Friday, May 01, 2009

What is certain?

What is certain?

Preface

British Columbia (photo from trekearth.com) 

For my PhD revisions I was required to revise my comments on the work of philosopher Immanuel Kant in greater detail, as an influence on John Hick and his soul making theodicy. 

In a serious discussion, Immanuel Kant may be mentioned and so this is a useful post. This part of my Kant revisions defends a view of philosophical certainty. I am not a Kantian scholar. 

Article originally published 20090501, revised on Blogger for an entry on academia,edu, 20250817.

The noumena and therefore noumenal realm is the non-material, non-empirical realm of reality

The first citation is background from another part of my Kant section. The noumena realm is invisible and has true infinity where Kant believes one can reason that contingent personality is dependent on the universal and necessary connection to the invisible world.[1] [1] Kant (1788)(1898)(2006: 100)... 

John Hick states that natural theology can only at best demonstrate that God is probable;[1] however, I hold that Peter D. Klein’s definition of certainty[2] could possibly be applied to natural theology. [3] Klein (1996) in ‘Certainty’ describes the idea as being that a proposition is true if there are no legitimate grounds whatsoever for doubting it.[4] This is a reasonable concept, and I support the similar idea that a proposition is certain if there are no counter propositions that are superior.[5] Natural theology therefore would never be 100% certain,[6] but could hypothetically at least be philosophically certain as long as arguments that supported natural theology were true beyond any reasonable doubt,[7] or the arguments for natural theology were superior to those opposing them.

In regard to the noumena realm of Immanuel Kant making Christian doctrine clearly metaphorical and indefensible, I respectfully disagree with Hick.[8] Christian doctrine is not primarily established through the use of natural theology, but by what many conservatives and some liberals view as the revelation of God through Hebrew Bible writers, and Christ and his New Testament writers.[9] 

For Hick to demonstrate that Biblical revelation should be interpreted in a way that denies traditional conservative doctrines, or liberal ones for that matter, would be difficult since by Hick’s own standard[10] his denial of any possible reasonable understanding of the noumenal realm[11] makes his evaluation of Scripture subject to the same negative critique by which he judges traditional theology. Christian scholars therefore, whether conservative or liberal, are left with looking at contextual, historical and methodological issues relating to Biblical interpretation, and attempting to reason out what Scripture is stating and related issues.[12] This despite the fact that the noumena realm cannot be empirically known.[13] As for Kant, his view allows for the concept of negative noumena.[14] The idea of noumena, according to Kant was bound to the limit of pretension of sensibility and reason, and therefore only negative noumena was of intellectual use.[15] The use of positive noumena which trusts in pure reason is rejected.[16] 

Christian scholarship does not rely primarily on natural theology,[17] which would be considered by certain scholars to simply use pure reason which some also think Kant had demolished.[18] Scriptural Revelation in my view, is not to be considered a source of the concept of pure reason as discussed by Kant and reviewers,[19] but rather I see it as similar to how Kant approached theodicy within his brief article.[20] 

Scripture, like theodicy approaches can be used as an historical, traditional and authoritative source.[21] Revelation from God in Scripture and resulting claims made within could perhaps be tied to Kantian concepts and intuition arising from empirical sensations.[22] This is not a difficulty for a Reformed and some other approach to Christianity which do not rely primarily on philosophical deductions but in supernatural revelation of God through empirical sensations, such as prophets, Christ, the apostles, scribes.[23] As cited, Plantinga reasons that for Kant the intellectual problem is not that persons cannot think about God but that persons cannot come to speculative metaphysical knowledge of God.[24] 

My proposition and conclusion here, which I realize some will debate, is that Scripture is not primarily metaphysical speculation about God as discussed,[25] but is rather coming from empirically based sources[26] as God speaks through the authors and players within his Bible.[27]

