The Best Possible World? (PhD Edit)

The Best Possible World? (PhD Edit)

Fleet Street, London (trekearth)  

2012 article edited for an academia.edu entry on July 26, 2022.

PLANTINGA, ALVIN.C. (1977)(2002) God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 

J. L. Mackie and the Best Possible World Objection 

The next objection Plantinga deals with is Mackie’s atheistic compatibilism[1] which, in part, assumes a perfectly good God[2] should have created, if he exists, a best possible world.[3] Leibniz believes God had an infinite number of worlds to choose from to create, and chose the best possible world.[4] 

Mackie’s ‘Evil and Omnipotence’ in Mind (1971) removes the possibility of hard determinism and postulates God could have made free creatures that only do what is right.[5] They do not have to be determined because God could have made people in a way they freely always chose what was right[6] even though, unlike Flew’s determinism,[7] wrong actions would be a technical possibility.[8] 

Plantinga admits it is logically possible, in a broad sense, there could be a world containing creatures that only do what is right.[9] Plantinga explains and rejects Mackie’s concept of possible worlds and does this with two main objections.[10] First, no matter how wonderful a world appears to be, no matter how many incredibly happy people there are, it is always possible there is an even better world containing more people who are even happier.[11] Plantinga’s reasoning appears sound as any finite world God would create could always be better.[12] Only an infinite world would be the best possible world, and it is debatable and unlikely God could create an infinite world. The fact that a world is created means it is not infinitely old or eternal, and so this would seemingly make the concept of a created infinite world untenable.

Plantinga’s second objection to Mackie’s best possible world idea concerns the concept of human free choice.[13] Plantinga describes Paul (1) accepting an offer, or (2) rejecting an offer.[14] Whichever choice Paul makes, either (1) or (2), God would not be able to actualize that world.[15] If Paul would make a wrong choice at any point, the problem of evil would occur, and the world would no longer be the best possible as Mackie describes.[16] To Plantinga, the result of God creating significantly free creatures is that their decisions did impact which type of world God created, and how much evil it would contain.[17] God’s omnipotence, to Plantinga, could not guarantee a best possible world free from evil, because there is always a possibility of human decisions that are contrary to what God would have desired.[18] Since significantly free creatures exist, it is never up to God alone in regard to which world is actualized.[19]

Augustine

Augustine, like Plantinga, seemingly did assume free creatures will eventually make one wrong decision, this making Mackie’s idea that human beings could always freely choose the right seem untenable to these free will proponents.[20] At the same time, both Augustine and Plantinga would reject Mackie’s notion that if God is understood and accepted, as in traditional Christian theism, he should have created a best possible world filled with perfect creatures that never do wrong actions,[21] and because God did not do this atheism would be the preferred philosophy to adopt. Both free will advocates have stated that significantly free creatures by definition could not be guaranteed by God to avoid wrong actions,[22] and thus when wrong actions occur it is because of the human abuse of free will only.[23] God is not to be blamed for creating a good thing, that being free will, which is willfully turned towards something evil by his human creation.[24]

Feinberg

Feinberg holds to modified rationalism and a sovereignty theodicy view similar to mine which was explained in Chapter Two as the idea that God was not obligated to create anything, including a world, but chose to create purely from his own desires.[25] Within modified rationalism, the concept of a best possible world is denied in favour of the view that God chose to create the present world which was initially perfectly good.[26] The fact that the problem of evil exists would be seen within modified rationalism as a result of the free choice of human beings to rebel against God in both free will and sovereignty theodicy which both deny the notion of best possible world.[27] Modified rationalism would oppose the best possible world concepts of Leibniz from the Enlightenment era, and Mackie from the modern era.[28]

[1] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 32-34).

[2] LaFollette (1980: 2). Plantinga (1977)(2002: 32-34). Phillips (2005: 3).

[3] LaFollette (1980: 2). Plantinga (1977)(2002: 32-34).

[4] Leibniz (1710)(1990).

