Begging The Question & Circulus In Probando

Tuscany, Italy

August 25, 2016

I noticed my original article on 'Begging the question' did not receive much viewership, but it was 2007. I therefore will republish and continue with my Pirie review, simultaneously (See, I am not a total moron, as I tell the toddlers). As readers will know, I am not whatsoever apologetic for recirculating old material with newer material, as I do not believe in 'reinventing the wheel.' Time is short and I am a busy man.

Begging The Question & Circulus In Probando

'It consists of using as evidence a fact which is authenticated by the very conclusion it supports.' (56).

From the original article below from 2007,  in the next section, I grant what Professor Blackburn is stating and acknowledge that such arguments can often be reasonably held to. Again, Blackburn's balance on such philosophical issues is very useful.

I will once again state what I did in 2007, that I still very much attempt to make my arguments as non-circular as possible. I have spent many hours on both of my Blogger sites, rewording premises so that they do not overly assume the conclusion.

Pirie further states:

'It fails to relate the unknown or unaccepted to the known or accepted. All it gives us is two unknowns so busy chasing each other's tails that neither has time to attach itself to reality.' (57).

Pirie notes (in this secular text, my add) that convincing proofs for religion and ideology would make it much more difficult for intelligent people to disagree with them. (57). He also warns against the use of supposed scientific knowledge with circular reasoning. A new theory in line with old theories is accepted, he suggests, but these are not often objectively proven. (57). He warns that scientific knowledge from argumentation may be consistent and circular, simultaneously. (57).

It seems to me that attempting to separate premise from conclusion as much as possible, within reason, is valid.

Rather than stating:

Premise

People have a 'God-shaped hole in the heart'.

Conclusion

Therefore the Bible is true.

Better to seek objectivity, even with spirituality as these are not mutually exclusive, contrary to some with hyper-theologies.

An obviously limited and non-exhaustive example follows:

Premise

The Hebrew Bible is documented religious history.

Premise

The New Testament is documented religious history.

Premise

The New Testament presents a bridge to and from the Hebrew Bible by prophetic and theological means.

Premise

The New Testament presents the culmination of God's plans for this creation through the atoning and resurrection work of Jesus Christ.

Premise

Rationalism and philosophy of religion can provide arguments for the existence of an infinite, eternal, non-material first cause.

Conclusion

Therefore, the Christian faith and philosophy is reasonable to hold to.
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Begging the question

February 12, 2007

In books and on blogs I see the term begging the question thrown around a lot. Here is a look at how three philosophy texts define this term.

Simon Blackburn in Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy writes that begging the question assumes what is at issue in an argument. Blackburn (1996: 39). Although persons are commonly accused of begging the question there is no logical definition of those kinds of arguments that beg the question. Blackburn (1996: 39). In the widest sense any valid argument may beg the question since its premises already contain its conclusion. Blackburn (1996: 39). Blackburn explains that these types of arguments can still be reasonably held. Blackburn (1996: 39). I do however, attempt to avoid arguing my conclusion in any one of my premises although a premise could allude to a conclusion, although I attempt to avoid this as well. Blackburn writes that a best definition of begging the question would be if a clear premise would not be accepted by any reasonable person who is initially prone to deny the conclusion. Blackburn (1996: 39).

David H. Sanford within The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy defines begging the question under the heading of circular reasoning. It is described as reasoning that traced backwards forms it own conclusion and returns to that starting point. Sanford (1996: 124). Sanford explains that presuming a truth of a conclusion within a premise thwarts the attempt to increase the degree of reasonable confidence that a conclusion is true. Sanford (1996: 124). It is better when putting together different types of arguments to establish separate but related premises that would ultimately support a conclusion rather than weakening an argument by assuming the conclusion within a premise and therefore not providing actual evidence for the conclusion.