Kant explains in a follow up work entitled The Critique of Practical Reason from 1788, that the noumena is the theoretical department of knowledge denied, while the phenomena is one’s own empirical consciousness. Kant (1788)(1898)(2006: 3).
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[1] Hick in Geivett (1993: 230-231). Geivett (1993: 49).
[2] Klein (1996: 113).
[3] And Biblical theology as well.
[4] Klein (1996: 113). Blackburn explains that a proposition would be considered certain when there is no doubt concerning its truth. Blackburn (1996: 60). 
[5] This would also accomplish the standard of a proposition being true as it is beyond (reasonable) doubt. 
[6] In my view 100% certainty is impossible to grasp for a finite being that cannot have 100% knowledge. Absolute certainty could only belong to an infinite, omniscient being. 
[7] Klein (1996: 113). Blackburn (1996: 60).
[8] Hick (1993: 126). Geivett points out Kant postulates the existence of God out of practical necessity within a system of morality. Geivett (1993: 87). I would deduce Christian doctrine could be considered in a similar sense, even from a critical perspective.
[9] Otto Weber discusses this issue. Weber (1955)(1981: 169-331). John Murray suggests that through Scripture the activity of God, the Father, is reflected. Murray (1937-1966)(1977: 148). See also Erickson (1994: 176-177).
[10] Hick (1993: 126). Geivett explains that there is no way of knowing whether or not Hick’s theodicy is true. Geivett (1993: 88).
[11] Kant (1781)(1787)(1929)(2006: 393). Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 10). Smid (1999: 10).
[12] Weber (1955) (1981: 169-331). Lindsell (1976: 200-211). 
[13] Kant (1788)(1898)(2006: 26). Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 10). Smid (1999: 10). [14] Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 350).
[15] Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 350). Smith (1930: 413). Ameriks (1996: 400). 
[16] Williams (1987: 150). Smith (1930: 413). Ameriks (1996: 400).
[17] Weber (1955) (1981: 169-331). Erickson (1994: 176-177).
[18] Hick in Geivett (1993: 230). Weber (1955) (1981: 203). Geivett would not agree and considers it dangerous to completely dismiss natural theology. Geivett (1993: 69-89). Even after accepting Kant’s critique as reasonable and somewhat valuable, I still reason that philosophical truths about God can possibly be deduced without the use of direct divine revelation through a supernatural event and/or Scripture. Deductions concerning a first cause and/or God, do not however qualify as equivalent to the knowledge of knowing God as a result of Scripture and the influence of the Holy Spirit. Philosophical deductions concerning God would not necessarily be of pure reason, and I can agree with Kant that any reasonable deduction and intuition must be tied back to empirical experience by which to make sense of these deductions. Kant (1781)(1787)(1929)(2006: 66). Blackburn (1996: 205).
[19] Williams (1987: 150). Smith (1930: 413). Ameriks (1996: 400).
[20] Kant, Immanuel (1791)(2001) ‘On The Miscarriage of All Philosophical Trials in Theodicy’, in Religion and Rational Theology. 
[21] Weber (1955) (1981: 169-331).
[22] Kant (1781)(1787)(1929)(2006: 66). Blackburn (1996: 205). 
[23] Weber (1955) (1981: 169-331). William G.T. Shedd provides the view that general, natural revelation is not infallible. He differentiates this from Scriptural Revelation. Shedd (1874-1890)(1980: 66). Van Til writes that the Reformers reasoned they were listening to Christ directly through the Scriptures as God revealed himself to humanity. Van Til (1977: 246).
[24] Plantinga (2000: 9).
[25] Plantinga (2000: 9).
[26] Kant (1781)(1787)(1929)(2006: 66). Blackburn (1996: 205). I am not stating that Kant was a Christian philosopher from an orthodox, historical perspective, but Van Til writes that Kant made room for Christ as the Son of God as Christ is viewed as the idea set before humanity for persons to emulate moral perfection. This was done through a historical faith. Van Til (1977: 399). Minimally this does not appear as a complete rejection of Biblical theology. 
[27] Weber (1955) (1981: 169-331). Shedd (1874-1890)(1980: 66). Van Til (1977: 246). Lindsell (1976: 200-211). 
---

AMERIKS, KARL (1999) ‘Kant, Immanuel’, in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

GEIVETT, R. DOUGLAS (1993) Evil and the Evidence for God, Philadelphia, Temple University Press. 

GUYER, PAUL AND ALLEN W, in KANT, IMMANUEL (1781)(1787)(1998) Critique of Pure Reason, Translated and edited by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 

HICK, JOHN (1970) Evil and The God of Love, London, The Fontana Library. 

HICK, JOHN (1978) ‘Present and Future Life’, Harvard Theological Review, Volume 71, Number 1-2, January-April, Harvard University. 

HICK, JOHN (1981) Encountering Evil, Stephen T. Davis (ed.), Atlanta, John Knox Press.

HICK, JOHN (1993) The Metaphor of God Incarnate, Louisville, Kentucky, John Know Press.

HICK, JOHN (1994) Death and Eternal Life, Louisville, Kentucky, John Knox Press. 

HICK, JOHN (1999) ‘Life after Death’, in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press. 

