Praying: In Jesus’ Name & In The Name of The Father, Son And Holy Spirit (Non-exhaustive)

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Praying: In Jesus’ Name & In The Name of The Father, Son And Holy Spirit

Edited February 11, 2023

Non-exhaustive analysis

Often when professional Christian speakers as in Reverends, missionaries, professors and others pray, they pray in Jesus' name, or in the name of God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Spirit. 

'They might pray in the name of the 'Heavenly Father' or 'our Lord', Lord, or simply in the name of God or to God, is often used.

Is this acceptable? Or should from a trinitarian perspective, should God always be strictly addressed as in Matthew 28: 19:20, in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit?

English Standard Version (ESV)

¹⁹ Go therefore and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, ²⁰ teaching them to observe all that I have commanded you. And behold, I am with you always, to the end of the age.”

Millard Erickson in 'Christian Theology' expresses a Biblical, orthodox (not meaning Orthodox Church here) position on the Trinity via the  Council of Constantinople (381). Erickson (1994: 335). A formula ὑποστάσεις was expressed, which expressed three separate persons that exist simultaneously in three modes of being or hypostases. Erickson (1994: 335). The idea being the Godhead is undivided in essential nature, in divided persons. Erickson  (1994: 335).

There are three distinctions within the triune God, but only one divine nature and therefore only one God. There is not tritheism. There is not modalism or Sebellanism, as the persons of the trinity are simultaneously existing and not interchanging among one another. Jesus does not become the Father, for example. Greek scholar Walter Bauer defines 'Hupostasis' the original word: ὑπόστασις, εως, ἡit from the Greek as substantial nature, essence, actual being, reality. In the context of Hebrews 1: 3 the Son of God is the exact representation of God’s real being. page 847.

Erickson further explains that each member of the Trinity is quantitatively equal. Erickson (1994: 337). This would be in spiritual essence accepting that God the Son took an additional human nature in the incarnation in order to accomplish the atonement and resurrection and also his future Kingship. This does not in any way alter the divine nature of God the Son or the Trinity. Erickson points out that the Son did subordinate himself to God the Father as fully human while on earth, but this was an aspect of will. God the Son did not become less than God the Father, or less God. Erickson (1994: 338). Similarly, even though the Holy Spirit is the third person of the Trinity and is named the 'Helper' in the Gospel of John in the New American Standard Version as well as the English Standard Version, this does not mean the Holy Spirit is any less Almighty God. In that instance, functionally the Holy Spirit willingly takes that position.

One of my Theology professors at Trinity Western, at the Seminary, stated that although he was fully trinitarian, in his opinion, the Holy Spirit was not meant to be addressed primarily in prayer. Instead the prayer needed to take place through the Holy Spirit to God the Son as he is the mediator between God and humanity as Hebrews mentions. This view certainly is not without merit as the Holy Spirit as God indeed is to focus persons on Christ and his atoning and resurrection work he has done for the chosen that believe.  However, because God is of one substance and nature and therefore Christ was and is the fullness of deity in bodily form (Colossians 2: 9), if one is a trinitarian Christian and addresses a prayer to the Holy Spirit it can be reasoned that it certainly be understood by God the Father and God the Son as well.

Boice mentions that correctly and Biblically, Christians do pray through Jesus Christ. Boice (1986: 488-489). And they pray in the Holy Spirit.  'Prayer is communion with God the Father through the Lord Jesus Christ. But it is also in the Holy Spirit'. Boice (1986: 489).

I would reason that it is always Biblical and spiritually correct to pray in a triune manner as Jesus set out out in Matthew 28:19-20, but that to not necessarily use that exact formula by praying in Jesus' name, to the Lord, to the Father, 'Heavenly Father' or God is not Biblically and spiritually wrong because to pray to any aspect of God, to any of the three Biblical distinctions or persons of God, as God is of one essence and nature, is to pray to God as one God.

BAUER, WALTER. (1979) A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament, Translated by Eric H. Wahlstrom, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press.

BLAISING, C.A. (1996) ‘Monarchianism' in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books. 

BLAISING, C.A. (1996) ‘Nicea, Council of (325)’ in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books. 

BOICE, JAMES, MONTGOMERY (1981) Foundations of the Christian Faith, Downers Grove, IVP Press.