David A. Conway and Ronald Munson in The Elements of Reasoning explain begging the question (Petitio Principii) as when the issue at hand is begged and not really addressed. Conway and Munson (1997: 132). This is when some reason offered for some conclusion is not really different from the conclusion itself. Conway and Munson (1997: 132). This is stating a conclusion that also serves as a premise. Conway and Munson (1997: 132).

In my view it is not begging the question to define a viewpoint without argumentation or to state that if a certain view is assumed correct then a related point could be assumed correct in a hypothetical context. If a person defines a theory in response to a contrary view it is not begging the question because the person is merely pointing out the differences between two different perspectives and not arguing for or against those perspectives. Also if a person states that if an assumption is correct then another assumption may be true is also not begging the question since the person would be offering hypothetical analysis and not an argumentation on the truth of the claims. Begging the question would be if a person specifically argued the conclusion of an argument within a premise.

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) ‘Begging the question’, in Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

CONWAY DAVID A. AND RONALD MUNSON (1997) The Elements of Reasoning, Wadsworth Publishing Company, New York.

PIRIE, MADSEN (2006)(2015) How To Win Every Argument, Bloomsbury, London.

SANFORD, DAVID H. (1996) ‘Circular Reasoning', in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Mark 8 Brief On Spitting/Fourth Short Study

Christianity Explored

Mark 8:22-26

New American Standard Bible (NASB)

22 And they *came to Bethsaida. And they *brought a blind man to Jesus and *implored Him to touch him.
23 Taking the blind man by the hand, He brought him out of the village; and after spitting on his eyes and laying His hands on him, He asked him, “Do you see anything?”
24 And he [a]looked up and said, “I see men, for [b]I see them like trees, walking around.”
25 Then again He laid His hands on his eyes; and he looked intently and was restored, and began to see everything clearly.
26 And He sent him to his home, saying, “Do not even enter the village.”

Footnotes: Mark 8:24 Or gained sight Mark 8:24 Or they look to me

During the Christianity Explored class, Wednesday, the question was asked in regard to Mark 8: (paraphrased) Why did Jesus Christ use spitting and saliva in some healing? I stated that God and Christ could have healed the blind man instantly, but this was a matter of progressive faith or a progression of faith. The man would be provided more healing as he demonstrated more faith.

Short explains this was done 'to awaken faith in the man.' (1166). 'But on account, perhaps, of the weakness of the man's faith, he did not at first attain full clarity of vision...' (1166). The healing did ultimately fully occur. (1166).

John 9, also contains a story where Jesus Christ uses spittle.

Barclay has an interesting take on the use of spittle in the context of the three synoptic gospels. He writes in regard to Mark (7: 33; 8:23).

Mark 7:33

New American Standard Bible (NASB) My add:

33 Jesus took him aside from the crowd, by himself, and put His fingers into his ears, and after spitting, He touched his tongue with the saliva;

Barclay

'What was it about these miracles which made Matthew and Luke omit them? They are unusual miracles and they do stand apart. In both of them Jesus used spittle to effect a cure (7: 33; 8:23); and the healing of the blind man is one of the rare occasions where a miracle had, as it were, two stages.' (92).

Barclay opines that Matthew and Luke may have omitted Jesus Christ's lack of immediate success with the healings, as he used spittle which was a conventional method. (92). 'Matthew will tell no miracle story in which the cure in not immediate.' (92). Perhaps, in regard to miracles, Mark was more willing to document the humanity and human workings of Jesus Christ as Messiah. This done without differing with three other gospels in essential New Testament theology. This differing emphasis is reasonable within the New Testament theology of God, the Holy Spirit inspiring Scripture through individual writer perspectives.

2 Timothy 3:16

New American Standard Bible (NASB)

16 All Scripture is [a]inspired by God and profitable for teaching, for reproof, for correction, for [b]training in righteousness;

Footnotes: 2 Timothy 3:16 Lit God-breathed 2 Timothy 3:16 Lit training which is in

BARCLAY, WILLIAM (1976) The Letters of James and Peter, Philadelphia, The Westminster Press. 