KANT, IMMANUEL (1781)(1787)(1998) Critique of Pure Reason, Translated and edited by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 

KANT, IMMANUEL (1781)(1787)(1929)(2006) Critique of Pure Reason, Translated by Norman Kemp Smith, London, Macmillan. http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~ppp/cpr/toc.html

KANT, IMMANUEL (1788)(1997) Critique of Practical Reason, Translated by Mary Gregor (ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 

KANT, IMMANUEL (1788)(1898)(2006) The Critique of Practical Reason, Translated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott, London, Longmans, Green, and Co. http://philosophy.eserver.org/kant/critique-of-practical-reaso.txt 

KANT, IMMANUEL (1791)(2001) ‘On The Miscarriage of All Philosophical Trials in Theodicy’, in Religion and Rational Theology, Translated by George di Giovanni and Allen Wood, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 

KLEIN, PETER D. (1996) ‘Certainty’, in Robert Audi, (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 

LINDSELL, HAROLD (1976) The Battle for the Bible, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House. 

MURRAY, JOHN (1937-1966)(1977) Collected Writings of John Murray, Vol. 2: Select Lectures in Systematic Theology, Edinburgh, The Banner of Truth Trust. 

PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (2000) Warranted Christian Belief, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

SHEDD, WILLIAM G.T. (1874-1890)(1980) Dogmatic Theology, Volume 2, Nashville, Thomas Nelson Publishers. 

SMID, ROBERT W. (1999) ‘John Harwood Hick, His Life’, in The Boston Collaborative Encyclopedia of Modern Western Theology, Boston, The Boston Collaborative Encyclopedia of Modern Western Theology. http://people.bu.edu/wwildman/WeirdWildWeb/courses/mwt/dictionary/mwt_them 

SMITH, NORMAN KEMP (1930) A Commentary to Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’, MacMillan and Co., Limited, London. 

VAN TIL, CORNELIUS (1977) Christianity and Barthianism, Nutley, New Jersey, Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company. 

WEBBER, OTTO (1955)(1981) Foundations of Dogmatics, Volumes 1 and 2, Translated and annotated by Darrell L. Guder, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 

WILLIAMS, ROWAN (2007) Wrestling with Angels, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, Grand Rapids. 

Related article for reference


Saturday, September 19, 2020 PhD Full Version PDF: Theodicy and Practical Theology 2010, Wales TSD

Saturday, April 18, 2009

Audio post: a face for radio two


Vista House, Oregon

God's omnipotence. This is a short audio presentation.

I am only allowed 5 MB of audio space per recording and that is roughly 5 minutes and so I have had to work on getting this to fit!

God is not omnipotent because he cannot ride a bicycle, or type a blog article?

I try to avoid 'uhms and ahhs', even though they seem to work for President Obama. Over time I reason I will become a better speaker. I have also increased the volume from my previous two presentations, one of which was on this blog, the other on satire and theology. In the future I hope to have a better audio card and microphone, as I realize they are not first rate.

I agree with Phillips that it is not illogical for God as spirit to ride a physical bike. But he reasons God is therefore not omnipotent as God cannot ride a bike.

In a sense God as spirit could move the bike as if it was being ridden by a person and it could be considered ridden, although strictly speaking he would not be sitting on it and riding it. This first suggestion would not satisfy many critics, but may satisfy some theists in particular.

I can see the point that some may suggest, that it would be illogical for a being of spirit only to do anything physical. But in regard to God I lean away from this view because of my suggestions and because it appears to limit God from logically acting in the physical universe which the infinite, omnipotent God should be able to do and did in Scripture.

I therefore offer the suggestion in agreement with John Frame (I read Frame after I had come to the similar conclusion) that God could remain as spirit in nature only and yet still temporarily take some type of physical form to ride the bike/do a physical action (Phillips suggests bicycle and not Frame). This would not be the same as my other suggestion of Christ riding the bike, which could also be accomplished, as Christ has both the eternal nature of God in spirit and has taken human nature in the incarnation, although the two natures do not mix.

At the same time I can grant Frame the point that God's omnipotence should not be challenged by the physical finite actions that God does not by nature do. He is correct that it is not a weakness. God is in fact beyond physical limitations.

A critic may state that my suggestion is little different than that of the incarnate Christ riding the bicycle. Even though I reason in both scenarios God is riding a bicycle with my suggestion God does not take on a new human nature, rather he simply takes on some type of temporary physicality to perform the action while remaining spirit in nature. We need to remember that the discussion of omnipotence is concerned with God's eternal nature in spirit and not the finite human nature Christ took in the incarnation. That is important in understanding why in the context of this philosophy of religion discussion I make that as my primary suggestion along with the two other scenarios where God could be considered to be riding a bicycle.