[5] Mackie (1971) in Plantinga (1977)(2002: 32-33). Mackie (1955)(1996: 250-253).

[6] LaFollette (1980: 2).

[7] Flew (1955: 150-153). Plantinga (1977)(2002: 31).

[8] Mackie (1971) in Plantinga (1977)(2002: 32-33). Mackie (1955)(1996: 250-253).

[9] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 32).

[10] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 32-64).

[11] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 34).

[12] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 34).

[13] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 39-44). LaFollette (1980: 3).

[14] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 40-42). There are possible worlds that God cannot actualize. LaFollette (1980: 3).

[15] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 42).

[16] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 42).

[17] Plantinga (1982: 180-181). Therefore, for Plantinga some worlds cannot be actualized. LaFollette (1980: 4).

[18] Plantinga (1982: 180-181). LaFollette (1980: 4).

[19] Geivett (1993: 196).

[20] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 3).

[21] Mackie (1971) in Plantinga (1977)(2002: 32-33). Mackie (1955)(1996: 250-253).

[22] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 3). Plantinga (1982: 189).

[23] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 3). Plantinga (1982: 189).

[24] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 33). Plantinga (1982: 170-171). The free will theist that reasons evil is adequately explained is left with the religious problem of individual suffering, according to LaFollette. LaFollette (1980: 1).

[25] Feinberg (1994: 36).

[26] Plantinga (1982: 167-189). Feinberg (1994: 36).

[27] Plantinga (1982: 167-189). Feinberg (1994: 36).

[28] Leibniz (1710)(1990). Mackie (1971) in Plantinga (1977)(2002: 32-33).

 

Wien  Parlamentsgebäude, Vienna (trekearth)

ADAMS, ROBERT. M (1996) ‘Theodicy’, in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 

AUGUSTINE (388-395)(1964) On Free Choice of the Will, Translated by Anna S.Benjamin and L.H. Hackstaff, Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall. 

AUGUSTINE (398-399)(1992) Confessions, Translated by Henry Chadwick, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

AUGUSTINE (400-416)(1987)(2004) On the Trinity, Translated by Reverend Arthur West Haddan, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Series One, Volume 3, Denver, The Catholic Encyclopedia. 

AUGUSTINE (421)(1998) Enchiridion, Translated by J.F. Shaw, Denver, The Catholic Encyclopedia. 

AUGUSTINE (426)(1958) The City of God, Translated by Gerald G. Walsh, Garden City, New York, Image Books. 

AUGUSTINE (427)(1997) On Christian Doctrine, Translated by D.W. Robertson Jr., Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall. 

AUGUSTINE (427b)(1997) On Christian Teaching, Translated by R.P.H. Green, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) ‘Theodicy’, in Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, p. 375. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

BOURKE, VERNON J. (1958) ‘Introduction’, in The City of God, Translated by Gerald G. Walsh, Garden City, New York, Image Books.

CALVIN, JOHN (1539)(1998) The Institutes of the Christian Religion, Book IV, Translated by Henry Beveridge, Grand Rapids, The Christian Classic Ethereal Library, Wheaton College. http://www.ccel.org/ccel/calvin/institutes.html 

CALVIN, JOHN (1540)(1973) Romans and Thessalonians, Translated by Ross Mackenzie, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 

CALVIN, JOHN (1543)(1996) The Bondage and Liberation of the Will, Translated by G.I. Davies, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

CALVIN, JOHN (1550)(1978) Concerning Scandals, Translated by John W. Fraser, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 

CALVIN, JOHN (1552)(1995) Acts, Translated by Watermark, Nottingham, Crossway Books. 

CALVIN, JOHN (1553)(1952) Job, Translated by Leroy Nixon, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House. 

CALVIN, JOHN (1554)(1965) Genesis, Translated by John King, Edinburgh, The Banner of Truth Trust.

CHADWICK, HENRY (1992) ‘Introduction’, in Confessions, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1729)(2006) Sovereignty of God, New Haven, Connecticut, Jonathan Edwards Center, Yale University. 

