Ontology

As documented

A Facebook friend of mine working on her PhD, posted on my Facebook main page and mentioned, ontology.

I was indicated to perhaps be donnish, but when I simply skimmed the post on my mobile phone quickly at work, I originally read it as dorkish.

Another reason for re-reads...

Ontology is from the Greek word for being, and is a 17th century term for the branch of metaphysics that is concerned with what exists. Blackburn (1996: 269).

The ontological argument is an a priori (non-empirical knowledge or speculation, my add) has been used by those such as Anselm and is noted as purely a priori as an attempt to prove the existence of God. Blackburn (1996: 269). Blackburn writes that Aquinas did not accept the argument. Blackburn (1996: 269).

Blackburn mentions Plantinga as a modern philosopher that has stated a version of the ontological argument. Blackburn (1996: 269).

The view of Anselm is that God is something of which nothing greater can be conceived. Blackburn (1996: 269).

Plantinga uses the concept of possible worlds and that it is at least possible that a maximally great being exists in every possible world, if it exists in one possible world, it exists in all possible worlds. So, the maximally great being exists in every possible world. Blackburn (1996: 269). Plantinga (1977)(2002: 111-112).

It is an impossible proposition of the maximally great being in one possible world and every possible world, to not exist, therefore the being exists in the actual world. Plantinga (1977)(2002: 111-112).

Plantinga presents a version he reasons is valid and sound and he states that the argument does not prove the existence of God. His version, proves not the truth of theism, but that fact that the argument is rational; or its 'rational acceptability' as an argument.  Plantinga (1977)(2002: 112).

This does read as reasonable and sound and true.

I have never used an ontological argument and likely never will.

The critic can state that he/she, because much of the argument rests on what a human being can reason in conception, can conceive of a being as great as the maximally great being.

So, two maximally great beings. Perhaps one good and one evil? Dualism? I have come across that argument more than once.

Even when countered with the concept, that I use, that there cannot be two infinite (limitless) beings as they would be one infinite (limitless) being, many ontological arguments and counter arguments would focus too much on what the person and critic can subjectively 'reason' and 'conceive'. The reasoning and conception not necessarily being philosophically and theologically reasonable or for that matter sound and true.

Dualism being ruled out as contradictory as I reason the one infinite being that was both infinitely good and infinitely evil would be contradictory.

Or, good and evil are one in the same, i.e. there is no such thing as evil. One infinite being would be viewed as good.

Instead arguments for first cause, although still using human reasoning of course, rely less on human reasoning in the sense of what a person subjectively conceives.

It relies more so on objective reason.

A vicious regress occurs when a problem cannot solve itself, this not being the case with infinite numbers, with negative numbers, as infinite regress, as they are not real things but can count real things that do actually exist. An infinite regress is not always vicious.

A vicious regress occurs if time is eternal and infinite as in how would we arrive from the eternal, infinite past to the present? It would be impossible to traverse from the infinite past to the present.

Therefore, there exists an eternal, infinite first cause prior to time that created time.

This also could be stated in regard to matter and the universe which many scientists reason began with a big bang theory. Energy, time and space also have beginnings and are therefore finite.

What immaterial being existed prior to the big bang?

It is deduced as a non-material, eternal, infinite first cause.

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1977)(2002) God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1982) The Nature of Necessity, Oxford, Clarendon Press.

PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (2000) Warranted Christian Belief, Oxford, Oxford University Press.