Below is the short lecture.

affrt.mp3

FRAME, JOHN M. (2002) The Doctrine of God, P and R Publishing, Phillipsburg, New Jersey.

PHILLIPS, D.Z. (2005) The Problem of Evil and the Problem of God, Fortress Press, Minneapolis.




California


It is barbecue season.

Wednesday, April 01, 2009

PhD questionnaire graphs (the problem of evil)

PhD questionnaire graphs (the problem of evil)

Edited on July 13, 2022

Anse-Couleuvre, France (photo from trekearth.com) 

Thanks, Charles! For the help with the graphs.

The following will be in the final copy of my PhD thesis. I shall email all those persons that I have on my list that assisted with the questionnaire. 


2010 Theodicy and Practical Theology: PhD thesis, the University of Wales, Trinity Saint David, Lampeter 

The survey results and graphs do not exhaustively reflect the statistics, but I only presented the most relevant results. 

Two-hundred thirteen persons from various Christian churches worldwide were surveyed. I present the thirty-two most relevant in my view, to my work. 

Please note that it is very difficult contextualizing often complex philosophical theology questions in the form of questionnaire propositions. I realize there are many difficulties with this empirical theology approach, but it has served as providing a vehicle for PhD thesis originality. Please keep this in mind when commenting, but of course your take on a question may be different than mine. It can be like trying to pull teeth to have persons fill questionnaires out! Thank you! Russ 

Question 1  
Question 4  
Question 7  
Questions 8-10  
Question 11  
Question 12  
Question 13  
Question 14  
Question 15  
Questions 16  
Question 17  
Question 18  
Question 19  
Question 21  
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Question 30  
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Question 46  

I am hungry for pie now...

Bibliography: Some key references from my MPhil/PhD and website work

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AUGUSTINE (427)(1997) On Christian Doctrine, Translated by D.W. Robertson Jr., Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall. 

AUGUSTINE (427b)(1997) On Christian Teaching, Translated by R.P.H. Green, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

BARNHART, J.E. (1977) ‘Theodicy and the Free Will Defence: Response to Plantinga and Flew’, Abstract in Religious Studies, 13, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 

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FRANCIS, LESLIE J. and Practical Theology Team (2005) ‘Practical and Empirical Theology’, University of Wales, Bangor website, University of Wales, Bangor. http://www.bangor.ac.uk/rs/pt/ptunit/definition.php. 

GEIVETT, R. DOUGLAS (1993) Evil and the Evidence for God, Philadelphia, Temple University Press. 

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HASKER, WILLIAM (1989) God, Time, and Knowledge, Ithaca, Cornell University Press. 

HASKER, WILLIAM (1993) ‘C. Robert Mesle, John Hick’s Theodicy: A Process Humanist Critique’, in Philosophy of Religion, Volume 34, Number 1, pp. 55-56. Dordrecht, Netherlands, Philosophy of Religion. 

HASKER, WILLIAM (1994) ‘Can Philosophy Defend Theology?’, in Faith and Philosophy, Volume 11, Number 2, April, pp. 272-278. Wilmore, Kentucky, Asbury College. 

HASKER, WILLIAM (2000) ‘The Problem of Evil in Process Theism and Classical Free Will Theism’, in Process Studies, Volume. 29, Number 2, Fall-Winter, pp. 194-208. Claremont, California, Religion Online. 

HASKER, WILLIAM (2003) ‘Counterfactuals and Evil’, in Philosophia Christi, Volume 5, Number 1, pp. 235-249. La Mirada, California, Biola University. 

HASKER, WILLIAM (2003) ‘Is Free-Will Theism Religiously Inadequate? A Reply to Ciocchi’, in Religious Studies, Volume 39, Number 4, December, pp. 431-440. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 

HASKER, WILLIAM (2007) ‘Peter van Inwagen, The Problem of Evil’, in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, Notre Dame, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. 

HENRY, CARL (1983) God, Revelation and Authority: Volume 6: God Who Stands and Stays, Waco, Word Books.

HICK, JOHN (1970) Evil and The God of Love, London, The Fontana Library. 

HICK, JOHN (1978) ‘Present and Future Life’, Harvard Theological Review, Volume 71, Number 1-2, January-April, Harvard University. 