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1731-1733)(2006) Law of Nature, New Haven, Connecticut, Jonathan Edwards Center, Yale University.

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1754)(2006) Freedom of the Will, Flower Mound, Texas. Jonathanedwards.com. 

ERICKSON, MILLARD (1994) Christian Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House. 

ERICKSON, MILLARD (2003) What Does God Know and When Does He Know It?, Grand Rapids, Zondervan.

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, in David Basinger and Randall Basinger (eds.), Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House. 

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (2001) No One Like Him, John S. Feinberg (gen.ed.), Wheaton, Illinois, Crossway Books.

FLEW, ANTONY, R.M. HARE, AND BASIL MITCHELL (1996) ‘The Debate on the Rationality of Religious Belief’, in L.P. Pojman (ed.), Philosophy, The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company. 

FLEW, ANTONY AND A.MACINTRYE (1999) ‘Philosophy of Religion’, in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press Ltd.

FRAME, JOHN M. (1999) ‘The Bible on the Problem of Evil: Insights from Romans 3:1-8,21-26; 5:1-5; 8:28-39’, IIIM Magazine Online, Volume 1, Number 33, October 11 to October 17, Fern Park, Florida, Third Millennium.

FRAME, JOHN M. (2002) The Doctrine of God, P and R Publishing, Phillipsburg, New Jersey. 

GEIVETT, R. DOUGLAS (1993) Evil and the Evidence for God, Philadelphia, Temple University Press.

HASKER, WILLIAM (1989) God, Time, and Knowledge, Ithaca, Cornell University Press. 

HASKER, WILLIAM (1993) ‘C. Robert Mesle, John Hick’s Theodicy: A Process Humanist Critique’, in Philosophy of Religion, Volume 34, Number 1, pp. 55-56. Dordrecht, Netherlands, Philosophy of Religion. 

HASKER, WILLIAM (1994) ‘Can Philosophy Defend Theology?’, in Faith and Philosophy, Volume 11, Number 2, April, pp. 272-278. Wilmore, Kentucky, Asbury College. 

HASKER, WILLIAM (2000) ‘The Problem of Evil in Process Theism and Classical Free Will Theism’, in Process Studies, Volume. 29, Number 2, Fall-Winter, pp. 194-208. Claremont, California, Religion Online. 

HASKER, WILLIAM (2003) ‘Counterfactuals and Evil’, in Philosophia Christi, Volume 5, Number 1, pp. 235-249. La Mirada, California, Biola University.

HASKER, WILLIAM (2003) ‘Is Free-Will Theism Religiously Inadequate? A Reply to Ciocchi’, in Religious Studies, Volume 39, Number 4, December, pp. 431-440. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 

HASKER, WILLIAM (2007) ‘Peter van Inwagen, The Problem of Evil’, in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, Notre Dame, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.

HICK, JOHN (1970) Evil and The God of Love, London, The Fontana Library. 

HICK, JOHN (1978) ‘Present and Future Life’, Harvard Theological Review, Volume 71, Number 1-2, January-April, Harvard University. 

HICK, JOHN (1981) Encountering Evil, Stephen T. Davis (ed.), Atlanta, John Knox Press.

HICK, JOHN (1993) ‘Afterword’ in GEIVETT, R. DOUGLAS (1993) Evil and the Evidence for God, Philadelphia, Temple University Press.

HICK, JOHN (1993) The Metaphor of God Incarnate, Louisville, Kentucky, John Know Press. 

HICK, JOHN (1994) Death and Eternal Life, Louisville, Kentucky, John Knox Press. 

HICK, JOHN (1999) ‘Life after Death’, in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press.

JORDAN, MARK D. (1996) ‘Augustine’, in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, pp. 52-53. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

KREEFT, PETER (1988) Fundamentals of the Faith, San Francisco, Ignatius Press.

KREEFT, PETER AND RONALD K. TACELLI (1994) Handbook of Christian Apologetics, Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press. 