BOWMAN, ROBERT M. (1990) Why You Should Believe in the Trinity, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

BROM, ROBERT H. (1983) The Eternal Sonship of Christ, San Diego, CIC 827. 

BROMILEY, G.W. (1996) ‘Trinity’ in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books. 

BROWNING, W.R.F. (1997) Dictionary of the Bible, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

ERICKSON, MILLARD (1994) Christian Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

FRANKE, JOHN R. (2005) The Character of Theology, Baker Academic, Grand Rapids. 

GRENZ, STANLEY J., DAVID GURETZKI AND CHERITH FEE NORDLING (1999) Pocket Dictionary of Theological Terms, Downers Grove, Ill., InterVarsity Press. 

HUGHES, PHILIP, EDGCUMBE (1990) A Commentary On The Epistle To The Hebrews, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

SCHRECK, ALAN (1984) Catholic and Christian, Ann Arbor, Michigan, Servant Books. 

STRONG, J. (1890)(1986) Strong’s Exhaustive Concordance of the Bible, Pickering, Ontario, Welch Publishing Company. 

THIESSEN, HENRY C. (1956) Introductory Lectures in Systematic Theology, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 

TURNER, H.E.W. (1999) ‘Sabellianism’, in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press Ltd.

Middle Knowledge: Latin-Scientia Media (In Brief)

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Middle Knowledge: Latin-Scientia Media (In Brief)

Updated on December 13, 2022

A later related article with some of the same content.

Wednesday, April 20, 2016 Middle Knowledge Revisited

Middle Knowledge

Simon Blackburn documents in his entry 'scientia media' that middle knowledge is the way that God has of knowing the truth in regard to future events. This speculatively for philosophers ables God to reconcile his present knowledge with open choices. Blackburn (1996: 343). In other words this view of middle knowledge presupposes a type of libertarian free will and incompatibilism. Free will and related topics have been discussed many times on this website in previous posts and definitions can be found by the use of the 'search' application. This view reasons that there is the simultaneous act of given grace and the persons freely accepting it, as opposed to a prior determination of that grace leading to acceptance. Blackburn (1996: 343). The concept was elaborated on by Luis de Molina (1535-1600). Blackburn (1996: 343). It is known as a view among many of the followers of Thomas Aquinas. Blackburn (1996: 343).

William Hasker explains middle knowledge is knowledge of certain kinds of propositions usually defined as 'counterfactuals of freedom' traced back to Luis de Molina. Hasker (1996: 492). These propositions state in each situation, concerning each possible free creature that God could create, and what that creature would do in each situation with the use of libertarian free will/choice. Hasker (1996: 492). The claim that God with foreknowledge knows these libertarian potential actions explains how he can maintain providential control over the universe. Hasker (1996: 492). Hasker argues that opponents of middle knowledge typically state that it is impossible for there to be true counterfactuals of freedom. Hasker (1996: 492). By this I reason he means knowledge of what might have occurred with the use of free will, assuming it libertarian. The view is indeed questionable without libertarian freedom.

A view of middle knowledge is also known as Molinism. Middle knowledge was a view I came across in my MPhil and PhD theses work within texts and journal articles which dealt with the problem of evil and theodicy, free will and determinism, but I never actually discussed it thoroughly within either theses work.

My view is a Reformed view of compatibilism and reasons that God as first cause wills all things. Therefore God would not only have knowledge and foreknowledge of all potential and actual thoughts, acts/actions of persons, angelic and demonic beings with significant and yet limited free will, but God would cause and will as the primary cause the actual thoughts, acts/actions of persons, angelic beings and demonic beings with significant and yet limited free wills and these finite beings would be secondary causes. If any secondary thoughts, acts/actions were somehow forced or coerced, for example, with the use of drugs forced upon him or her, a human being would not be morally responsible lacking significant freedom. God as infinite, eternal, and holy would will all things in moral and ethical perfection even when at times willing events that were evil, although I reason leading to greater good purposes.

As God would cause and will all things in a compatibilist sense this would go beyond incompatibilistic middle knowledge in regard to the sovereignty and providence of God, and I do not hold to libertarian free will for created finite beings.  I do not hold to 'determinism' or to be more clear hard determinism, but hold to soft-determinism. John Calvin explains this basic idea in theological terms as opposed to philosophical in 'Bondage and Liberation of the Will' in stating that Satan too and all wicked are under submission to God and his authority and cannot move beyond the commands of the sovereign God. They are guided divinely. Calvin (1543)(1996: 39). Further Calvin explains that God uses the evil work of persons and executes his works through them. Calvin (1543)(1996: 39). I reason a connection here could be made to Romans 8: 26-30 in that all things do work together for the good for those that love God.