HICK, JOHN (1981) Encountering Evil, Stephen T. Davis (ed.), Atlanta, John Knox Press. 

HICK, JOHN (1993) ‘Afterword’ in GEIVETT, R. DOUGLAS (1993) Evil and the Evidence for God, Philadelphia, Temple University Press. 

HICK, JOHN (1993) The Metaphor of God Incarnate, Louisville, Kentucky, John Know Press. 

HICK, JOHN (1994) Death and Eternal Life, Louisville, Kentucky, John Knox Press.

HICK, JOHN (1999) ‘Life after Death’, in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press. 

HILLE, ROLF (2004) ‘A Biblical-Theological Response to the Problem of Theodicy in the Context of the Modern Criticism of Religion’, in Evangelical Review of Theology, Volume 28, Number 1, pp. 21-37. Carlisle, UK, Evangelical Review of Theology. 

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KANT, IMMANUEL (1788)(1997) Critique of Practical Reason, Translated by Mary Gregor (ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 

KANT, IMMANUEL (1788)(1898)(2006) The Critique of Practical Reason, Translated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott, London, Longmans, Green, and Co. 

KANT, IMMANUEL (1791)(2001) ‘On The Miscarriage of All Philosophical Trials in Theodicy’, in Religion and Rational Theology, Translated by George di Giovanni and Allen Wood, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

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STRONG, J. (1890)(1986) Strong's Exhaustive Concordance of the Bible, Burlington, Welch Publishing Company. 

TENNANT, F.R.(1906) The Origin and Propagation of Sin, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

TENNANT, F.R.(1930)(1956) Philosophical Theology, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

THE GREEK NEW TESTAMENT (1993) Stuttgart, United Bible Societies. 

THIESSEN, HENRY C. (1956) Introductory Lectures in Systematic Theology, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 

WHALE, J.S. (1958) Christian Doctrine, Glasgow, Fontana Books. 

WILLIAMS, ROWAN (2000) On Christian Theology, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford. 

WILLIAMS, ROWAN (2007) Wrestling with Angels, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, Grand Rapids.

WOODWARD, JAMES AND STEPHEN PATTISON (2000)(2007)(eds.), The Blackwell Reader in Pastoral and Practical Theology, Oxford, Blackwell Publishing.

WRIGHT, N.T., Colossians and Philemon, (1986)(1989), IVP, Eerdmans, Grand Rapids.

WRIGHT, R.K.McGREGOR (1996) No Place for Sovereignty, Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press. 

Monday, March 09, 2009

God's omnipotence: Alister McGrath and William of Ockham


London/Greenwich (photo from trekearth.com )

The following is a section of my MPhil thesis (2003) where Alister McGrath deals with the concept of God's omnipotence and I will be adding a section on different views concerning omnipotence within my PhD revisions.

4. God’s Power

In Chapter 3 of Suffering entitled God Almighty, McGrath tried to clear up possible misunderstandings concerning the idea of God’s omnipotence. Firstly, he indicated that God cannot contradict himself. "‘God can’t make a square circle! He would contradict himself if he did.’ The logic of this is undeniable." McGrath (1992: 15)

Secondly, McGrath points out that although God can do anything that is not contradictory to his nature, he is bound by certain promises.

The simple fact of the matter is that God is not able to do everything. His hands are tied. He has made promises - promises which limit his freedom of action. And he is faithful to those promises. And those promises are not arbitrary. They reflect and rest upon God’s unchanging character. Those promises tell us about the way God is. They express the consistency and faithfulness, as well as offer us salvation. What God promises expresses what God is. McGrath (1992: 17).

Theologian, Millard J. Erickson, is in basic agreement with these two points. He stated:

There are, however, certain qualifications of this all-powerful character of God. He cannot arbitrarily do anything whatsoever that we may conceive of. He can do only those things which are proper objects of his power. Thus, he cannot do the logically absurd or contradictory. He cannot make square circles or triangles with four corners. He cannot undo what happened in the past, although he may wipe out its effects of even the memory of it. He cannot act contrary to his nature–he cannot be cruel or unconcerned. He cannot fail to do what he has promised. In reference to God’s having made a promise and having confirmed it with an oath, the writer to the Hebrews says: "So that through two unchangeable things, in which it is impossible that God should prove false, we . . . might have strong encouragement" (Heb. 6:18). All of these "inabilities" however, are not weaknesses, but strengths. The inability to do evil or to lie or to fail is a mark of positive strength rather than of failure.

