Gospel influence/Peer review

Conwy Castle 2001

Gospel influence

From

MPhil 2003

2003 The Problem of Evil: Anglican and Baptist Perspectives: MPhil thesis, Bangor University

Statement twenty-one: This statement was stated: Human suffering will decrease as the Gospel’s influence increases. For Anglicans 36% agreed, 20% were not certain, 44% disagreed. For Baptists, 36% agreed, 14% were not certain, and 50% disagreed.

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.

MOLTMANN, JÜRGEN (1993) The Crucified God, Minneapolis, Fortress Press.

PHILLIPS, D.Z. (1981) Encountering Evil, Stephen T. Davis (ed.), Atlanta, John Knox Press.

PHILLIPS, D.Z. (2005) The Problem of Evil and the Problem of God, Fortress Press, Minneapolis.

November 10, 2019

A tricky question. A true gospel influence (as opposed to a overly-politicized Christianity), over the western world and the world in general, should cause the Christian Church to benefit societies.

On the other hand, in this realm, suffering and death biblically continues until the new realm is established (Revelation 21-22) and the resurrection to perfection (1 Corinthians 15) for those truly within the gospel, atoning and resurrection work of Jesus Christ.
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Peer review

A good friend with a secular Master's degree, recently opined that an academic needs published journal articles. 'Publish or perish'. An argument is that academic journal articles alone allow for peer review. 

I agree that academic journal articles provide the possibility of peer review.

A blog, as in the traditional  blog, is considered not academically orientated. However, this Blogger blog is presented as an academic website, obviously. It is not a traditional blog. It is merely hosted on Blogger. It is published work.

An academic can search the internet and view my fifteen years of academic entries on this academic website and can provide an academic peer review through comments. My website archives can be searched. Or, I can reviewed on another website, or my ideas can be reviewed, without me being named.

Further, this website is previewed on my Facebook business page, Russell Norman Murray, which also has comments where an academic peer review could take place. The website is promoted on Twitter and LinkedIn where peer review, can occur. I can be reviewed online and offline.

In fact, my fifteen years of academic online work (almost thirty years of academic work), including my entire MPhil thesis and most of my PhD thesis is available for peer review. I would deduce, that unless an academic journal is available online, particularly to the public, that a website such as mine actually reaches more readers.

If I need to revise because I, or someone else, critiques web content, worthy of revision, and I revise, that is because my academic work is publicly available and available for peer review.

2010 Theodicy and Practical Theology: PhD thesis, the University of Wales, Trinity Saint David, Lampeter

Necessary v Sufficient

My previous entry deals with the necessary versus the contingent, or what is of necessity versus what is of the contingent.

This entry:

Necessary versus Sufficient conditions

Philosopher Blackburn explains...

'If p is a necessary condition of q, then q cannot be true unless p is true. If p is a sufficient condition of q, then given that p is true, q is so as well.' (73).

Blackburn provides the example:

Steering well is a necessary condition of driving well... (73).

But it is not sufficient, as one can steer well, but be an overall bad driver. (73).

Perhaps, one steers very well, but is overly occupied by texting while driving. (My add, and not my practice)

This concept from Blackburn with the use of symbolic logic, provides a level of complexity, yet consistent and logical at the same time. But providing a true example provides another level of difficulty.

A solid/true example

Infinite attributes (a) are a necessary condition of infinite nature (b).

Infinite attributes (a) are a necessary condition of infinite nature (b), then infinite nature (b) cannot be true unless infinite attributes (a) are true. If infinite attributes (a) are a sufficient condition of infinite nature (b), then given that infinite attributes (a) are true, then infinite nature (b) is so as well.

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Facebook: Re: Air Transat.

The necessary is good

The necessary is good

December 8 2018

I wrote:

Necessary v. Contingent 

1. The necessary must exist.

2. God is necessary.

3. God's plans are necessary. 

4. The contingent exist.

5. The necessary supersedes the contingent.

6. Human beings are contingent.

7. Human being's plans are contingent.

8. Human being's needs are contingent.

Therefore, the suffering of the contingent is permissible.

I am not stating that God by nature had to create anything, or anything finite. God does have significant free will within divine nature. His plans reflect nature. I am stating that God's plans must occur and therefore are necessary.

