Philosophical influences leading to non-Biblical Christianity

Bosphorus Bridge, Turkey connecting Europe to Asia (trekearth.com)

March 30, 2011

My Methodology

This post will be somewhat speculative and definitely non-exhaustive. I am not claiming these are all the influences leading to non-Biblical Christianity with some individuals and movements. These are reasons that come to mind from my studies and my last two degrees were in a secular context in departments where certain persons were moderate and even very liberal and I have had to consider these issues. As well, Westminster Seminary of Pennsylvania recently put on a related conference in Vancouver and so I continue to ponder on these issues.

I am not what I would consider a fundamentalist. I do reason that the Scripture is revelation from God that God guided certain persons to write. The original autographs do not exist, as far it is known, and the copies do have scribal errors, but the essential theology, philosophy and worldview of the Hebrew Bible and New Testament from academic appearances have been maintained. I hold to the inerrant word of God. I favour with the use of an English reading (in my case), seeking the original languages and the use of commentaries and other texts, finding the contextual meaning of Scripture and therefore finding proper theology. I do acknowledge the importance of methodology and background studies in academics, including in religious/philosophical studies. The Bible it is not all written in plain literal language and can be figurative literal.

Therefore, I reason the Bible is not mythology or fiction.

I am not a liberal, because of my stance on the Scripture and my resulting theology. I do see all truth as God's truth and the study of secular philosophy and in particular philosophy of religion can assist in the overall pursuit of knowledge and truth found via Biblical Studies and theology.

I would classify myself as moderate conservative, largely due to my academic approach.

I do not classify those who claim the Biblical God and triune God of the New Testament, that do not share my Reformed views, for example, or other secondary views I hold to, as those that have abandoned Biblical Christianity, and as sell-outs. In this article I am referencing persons and movements that seek to radically modify Christian faith and philosophy in non-Biblical ways.

It should be noted that extreme forms of fundamentalism that fail to exegete Scripture reasonably and properly leading to proper theology, also can lead to a corruption and even abandonment of Biblical Christianity, just as can radical liberal approaches.

Recent related post:

Kant (1724-1804)

The Enlightenment

From my 2009 post on Enlightenment (edited): 'Seventeenth century revision of Christian thought was known as the Age of Reason, which led to the Enlightenment. Colin Brown described the Enlightenment as follows: The Age of Enlightenment (German Die Aufklarung) covers roughly the eighteenth century. It is sometimes identified with the Age of Reason, but the latter term covers both the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Although the Enlightenment had some of its roots in seventeenth century rationalism, the ideas which characterize the Enlightenment went far beyond the rationalism of Descartes, Spinoza, and the thinkers of their time. Brown (1996: 355). So from Brown’s idea, the roots of the Enlightenment started with philosophers like Descartes, but went beyond those men.

David A. Pailin, of Manchester University, stated: The Enlightenment’s criticism of the authority of tradition led to increasing secularization in attitudes and ideas. Nature is seen as an ordered whole rather than as a stage for divine interventions and supernatural happenings. So far as religious beliefs are concerned, claims to revelation are acceptable only when they are rationally justified and their contents subject to reason’s judgment. Biblical stories and accepted doctrines are not immune from criticism. Works like Bayle’s Historical and Critical Dictionary and Voltaire’s Philosophical Dictionary highlight the faults of revered figures and the questionability of standard doctrines. Historical and literary investigations into the Bible develop. Reports about miracles, especially that of the resurrection, give rise to considerable discussion. There is great hostility to priestcraft and suspicion of ecclesiastical pretensions to guide human understanding. Pailin (1999: 180).

David Pailin’s comments demonstrate some of the modern assumptions made by philosophers of religion concerning Christianity. As Pailin pointed out, revelation and ecclesiastical pretensions would often face great hostility philosophically. I agree with the Enlightenment approach to review Christian claims through reason, but it appears that more faith is put in the Enlightenment critics of Christianity than in the people who wrote the original work. Enlightenment thinking is committed to ". . . reason as the proper tool and final authority for determining issues." Pailin (1999: 179).

