Tuesday, December 27, 2016

New York, Boston, London, Paris & symbolic logic

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Continuing on with the review of the Langer philosophical text, learning and sharing findings.

On page 111 it states:

'Express symbolically the propositional forms exemplified by:'

B.

New York is greater than Boston.

London is greater than Paris.

Paris is greater than London.

C.

If Paris is greater than London, then London is not greater than Paris.

If London is greater than Paris, then Paris is not greater than London.

The symbol > as in greater than is suggested for use by Langer. (111).

Some key symbols from the text

˜ = not
⊃ = means the same as
∃ = there exists
∃! = there exists
⊨ = entails

N > B ⊨ B < N
(New York is greater than Boston entails Boston is less than New York)

N > B ⊃ B < N
(New York is greater than Boston means the same as Boston is less than New York)

How New York is supposedly greater than Boston is not defined within this philosophical text.

P ˜ <  L

(Paris is not less than London)

E ⊨ (P, L) Brackets sometimes used for clarification.

Europe entails Paris and London.

∃!E or ∃!(E)
∃E or ∃(E)

Europe exists (There exists Europe).

I can deduce that this type of written communication could, if defined properly, clarify some philosophical and theological issues, or at least provide a different explanation.

LANGER, SUSANNE K (1953)(1967) An Introduction to Symbolic Logic, Dover Publications, New York.
foxlimousines.co.uk

Wednesday, December 14, 2016

Low probability fallacy and the supernatural

Piclogy: Twitter, Budapest
Low probability fallacy and the supernatural

Preface 

Edited October 7, 2023 

Back to the review of

PIRIE, MADSEN (2006)(2015) How To Win Every Argument, Bloomsbury, London.

Ex-post-facto statistics

Pirie reasons:

'...there are innumerable statistical fallacies ready to trap the unwary and aid the unethical.' (102).

'I draw the ace of spades. It was only a 1 in 52 chance, but it came up.

(The same applied to all cards, but one had to come up.)' (102).

'We cannot draw too many conclusions from the low 'probability' of certain past events'. (102).

'The fallacy is committed when we go on to suppose, from the occurrence of events of low probability, that something supernatural was operating...' (102).

This is reasonable from Pirie, in my view.

'This fallacy is a great prop for those who suppose themselves the children of destiny.' (103). Basing this view on the unlikely events that occurred in life.' (103).

There is the scientific concept of probability:

'The likelihood of a particular event occurring.  If there are n equally likely outcomes of some experiment, and a ways in which event E could occur, then the probability of event E is a/n.' Oxford (662).

If there were 7 equally likely outcomes of an experiment, and 8 equal ways in which the event (E) could occur: E=7/8 probability.

The science is also reasonable.

Reasonable and rational, Christian faith and philosophy is not primarily based in subjective views with low probability. The resurrection of Jesus Christ, for example, is documented in the textual religious history, known as the New Testament, and was also attested to by Church Fathers, who were basically disciples of the New Testament disciples and apostles. The resurrection is held to as doctrine because it is textually witnessed by disciples, apostles and associates.

Resurrection as doctrine was held to as intellectually certain, as in internal and external evidences 'for' were significantly stronger than internal and external evidences 'against' and those in the Christian community acted accordingly. The Christian belief is the resurrection of Christ, and the future resurrection of believer's in Christ (1 Corinthians 15, Revelation 21-22), for that matter, is not based on either high or low probability.

If interested see in 'search' top right, my writings on 'certainty', which is philosophically, not 100% certainty, because humanity lacks infinite knowledge. From my PhD thesis and website work.

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

BRUCE, F.F. (1986) ‘Revelation’, in F.F. Bruce (gen.ed.), The International Bible Commentary, Grand Rapids, Marshall Pickering/ Zondervan.

CLINES, DAVID, J. A. (1986), 2 Corinthians, The International Bible Commentary, Grand Rapids, Zondervan. 

DUNNETT, WALTER M. (2001) Exploring the New Testament, Wheaton, Crossway Books. 

EELLS, ELLERY (1996) 'Probability', in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, pp. 649-650. Cambridge University Press.

ERICKSON, MILLARD (1994) Christian Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

FEE, GORDON (1987) The First Epistle to the Corinthians, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

FLEW, ANTONY, R.M. HARE, AND BASIL MITCHELL (1983) (1996) ‘The Debate on the Rationality of Religious Belief’, in L.P. Pojman (ed.), Philosophy, The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.

HOCKING, DAVID (2014) The Book of Revelation, Tustin, California, HFT Publications.

KLEIN, PETER D. (1996) ‘Certainty’, in Robert Audi, (ed), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 

KLEIN, PETER D. (1998, 2005). ‘Epistemology’, in E. Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, London, Routledge. 

MARSH, PAUL W. in Bruce, F.F. (ed.), (1986), First Corinthians, The International Bible Commentary, Grand Rapids, Zondervan.