It could be stated that it is a weaker sense of necessity in point 3 than points 1 and 2.  

1. The necessary must exist.

2. God is necessary

I would view 1,2 as within absolute necessity.

Open Edition Journals: Philosophia Scientia What is Absolute Necessity? Bob Hale 16/2/2012 

Cited 

Absolute necessity might be defined as truth at absolutely all possible worlds without restriction. But we should be able to explain it without invoking possible worlds.

By my definition 1,2 are necessary in all possible worlds. 

3. God's plans are necessary. 

This could be explained as relative necessity.

Relative Necessity Reformulated Bob Hale & Jessica Leech Journal of Philosophical Logic volume 46, pages1–26(2017)

Cited 

The standard account defines each kind of relative necessity by means of a necessitated or strict conditional, whose antecedent is a propositional constant for the body of assumptions relative to which the consequent is asserted to be necessary.

The relative necessity of (3) has as antecedent the absolute necessity of (1,2).

Further, God, within his infinite, eternal nature, would only be morally obligated to keep his revealed word, as in promises, in regard to contingent, human beings. These are documented in the Hebrew Bible and New Testament within a theistic, Christian worldview.

November 2 2019 

Blackburn writes that a proposition is necessary, if it could not have been false.(257). Admittedly, someone can and will always disagree with any provided proposition. But, I agree with the definition here from secular, British, philosopher Blackburn. Further he writes that the necessary, what is of necessity, is true is all possible worlds. (257)

I philosophically hold to a priori truths. Louis P. Pojman explains that the term a priori comes from the Latin “preceding” and is knowledge that is not based on sense experience but is innate or known to human beings by the meanings of words and definitions. Pojman (1996: 595). Arthur Pap defines a priori knowledge as being independent of experience. Pap (1973: 666).

Pojman writes that a posteriori comes the Latin “the later” and is knowledge that is obtained from human sense experience only, as in the five senses. Pojman (1996: 595). Blackburn reasons that something can be known a posteriori when it cannot be known a priori. Blackburn (1996: 21-22)

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Importantly, not all valid and sound argumentation holds to the classic three line syllogism. 

University of Kentucky

Quote

'argument

An Argument is a group of statements including one or more premises and one and only one conclusion. The point of an argument is to give the receiver of the argument good reason to believe new information. assumption a premise that is implied, or is necessary for the argument to be valid, but is unstated.'

University of Windsor

Cited

'G.C. GODDU Department of Philosophy University of Richmond'

'ABSTRACT: Is it possible for an argument to have either zero premises or an infinite number of premises? I shall argue that regardless of how you conceive of arguments you should accept that an argument could have an infinite number of premises. The zero case is more complicated since the matter seems to depend not only on the metaphysics of arguments, but also the nature and function of arguing. I shall argue that at least a plausible case can be made for the possibility of zero premise arguments.'

'How many premises can an argument have?'

'If what I have argued here is correct, then everyone should accept the possibility of infinite premise arguments. On the other hand, whether we should accept zero-premise arguments seems to depend upon the resolution of other highly controversial options in argumentation theory such as—does every argument need a corresponding act of arguing? Does defining argument require an appeal to function? Trying to resolve these issues is a project for another time. At the very least, however, I hope that I have sketched out a position according to which it is straightforwardly possible for there to be zero-premise arguments.'
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I reason...

1. In every possible world, the necessary exists.

2. The necessary is good.

3. The contingent exists.

4. God, as the first cause of the contingent, is necessary.

Therefore, God is good.

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Further, philosophically, what is of necessity would certainly be what is good, and what is perfectly good. Anything contingent, opposed to that good, the perfectly good, would be evil.

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

BONJOUR, LAURENCE. (1996) ‘A Priori’, in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

POJMAN, LOUIS P. (1996) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.

Note, I am not using syllogism as arguments 

Thursday, July 13, 2017: Quaternio terminorum: The fallacy of four

Satanic beings are a major force of evil?

From

2003 The Problem of Evil: Anglican and Baptist Perspectives: MPhil thesis, Bangor University

MPhil  

Statement twenty: 

The statement was: Satanic beings are a major force of evil. There was much more skepticism concerning these beings within the Anglican camp in comparison to the Baptist group; however, the ministry of Jesus and his Apostles interacted with Satanic beings and there is no scriptural indication that these beings would not exist today. With the Anglicans, 62% agreed, 18% were not certain, 20% disagreed. With the Baptists, 92% agreed, 6% were not certain, and 2% disagreed.