SHORT, STEPHEN S. (1986) ‘Mark’, in F.F. Bruce (ed.), The International Bible Commentary, Grand Rapids, Zondervan.

Middle Knowledge Revisited

French Riviera

Middle Knowledge Revisited

Middle Knowledge: Latin-Scientia Media 

Edited for an entry on academia.edu, November 27, 2022

This view has intellectual merit, although problematic based on my studies.

Simon Blackburn documents in his entry 'scientia media' that middle knowledge is the way that God has of knowing the truth in regard to future events. This speculatively for philosophers enables God to reconcile his present knowledge with open choices. Blackburn (1996: 343). In other words this view of middle knowledge presupposes a type of libertarian free will and incompatibilism.

This view reasons that there is the simultaneous act of given grace and the persons freely accepting it, as opposed to a prior determination of that grace leading to acceptance. Blackburn (1996: 343). The concept was elaborated on by Luis de Molina (1535-1600). Blackburn (1996: 343). It is known as a view among many of the followers of Thomas Aquinas. Blackburn (1996: 343).

William Hasker explains middle knowledge is knowledge of certain kinds of propositions usually defined as 'counterfactuals of freedom' traced back to Luis de Molina. Hasker (1996: 492). These propositions state in each situation, concerning each possible free creature that God could create, and what that creature would do in each situation with the use of libertarian free will/choice. Hasker (1996: 492). The claim that God with foreknowledge knows these libertarian potential actions explains how he can maintain providential control over the universe. Hasker (1996: 492). Hasker argues that opponents of middle knowledge typically state that it is impossible for there to be true counterfactuals of freedom. Hasker (1996: 492). By this I reason he means knowledge of what might have occurred with the use of free will, assuming it libertarian. The view is indeed questionable without libertarian freedom.

A view of middle knowledge is also known as Molinism. Middle knowledge was a view I came across in my MPhil and PhD theses work within texts and journal articles which dealt with the problem of evil and theodicy, free will and determinism, but I never actually discussed it thoroughly within either theses work.

My view is a Reformed view of compatibilism and reasons that God as first cause wills all things. Therefore God would not only have knowledge and foreknowledge of all potential and actual thoughts, acts/actions of persons, angelic and demonic beings with significant and yet limited free will, but God would cause and will as the primary cause the actual thoughts, acts/actions of persons, angelic beings and demonic beings with significant and yet limited free wills and these finite beings would be secondary causes. If any secondary thoughts, acts/actions were somehow forced or coerced, for example, with the use of drugs forced upon him or her, a human being would not be morally responsible lacking significant freedom. God as infinite, eternal, and holy would will all things in moral and ethical perfection even when at times willing events that were evil, although I reason leading to greater good purposes.

Middle Knowledge Revisited

If hard determinism did take place, in my view there would not be significant moral responsibility from a finite creature and human being. I reason significant human freedom requires limited free will and not libertarian free will.

Example:

Did you with libertarian free will have a choice of your nature, as in either perfect and sinless, or imperfect and sinful?

The answer is a definitive, no.

This is problematic for libertarian free will supporters that claim that if 'one could not do otherwise', outside of libertarian free will and choices, it is not true freedom. This is a problem for those that reason significantly free human beings must take the initiative in free will, when one could not take the initiative in regard to core nature, behind the will.

This example seems to indicate that it is not a matter of 'being able to do otherwise', but is rather a matter of being able to via nature and will (and the hypothetical chain which I have speculated on my PhD and on this website) to significantly understand and embrace sinful thoughts, acts and actions that God simultaneously causes (Feinberg in the Many Faces of Evil). This based on Scripture (Romans) leads to human guilt. To have a significant understanding of good and evil and to embrace one's nature with significant freedom.