MOLTMANN, JÜRGEN (1993) The Crucified God, Minneapolis, Fortress Press.

MOUNCE, ROBERT H. (1990) The Book of Revelation, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

Oxford Dictionary of Science, (2010), Sixth Edition, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

PIRIE, MADSEN (2006)(2015) How To Win Every Argument, Bloomsbury, London.

SLUGA, HANS (1996) ‘Wittgenstein’, in Robert Audi, (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 

WITTGENSTEIN, LUDWIG (1951)(1979) On Certainty, Basil Blackwell, Oxford.

Sunday, December 11, 2016

Key Problem of Evil texts

Today: The Incredible Hulk's Christmas tree...

I visited my former church in Vancouver today and had an interesting discussion on 'evil' during lunch at a Japanese restaurant. I share this entry in order to relearn and assist.

PhD, University of Wales Trinity Saint David, Lampeter, 2010 

MPhil, Bangor University, 2003

January 2007: Different version 

AUGUSTINE (388-395)(1964) On Free Choice of the Will, Translated by Anna S. Benjamin and L.H. Hackstaff, Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall.

Augustine was one of the first ancient writers to deal with the problem of evil. Peterson, Hasker, Reichenbach, and Basinger (1996: 231). Within On Free Choice of the Will, Augustine presents his free will theodicy, theodicy being an explanation for the problem of evil in a theistic universe.

Augustine was somewhat influential on Alvin C. Plantinga’s free will defence in the 1970’s. Plantinga (1977)(2002: 26). Augustine reasons that God is not the cause of evil, but rather human beings create the problem when they choose to follow their own temporal ways rather than God’s. Augustine (388-395)(1964: 3). A possible problem with Augustine’s view is that he blames the problem of evil on human choice but at the same time places a heavy emphasis on God’s sovereignty in creation. Augustine’s view on human free will appears libertarian while, as John Feinberg points out, Augustine’s concept of God’s sovereignty would seemingly require some form of determinism. Feinberg (1994: 98).

PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1977)(2002) God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 

Plantinga successfully demonstrates that a free will defence is logical and reasonable. Plantinga (1977)(2002: 28). He speculates that the price of God creating a universe with significantly free creatures is that wrong actions will inevitably occur leading to the problem of evil. Plantinga (1977)(2002: 30). Plantinga’s free will approach is not primarily theological as is Augustine’s and therefore offers a different but somewhat related perspective.

A question arises if Plantinga has really successfully answered the objection of theistic critics such as Feinberg, and atheists such as J.L. Mackie on why God could not simply create human beings who were significantly free and never committed wrong actions. I believe that God could have created significantly free human beings, or at least human-like creatures that only committed right actions. Perhaps God desired to create human beings that would ultimately posses a greater spiritual maturity than Adam and Eve prior to the fall because those restored in Christ would have experienced sin, the problem of evil, death and the atoning work and resurrection of Christ.

Quite possibly restored human beings would ultimately be more spiritually mature and valuable to God than persons that never knew what it was like to disobey God and experience evil. I would also point out that Biblically speaking the angels that did not fall would seemingly be significantly free and have not committed wrong actions.

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House. 

Within this text Feinberg presents a defence which could be labelled a sovereignty theodicy. My personal sovereignty theodicy is embedded within my MPhil and more so my PhD and is somewhat similar to Feinberg’s work. As well as presenting his own perspective Feinberg does a thorough job of reviewing various theistic and atheistic concepts on the problem of evil. He reasons that God does not presently eliminate the problem of evil because to do so would violate divine plans and human development. Feinberg (1994: 130).

CALVIN, JOHN (1543)(1996) The Bondage and Liberation of the Will, Translated by G.I. Davies, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House. 

In the case of human sin, John Calvin did not believe that God used hard determinism as in forcing or coercing human sin, and nor do I. I agree that God can use human sin for the greater good, yet human beings have limited free will and freely sin by choice within a sinful nature.

Calvin stated concerning free will: If freedom is opposed to coercion, I both acknowledge and consistently maintain that choice is free and I hold anyone who thinks otherwise to be a heretic. If, I say, it were called free in this sense of not being coerced nor forcibly moved by an external impulse, but moving of its own accord, I have no objection. Calvin (1543)(1996: 68).

Human beings in Calvin’s thinking were not forced by God to sin, but God as an infinite being had and used the power to use their sin for the greater good. So to say that God willed evil for the greater good means that God could use sinful actions of others in order to accomplish his divine purpose.

Calvin stated: For we do not say that the wicked sin of necessity in such a way as to imply that they sin without wilful and deliberate evil intent. The necessity comes from the fact that God accomplishes his work, which is sure and steadfast, through them. At the same time, however, the will and purpose to do evil which dwells within them makes them liable to censure. But, it is said, they are driven and forced to this by God. Indeed, but in such a way that in a single deed the action of God is one thing and their own action is another. For they gratify their evil and wicked desires, but God turns this wickedness so as to bring his judgements (judgments) to execution. Calvin (1543)(1996: 37).

