A Paradox

Caerphilly Castle, Wales (trekearth)


Gwbert, Wales (trekearth)


Hay-One-Wye, Wales (trekearth)

Philosopher Simon Blackburn explains a paradox arises when a set of apparently incontrovertible premises provides what would be viewed as unacceptable or contradictory conclusions. Blackburn (1996: 276). John Etchemendy writes that seemingly sound reasoning based on assumptions leads to conclusions contradictory or obviously false. Etchemendy (1996: 558).

Blackburn uses the 'barber paradox' (page 36) where a village has a barber in it, who shaves all and only the persons that do not shave themselves. Therefore who shaves the barber? If he shaves himself, then he does not, but if he shaves himself, then he does. Blackburn (1996: 36). Blackburn provides the opinion that in reality philosophically there would be no such barber. The situation is inconsistent. Blackburn (1996: 36).

He references Russell's paradox and the class of all classes that are not members of themselves.

'If it is, then it is not, and if it not, then it is'. Blackburn (1996: 336).

Again an inconsistency and Blackburn notes what a 'class' is needs to be more clearly defined.

With paradoxes such as these that arise in certain arguments within theology and philosophy it is often important to simply deny certain assumptions, premises, propositions that can lead to illogical, inconsistent and false conclusions.

I agree with Etchemendy as he stated paradoxes are often solved when mistaken principles or assumptions are found and rejected. Etchemendy (1996: 558).

This was a very useful in working through theological and philosophical theodicy and problem of evil arguments. Often a way to deny apparent paradoxes is to seriously examine if premises in actuality should be accepted as presented. Often this is more important than concentrating primarily on the conclusion or conclusions.

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

ETCHEMENDY, JOHN (1996) ‘Paradox’, in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Infinite Versus Finite (God, Creation)

Infinite Versus Finite (God, Creation)

Preface

Chateau near Paris, France (trekearth)

I have taken material from previous posts 'Infinite' and 'Infinite Revisited' edited some material and added some in for more of the 'finite' angle to be included.

Infinite Versus Finite (God, Creation)

Philosopher Blackburn explains that the infinite is unlimited and that which is beyond anything that is fixed and bound. Blackburn (1996: 193). In contrast a ‘finite set’ (example used) is a set that stops at a point, somewhere. Blackburn (1996: 140). Brian Davies writes that the English word infinity comes from the Latin word ‘infinitas’, meaning boundless or endless. Davies (1999: 298). Davies states that some have ascribed the term infinity with various degrees of understanding of substance, time, space, the universe, numbers, and classes. Davies (1999: 298). He mentions that many philosophers have dealt with the issue of infinity through the centuries, but Biblically speaking there is not a doctrine of infinity. Davies (1999: 298). Biblically there is not a specific philosophical explanation of a doctrine of the infinite God. He explains that God's infinity is viewed as marking his perfection, and that God alone is understood as infinite. Davies (1999: 298). As one could count to the minus and to the plus to infinity, numbers could be considered infinite in a sense, but are not ontological living beings. As God is uncreated and uncreatable, he is alone is infinite ontologically. God would not be limited by time and space, and so in another sense created matter and space would be considered finite and not infinite within traditional Christian thought. God would be superior to all creatures and would be omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent, and eternal. Davies (1999: 298). Davies notes that process theology has postulated that God's personal nature means that he can change as he works within created time. Davies (1999: 228). Process theology reasons that God possibly develops in personality as he deals with his created beings. Davies (1999: 228).

It could be stated that if God's nature can be changed and develop within time, then he is not infinite, but rather the most advanced finite being in existence. A finite being that is beyond matter, space and time, perhaps. I reject process theology's notion of a finite God, for at least the following reasons.