LAFOLLETTE, HUGH (1980) ‘Plantinga on Free Will Defence’, in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 11, The Hague, Martimus Nijhoff Publishers. 

LEIBNIZ, G.W. (1710)(1998) Theodicy, Translated by E.M. Huggard Chicago, Open Court Classics. 

MACKIE, J.L. (1955)(1996) ‘Evil and Omnipotence’, in Mind, in Michael Peterson, William Hasker, Bruce Reichenbach, and David Basinger (eds.), Philosophy of Religion, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

MACKIE, J.L. (1971)(1977)(2002) ‘Evil and Omnipotence’, in The Philosophy of Religion, in Alvin C. Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids. Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

MESLE, C. ROBERT (1986) ‘The Problem of Genuine Evil: A Critique of John Hick’s Theodicy’, in The Journal of Religion, Volume 66, Number 4, pp. 412-430. October, Chicago, University of Chicago Press. 

MESLE, C. ROBERT (1991) John Hick’s Theodicy, New York, St. Martin’s Press. 

MESLE, C. ROBERT (2004) ‘Suffering, Meaning, and the Welfare of Children: What Do Theodicies Do?’, in American Journal of Theology & Philosophy, Volume 25, Number 3, September. Lamoni, Iowa, Graceland University.

PHILLIPS, D.Z. (1981) Encountering Evil, Stephen T. Davis (ed.), Atlanta, John Knox Press.

PHILLIPS, D.Z. (2005) The Problem of Evil and the Problem of God, Fortress Press, Minneapolis.

PLANTINGA, ALVIN.C. (1977)(2002) God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 

PLANTINGA, ALVIN.C. (1982) The Nature of Necessity, Oxford, Clarendon Press.

POJMAN, LOUIS P. (1996) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.

ROTH, JOHN K. ‘Introduction’ (1892-1907)(1969) in The Moral Philosophy of William James, John K. Roth (ed.), Thomas Y. Crowell Company, New York. 

ROTH, JOHN K. (1981) Encountering Evil, Stephen T. Davis (ed.), Atlanta, John Knox Press.

ROWE, WILLIAM L. (1990) ‘The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism’, in Adams and Adams (eds.), The Problem of Evil, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

ROWE, WILLIAM L. (1994) ‘The Problem of No Best World’, Faith and Philosophy, Volume 11, Number 2, April, pp. 269-278. Wilmore, Kentucky, Asbury College. 

ROWE, WILLIAM L. (1996) ‘Privation’, in Robert Audi, (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 

ROWE, WILLIAM L. (1999) ‘The Problem of Divine Sovereignty and Human Freedom’, in Faith and Philosophy, Volume 16, Number 1, January, pp. 98-101. Wilmore, Kentucky, Asbury College.

Saturday, September 19, 2020: PhD Full Version PDF: Theodicy and Practical Theology 2010, Wales TSD

Webcam Post I

Firefox earned the position recently as my default browser but lately problems have occurred with Blogger. I cannot see the video with Firefox, and it may be the case on your computer with Firefox as well. On my computer the video can be seen with Internet Explorer, Safari and Google Chrome.


Vancouver (Google Images)


Vancouver (Google Images)


New Westminster BC (trekearth)


New Westminster BC (trekearth)

From Facebook on Sunday:

A first: With a friend trying to be squeezed for more tip money by a restaurant owner after a supposed missed payment within the group which was not a missed payment. Ended on a handshake in agreement.

Additional:

The restuarant owner stated at first 'Pwan guy not pay!' and the pwan guy is a commenter on this blog that did pay which the restaurant owner eventually admitted.

Yes, this means it is the end of my audio posts which usually ended up being deleted without my permission by filefreak, or I needed to delete them on Shaw, my internet provider, to make room for the newer ones. I do however have my audio posts stored on DVD. As noted previously I can share them if requested but the posts usually contained a written section as well.

Webcam experiments July 21, 2012 the first two, July 23-24, 2012, the last photos.

My first Samsung Galaxy S2 photo. Definite upgrade from the Blackberry Curve. An upgrade for my blogs.