Human nature was created by God, that willingly caused and allowed, in my view without force or coercion, the first human beings (Genesis 1-3) to via nature and will (Feinberg adds desires in the chain), to reject the command of God with led to corrupted sinful nature and sinful choices. In my view, God sanctioned this and therefore willed and caused it as primary cause, and this was significantly embraced by the first persons as secondary cause. Therefore, they were held morally responsible for sin as sinners (Genesis 1-3, Romans 5, Romans 1-6). Humanity as descendants of Adam and Eve (Romans) embrace sinful nature and sinful choices and therefore are held morally responsible, despite not being the primary cause; or being able to cause human nature, will and choices outside of God's simultaneous influence (Feinberg).

Libertarian free will supporters attempt to often state that God with permissible will merely allows this to occur. We do have some common ground. I agree with a perfect will and permissible distinction as very helpful. I found this well explained by Erickson (Christian Theology) in my theses research. But, I reason that this in a sense does not 'get God off the hook'. As God is infinite and omnipotent, which most Biblical Christians agree on theologically, if God allows something, within permissible will, he is the still the primary cause. If he could prevent thoughts, acts and actions as he is infinite and omnipotent, and he does not, then he is still the first cause/primary cause.

Here I think Calvin's work is useful as it points to differing motives in thoughts, acts and actions. God's being perfectly good and holy, and humanity (and demonic beings at times) being imperfect and sinful. The historical, Biblical, crucifixion of Christ, being in my mind, the best classic example of this theological and philosophical concept. Satanic beings and human beings having wrong, sinful motives in killing Christ, and being held morally responsible by God. The triune God having perfect motives in the same events, leading to the atoning work, resurrection and eventual culminated Kingdom of God.

Calvin stated concerning free will:

If freedom is opposed to coercion, I both acknowledge and consistently maintain that choice is free and I hold anyone who thinks otherwise to be a heretic. If, I say, it were called free in this sense of not being coerced nor forcibly moved by an external impulse, but moving of its own accord, I have no objection. Calvin (1543)(1996: 68).

Human beings in Calvin’s thinking were not forced by God to sin, but God as an infinite being had and used the power to use their sin for the greater good. So to say that God willed evil for the greater good means that God could use sinful actions of others in order to accomplish his divine purpose. 

Calvin stated:

For we do not say that the wicked sin of necessity in such a way as to imply that they sin without wilful and deliberate evil intent. The necessity comes from the fact that God accomplishes his work, which is sure and steadfast, through them. At the same time, however, the will and purpose to do evil which dwells within them makes them liable to censure. But, it is said, they are driven and forced to this by God. Indeed, but in such a way that in a single deed the action of God is one thing and their own action is another.

For they gratify their evil and wicked desires, but God turns this wickedness so as to bring his judgements (judgments) to execution. Calvin (1543)(1996: 37).

God could set up events in such a way that someone would freely choose to sin, but this is not done in such a way that God is forcing or hard determining one to do so.

The objection is raised that this makes God, the author of sin. Again, divine motives are key, and if God as infinite and omnipotent, does not prohibit sin, then he is still, in a sense, the cause of it.

Based on what Calvin stated:

'For we do not say that the wicked sin of necessity in such a way as to imply that they sin without wilful and deliberate evil intent. The necessity comes from the fact that God accomplishes his work, which is sure and steadfast, through them.'

Sin in this context is performed willfully by second cause human agents, held morally responsible by God. Sin, is caused by God in perfect and holy motives. I do not have an intellectual problem with stating God allowed it, but I do not think that terminology is exhaustive enough in context.

Mystery

There is the negative critique that the Reformed perspective involves an overuse of mystery.

From my Doctoral thesis (Edited).

'A praxis of sovereignty theodicy would be that, from start to finish, salvation is primarily the goal directed plan of God. Human beings are not brought to Christ through compulsion, but when predestined in election shall be convinced to accept the offer of salvation. Praxis shifts from the incompatibilism of free will that assumes God desires to save all persons, but can only save those who are eventually persuaded to believe, to an understanding that whom God desires to save shall be regenerated and placed in a process of salvation.