It could be argued that if God is not infinite then he cannot posses any infinite attributes, and this would prohibit God from being eternal. To be eternal would mean that one has unlimited life. If God is not eternal, then how did God come to exist? If there was a God that created God and so on, there is the problem of vicious regress in which there are a hypothetical infinite regressions of Gods. If it is suggested at some point the regression ends, why cannot one simply reject the vicious regress and state that the Biblical God, or a God, is the only God? To state that God simply came to exist from nothing does not seem reasonable, and the suggestion answers nothing. If God is merely finite, then one has a problem of determining the first cause. A reasonable explanation is that God prior to time eternally was and eternally is today.

Many scientists and scholars reason that the universe is 15-20 billion years old, and believe in a 'Big Bang Theory'. Whether the universe is billions, millions, or thousands of years is not the primary concern of this article, but with a big bang model or like, the universe in agreement with the Bible, is not eternal. Billions, millions, or thousands of years is more time than any of human being, only living 100+ years maximum in the modern age can comprehend and may be considered perhaps from a human perspective, virtual eternity, but is not actual eternity, and therefore is not infinite. Since God created matter, time and space in Genesis, Chapter 1, it is clear that nothing within the material, physical realm existed prior to creation. This would leave God, and perhaps the angelic beings prior to the existence of matter, time (solar time at least) and space. It can be deduced that angels cannot be infinite in nature, because if they were limitless in nature they would themselves be God. It can be reasoned there are two or more limitless beings by definition as they simply would be an aspect of one infinite, eternal God of one substance. Thiessen notes angels are not eternal although the Bible does not state when they were created. Thiessen (1956: 191).

Thiessen thinks angels may have been formed at the Genesis 1 creation or just after. Thiessen (1956: 191). I would of course have no definite idea, but think that angels were created within some type of time, not solar time. I do not reason that angels existed in a timeless state with God. I would deduce that even non-physical finite spiritual beings must exist within time, although not necessarily within physical matter, time and space, in order to process thought patterns, as God alone is all-knowing and does not need to process thoughts within time. I would conclude this point by stating that God alone existed before the creation of matter, time and space and angelic beings. Again, God eternally simply was and is.

I suppose it possible and perhaps reasonable for God to instantaneously provide angelic beings with information in a timeless state, and at the same time  I deduce information would also have to be available for demonic beings in the spiritual realm if time does not exist there, in order for them to function as the Bible has them. I am not meaning solar time, but time allotted for a finite spiritual being to process thoughts. For example, angels to process instructions from God and communicate and for demonic beings to communicate.

I reason a timeless state is more difficult philosophically as in likely being correct than a spiritual realm of some sort with time where angels and demons would work.

Millard J. Erickson discusses the Scriptural concept of God's existence in contrast to that of his creation. In Acts 17: 24-25 it states that God does not dwell physically, but is the creator of everything. Erickson notes that God is called the first and last in Isaiah 44: 6, and the Alpha and Omega in Revelation 1:8, 21:6, and 22:13. The idea being shown here is that God has always existed and will always exist. Erickson (1994: 273-274).

As pointed out previously, before the creation of matter and the angels nothing else would have existed. There is also the idea put across in Scripture that God is immutable and does not change in his nature. Malachi 3:6 states that the Lord does not change and Erickson views this as referring to God’s nature and attributes.

God and not his creation, is alone infinite in the sense described.

Human beings in contrast are finite. Humanity has a distinct Biblical religious historical beginning in Genesis 1-2, and a secular historical beginning which is not certain as far as date. From a Biblical perspective, even with promises of everlasting life for those in Christ a human being that lives forever with a resurrected body is still finite ontologically.

Any other living creatures that would exist in the new creation described in Revelation would also be finite.

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

DAVIES, BRIAN (1999) ‘Infinity’, in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press Ltd.

ERICKSON, MILLARD (1994) Christian Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

THIESSEN, HENRY C. (1956) Introductory Lectures in Systematic Theology, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.