Fatalism Revisited

Edinburgh Castle (trekearth)

Nov 2007 Fatalism

Newly presented and updated:

Edinburgh: 1995

I find a rare Jazz Fusion unofficial CD, featuring an artist I was looking for at a flea market. I explain this to the seller and he states. ‘It was fate’ with a strong Scottish accent. ‘Pardon’ I said, ‘It was fate’, he stated. I thought he had said ‘It was fiit’.

Compatibilism/soft determinism:

P.S. Greenspan writes that compatibilism holds to free will and determinism being compatible. Greenspan (1998: 1). Louis P. Pojman, defines compatibilism as the concept that an act can be entirely determined and yet be free in the sense that it was done voluntarily and without compulsion. Pojman (1996: 596). J.S. Feinberg explains that compatibilism does not allow for coercion or force, but holds that God, or some outside force, can simultaneously determine with the use of persuasion, that an action will or will not take place. Feinberg (1986: 24). Feinberg writes that certain nonconstraining conditions could strongly influence actions, in conjunction with human free will performing these actions. Feinberg (1994: 60). With this viewpoint, there will be no contradiction in stating that God would create human beings who were significantly free, unconstrained, and yet committed actions that God willed. Feinberg (2001: 637). W.T. Stace (1952)(1976) explains that moral responsibility is consistent with determinism in the context of soft determinism and requires it. Stace (1952)(1976: 29). If human actions are uncaused then reward or punishment would be unjustified. Stace (1952)(1976: 29). Stace reasons that there must be at least some human cause within human actions to make them morally responsible acts. Stace (1952)(1976: 30).

Indeterminism is equated with incompatibilism which states that God, or any other being, cannot cause by force or coercion any human action, nor can any action be simultaneously willed by God or any other being, for the human action to remain significantly free. Compatibilism would agree with incompatibilism that God or any other being cannot cause by force or coercion any significantly free human action, but contrary to incompatibilism thinks that God can simultaneously will significantly free human actions.

Fatalism compared with hard determinism:

Simon Blackburn comments that this is the doctrine that human action has no influence on events. Blackburn (1996: 137). Blackburn gives the opinion that fatalism is wrongly confused with determinism, which by itself carries no implications that human actions have no effect. Blackburn (1996: 137). Tomis Kapitan notes that determinism is usually understood as meaning that whatever occurs is determined by antecedent (preceding cause) conditions. Kapitan (1999: 281). Pojman states that hard determinism holds that every event is caused and no one is responsible for actions, whereas soft determinism holds that rational creatures can be held responsible for determined actions as long as they are done voluntarily and without force or coercion. Pojman (1996: 586).

Fatalism should not be equated with compatibilism/soft determinism, but if fatalism states that no human actions can influence or cause events, and hard determinism holds that human beings do not cause actions or are morally responsible, there is clearly a similarity in definitions. D.G. Bloesch explains that fate is not chance, but instead is cosmic determinism that has no meaning or purpose. Bloesch (1996: 407). He writes that fate/fatalism would differ from a Christian idea of divine providence and its implied use of determinism, in that fatalism is impersonal and irrational, whereas providence is personal and rational. Bloesch (1996: 407). Thiessen comments that fatalism is not determinism because fatalism holds that all events are caused by fate, and not natural causes, and nothing can change these events. Determinism in contrast, holds that all events occur by necessity. Thiessen (1956: 186). Compatibilism and soft determinism does hold that what God determines must happen by necessity, but reasons that rational beings with a significant use of free will are not coerced or forced to commit acts, which must occur by necessity. A person can hold to hard determinism and believe that God determined all events without the significant use of free will of rational creatures, and a fatalist can also believe that events are determined without the use of significant free will of rational creatures, and yet this is caused without any meaning, and without the understanding that God or any rational entity is behind these events.