Enlightenment thinking has human reason as the final authority, whereas traditional Christianity uses human reason, but it assumes that human nature is fallen and God must reveal himself to that reason. Enlightenment thinking, in my view, rests on the faulty idea that finite man should be able to be the final judge regarding ideas about God. Enlightenment era thinking, which is still prominent in liberal circles today, believes that humanity has the ability to reason out who God is, whereas traditional Christianity believes that God must reveal himself in order for human beings to come to some understanding of who he is. So the Enlightenment puts greater emphasis on the human mind comprehending God, whereas traditional Christianity puts emphasis on Scripture inspired by God, which must teach human beings about God.

Two problems come to mind concerning the human mind’s ability to know God. First, the human mind is finite, God is infinite. It could be said that human beings could only understand God in a limited way. This is not to say that the limited human understanding was in error or without logic, but simply limited. For this reason, I think in this relationship God would have to take the initiative in presenting himself to humanity for greater understanding, and this would lead to revelation. Second, I believe there is significant evidence in Scripture and everyday life, that humanity is imperfect and sinful, and in a spiritual condition where they would have to be transformed in order to have a relationship with God. I am not saying that human beings cannot understand things about God without revelation, but I am stating that revelation is required for a changed spirit which could lead to a relationship with God. I, therefore, do not think that human reason outside of revelation should be our final authority in theology.'

Postmodernism

From my PhD:

'Modernity was the dominant worldview heavily influenced by the Enlightenment. Grenz, Guretzki, and Nordling (1999: 79-80). Veith writes that in the late twentieth century these views have been replaced by post-modernism, which has less emphasis on absolute truth. Veith (1994: 19). This is not to state that post-modernism completely sets aside the concept of truth, but post-modern philosophies are often less dogmatic in approach than ones from the modern era.'

Blackburn explains that philosophically postmodernism implies a mistrust in the views of modernity. Blackburn (1996: 294). Post-structuralists deny fixed meanings or correspondences between language and reality and fixed objective truth and fact. Blackburn (1996: 295). Truth is not so much objective, but there can be more or less accuracy. Blackburn (1996: 295).

Philosophically, I would reason for the finite mind there is no such thing as complete objectivity and there are always subjective aspects to reasoning. I reason the infinite God can see things perfectly and fully objectively and also sees the subjective. However, the Scripture does appear to make certain largely and primarily objective claims. For example, in John 14:6 where Jesus claims (from the NASB) that he is the way, the truth and the life, and that no one comes to the Father but through him. This appears to be an objective truth claim in regard to the nature of God and the nature of salvation.

There is a fixed meaning between the language of the text and reality. There is a claim of truth and fact.

Therefore, a postmodern approach to Scripture is in error as it fails to reasonably accept the objective claims made within.

Empiricism

The permanent strand of philosophy that ties knowledge to experience, as in sensory consciousness and in what can be observed as true by the use of the senses. Blackburn (1996: 119). Knowledge outside of this approach is denied and there is no such thing as a priori knowledge or intuitive knowledge that can be found by the use of reason. Blackburn (1996: 119).

A problem with this Blackburn states is explaining how thought does not derive from experience but appears to allow persons to categorize experience. Blackburn (1996: 119). He also noted that mathematics, and the logical appear to have no basis in experience. Blackburn (1996: 119). In can be deduced that there are mathematical and logical truths that exist outside of empirical experience.

Therefore, there would also be philosophical and theological truths that exist outside of empirical experiences.

Further:

Empirical experiences allow the human being to understand in thought mathematics, logic, philosophy and theology.

To use empiricism in Religious Studies at the expense of other forms of thought such as rationalism which uses unaided reason in order to gain knowledge, Blackburn (1996: 318) in the discipline of philosophy/philosophy of religion, and theology which trusts and depends in Biblical supernatural revelation, is to overlook certain means of finding truth.

Therefore, empiricism is a valid and reasonable form of philosophy and very necessary in science, but is limited and should not be the only worldview considered in the pursuit of truth.

A Philosophy of God's Love over God's Justice

No question God's love for humanity is seen in the New Testament by Christ's atoning work (Mark 10: 45, Hebrews 9, 10) including justification (Romans 1-3, Galatians 2) and sanctification (2 Thessalonians 2: 13-15) and his resurrection (John 20, 21, 1 Corinthians 15) for humanity as he elects those in Christ (Ephesians 1, Romans 8). It is also demonstrated in the Hebrew Bible with various covenants.

