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A. Plantinga and Transworld Depravity
Plantinga, like Augustine, states human beings’ wrong decisions and abuse of free will have led to an evil creation.[1] Plantinga did not propagate privation but instead developed a theory of transworld depravity.[2] The concept of transworld depravity is a further response to Mackie’s possible world approach.[3] Transworld depravity notes the idea that in any possible world, including our actual one, each person would make at least one wrong decision and the resulting bad action would lead to evil occurring within that reality.[4] Persons would always choose at least one wrong action, and God could not actualize a world where this was not the case.[5] Plantinga describes transworld depravity as: ‘A person P suffers from transworld depravity if and only if the following holds: for every world W such that P is significantly free to W and P only does what is right in W, there is an action A and a maximal world segment S’ such that (1) S’ includes A’s being morally significant for P; (2) S’ includes P’s being free with respect to A; (3) S’ is included in W and includes neither P’s performing A nor P’s refraining from performing; and (4) If S’ were actual, P would go wrong with respect to A.’[6] Bloesch notes that in every human system of ethics[7] there is demonstrated a human flaw that prohibits people from fulfilling a moral requirement.[8] Such a flaw[9] can be philosophically and theologically considered to perhaps relate to Plantinga’s theory.[10]
Plantinga notes if people suffered from transworld depravity, it would not be possible for God to actualize any possible world he could think of, specifically a world containing significantly free creatures that only commit good actions.[11] The price, according to Plantinga, of God creating significantly free creatures would be they would eventually go wrong with an action, leading to the problem of evil existing.[12] Transworld depravity, to Plantinga, would be possible and likely, even if God had created a different universe with a completely different type of rational beings with significant freedom.[13] This is so because significant freedom will eventually lead to at least one wrong action being made by each person.[14] Within this system, as long as one person makes a wrong decision the problem of evil will exist and the depravity caused will alienate that person from God’s original plan and lead to a multiplication of wrong actions.[15]
Howard-Snyder and O’Leary-Hawthorne suggest a concept of transworld sanctity.[16] They demonstrate that transworld sanctity is no less intellectually possible than is transworld depravity.[17] This would be a hypothetical world where persons do not commit wrong actions.[18] The authors do not present transworld sanctity as their held view,[19] as they are incompatibilists as is Plantinga,[20] but reason that Plantinga’s view on transworld depravity intellectually fails and is false.[21] It is not obviously necessary that some persons in a given world are blessed with transworld sanctity, they argue.[22] It is also not necessary that some persons in a world have transworld depravity.[23] Plantinga does not demonstrate beyond reasonable doubt that all persons suffer with transworld depravity.[24] The authors therefore strongly doubt Plantinga’s free will defence.[25] They do acknowledge that other philosophers will counter that Plantinga is only presenting the possibility of transworld depravity,[26] and that is a reasonable point.
[2] Plantinga (1982: 184-189). Howard-Snyder and O’Leary-Hawthorne (1998: 3-4). Also called trans-world depravity.
[7] Bloesch (1987: 34). Bloesch is discussing ethical systems and not a defence or theodicy, but still the concepts of human nature and actions relate.
[8] Bloesch (1987: 34).
[9] Bloesch (1987: 34).
[10] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 53). Plantinga (1982: 189). Every ethical system fails because of human moral failure. Bloesch’s commentary on human ethics could also be connected to Reformed compatibilistic concepts of depravity.
[11] Plantinga (1982: 189). Howard-Snyder and O’Leary-Hawthorne (1998: 3-4). There would be a high risk of moral evil occurring.
[13] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 53).
[14] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 53).
[21] Howard-Snyder and O’Leary-Hawthorne (1998: 1).
[22] Howard-Snyder and O’Leary-Hawthorne (1998: 9).
[23] Howard-Snyder and O’Leary-Hawthorne (1998: 9).
[24] LaFollette (1980: 8).
[25] Howard-Snyder and O’Leary-Hawthorne (1998: 1). Plantinga does not know that his defence is true, and LaFollette reasons it is false. LaFollette (1980: 9). As noted, Plantinga claims to write a defence that is logically possible only. He does not claim it is true. Plantinga (1977)(2002: 27-29).
[26] Howard-Snyder and O’Leary-Hawthorne (1998: 14). Plantinga argues for the possibility of transworld depravity only, strictly speaking. It is theory. Plantinga (1982: 184-189).