Also from my MPhil

Edited

Some observers of Christianity like to think of Satan and his fallen angels as a metaphor for evil and wish to deny that these beings exist. Professor David Pailin, who was my advisor for a short time, criticized me for believing in these beings as there was no proof of their existence. I think that Scripture is historical and it certainly accepts their existence. As well, and this was a point that I made to Professor Pailin, if theists believe that God, who is spirit (John 4:24) created human beings who are of a physical nature, why is it more difficult to believe that God made angels who were of spiritual nature?

When I examine the Book of Job for example, I see in 1:8 God mentioning Job to Satan, it seems that God was desiring Satan to take action against Job. Indeed in 1:12, he allows Satan to destroy Job’s possessions, and later in 2:6 Satan was allowed to harm Job but not take his life. This story certainly seems to demonstrate God’s power over Satanic evil. God is sovereign over it and indirectly sanctions it.

Calvin also discussed in The Institutes the case of the Chaldeans attacking Job, that God, Satanic beings and human beings can all participate in the same evil acts:

How can we attribute the same work to God, to Satan, and to man, without either excusing Satan by the interference of God, or making God the author of the crime? This is easily done, if we look first to the end, and then to the mode of acting. The Lord designs to exercise the patience of his servant by adversity; Satan’s plan is to drive him to despair; while the Chaldeans are bent on making unlawful gain by plunder. Such diversity of purpose makes a wide distinction in the act. . . . We thus see that there is no inconsistency in attributing the same act to God, to Satan, and to man, while, from the difference in the end and mode of action, the spotless righteousness of God shines forth at the same time that the iniquity of Satan and of man is manifested in all its deformity. Calvin, (1539)(1998) Book II, Chapter 4, Section 2.

From

2010 Theodicy and Practical Theology: PhD thesis, the University of Wales, Trinity Saint David, Lampeter 

Edited

A traditional approach to Biblical interpretation tends to lead to an acceptance of the existence of satanic beings. Erickson explains these beings are understood as Biblical, literal, and historical. Erickson (1994: 445-451). Roman Catholic scholar Peter Kreeft, working with Ronald K. Tacelli, states Satan is a deceiver of humanity, and this implies the assumption that Satan has personality. Kreeft and Tacelli (1994: 294).There is of course a debate between those of traditional conservative perspectives and those of liberal, progressive, mainline perspectives on the existence of satanic beings.

October 30, 2019 

A reasonable researched, exegesis and contextual review of the scripture, demonstrates that the biblical worldview is of actual, satanic beings that exist.

I noted in my PhD thesis, although less dogmatically for a secular university context than on this website:

Greek scholar, Walter Bauer (1979) in agreement with Strong, Strong (1890)(1986: 152), describes ‘Satan’ or ‘Satanas’ as the Adversary, enemy of God and those who belong to God. Bauer (1979: 744). Bauer goes on to note that Revelation, Chapter 2, verse 13, is describing Satan as persecuting the Church. Bauer (1979: 745). It appears by studying the Greek copies of the New Testament and assuming a type of contextual, literal hermeneutical method of examining Scripture, it is possible to view satanic beings as literal and historical beings…

BAUER, WALTER. (1979) A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament, Translated by Eric H. Wahlstrom, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press.

CALVIN, JOHN (1553)(1952) Job, Translated by Leroy Nixon, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

CALVIN, JOHN (1539)(1998) Institutes of the Christian Religion, Book II.

ERICKSON, MILLARD (1994) Christian Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

ERICKSON, MILLARD (2003) What Does God Know and When Does He Know It?, Grand Rapids, Zondervan.

KREEFT, PETER AND RONALD K. TACELLI (1994) Handbook of Christian Apologetics, Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.

PAILIN, DAVID A. (1999) ‘Deism’, in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press Ltd.

PAILIN, DAVID A. (1999) ‘Enlightenment’, in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press Ltd.

PAILIN, DAVID A. (1999) ‘Process Theology’, in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press Ltd.

STRONG, J. (1890)(1986) Strong's Exhaustive Concordance of the Bible, Burlington, Welch Publishing Company.