In my mind often certain conservatives and fundamentalists emphasize their particular secondary doctrines and related cultural beliefs so strongly that they do not sufficiently love others, this love should be a result of loving God fully (Matthew 22, Mark 12, Luke 10). In the name of justice it appears they reason others can be shunned or not fully respected because others outside of these views are not following God properly.

Some liberals, especially the more radical ones, often seem to at times wish to include so many within the Church that they are willing to overlook claims made in the Scripture that would exclude others, at least from membership, such as the Ten Commandment and other morality claims and commands. God's love is emphasized at the expense of justice. Christians should love their neighbour (Matthew 22, Mark 12), and Christians are to love one another (John 13). Others of different non-Biblical views should always be loved. But, there are objective standards given in Scripture and final judgment for those outside of Christ (Revelation 20) and in Christ (2 Corinthians 5: 10).

Supporting persons and churches claiming to be Christian which overemphasize the love of God at the expense of justice are really setting certain many persons up for a disappointing final review from God, whether the persons being judged are in or outside of Christ, although obviously it is much better to be in Christ.

Therefore, I think this philosophy is theologically misguided error which places one aspect of God above the other.

Further: It is not loving in a proper sense.

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford, University, Press.

BROWN, C. (1996) The Enlightenment, in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books.

GRENZ, STANLEY J., DAVID GURETZKI AND CHERITH FEE NORDLING (1999) Pocket Dictionary of Theological Terms, Downers Grove, Ill., InterVarsity Press.

PAILIN, D.A. (1999) Enlightenment, in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press Limited.

VEITH, GENE EDWARD, JR. (1994) Postmodern Times, Wheaton Illinois, Crossway Books.


Las Vegas, Nevada strip (Ron Niebrugge)


Bristol, England (trekearth.com)


Vancouver, BC (trekearth.com)



BA, MTS, MPhil, PhD (Order on wall, PhD, up BA, down MTS, MPhil)
My wall completed after my PhD graduation party.

Natural Evils (PhD Edit)

Natural Evils (PhD Edit)

20240423 photo from my recent trip, Liverpool Cathedral

Preface

20110313 article from my PhD work with revisions 20240520

Augustine’s Perspective

Philip L. Quinn (1996) defines natural evils as the bad consequences of impersonal forces operating in nature, and this is a good secular definition.[1] Feinberg explains the concept of natural evils is often considered to be missing from Augustine’s theodicy;[2] however, ideas taken from Augustine can shed light on his leanings.[3] Feinberg notes the fact Augustine does not deal specifically with natural evils is not a devastating problem. To Feinberg, Augustine’s work is successful because the free will theodicy is logically presented without contradiction, and solves the moral problem of evil presented within Augustine’s work. It accomplishes its purpose as natural evil is not the same as moral evil, and Augustine does not need to deal with natural evils in order for his theodicy to be successful. Augustine wrote that humanity is in bondage to the prince of the world, Satan, who makes people subject to him through persuasion.[4] Augustine understood humanity as losing its dominion over creation,[5] and that dominion has been awarded substantially to Satan who he calls the prince of this world.[6] Feinberg points out that natural evils are not specifically explained by Augustine.[7] Natural evils will be discussed further in this Chapter in the context of Plantinga.

Saturday, September 19, 2020: PhD Full Version PDF: Theodicy and Practical Theology 2010, Wales TSD

Plantinga’s Perspective

Plantinga, although a modern philosopher, postulated the existence of satanic beings that were involved in causing the problem of evil.[8] He emphasized cautiously that significantly free actions of non-human persons/devils were quite possibly responsible for natural evils,[9] so his theory would be in line with basic assumptions of Augustine, and were likely influenced by Augustine.[10] Certainly, such beings as devils would be difficult, if not impossible, to prove empirically.[11] However, it seems Augustine’s and Plantinga’s beliefs that demonic beings could be involved in natural evils are plausible for at least the following reasons: (1) If material human beings were made significantly free[12] and rebelled against an immaterial God[13] then it is logical and reasonable God could create significantly free immaterial beings[14] that could rebel against him. (2) A traditional approach to Biblical interpretation tends to lead to an acceptance of the existence of satanic beings.[15] Erickson explains these beings are understood as Biblical, literal, and historical.[16] Roman Catholic scholar Peter Kreeft, working with Ronald K. Tacelli, states Satan is a deceiver of humanity,[17] and this implies the assumption that Satan has personality.[18] There is of course a debate between those of traditional conservative perspectives and those of liberal, progressive, mainline perspectives on the existence of satanic beings.[19] It would be far beyond the scope of this thesis to exhaustively debate the strengths and weaknesses of arguments of both sides.[20] The conservative, traditional position claims that the context of the Scripture allows for Satan and his demons to be understood as literal, historical beings, and referencing Greek scholars such as Strong,[21] which was done previously, allows this as an academic and intellectual possibility.[22] 