Hohenaschau Castle, Germany (trekearth)


Royal Palace, Madrid (trekearth)


Glasgow (trekearth)

The Best Possible World? (PhD Edit)

The Best Possible World? (PhD Edit)

Fleet Street, London (trekearth)  

PLANTINGA, ALVIN.C. (1977)(2002) God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 

J. L. Mackie and the Best Possible World Objection 

The next objection Plantinga deals with is Mackie’s atheistic compatibilism[1] which, in part, assumes a perfectly good God[2] should have created, if he exists, a best possible world.[3] Leibniz believes God had an infinite number of worlds to choose from to create, and chose the best possible world.[4] 

Mackie’s ‘Evil and Omnipotence’ in Mind (1971) removes the possibility of hard determinism and postulates God could have made free creatures that only do what is right.[5] They do not have to be determined because God could have made people in a way they freely always chose what was right[6] even though, unlike Flew’s determinism,[7] wrong actions would be a technical possibility.[8] 

Plantinga admits it is logically possible, in a broad sense, there could be a world containing creatures that only do what is right.[9] Plantinga explains and rejects Mackie’s concept of possible worlds and does this with two main objections.[10] First, no matter how wonderful a world appears to be, no matter how many incredibly happy people there are, it is always possible there is an even better world containing more people who are even happier.[11] Plantinga’s reasoning appears sound as any finite world God would create could always be better.[12] Only an infinite world would be the best possible world, and it is debatable and unlikely God could create an infinite world. The fact that a world is created means it is not infinitely old or eternal, and so this would seemingly make the concept of a created infinite world untenable.

Plantinga’s second objection to Mackie’s best possible world idea concerns the concept of human free choice.[13] Plantinga describes Paul (1) accepting an offer, or (2) rejecting an offer.[14] Whichever choice Paul makes, either (1) or (2), God would not be able to actualize that world.[15] If Paul would make a wrong choice at any point, the problem of evil would occur, and the world would no longer be the best possible as Mackie describes.[16] To Plantinga, the result of God creating significantly free creatures is that their decisions did impact which type of world God created, and how much evil it would contain.[17] God’s omnipotence, to Plantinga, could not guarantee a best possible world free from evil, because there is always a possibility of human decisions that are contrary to what God would have desired.[18] Since significantly free creatures exist, it is never up to God alone in regard to which world is actualized.[19]

Augustine

Augustine, like Plantinga, seemingly did assume free creatures will eventually make one wrong decision, this making Mackie’s idea that human beings could always freely choose the right seem untenable to these free will proponents.[20] At the same time, both Augustine and Plantinga would reject Mackie’s notion that if God is understood and accepted, as in traditional Christian theism, he should have created a best possible world filled with perfect creatures that never do wrong actions,[21] and because God did not do this atheism would be the preferred philosophy to adopt. Both free will advocates have stated that significantly free creatures by definition could not be guaranteed by God to avoid wrong actions,[22] and thus when wrong actions occur it is because of the human abuse of free will only.[23] God is not to be blamed for creating a good thing, that being free will, which is willfully turned towards something evil by his human creation.[24]

Feinberg

Feinberg holds to modified rationalism and a sovereignty theodicy view similar to mine which was explained in Chapter Two as the idea that God was not obligated to create anything, including a world, but chose to create purely from his own desires.[25] Within modified rationalism, the concept of a best possible world is denied in favour of the view that God chose to create the present world which was initially perfectly good.[26] The fact that the problem of evil exists would be seen within modified rationalism as a result of the free choice of human beings to rebel against God in both free will and sovereignty theodicy which both deny the notion of best possible world.[27] Modified rationalism would oppose the best possible world concepts of Leibniz from the Enlightenment era, and Mackie from the modern era.[28]

[1] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 32-34).

[2] LaFollette (1980: 2). Plantinga (1977)(2002: 32-34). Phillips (2005: 3).

[3] LaFollette (1980: 2). Plantinga (1977)(2002: 32-34).

[4] Leibniz (1710)(1990).

