I left this morning the weather was transforming from snow to rain and so I decided to risk the trek out to Abbotsford and Northview Community Church.

Probably not my best decision ever as it was snowing heavily and I took the usual most direct back road way to the church. The church somewhat surprisingly being a megachurch of 4, 000+ attenders is in a suburban/rural area just outside of town.

The car slipped around a few times, but I was careful as usual. After church speaking with one of the church leaders, he agreed that my idea was wise to drive home through town and not the back roads. It was raining, thankfully.

I stated yesterday, mostly by texting in comments on 'Give Me Cake Liberty Or Give Me...', Satire And Theology.

Cited:

'how many x..mom do not put hand in car door frame... dark outside at safeway on her bday....i close door she screams. only bruised cannot see damage inside store...will ice. could not see her hand in p lot and she should have asked for help instead.'

'Glove probably saved her hand from worse result... Icing.'

The boss got away with a minor bruise, thankfully. She is thankful I was there to open the door. I am thankful she had her gloves on.

I remember as child, her Dad, my Grandpa, did basically the same thing with someone else closing the door. Does not surprise me, there is something to genetics.

Brief On The Problem Of Evil, God & Violence

Today the sermon at Northview dealt with God Biblically commanding Israel in the Hebrew Bible at times and points to take the lives of all enemies, including children within a nation and society.

Some within scholarship attempt to argue, against the more traditional view provided in the sermon, that there are other interpretations where genocide does not occur. The Pastor did not get into these thoroughly, but noted some serious objections to God taking via commanding Israel, the lives of entire civilizations.

I have not studied the Old Testament/Hebrew Bible for this topic in-depth, but did study the problem of evil and theodicy for twelve plus years at three Universities, eventually embedding my own theodicy within a successful PhD.

I do have some philosophical and theological insights, I reason:

Based on a Reformed, compatibilist, Biblical view, God is the first cause of all things.

God as the first cause, is infinite and eternal, based on Scriptural, theological essentials. God is the only necessary being, God exists by necessity.  Something exists by necessity when it is not possible for the proposition to be false. The denial of such being self-contradictory. Bradley (1996: 522).

It could be reasoned contingent beings do not have to exist. Contingent beings 'could have failed to exist'. They 'must be caused to exist by some another being'. Quinn (1996: 609).

Contingent beings, that also if significantly free, serve as secondary causes of thoughts, actions and acts, exist because the first-cause, God, chose for them to exist. He could reasonably, even after creating humanity, chose for them not to exist in various contexts including complete annihilation of both body and spirit, or physical death alone as the spirit lives on (Luke 16 as a figurative literal example, although a parable).

I reason, although not dogmatically, it quite reasonable and possible that God would have been ethically and morally reasonably able to annihilate Adam and Eve prior to their sin and fall, because the creator as necessary only needs to exist; contingent beings that do not have to exist by necessity could be eliminated. Therefore Adam and Eve could have justly been annihilated, outside of an ethical/moral promise by God, including Biblical, to provide them with continued existence.

As the first-cause, Biblical God has promised eternal/everlasting life for those in Christ, and eternal/everlasting death/punishment for those outside of Christ (Revelation 20-22).

Therefore, annihilation is not an ethical, moral option for God as he has promised otherwise. Assuming, reasonably God keeps his word and he does not change in how he deals with humanity within time (Malachi 3).

Yes, I realise there is a debate on whether or not everlasting punishment is actually annihilation and have discussed on both of my blogs. I have argued both positions and hold to the traditional view.

Physical death is however, an ethical/moral option for God because of sin the fall, and punishment (Genesis 1-3, Romans 1-6, Hebrews 9). This leads to judgement after death for all (Hebrews 9: 27), each person appointed one physical death and then judgement.

When and how physical death is issued by God, for persons, corporately or privately is not limited.

It is not specifically limited by Scripture, as persons can physically die in many ways.

Theologically and philosophically I reason God with perfect or permissible will, could ethically, morally and justly end the physical life of persons. This could take place with human beings being secondary causes.

Normally, the person taking the life of another person would be Biblically unlawful as murder (Exodus 20). And this allows for the possibility for alternate philosophical and theological views as some would see any breaking of this commandment as contradiction and God is not a God of contradiction.

However, it is also possible to view such killing as execution, a protection of the people of Israel in a Hebrew Bible context from non-God negative influences.

God willing that secondary causes lawfully kill persons for by divine order, not being totally foreign to the New Testament, although different in focus. Old Testament concepts could be philosophically and theologically connected to preservation of law and order in the New Testament in Romans 13 and 1 Peter 2.

Admittedly in the New Testament context, the State replacing Israel and its Old Testament divine order, for the maintaining of divinely sanctioned law and order. There is no theocracy or attempt at like in the New Testament context.

BRADLEY, RAYMOND D. (1996) ‘Necessity’, in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

QUINN, PHILIP L. (1996) 'Philosophy of Religion' , in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.



Excellent solo, dumb cartoon.