Greek scholar, Walter Bauer (1979) in agreement with Strong,[23] describes ‘Satan’ or ‘Satanas’ as the Adversary, enemy of God and those who belong to God.[24] Bauer goes on to note that Revelation, Chapter 2, verse 13, is describing Satan as persecuting the Church.[25] It appears by studying the Greek copies of the New Testament and assuming a type of contextual, literal hermeneutical method of examining Scripture, it is possible to view satanic beings as literal and historical beings,[26] and this makes Augustine’s and Plantinga’s deduction that satanic beings may be involved in natural evils as at least an intellectual possibility to consider academically.[27] The liberal, progressive, mainline perspectives can point out that there is no empirical evidence for such satanic beings,[28] and that it is not a satisfactory explanation for evil.[29] I can also understand how some within a mainline tradition in the post Enlightenment era,[30] would view it as more beneficial to deal with the empirical human problem of evil,[31] as opposed to a hypothetical satanic one.[32] Erickson writes that it would be wrong to too quickly credit physical and psychological phenomena with satanic beings.[33] I agree with this assertion and the human problem of evil should be the main focus of Christian churches and ministries as opposed to a possible satanic problem.[34]

[1] Quinn (1996: 610).

[2] Feinberg (1994: 58).

[3] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 111).

[4] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 111).

[5] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 111).

[6] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 111).

[7] Feinberg (1994: 58). Feinberg (1994: 80).

[8] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 58). The existence of satanic beings are a logical possibility for Plantinga.

[9] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 58).

[10] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 58). Augustine (388-395)(1964: 111). Natural evils for Plantinga could be caused by immoral actions of superhuman fallen angels.

[11] Phillips documents the idea that Plantinga does at times demonstrate a desire to deal with the problem of evil practically and not just with abstract philosophy. Phillips (2005: 56). Plantinga’s comments on natural evils may be an indicator that he at least intellectually can admit that empirical natural evils are a serious concrete problem.

[12] As within both theistic compatibilism and incompatibilism.

[13] God is spirit, as noted in John 4: 24. Erickson (1994: 267).

[14] Sharing God’s immaterial nature.

[15] Within that Biblical worldview which accepts the possibility of fallen angels, for Plantinga natural evils are as compatible with the existence of God as are moral evils.

[16] Erickson (1994: 445-451).

[17] Kreeft and Tacelli (1994: 294).

[18] Kreeft and Tacelli (1994: 294).

[19] Richardson (1999: 521-522).

[20] Richardson (1999: 521-522).

[21] Strong (1890)(1986: 152).

[22] Strong (1890)(1986: 152).

[23] Strong (1890)(1986: 152).

[24] Bauer (1979: 744).

[25] Bauer (1979: 745).

[26] Strong (1890)(1986: 152). Bauer (1979: 744).

[27] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 111).

[28] Richardson (1999: 521-522).

[29] Richardson (1999: 521-522).

[30] Richardson (1999: 521-522).

[31] And to deal with everyday human problems based in science and psychology, along with Scripture.

[32] Richardson suggests demonic beings provide a pictorial description of evil in the universe. Richardson (1999: 521-522). Demonic beings would serve as metaphor.

[33] Erickson (1994: 450).

[34] I therefore do not hold to a fundamentalistic position on demonology. In other words, I am not ‘looking for Satan around every corner.’

Additional, March 13, 2011

Augustine and Plantinga have some good points. I grant in light of the book of Job for example that God willingly allows/wills demonic beings to participate in certain evil acts.