PhD Viva

I was challenged on the similarities between fatalism and my view of determinism, which is soft-determinism/compatibilism in Wales in January 2009 at my PhD Viva. I used the material from the 2007 post in the defence. I think I was successful. The reviewer noted that there are definite similarities in that both determinism and fatalism bring about events by necessity without libertarian free will from a secondary cause, but I did note correctly that determinism was theistic, at least in the context discussed and fatalism not for certain, it could, for example, exist in a naturalistic philosophical context.

(Fate and determinism are aspects of Islam, but this was beyond the scope of my work)

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) ‘Fatalism’, in Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, p. 137. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

BLOESCH, D. (1996) ‘Fate, Fatalism’, in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books.

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, David Basinger and Randall Basinger (eds.), Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (2001) No One Like Him, John S. Feinberg (gen.ed.), Wheaton, Illinois, Crossway Books.

GREENSPAN, P.S. (1998) Free Will and Genetic Determinism: Locating the Problem (s), Maryland, University of Maryland.

KAPITAN, TOMIS (1996) ‘Free Will Problem’, in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

POJMAN, LOUIS P. (1996) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.

STACE, W.T. (1952)(1976) Religion and the Modern Mind, in John R. Burr and Milton Goldinger (eds), Philosophy and Contemporary Issues, London, Collier Macmillan Publishers.

THIESSEN, HENRY C. (1956) Introductory Lectures in Systematic Theology, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

Edinburgh Castle (Google Images)


Edinburgh, The Path (trekearth)


Edinburgh, 1995 trip


Giants Causeway, Northern Ireland 1995 trip


Cliffs of Moher, Irish Republic 1995 trip

Hermeneutics of Suspicion, Feminism, Christopraxis (PhD Edit)

British Columbia (trekearth) British Columbia (trekearth) McSween, BC (trekearth)  

McSween, BC (trekearth) 

A short post on my birthday... 

Hermeneutics of Suspicion 

Marie McCarthy (2000)(2007) writes that given the human tendency to distort the truth within a certain tradition,[1] a certain hermeneutic of suspicion should exist.[2] She is not specifically discussing Biblical hermeneutics,[3] but is concerned that certain individuals may make personal spiritual experiences normative.[4] In particular as with Gebara,[5] McCarthy is concerned that a hermeneutics and a spirituality that overlooks the real human suffering of persons should be questioned.[6] 

Christopraxis 

Ray S. Anderson defines Christopraxis as the continuing power of Jesus Christ, as his ministry works with followers through the Holy Spirit.[7] Anderson’s theory of Christopraxis assumes a bodily resurrection of Christ, which Anderson states is a fact of history,[8] but presently Christ works through the Holy Spirit in this world.[9] The inner core of practical theology, as Anderson views it, is the life of a historical Jesus Christ, his resurrection and the work of the Holy Spirit of God continuing the gospel plan on earth.[10] Anderson deduces that the concept of Christopraxis includes the Holy Spirit of God working with Scripture to bring about revelation and reconciliation to persons within the Christian Church.[11] Gebara does not deny the death of Christ on the cross as a historical event and she explains there is evidence that he was crucified.[12] Gebara’s feministic theology is concerned that making the death of Christ central for salvation within the Christian faith,[13] affirms a path of suffering through male martyrdom as the only way for salvation.[14] Gebara concludes that this theory of salvation makes the suffering of women over the centuries useless.[15] Although I can fully acknowledge that women have suffered throughout history and continue to suffer in ways that are not always recognized,[16] I respectfully disagree with Gebara,[17] as the New Testament salvation is for persons that believe and trust in Christ.[18] God has a definite plan of salvation for persons.[19] Women’s status before God within the New Testament is equal to that of men with respect to personal salvation, and there is no difference between male and female as both are saved through the atoning work of Christ.[20] There is no exclusion of persons based on their gender within this process.[21] Bloesch suggests feminists desire for men and women to be able to work together as equals.[22] 