As stated on this blog previously in various posts:

John S. Feinberg explains that compatibilism does not allow for coercion or force, but holds that God, or some outside force, can simultaneously determine with the use of persuasion, that an action will or will not take place. Feinberg (1986: 24). Feinberg writes that certain nonconstraining conditions could strongly influence actions, in conjunction with human free will performing these actions. Feinberg (1994: 60). With this viewpoint, there will be no contradiction in stating that God would create human beings who were significantly free, unconstrained, and yet committed actions that God willed. Feinberg (2001: 637). W.T. Stace (1952)(1976) explains that moral responsibility is consistent with determinism in the context of soft determinism and requires it. Stace (1952)(1976: 29). If human actions are uncaused then reward or punishment would be unjustified. Stace (1952)(1976: 29). Stace reasons that there must be at least some human cause within human actions to make them morally responsible acts. Stace (1952)(1976: 30). Calvin explains:

'If freedom is opposed to coercion, I both acknowledge and consistently maintain that choice is free and I hold anyone who thinks otherwise to be a heretic. If, I say, it were called free in this sense of not being coerced nor forcibly moved by an external impulse, but moving of its own accord, I have no objection.' Calvin (1543)(1996: 68).

Indeterminism is equated with incompatibilism which states that God, or any other being, cannot cause by force or coercion any human action, nor can any action be simultaneously willed by God or any other being, for the human action to remain significantly free. Compatibilism would agree with incompatibilism that God or any other being cannot cause by force or coercion any significantly free human action, but contrary to incompatibilism thinks that God can simultaneously will significantly free human actions.

Pojman states that hard determinism holds that every event is caused and no one is responsible for actions, whereas soft determinism holds that rational creatures can be held responsible for determined actions as long as they are done voluntarily and without force or coercion. Pojman (1996: 586).

Therefore, middle knowledge although a logical view with merit is not a philosophically necessary view or most reasonable view to accept within a Reformed perspective.

Bibliography  

AQUINAS, THOMAS (1261)(1920) Summa Theologica, Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province, London, Fathers of the English Dominican Province.

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

CALVIN, JOHN (1539)(1998) The Institutes of the Christian Religion, Book IV, Translated by Henry Beveridge, Grand Rapids, The Christian Classic Ethereal Library, Wheaton College. http://www.ccel.org/ccel/calvin/institutes.html

CALVIN, JOHN (1543)(1996) The Bondage and Liberation of the Will, Translated by G.I. Davies, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

ERICKSON, MILLARD (1994) Christian Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

FEINBERG. JOHN S. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, David Basinger and Randall Basinger (eds.), Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (2001) No One Like Him, John S. Feinberg (gen.ed.), Wheaton, Illinois, Crossway Books.

HASKER, WILLIAM (1996) ‘Middle Knowledge’, in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

POJMAN, LOUIS P. (1996) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.

STACE, W.T. (1952)(1976) Religion and the Modern Mind, in John R. Burr and Milton Goldinger (eds), Philosophy and Contemporary Issues, London, Collier Macmillan Publishers.

Middle Knowledge: Internet Encylopedia of Philosophy 

Selected references

a. Books 

Craig, William Lane. Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom: The Coherence of Theism, Omniscience. New York: Brill, 1990. 

Craig, William Lane. The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents from Aristotle to Suarez. New York: Brill, 1988. 

Molina, Luis de. On Divine Foreknowledge: Part IV of the Concordia. Translated by Alfred J. Freddoso. Ithaca: Cornell, 1988. Plantinga, Alvin. The Nature of Necessity. Oxford: Clarendon, 1974. 

b. Articles

Hasker, William. “Middle Knowledge: A Refutation Revisited.” Faith and Philosophy 12:2 (April 1995): 223-36.

Hasker, William. “A New Anti-Molinist Argument.” Religious Studies 35:3 (September 1999): 291-97. 

Author Information John D. Laing  

Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary U. S. A.