[5] Mackie (1971) in Plantinga (1977)(2002: 32-33). Mackie (1955)(1996: 250-253).

[6] LaFollette (1980: 2).

[7] Flew (1955: 150-153). Plantinga (1977)(2002: 31).

[8] Mackie (1971) in Plantinga (1977)(2002: 32-33). Mackie (1955)(1996: 250-253).

[9] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 32).

[10] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 32-64).

[11] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 34).

[12] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 34).

[13] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 39-44). LaFollette (1980: 3).

[14] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 40-42). There are possible worlds that God cannot actualize. LaFollette (1980: 3).

[15] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 42).

[16] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 42).

[17] Plantinga (1982: 180-181). Therefore, for Plantinga some worlds cannot be actualized. LaFollette (1980: 4).

[18] Plantinga (1982: 180-181). LaFollette (1980: 4).

[19] Geivett (1993: 196).

[20] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 3).

[21] Mackie (1971) in Plantinga (1977)(2002: 32-33). Mackie (1955)(1996: 250-253).

[22] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 3). Plantinga (1982: 189).

[23] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 3). Plantinga (1982: 189).

[24] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 33). Plantinga (1982: 170-171). The free will theist that reasons evil is adequately explained is left with the religious problem of individual suffering, according to LaFollette. LaFollette (1980: 1).

[25] Feinberg (1994: 36).

[26] Plantinga (1982: 167-189). Feinberg (1994: 36).

[27] Plantinga (1982: 167-189). Feinberg (1994: 36).

[28] Leibniz (1710)(1990). Mackie (1971) in Plantinga (1977)(2002: 32-33).

 

Wien  Parlamentsgebäude, Vienna (trekearth)

ADAMS, ROBERT. M (1996) ‘Theodicy’, in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 

AUGUSTINE (388-395)(1964) On Free Choice of the Will, Translated by Anna S.Benjamin and L.H. Hackstaff, Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall. 

AUGUSTINE (398-399)(1992) Confessions, Translated by Henry Chadwick, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

AUGUSTINE (400-416)(1987)(2004) On the Trinity, Translated by Reverend Arthur West Haddan, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Series One, Volume 3, Denver, The Catholic Encyclopedia. 

AUGUSTINE (421)(1998) Enchiridion, Translated by J.F. Shaw, Denver, The Catholic Encyclopedia. 

AUGUSTINE (426)(1958) The City of God, Translated by Gerald G. Walsh, Garden City, New York, Image Books. 

AUGUSTINE (427)(1997) On Christian Doctrine, Translated by D.W. Robertson Jr., Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall. 

AUGUSTINE (427b)(1997) On Christian Teaching, Translated by R.P.H. Green, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) ‘Theodicy’, in Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, p. 375. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

BOURKE, VERNON J. (1958) ‘Introduction’, in The City of God, Translated by Gerald G. Walsh, Garden City, New York, Image Books.

CALVIN, JOHN (1539)(1998) The Institutes of the Christian Religion, Book IV, Translated by Henry Beveridge, Grand Rapids, The Christian Classic Ethereal Library, Wheaton College. http://www.ccel.org/ccel/calvin/institutes.html 

CALVIN, JOHN (1540)(1973) Romans and Thessalonians, Translated by Ross Mackenzie, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 

CALVIN, JOHN (1543)(1996) The Bondage and Liberation of the Will, Translated by G.I. Davies, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

CALVIN, JOHN (1550)(1978) Concerning Scandals, Translated by John W. Fraser, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 

CALVIN, JOHN (1552)(1995) Acts, Translated by Watermark, Nottingham, Crossway Books. 

CALVIN, JOHN (1553)(1952) Job, Translated by Leroy Nixon, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House. 

CALVIN, JOHN (1554)(1965) Genesis, Translated by John King, Edinburgh, The Banner of Truth Trust.

CHADWICK, HENRY (1992) ‘Introduction’, in Confessions, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1729)(2006) Sovereignty of God, New Haven, Connecticut, Jonathan Edwards Center, Yale University. 