Rosemary R. Ruether (1998) acknowledges that within Christian history there has been a theology where the original equality of all people in Christ is restored.[23] She believes that equality shall not be completely accomplished until social hierarchy is ended,[24] but she states that in Christ’s new Kingdom all class, race and gender divisions are overcome.[25] This Kingdom will include both men and women redeemed through the work of Christ.[26] Rebecca S. Chopp (1995) suggests that a goal of feminist theology is to deconstruct patriarchal images of God.[27] She writes that feminist theology looks to overthrow oppression based in patriarchy.[28] New Testament scholar Aida Besançon Spencer (1991) notes that the feminist critic is to alert the reader that there is a human tendency to alienate those persons who are different and have less power.[29] Klein, Blomberg and Hubbard explain that feminists desire readers to examine the Biblical stories concerning women from a feminine perspective.[30]

[1] McCarthy in Woodward and Pattison (2000)(2007: 203). 

[2] McCarthy in Woodward and Pattison (2000)(2007: 203).

[3] McCarthy in Woodward and Pattison (2000)(2007: 203). 

[4] McCarthy in Woodward and Pattison (2000)(2007: 203). 

[5] Gebara (2002: 122-129). 

[6] McCarthy in Woodward and Pattison (2000)(2007: 203). 

[7] Anderson (2001: 29). 

[8] Anderson (2001: 52). 

[9] Anderson (2001: 52). 

[10] Anderson (2001: 52).

[11] Anderson (2001: 54). 

[12] Gebara (2002: 117).

[13] Gebara (2002: 118). 

[14] Gebara (2002: 118). 

[15] Gebara (2002: 118).

[16] Gebara (2002: 110, 112, 117).

[17] Gebara (2002: 118).

[18] John 3:16 mentions that whoever believes in Christ will have everlasting life, and John 14: 6 explains that no one comes to the Father, but through Christ. My point is not to exegete or exposit these verses but to point out that females and women are included and not excluded from the salvation process. Male and female alike are saved within the Christian tradition through faith and trust in Christ. NASB (1984: 1197, 1215). 

[19] Thiessen (1956: 277). 

[20] Erickson (1994: 548). Erickson (1994: 548). 

[21] Thiessen (1956: 277).

[22] Bloesch (1987: 256). I can support this desire in general terms, even while accepting men and women are equal but not the same, even as all men, and all women, are not the same.

[23] Ruether (1998: 28).

[24] Ruether (1998: 28). 

[25] Ruether (1998: 28). 

[26] Ruether (1998: 28).

[27] Chopp (1995: 88-89). Patriarchy can limit God to being humanly understood from a male point of view. Gebara (2002: 165). 

[28] Chopp (1995: 89). 

[29] Spencer (1991: 239-240).

[30] Klein, Blomberg, and Hubbard (1993: 455).

ANDERSON, RAY S. (2001) The Shape of Practical Theology, Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press. 

BLOESCH, DONALD G. (1987) Freedom for Obedience, San Francisco, Harper and Rowe Publishers. 

CHOPP, REBECCA S. (1995) Saving Work, Louisville, Kentucky, Westminster John Knox Press. 

ERICKSON, MILLARD (1994) Christian Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House. 

GEBARA, IVONE (2002) Out of the Depths, Translated by Ann Patrick Ware, Minneapolis, Fortress Press. 

KLEIN, WILLIAM W., CRAIG, C. BLOMBERG, AND ROBERT L. HUBBARD, JR. (1993) Introduction to Biblical Interpretation, London, Word Publishing.

RUETHER, ROSEMARY R. (1998) Introducing Redemption in Christian Feminism, Sheffield, Sheffield Academic Press. 

SPENCER, AIDA BESANÇON (1991) ‘Literary Criticism’, in David Alan Black and David S. Dockery (eds.), New Testament Criticism and Interpretation, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.

THIESSEN, HENRY C. (1956) Introductory Lectures in Systematic Theology, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

WOODWARD, JAMES AND STEPHEN PATTISON (2000)(2007)(eds.), The Blackwell Reader in Pastoral and Practical Theology, Oxford, Blackwell Publishing.

 

A photo from the previous post...