God could set up events in such a way that someone would freely choose to sin, but this is not done in such a way that God is forcing or hard determining one to do so.

HICK, JOHN (1970) Evil and The God of Love, London, The Fontana Library. 

Hick rejects Augustinian and Calvinistic views on theodicy, and instead supports what he views as the Irenean position. Hick (1970: 221). Ramsay (2004: 2). Hick also rejects conservative Christian doctrines and instead favours the idea of universalism. Hick (1970: 172). Hick (1970: 381). He reasons that human beings were made immature and capable of committing wrong human actions in order that God eventually can bring all persons to the creator through soul-making. Hick (1970: 292).

I can accept that some type of soul-making is used by God in the development of believers, but without the atoning work of Christ and resurrection within a Christian tradition we do not have a revealed divine means of salvation and are left to speculate on how God should or could save persons, as Hick speculates.

AUGUSTINE (388-395)(1964) On Free Choice of the Will, Translated by Anna S.Benjamin and L.H. Hackstaff, Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall

CALVIN, JOHN (1539)(1998) The Institutes of the Christian Religion, Book IV, Translated by Henry Beveridge, Grand Rapids, The Christian Classic Ethereal Library, Wheaton College. http://www.ccel.org/ccel/calvin/institutes.html

CALVIN, JOHN (1543)(1996) The Bondage and Liberation of the Will, Translated by G.I. Davies, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House. 

HICK, JOHN (1970) Evil and The God of Love, London, The Fontana Library.

PETERSON, MICHAEL, WILLIAM HASKER, BRUCE REICHENBACH, and DAVID BASINGER (1996) (eds.), ‘Introduction: Saint Augustine: Evil is Privation of Good’, in Philosophy of Religion, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

MACKIE, J.L. (1955)(1996) ‘Evil and Omnipotence’, in Mind, in Michael Peterson, William Hasker, Bruce Reichenbach, and David Basinger (eds.), Philosophy of Religion, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

MACKIE, J.L. (1971)(1977)(2002) ‘Evil and Omnipotence’, in The Philosophy of Religion, in Alvin C. Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids. Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 

PLANTINGA, ALVIN, C. (1977)(2002) God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

RAMSAY, MEGHAN (2004) ‘John Hick: ‘Evil and Soul Making’, Philosophy of Religion, (ed.) Philip A. Pecorino, Web Surfers Caveat, Suffolk, Virginia, Philosophy of Religion. http://www2.sunysuffolk.edu/pecorip/

Thursday, December 08, 2016

Fear Inspired Silence

Photo taken this evening after arriving home from work in Vancouver

A kind co-worker, at our Vancouver work meeting today suggested I could present a webinar and related in regard to practical problems of suffering and evil.

As in for example: How does a person deal with the death of a loved one?

In agreement with this colleague, I am God-willing, aiming for greater ministry exposure in the future.

I have dealt with practical problems of evil and suffering in my British theses work and independently on this website.

From

PhD, University of Wales Trinity Saint David, Lampeter, 2010: Theodicy and Practical Theology

I can interject and state that academically solving the logical and gratuitous problems of evil by tying them back to God is an ultimate intellectual solution, but there are still practical ramifications to deal with, such as why certain evils occur. The fact that a sovereignty theodicy can logically and reasonably solve its problem of evil, does not mean that suffering often comes with an explanation.

Practical theology and empirical data can strengthen and complement a successful Biblically inspired sovereignty theodicy by explaining how the common church member and attendee deals with theological concepts relating to theodicy.

A theodicy can be adjusted in order to better assist persons in the Christian Church by being adaptable in message without compromising Biblical and intellectual integrity. I also reason that a logical and reasonable sovereignty theodicy presentation, even with its limitations, provides greater comfort to those trusting in the Biblical God and Christ than does fear inspired silence which completely capitulates to notions that human beings cannot in any meaningful way possibly understand why a holy God willingly allows evil within his creation.

From

MPhil, Bangor University, 2003: The Problem of Evil: Anglican and Baptist Perspectives 

The problem seen from the Road, is very different. Those on the Road are suffering, and are wondering how on earth they will cope with it, and continue the life of faith as they suffer. They are participating in suffering, not observing it at a safe distance. Their difficulties are practical, not theoretical. They need something to help them keep going on that Road. The uncommitted and detached perspective of the Balcony seems to have little bearing on their position. McGrath (1992: 5).

I believe that the true solution to the problem of evil, in practical terms, is the work of Christ. His work leads to the culminated Kingdom of God where evil is arrested. At this point, the philosophical problem may still exist, but it is rather academic!

McGRATH, A. (1992) Bridge-Building, Leicester, Inter-Varsity Press.

McGRATH, A. (1992) Suffering, London, Hodder and Stoughton Limited.