Another aspect of the power of God is that he is free. While God is bound to keep his promises, he was not initially under any compulsion to make those promises. Nothing in Scripture suggests that God’s will is determined or bound by any external factors. On the contrary, it is common to attribute his decisions and actions to the "good pleasure of his will" (eudokia). Paul in particular attributes them to God’s will (Eph. 1:5, 9; Phil. 2:13). God’s decisions and actions are not determined by consideration of any factors outside himself. They are simply a matter of his own free choice. Erickson (1994: 277-278).

Both McGrath and Erickson are stating that God is not a contradictory being in any of his actions. This means, for example, that God would not have the power to stop being God, or to make someone else God. This, however, has nothing to do with omnipotence, and being all-powerful means God is able to do what can be done logically, but never what cannot done be logically.

Concerning the assertion that God is bound by his promises, I agree, Scripture makes it clear in Hebrews 6:18 that he cannot lie, and also when Jesus promises he is the only way of salvation in John 14:6, it can be concluded that this system of salvation will not be altered. One can be sure that God will save those in Christ who believe, and at the same time, there will never be another way of salvation. God could have chosen not to save humanity from its sins, but once this decision was made and God made a promise, it would not be broken.

With these concepts in mind, according to McGrath, God is restricted in the future as to how he deals with humanity, because he has promised certain things for humankind’s ultimate salvation. With regard to the problem of evil this means that much of the suffering in God’s creation was because God "has deliberately limited his possibilities." McGrath (1992: 20).

McGrath notes the approach of William of Ockham who, according to McGrath, described God’s omnipotence in the following way:

Ockham uses two terms to refer to these different options. The absolute power of God refers to God’s options before he had committed himself to any course of action or world ordering. The ordained power of God refers to the way things are, which reflects the will of God their creator. These do not represent two different sets of options now open to God. They represent two different moments in the history of human salvation. And our concern is with the ordained power of God, the way in which God orders his creation at present. McGrath (1992: 20).

These definitions by Ockham adequately described McGrath’s ideas and made sense; however, McGrath went on to ask: "So where does this leave all the abstract talk about God being omnipotent? In something of a state of ruin, is the short answer." McGrath (1992: 21).

I agree with McGrath’s "Ockham" concept that God had ordained power at this point which included God limiting himself within his promises. However, I do not think this, in any way, puts the idea of God’s omnipotence in ruins because, technically speaking, God still has absolute power so it is not his lack of power that is the issue, it is instead his lack of will.

God possesses will and desire to make certain promises for humanity’s ultimate salvation through him and life with him. He stays omnipotent through all of this but he wills not to do certain things, including not to stop certain evil because to will the cessation of certain evil would interfere with his ultimate will and plan. So although I agree with McGrath’s concept, I would not, in any way, challenge God’s omnipotence but would simply state that he can will evil for the greater good, meaning that people and demonic beings have the freedom to sin. He remains without contradiction and perfectly good, but can use the actions of all finite beings within his ultimate plan for he is infinite. It is logical and plausible to think that the infinite God can create a Universe where an ultimate plan prevails, even while his finite creations plot against him. For God to stop all sin at this time may not be within his plan because human beings may need to experience sin and redemption in order to appreciate God in the greatest measure. It is possible that under every circumstance, humanity would have fallen eventually, and that this type of scenario, where God incarnate must die for humanity, would be needed.

Additional:

'It is possible that under every circumstance, humanity would have fallen eventually, and that this type of scenario, where God incarnate must die for humanity, would be needed.'

Within my PhD I more clearly point my view that God could within a compatibilistic system create significantly free physical/spiritual creatures, or just spiritual creatures with significant free will that would never commit wrong actions. So I would state that human beings as they have been created originally with Adam and Eve would have eventually always fallen, unless God would have severely interfered with their thoughts and actions well beyond what he has done in reality. I have speculated within the MPhil and PhD theses on why God created human creatures in need of salvation.

I noted here:

'For God to stop all sin at this time may not be within his plan because human beings may need to experience sin and redemption in order to appreciate God in the greatest measure.'

And it could be added more importantly that this type of human being would be considered most valuable to God within his culminated Kingdom. This concept received some criticism at my PhD viva, but more in the sense of complaint and not in the sense of defeating with argumentation.

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.

McGRATH, ALISTER (1992) Suffering, London, Hodder and Stoughton Limited.

Giovanni Antonio Canal Canaletto (1697-1768)


Canaletto, Tomb of Lord Somers, 1722-29 (I have seen this one in person)


Something far inferior to Canaletto from Facebook graffiti.