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1731-1733)(2006) Law of Nature, New Haven, Connecticut, Jonathan Edwards Center, Yale University.

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1754)(2006) Freedom of the Will, Flower Mound, Texas. Jonathanedwards.com. 

ERICKSON, MILLARD (1994) Christian Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House. 

ERICKSON, MILLARD (2003) What Does God Know and When Does He Know It?, Grand Rapids, Zondervan.

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, in David Basinger and Randall Basinger (eds.), Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House. 

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (2001) No One Like Him, John S. Feinberg (gen.ed.), Wheaton, Illinois, Crossway Books.

FLEW, ANTONY, R.M. HARE, AND BASIL MITCHELL (1996) ‘The Debate on the Rationality of Religious Belief’, in L.P. Pojman (ed.), Philosophy, The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company. 

FLEW, ANTONY AND A.MACINTRYE (1999) ‘Philosophy of Religion’, in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press Ltd.

FRAME, JOHN M. (1999) ‘The Bible on the Problem of Evil: Insights from Romans 3:1-8,21-26; 5:1-5; 8:28-39’, IIIM Magazine Online, Volume 1, Number 33, October 11 to October 17, Fern Park, Florida, Third Millennium.

FRAME, JOHN M. (2002) The Doctrine of God, P and R Publishing, Phillipsburg, New Jersey. 

GEIVETT, R. DOUGLAS (1993) Evil and the Evidence for God, Philadelphia, Temple University Press.

HASKER, WILLIAM (1989) God, Time, and Knowledge, Ithaca, Cornell University Press. 

HASKER, WILLIAM (1993) ‘C. Robert Mesle, John Hick’s Theodicy: A Process Humanist Critique’, in Philosophy of Religion, Volume 34, Number 1, pp. 55-56. Dordrecht, Netherlands, Philosophy of Religion. 

HASKER, WILLIAM (1994) ‘Can Philosophy Defend Theology?’, in Faith and Philosophy, Volume 11, Number 2, April, pp. 272-278. Wilmore, Kentucky, Asbury College. 

HASKER, WILLIAM (2000) ‘The Problem of Evil in Process Theism and Classical Free Will Theism’, in Process Studies, Volume. 29, Number 2, Fall-Winter, pp. 194-208. Claremont, California, Religion Online. 

HASKER, WILLIAM (2003) ‘Counterfactuals and Evil’, in Philosophia Christi, Volume 5, Number 1, pp. 235-249. La Mirada, California, Biola University.

HASKER, WILLIAM (2003) ‘Is Free-Will Theism Religiously Inadequate? A Reply to Ciocchi’, in Religious Studies, Volume 39, Number 4, December, pp. 431-440. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 

HASKER, WILLIAM (2007) ‘Peter van Inwagen, The Problem of Evil’, in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, Notre Dame, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.

HICK, JOHN (1970) Evil and The God of Love, London, The Fontana Library. 

HICK, JOHN (1978) ‘Present and Future Life’, Harvard Theological Review, Volume 71, Number 1-2, January-April, Harvard University. 

HICK, JOHN (1981) Encountering Evil, Stephen T. Davis (ed.), Atlanta, John Knox Press.

HICK, JOHN (1993) ‘Afterword’ in GEIVETT, R. DOUGLAS (1993) Evil and the Evidence for God, Philadelphia, Temple University Press.

HICK, JOHN (1993) The Metaphor of God Incarnate, Louisville, Kentucky, John Know Press. 

HICK, JOHN (1994) Death and Eternal Life, Louisville, Kentucky, John Knox Press. 

HICK, JOHN (1999) ‘Life after Death’, in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press.

JORDAN, MARK D. (1996) ‘Augustine’, in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, pp. 52-53. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

KREEFT, PETER (1988) Fundamentals of the Faith, San Francisco, Ignatius Press.