Transworld depravity provides the concept that in any possible world, including our own, each person would make at least one wrong decision and the resulting bad action would lead to evil occurring within creation.[1] It can be reasoned that the praxis related end goal of free will theodicy is for God within an incompatibilist, libertarian system to convince many human beings to accept Christ and turn from evil in order to fully establish the Kingdom of God.[2]
In contrast, with a compatibilistic sovereignty perspective, God is reasoned to transform and mould persons he chooses for salvation,[3] so that the culminated Kingdom takes place at God’s appointed time.[4] Both free will and sovereignty perspectives accept the Biblical idea of the culminated Kingdom, but free will places much more emphasis on the individual freely deciding that this is for him/her, rather than being determined in any way to do so.[5] Free will advocates will understand the process as God making an offer and over time convincing persons to believe it.[6] A devotion to God can only be a good thing when persons freely accept it.[7] Sovereignty perspectives reason that God alone makes the choice to begin a regeneration process that leads to salvation in a human being.[8] F.F. Bruce (1996) explains that because of the universal fact of human sin, there is no way to be accepted by God by human means.[9] This divinely guided change in a person must occur in order for salvation to ever take place within a human being with a corrupted nature.[10]
Free will theodicy, unlike soul-making theory, does not necessarily accept universalism[11] as part of its praxis and it could logically be argued that Plantinga’s transworld depravity would apply in all post-mortem situations.[12] In my view, these are perils of a praxis that rejects compatibilism and soft determinism. Even as traditional Christian free will theory would not accept universalism,[13] it still reasons eventually those citizens saved by Christ would not sin within the culminated Kingdom.[14] Those within the Kingdom will have been brought to God through Christ.[15] The resurrection work would be reasoned to change the entire nature of saved persons to sinless and allow everlasting life,[16] but without God also determining[17] that sin would never again occur, I reason that transworld depravity could always be a concern.[18]
A praxis of sovereignty theodicy would be that, from start to finish, salvation is primarily the goal directed[19] plan of God. Human beings are not brought to Christ through compulsion,[20] but when predestined in election[21] shall be convinced to accept the offer of salvation.[22] Praxis shifts from the incompatibilism of free will that assumes God desires to save all persons, but can only save those who are eventually persuaded to believe,[23] to an understanding that whom God desires to save shall be regenerated and placed in a process of salvation.[24] The problem of evil is therefore not primarily subject to, and in existence, because human sin is stalling the culmination of God’s plans.[25] I do not doubt that human beings do often oppose God’s plans, but God being almighty can overcome the problem of evil, and is working through this process slowly in history. Within a sovereignty perspective human sin does oppose God, but God will use sin for his purposes and regenerate and mould those he chooses towards salvation. As long as one can accept the idea that a perfectly moral God wills and allows evil[26] within his plans for the greater good,[27] there is a degree of intellectual certainty with sovereignty theodicy that free will theodicy lacks. God could inevitably bring about, through the use of the regeneration[28] and the resurrection of elected human persons,[29] the end of human corruption,[30] and even Plantinga’s concept of transworld depravity.[31] If God willed and created a finalized Kingdom of restored persons that had experienced the problem of evil and were saved from it, then it could be reasoned that with God’s constant persuasion through the Holy Spirit[32] and human experience and maturity, transworld depravity[33] would never take place again. No human wrong decision[34] would need to occur as God always determines otherwise, and restored human beings do not lack experience as did the first humans who rebelled against God causing corruption. I speculate that theological praxis of sovereignty theodicy is more certain and comforting than free will theodicy, as transworld depravity is overcome by taking the primary choice of human belief in God away from corrupted human beings[35] and placing it in the hands of a sovereign God.[36]
[1] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 53).
[2] This assumes that human beings by grace through faith can be convinced into belief in Christ and then regenerated and indwelled by the Holy Spirit.
[3] Luther (1525)(1972: 133). Calvin (1543)(1996: 204).
[4] Calvin (1539)(1998: Book II, Chapter 3, 6). Calvin (1552)(1995: 13).
[5] Geisler (1986: 75). McCann (2001: 115).
[6] Foulkes (1989: 55). Browning (1997: 301).
[7] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 78).
[8] Regeneration consists of the Holy Spirit of God beginning the salvation process of spiritual re-creation in a human being. Grenz, Guretzki, and Nordling (1999: 101).
[9] Bruce (1996: 93).
[10] Bruce (1996: 93).
[11] Contrary to Hick. Hick (1970: 381).
[12] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 53).
[13] Kreeft and Tacelli (1994: 286).
[14] Revelation Chapters 21-22 although containing figurative language describe a world free from tears and death and pain (21: 4). The New American Standard Version Bible Version (1984: 1417).
[15] Augustine viewed the atoning work of Christ as a means by which humanity can be brought back to a proper relationship with God. Augustine (398-399)(1992: 178). Christ would mediate humanity back to God. Augustine (398-399)(1992: 219).
[16] Augustine reasoned the resurrection would save believers from everlasting death. Augustine (400-416)(1987)(2004: Book 4: Chapter 13: 11).
[17] Geisler (1986: 75). McCann (2001: 115). I reason that as human nature has already demonstrated that it can fall, in the restoration it will need not only culminated perfect nature through resurrection, but also the influence of the Holy Spirit in heavy measure. Citizens will be filled with the Holy Spirit as was Stephen in Acts Chapter 6, for example. The New American Standard Version Bible Version (1984: 1234-1235). As God has developed saved persons to freely follow him with his guidance, I do not see why this would change within the everlasting realm.
[18] Without compatibilism in my view, incompatibilism and free will theory is left with the problem of explaining how human corruption and Plantinga’s transworld depravity will not prevent the salvation of persons and the completed and finalized Kingdom of God.
[19] Teleological. Bloesch (1987: 19).
[20] Shedd (1874-1890)(1980: 136-137 Volume 2).
[21] Whale (1958: 63).
[22] Feinberg (2001: 637).
[23] Peterson (1982: 104). McCann (2001: 115). Feinberg (1994: 64).
[24] Calvin (1543)(1996: 204).
[25] Peterson (1982: 104). McCann (2001: 115). Feinberg (1994: 64).
[26] Erickson (1994: 361). Many theistic and atheistic critics find this intellectually untenable. Mesle (1986: 418).
[27] Calvin (1543)(1996: 37-40). Edwards (1729)(2006: 414).
[28] Murray (1937-1966)(1977: 172).
[29] Whale (1958: 65-70).
[30] Berkouwer (1962: 192).
[31] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 53).
[33] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 53).
[34] Moral wrong decisions is meant here. A lack of infinite knowledge could still lead to a human being making a non-moral mistake, for example, not playing a perfect game.
[35] Augustine (421)(1998: Chapter 13: 8). Plantinga (1982: 184-189). Calvin (1539)(1998: Book II, Chapter 2, 7). Luther (1516)(1968: 31). Feinberg (1994: 126-127).
[36] Pink (1968: 20). Green (1971: 7).
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