Also online

Lonergan, Bernard J.F. Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas. New York: Herder and Herder, 1971.

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Still true.

Motivation?

Second Peter 3:9 In Brief With Webcam

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Agassiz, British Columbia from trekearth

Autumn: October 3, 2012

Post Preface on webcam

 

Edited at later dates

I decided to once again use my trial version of Wondershare and edit a video. I therefore also have a transparent 'tat' on my head as does Chucky on the present 'Jones' post on Satire And Theology.

Preface Authorship

David F. Payne notes that the majority of scholarship does not hold to the Apostle Peter as the author of Second Peter. Payne (1986: 1564).  The stylistic and linguistic objections are primary reasons. Payne (1986: 1564). William Barclay in his 1976 commentary also noted that there are stylistic differences. Barclay (1976: 286). He reasoned another author wrote the book in the name of the Apostle Peter for the sake of humility. Barclay (1976: 289).  Barclay listed differences in subject material between the two texts as a reason to not believe they were written by the same author, but this seems rather subjective.

Why does Part Two of a text necessarily need to duplicate material from Part One as evidence of same authorship?

Payne points out that as of 1986, when the commentary was written, linguistic studies done with computers have shown similarities between First and Second Peter.

As well, as I have mentioned other times on this blog, scribes did write for Apostles at times and that could account for literary and stylistic differences. Payne acknowledges that John Calvin thought Peter was responsible for Second Peter although not technically the writer. Payne (1986: 1565).

Second Peter 3:9

Second Peter 3:9 New American Standard Bible (NASB)

9 The Lord is not slow about His promise, as some count slowness, but is patient toward you, not wishing for any to perish but for all to come to repentance.

William Barclay takes the perspective that when the text is stating that God does not want any to perish, like Paul in Romans in certain verses (Barclay lists 11: 32) it is in the context of God shutting persons out to unbelief. Barclay (1976: 343).

However, in the context of Second Peter 3:9 to whom is the writer writing to?

In the NASB it states 'patient toward you' not wishing for any to perish but for all to come to repentance. The English Standard Version states 'but is patient toward you', not wishing that any should perish but that all should reach repentance'. In context the writer is speaking to Christians as in 'you'. Second Peter Chapter 2 was discussing in context false prophets and teachers but in Chapter 3 the writer, as he is writing to 'you', is clearly addressing Christians. The Chapter begins with a reminder of the words spoken of holy prophets (verse 2) and the commandments of the Lord and Saviour spoken by your apostles (verse 2). Mockers are then introduced in verse 3 and their own lusts, but by verse 9 the context is the writer speaking to Christians and that they be ready for the Second Advent of verse 10 as the Lord will arrive like a thief. Verse 10 then goes on to describe in what is likely somewhat figurative language, how the heavens will pass away and this ties into the New Heaven and New Earth of Revelation Chapters 21-22. Verse 11 states that since present things are destroyed that persons should be holy and godly.

Strong's Concordance ‘You’ #2248

Original Greek word ἡμᾶς

Meaning: our, us, we. The meaning is also documented for 2 Peter 3:9. The word being changed slightly in this usage. Strong (1890)(1986: 45). ὑμᾶς

Strong's Concordance ‘Perish’ #622

‘Perish’ Original Word: ἀπόλλυμι

Meaning: to destroy fully, to perish, to lose, literal or figurative , die. Documented in context of Second Peter. Strong (1890)(1986: 16). The word being altered slightly in this usage.  ἀπολέσθαι

In context therefore, it is possible that Second Peter Chapter 3:9 is not directed to non-believers in regard to salvation but is directed to Christians in regard to repentance. It may be stating basically that the Lord is patient with you (Christians), not wishing for any of you to (perish/die) in a state of non-repentance.

BARCLAY, WILLIAM (1976) The Letters of James and Peter, Philadelphia, The Westminster Press.

MARSHALL, ALFRED (1975)(1996) The Interlinear KJV-NIV, Grand Rapids, Zondervan.

PAYNE. DAVID F.(1986) ‘2 Peter’, in F.F. Bruce, (ed.), The International Bible Commentary, Grand Rapids, Marshall Pickering/Zondervan.

STRONG, J. (1890)(1986) Strong's Exhaustive Concordance of the Bible, Burlington, Welch Publishing Company.  