The problem of evil is therefore not primarily subject to, and in existence, because human sin is stalling the culmination of God’s plans. I do not doubt that human beings do often oppose God’s plans, but God being almighty can overcome the problem of evil, and is working through this process slowly in history. Within a sovereignty perspective human sin does oppose God, but God will use sin for his purposes and regenerate and mould those he chooses towards salvation.

As long as one can accept the idea that a perfectly moral God wills and allows evil within his plans for the greater good, there is a degree of intellectual certainty with sovereignty theodicy that free will theodicy lacks. God could inevitably bring about, through the use of the regeneration and the resurrection of elected human persons, the end of human corruption, and even Plantinga’s concept of transworld depravity.'

End citation

A mystery with incompatibilism is that in light of Romans and the universal corrupt nature of humanity, allowing for significant free will, and in light of Plantinga’s transworld depravity, why would anyone choose God and Jesus Christ, without being simultaneously influenced to do so? In my mind, this seems extremely unlikely (Ephesians 1: 5: ‘He predestined us to adoption as sons through Jesus Christ to Himself, according to the intention of his will.’ New American Standard Bible). Ephesians 2 states that those in Christ are saved by grace through faith for good works.

To state that if God alone is the initiator of cause and therefore, secondary causes are not true causes is to misinterpret the theology of Ephesians. God as first and primary cause brings about salvation leading to the secondary cause, in my view, not being a hard determinist, simultaneously embracing this regeneration by grace through faith.

This is Biblically supposed to lead to legitimate good human works. This does not read as hard determinism, nor libertarian free will. Clearly it reads as compatibilism.

Overuse of Philosophy

I reasoned while researching and analyzing my MPhil and PhD work that both compatibilists and incompatibilists can be guilty at times of depending more on theology, philosophy and philosophy of religion than Scripture. But here I am using Ephesians as example.

Feinberg's work speculated on going behind will to desires within 'The Many Faces of Evil'. Perhaps going behind significant human free will to human nature is helpful. My example that one cannot choose their nature via will, at least in the context of perfection versus imperfection and sinless versus sinful, has merit.

In the case of the unregenerate that God eventually regenerates, the Reformed concept I reviewed in theses studies of God enlightening persons through preaching and teaching is reasonable. This would culminate in regeneration and the human embracing of salvation. In the regenerated in Christ, moulding of persons may be viewed as the sanctification process. Being set apart for holiness with God.

Note

I reason the Reformed 'tag' is more accurate for my position than that of Calvinist. I am not a resident or citizen of the United States of America and did not grow up in that culture. A stronger Calvinist in my mind would not favour Believer's Baptism to Infant Baptism, as do I. I am Reformed, theologically and philosophically on many issues, but I am also a baptized Mennonite Brethren in an Evangelical church. My sacramental leanings would be Anabaptist and Baptist. I state this because online in some what I view as rare unnecessarily heated contexts, I have been written-off as a Calvinist by upbringing, and that is far from the truth. My views, are of course a product of influence, as with everyone, but they are mainly a product of seeking the Lord's truth, academically. But I did with God's help manage to develop enough expertise to pass two major British theses of Reformed Theology and Philosophy of Religion in secular departments, not in agreement with my views.

I am still in process.

BARCLAY, WILLIAM (1976) The Letters of James and Peter, Philadelphia, The Westminster Press. 