KREEFT, PETER AND RONALD K. TACELLI (1994) Handbook of Christian Apologetics, Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press. 

LAFOLLETTE, HUGH (1980) ‘Plantinga on Free Will Defence’, in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 11, The Hague, Martimus Nijhoff Publishers. 

LEIBNIZ, G.W. (1710)(1998) Theodicy, Translated by E.M. Huggard Chicago, Open Court Classics. 

MACKIE, J.L. (1955)(1996) ‘Evil and Omnipotence’, in Mind, in Michael Peterson, William Hasker, Bruce Reichenbach, and David Basinger (eds.), Philosophy of Religion, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

MACKIE, J.L. (1971)(1977)(2002) ‘Evil and Omnipotence’, in The Philosophy of Religion, in Alvin C. Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids. Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

MESLE, C. ROBERT (1986) ‘The Problem of Genuine Evil: A Critique of John Hick’s Theodicy’, in The Journal of Religion, Volume 66, Number 4, pp. 412-430. October, Chicago, University of Chicago Press. 

MESLE, C. ROBERT (1991) John Hick’s Theodicy, New York, St. Martin’s Press. 

MESLE, C. ROBERT (2004) ‘Suffering, Meaning, and the Welfare of Children: What Do Theodicies Do?’, in American Journal of Theology & Philosophy, Volume 25, Number 3, September. Lamoni, Iowa, Graceland University.

PHILLIPS, D.Z. (1981) Encountering Evil, Stephen T. Davis (ed.), Atlanta, John Knox Press.

PHILLIPS, D.Z. (2005) The Problem of Evil and the Problem of God, Fortress Press, Minneapolis.

PLANTINGA, ALVIN.C. (1977)(2002) God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 

PLANTINGA, ALVIN.C. (1982) The Nature of Necessity, Oxford, Clarendon Press.

POJMAN, LOUIS P. (1996) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.

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ROTH, JOHN K. (1981) Encountering Evil, Stephen T. Davis (ed.), Atlanta, John Knox Press.

ROWE, WILLIAM L. (1990) ‘The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism’, in Adams and Adams (eds.), The Problem of Evil, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

ROWE, WILLIAM L. (1994) ‘The Problem of No Best World’, Faith and Philosophy, Volume 11, Number 2, April, pp. 269-278. Wilmore, Kentucky, Asbury College. 

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ROWE, WILLIAM L. (1999) ‘The Problem of Divine Sovereignty and Human Freedom’, in Faith and Philosophy, Volume 16, Number 1, January, pp. 98-101. Wilmore, Kentucky, Asbury College.

Saturday, September 19, 2020: PhD Full Version PDF: Theodicy and Practical Theology 2010, Wales TSD

Webcam Post I

Firefox earned the position recently as my default browser but lately problems have occurred with Blogger. I cannot see the video with Firefox, and it may be the case on your computer with Firefox as well. On my computer the video can be seen with Internet Explorer, Safari and Google Chrome.


Vancouver (Google Images)


Vancouver (Google Images)


New Westminster BC (trekearth)


New Westminster BC (trekearth)

From Facebook on Sunday:

A first: With a friend trying to be squeezed for more tip money by a restaurant owner after a supposed missed payment within the group which was not a missed payment. Ended on a handshake in agreement.

Additional:

The restuarant owner stated at first 'Pwan guy not pay!' and the pwan guy is a commenter on this blog that did pay which the restaurant owner eventually admitted.

Yes, this means it is the end of my audio posts which usually ended up being deleted without my permission by filefreak, or I needed to delete them on Shaw, my internet provider, to make room for the newer ones. I do however have my audio posts stored on DVD. As noted previously I can share them if requested but the posts usually contained a written section as well.

Webcam experiments July 21, 2012 the first two, July 23-24, 2012, the last photos.

My first Samsung Galaxy S2 photo. Definite upgrade from the Blackberry Curve. An upgrade for my blogs.