Evidential Evil (PhD Edit)

Portugal passage from trekearth

Preface

I am working on Chapter One from my PhD for a potential journal article. This struck me as most interesting from today's monotonous 'torture' while dealing with MS Word and the turning of United Kingdom style footnotes into Harvard style in-notes, among other things. If you appreciate my theological, Biblical Studies posts such as the James and Matthew posts, my previous two articles, please comment on them and this is an indicator besides pageviews. Yes, I intend to present both articles related to theodicy/the problem of evil and other on this blog.

Thank you very much.

I am primarily researching and writing on the logical and not the evidential, gratuitous problem of evil, since although I can accept that Plantinga has primarily successfully dealt with the logical problem of evil, as described within his system and assumptions,^[1] I reason that Plantinga’s free will approach is not the best and most effective system within Christian theism for dealing with the issue.[2]  A well-constructed sovereignty approach,[3] such as will be presented by John S. Feinberg in Chapter Three: Sovereignty Theodicy, is better equipped at dealing with both the logical and gratuitous problem.  I also embed my own sovereignty theodicy throughout this thesis, particularly in Chapter Three.^[4]  Within this thesis my own concepts of sovereignty theodicy are discussed in contrast to the approaches reviewed.^[5]  Plantinga’s (1982) approach is problematic due largely to his support of the idea that God could not create significantly free, good creatures that would only commit good acts at all times.^[6]  Welty rejects Plantinga’s idea that God cannot create a world containing moral good and no moral evil,^[7] and raises the objection that God brought Christ into the world as a sinless human being.^[8]  Welty’s point here is that every human being could have therefore been sinless^[9] and the world could contain good and no evil with significantly free human beings that would not commit wrong actions.[10]  I have a similar objection to Welty’s,^[11] which shall be discussed in Chapters Two and Three.  Within my theodicy, I reason that God could have, if he wished, made significantly free human beings, or human like beings who would have been perfectly morally good and would not commit wrong actions.^[12]  God’s choice not to create such beings, in my mind is not a sign of a lack of power, or moral failure, but rather the use of his own perfect and significantly free will for good purposes.  In Chapter Four, with my discussion on the evidential, gratuitous problem of evil, it shall be seen that a sovereignty theodicy can reasonably and successfully deal with both the logical and evidential problem of evil, and therefore the evidential problem is not a greater difficulty for theists than the logical one, rather it is simply a newer type of criticism since theism has been able to defend itself substantially through the use of free will approaches.^[13]  However, I can agree with Durston that even if there is no such thing as gratuitous evil,[14] which is my position, large amounts of evil that appear gratuitous will exist.[15]  This would be evil that I would consider unexplainable, humanly speaking, but would not be gratuitous from God’s perspective.  God can use evil for his greater purposes, but this does not mean that any person will completely understand why certain evils exist.[16]  God’s attribute of omniscience provides him knowledge in order to work his plans for the greater good within creation that no other being can possess without God revealing this information.                                

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[1] Primarily from Plantinga’s book, God, Freedom, and Evil (1977).

[2] This will be discussed primarily in Chapters Two and Three.

[3] With Reformed theological deductions.

[4] It is similar, but not identical to Feinberg’s approach, which I shall point out.

[5] It is not necessary for me to present my own theodicy Chapter within this work, as my views shall be explained throughout this thesis.

[6] Plantinga (1982: 166-167).  This is an aspect of incompatibilism, which shall be primarily defined and discussed in Chapter Two.

[7] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 30).  Welty (1999: 1).

[8] Welty (1999: 1).

[9] Welty (1999: 1).

[10] Welty (1999: 1).

[11] Welty (1999: 1).

[12] This is an aspect of compatibilism, which shall be primarily defined and discussed in Chapters Two and Three.

[13] Freewill approaches can be logically coherent, although not necessarily true. 

[14] Durston (2000: 79).

[15] Durston (2000: 79).

[16] Durston (2000: 79).

 

DURSTON, KIRK (2000) ‘The Consequential Complexity of History and Gratuitous Evil’, in Religious Studies, Volume 36, pp. 65-80. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1977)(2002) God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1982) The Nature of Necessity, Oxford, Clarendon Press.

WELTY, GREG (1999)  ‘The Problem of Evil’, in Greg Welty PhD, Fort Worth, Texas.

Philosophy Department, Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary.
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Further comments

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