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

BRUCE, F.F. (1987) Romans, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

CAIRD, GEORGE B. (1977) Paul's Letters from Prison Paperback, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

CALVIN, JOHN (1539)(1998) The Institutes of the Christian Religion, Book IV, Translated by Henry Beveridge, Grand Rapids, The Christian Classic Ethereal Library, Wheaton College. http://www.ccel.org/ccel/calvin/institutes.html

CALVIN, JOHN (1543)(1996) The Bondage and Liberation of the Will, Translated by G.I. Davies, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

COURSON, JON (2005) Application Commentary, Thomas Nelson, Nashville,

CRANFIELD, C.E.B. (1992) Romans: A Shorter Commentary, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 

DUNN, JAMES D.G. (1988) Romans, Dallas, Word Books. 

ERICKSON, MILLARD (1994) Christian Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

FEINBERG. JOHN S. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, David Basinger and Randall Basinger (eds.), Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House. 

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (2001) No One Like Him, John S. Feinberg (gen.ed.), Wheaton, Illinois, Crossway Books.

GUNDRY, ROBERT (1981) A Survey of the New Testament, Grand Rapids, Zondervan.

HASKER, WILLIAM (1996) ‘Middle Knowledge’, in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

LA SOR, WILLIAM SANFORD, DAVID ALLAN HUBBARD, AND FREDERIC WILLIAM BUSH. (1987) Old Testament Survey, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 

LIGHTFOOT, JOHN B. (1993) The Destination of the Epistle to the Ephesians in Biblical Essays, New York, Macmillan. 

MOUNCE, ROBERT H. (1995) The New American Commentary: Romans, Nashville, Broadman & Holman Publishers. 

POJMAN, LOUIS P. (1996) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company. 

PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1977)(2002) God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

STACE, W.T. (1952)(1976) Religion and the Modern Mind, in John R. Burr and Milton Goldinger (eds), Philosophy and Contemporary Issues, London, Collier Macmillan Publishers.

The Orthodox Study Bible, New Testament and Psalms, (1993) Saint Athanasius Orthodox Academy, Thomas Nelson Publishers, Nashville, Tennessee.

Middle Knowledge: Internet Encylopedia of Philosophy 

Selected references

a. Books 

Craig, William Lane. Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom: The Coherence of Theism, Omniscience. New York: Brill, 1990. 

Craig, William Lane. The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents from Aristotle to Suarez. New York: Brill, 1988. 

Molina, Luis de. On Divine Foreknowledge: Part IV of the Concordia. Translated by Alfred J. Freddoso. Ithaca: Cornell, 1988. Plantinga, Alvin. The Nature of Necessity. Oxford: Clarendon, 1974. 

b. Articles

Hasker, William. “Middle Knowledge: A Refutation Revisited.” Faith and Philosophy 12:2 (April 1995): 223-36.

Hasker, William. “A New Anti-Molinist Argument.” Religious Studies 35:3 (September 1999): 291-97. 

Author Information John D. Laing  

Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary U. S. A.

Also online

Lonergan, Bernard J.F. Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas. New York: Herder and Herder, 1971.

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Saturday, October 06, 2012: Middle Knowledge: Latin-Scientia Media (In Brief)

Mark 12 Third Short Study

Georgia Straight: trekearth

Christianity Explored

This week, the course leading Pastor and the Christianity Explored, DVD focused on Mark 12 in regard to the meaning of life. I will discuss this as opposed to workbook concepts already dealt with in the two previous posts.

Mark 12: 29-31 from the New American Standard Bible (NASB)

29 Jesus answered, “The foremost is, ‘Hear, O Israel! The Lord our God is one Lord;
30 and you shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your mind, and with all your strength.’
31 The second is this, ‘You shall love your neighbor as yourself.’ There is no other commandment greater than these.”

