God's omnipotence: Alister McGrath and William of Ockham

London/Greenwich (photo from trekearth.com )

The following is a section of my MPhil thesis (2003) where Alister McGrath deals with the concept of God's omnipotence and I will be adding a section on different views concerning omnipotence within my PhD revisions.

4. God’s Power

In Chapter 3 of Suffering entitled God Almighty, McGrath tried to clear up possible misunderstandings concerning the idea of God’s omnipotence. Firstly, he indicated that God cannot contradict himself. "‘God can’t make a square circle! He would contradict himself if he did.’ The logic of this is undeniable." McGrath (1992: 15)

Secondly, McGrath points out that although God can do anything that is not contradictory to his nature, he is bound by certain promises.

The simple fact of the matter is that God is not able to do everything. His hands are tied. He has made promises - promises which limit his freedom of action. And he is faithful to those promises. And those promises are not arbitrary. They reflect and rest upon God’s unchanging character. Those promises tell us about the way God is. They express the consistency and faithfulness, as well as offer us salvation. What God promises expresses what God is. McGrath (1992: 17).

Theologian, Millard J. Erickson, is in basic agreement with these two points. He stated:

There are, however, certain qualifications of this all-powerful character of God. He cannot arbitrarily do anything whatsoever that we may conceive of. He can do only those things which are proper objects of his power. Thus, he cannot do the logically absurd or contradictory. He cannot make square circles or triangles with four corners. He cannot undo what happened in the past, although he may wipe out its effects of even the memory of it. He cannot act contrary to his nature–he cannot be cruel or unconcerned. He cannot fail to do what he has promised. In reference to God’s having made a promise and having confirmed it with an oath, the writer to the Hebrews says: "So that through two unchangeable things, in which it is impossible that God should prove false, we . . . might have strong encouragement" (Heb. 6:18). All of these "inabilities" however, are not weaknesses, but strengths. The inability to do evil or to lie or to fail is a mark of positive strength rather than of failure.

Another aspect of the power of God is that he is free. While God is bound to keep his promises, he was not initially under any compulsion to make those promises. Nothing in Scripture suggests that God’s will is determined or bound by any external factors. On the contrary, it is common to attribute his decisions and actions to the "good pleasure of his will" (eudokia). Paul in particular attributes them to God’s will (Eph. 1:5, 9; Phil. 2:13). God’s decisions and actions are not determined by consideration of any factors outside himself. They are simply a matter of his own free choice. Erickson (1994: 277-278).

Both McGrath and Erickson are stating that God is not a contradictory being in any of his actions. This means, for example, that God would not have the power to stop being God, or to make someone else God. This, however, has nothing to do with omnipotence, and being all-powerful means God is able to do what can be done logically, but never what cannot done be logically.

Concerning the assertion that God is bound by his promises, I agree, Scripture makes it clear in Hebrews 6:18 that he cannot lie, and also when Jesus promises he is the only way of salvation in John 14:6, it can be concluded that this system of salvation will not be altered. One can be sure that God will save those in Christ who believe, and at the same time, there will never be another way of salvation. God could have chosen not to save humanity from its sins, but once this decision was made and God made a promise, it would not be broken.

With these concepts in mind, according to McGrath, God is restricted in the future as to how he deals with humanity, because he has promised certain things for humankind’s ultimate salvation. With regard to the problem of evil this means that much of the suffering in God’s creation was because God "has deliberately limited his possibilities." McGrath (1992: 20).

McGrath notes the approach of William of Ockham who, according to McGrath, described God’s omnipotence in the following way:

Ockham uses two terms to refer to these different options. The absolute power of God refers to God’s options before he had committed himself to any course of action or world ordering. The ordained power of God refers to the way things are, which reflects the will of God their creator. These do not represent two different sets of options now open to God. They represent two different moments in the history of human salvation. And our concern is with the ordained power of God, the way in which God orders his creation at present. McGrath (1992: 20).

These definitions by Ockham adequately described McGrath’s ideas and made sense; however, McGrath went on to ask: "So where does this leave all the abstract talk about God being omnipotent? In something of a state of ruin, is the short answer." McGrath (1992: 21).

I agree with McGrath’s "Ockham" concept that God had ordained power at this point which included God limiting himself within his promises. However, I do not think this, in any way, puts the idea of God’s omnipotence in ruins because, technically speaking, God still has absolute power so it is not his lack of power that is the issue, it is instead his lack of will.

God possesses will and desire to make certain promises for humanity’s ultimate salvation through him and life with him. He stays omnipotent through all of this but he wills not to do certain things, including not to stop certain evil because to will the cessation of certain evil would interfere with his ultimate will and plan. So although I agree with McGrath’s concept, I would not, in any way, challenge God’s omnipotence but would simply state that he can will evil for the greater good, meaning that people and demonic beings have the freedom to sin. He remains without contradiction and perfectly good, but can use the actions of all finite beings within his ultimate plan for he is infinite. It is logical and plausible to think that the infinite God can create a Universe where an ultimate plan prevails, even while his finite creations plot against him. For God to stop all sin at this time may not be within his plan because human beings may need to experience sin and redemption in order to appreciate God in the greatest measure. It is possible that under every circumstance, humanity would have fallen eventually, and that this type of scenario, where God incarnate must die for humanity, would be needed.

Additional:

'It is possible that under every circumstance, humanity would have fallen eventually, and that this type of scenario, where God incarnate must die for humanity, would be needed.'

Within my PhD I more clearly point my view that God could within a compatibilistic system create significantly free physical/spiritual creatures, or just spiritual creatures with significant free will that would never commit wrong actions. So I would state that human beings as they have been created originally with Adam and Eve would have eventually always fallen, unless God would have severely interfered with their thoughts and actions well beyond what he has done in reality. I have speculated within the MPhil and PhD theses on why God created human creatures in need of salvation.

I noted here:

'For God to stop all sin at this time may not be within his plan because human beings may need to experience sin and redemption in order to appreciate God in the greatest measure.'

And it could be added more importantly that this type of human being would be considered most valuable to God within his culminated Kingdom. This concept received some criticism at my PhD viva, but more in the sense of complaint and not in the sense of defeating with argumentation.

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.

McGRATH, ALISTER (1992) Suffering, London, Hodder and Stoughton Limited.

Giovanni Antonio Canal Canaletto (1697-1768)


Canaletto, Tomb of Lord Somers, 1722-29 (I have seen this one in person)


Something far inferior to Canaletto from Facebook graffiti.