I agreed with the DVD presenter that stated following this would be technically humanly impossible, in this realm. The atoning and resurrection work of Christ is applied to believers, by faith, through grace, and by faith through grace, alone, for good works. (Ephesians 1-2, Galatians 2, Romans 1-9). Spiritual, moral and ethical perfection should be a human goal (Matthew 5: 48), but in this temporal state only God is truly good (Mark 10: 18, Luke 18: 19). I would add that the angels of God, in his holy presence, are finitely, spiritually, morally and ethically perfectly good, but only God is infinitely perfectly good. What humanity can accomplish in the future resurrection (1 Corinthians 15) forward is levels of finite spiritual, moral, ethical and physical perfection. Short states in his Mark commentary: 'It should be appreciated that there is a great deal more involved in 'loving God' and 'loving one's neighbour' than might be superficially imagined, the implication of the latter of these duties having been expanded by Jesus earlier...parable of the Good Samaritan (Luke 10: 30-37). Short (1986: 1174). Being saved by grace through alone, indicates a human nature and limited free will that cannot obtain perfection in this realm.

The concepts from Mark 12, led to a table discussion where a kind agnostic asked, what I view a common and reasonable question from a secular perspective. That being (paraphrased):  How is it that the more sinful Christian that repents can be saved through the work of Christ and within the Kingdom of God, while the more moral person that does not accept Christ is hell-bound?  I quoted as I often do on my sites, from the New American Standard Version, Ephesians 2 8-10. I stated that because the atoning and resurrection work of Christ is applied to those in Christ by grace through faith for good works, it is not as if, for example, the 1 billion most moral and ethical people will be in the Kingdom of God. Rather it is those God chooses that chooses him in return (not over-emphasizing compatibilism and workings in this non-academic church ministry context). I did mention that sinful choices did arise from a universal human nature.

Further, for this website presentation, the 'moral person' that does not accept Christ, still has a sinful nature and is with limited free will, embracing sin and rejecting the Biblical God. This regardless of the finite heights of human morality and ethics. In regard to a question presented in regard to obedient and disobedient people in the Church, I quoted 1 Corinthians 6 (NASB) where those who struggle with sin in Christ are differentiated from those that live in sin outside of Christ. I also mentioned James 2: 17 (related James 2: 26) from the (NASB): 'Even so faith, if it has no works, is dead, being by itself.'

Adding to what I stated, the 1 Corinthians verse definitely and definitively is discussing non-believers ('Do not be deceived neither fornicators' etc..).  I should acknowledge that with James there is some theological room to consider a person in James 2: 17 as having a dead faith and therefore being a non-believer, or having a dead faith that is not a non-faith, but is rather a faith with no substantial good works, or both possibilities.  I have read scholarship that supports various views. Either way my quotation of the verse worked to demonstrate to the agnostic that the New Testament acknowledges the obedient Christian life from other in the Church. The following scholarship does seem to support a view compatible with Reformed perspectives in light of 1 Corinthians 3 (leadership), 2 Peter 3 and Hebrews 6. These verses would be debated, especially 2 Peter 3 and Hebrews 6 with various views. It seems theologically difficult, although I admit not impossible, to equate non-faith with dead faith. The assumption would be the Christian faith was fake and not real. A theological problem is dead faith indicates a faith that existed as alive faith at some point. Does not a non-believer have no faith at every point? No saving faith in Christ and the Father, Son and Holy Spirit.

Redeeming God: James 2 14-26

Cited:

'It does not mean to be delivered or saved from hell and given eternal life unless the context indicates that this is the meaning. In Ephesians 2, the context tells us that our salvation, our deliverance is from sin and the eternal consequences of sin. So Ephesians 2 is talking about being delivered from sin.'  

'But is that what James 2 is talking about? No, not even close.'...

Cited:

'Faith alone in Christ alone gets you into heaven. Works earn you reward in heaven. If all you have is faith in Christ, that will get you into heaven, but faith will not save your reward, or inheritance or profit that could have been yours in heaven. When Christians ask, “Why can’t I sin all I want?” the most basic Biblical answer is: “Because you will lose heavenly reward. You will be disinherited at the judgment seat of Christ.”'

SHORT, STEPHEN S. (1986) ‘Mark’, in F.F. Bruce (ed.), The International Bible Commentary, Grand Rapids, Zondervan.