I tend to reason the laws of universe have remained the same since before the fall, but that is a deduction. Romans 8 speaks of in verse 20 creation being subject to futility. Mounce states the universe was frustrated by Adam's sin and there needs to be a new heaven and new earth of 2 Peter 3 and Revelation 21. Mounce (1995: 184-185). In this sense, at least, because of human sin the present universe is corrupted. Therefore, natural evils effect human beings harshly because persons are subject to death and decay because of the fall of Genesis 3.

I reason Quinn's definition is not incorrect if one sees impersonal forces as natural forces in scientific terms. Therefore, I would tend to generally place most Natural Evils in the category of natural forces due to the laws of the nature that overpower human beings subject to suffering, death and decay, as opposed to from Satanic beings, while always allowing that as a possibility as is a combination.

Additional, May 20, 2024

Greek scholar, Walter Bauer (1979) in agreement with Strong,[23] describes ‘Satan’ or ‘Satanas’ as the Adversary, enemy of God and those who belong to God.[24] Bauer goes on to note that Revelation, Chapter 2, verse 13, is describing Satan as persecuting the Church.[25] 

Again, Bauer writes that σαταν and σατανᾶς (744) is literally the adversary. In the original writing of my PhD thesis which was within a Theology Department, using mainly philosophical theology (Theology) and philosophy of religion (Philosophy), I was advised against using New Testament, Koine Greek as my work was technically not New Testament. Therefore, I add this information for my website.

Blue Letter Bible: Σατανᾶς 

Cited 

STRONGS G4567: σαταν indeclinable (2 Corinthians 12:7 R G (Tdf. in 1 Kings 11:14 accents σαταν (Lagarde leaves it unaccented))), ὁ, and ὁ σατανᾶς (i. e. with the article (except in Mark 3:23; Luke 22:3)), σατανᾶ (cf. Buttmann, 20 (18); Winer's Grammar, § 8, 1) ((Aram. סָטָנָא, stative emphatic of סָטָן.) Hebrew שָׂטָן), adversary (one who opposes another in purpose or act)

Hoffstadt Creek Bridge, Mount Saint Helens (trekearth.com). This was the original lead photo for this article on 20110313.

AUGUSTINE (388-395)(1964) On Free Choice of the Will, Translated by Anna S.Benjamin and L.H. Hackstaff, Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall.

BARCLAY, WILLIAM (1976) The Letters of James and Peter, Philadelphia, The Westminster Press. 

BAUER, W. (1979) A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament, Translated by Eric H. Wahlstrom, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press.

BRUCE, F.F. (1987) Romans, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 

CRANFIELD, C.E.B. (1992) Romans: A Shorter Commentary, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. DUNN, JAMES D.G. (1988) Romans, Dallas, Word Books. 

ERICKSON, MILLARD (1994) Christian Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.

HOEHNER, HAROLD, ThD, PhD (1985) The Epistle To The Romans, Institute of Theological Studies. (Audio) 

KREEFT, PETER AND RONALD K. TACELLI (1994) Handbook of Christian Apologetics, Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.

MOUNCE, ROBERT H. (1995) The New American Commentary: Romans, Nashville, Broadman & Holman Publishers.

PAYNE DAVID F.(1986) ‘2 Peter’, in F.F. Bruce, (ed.), The International Bible Commentary, Grand Rapids, Marshall Pickering/Zondervan. 

PHILLIPS, D.Z. (2005) The Problem of Evil and the Problem of God, Fortress Press, Minneapolis.

PLANTINGA, ALVIN.C. (1977)(2002) God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

PLANTINGA, ALVIN.C. (1982) The Nature of Necessity, Oxford, Clarendon Press.

QUINN, PHILIP L. (1996) ‘Philosophy of Religion’, Robert Audi (ed.), in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

RICHARDSON, ALAN (1999) ‘Satan’, in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press Ltd.

STRONG, J. (1890)(1986) Strong’s Exhaustive Concordance of the Bible, Pickering, Ontario, Welch Publishing Company.

Sabellianism and modalism (non-exhaustive)

Sabellianism and modalism (non-exhaustive)

Originally published March 1, 2011, edited on May 27, 2023.

Photo: Princeton University

February 25, 2011

On Sunday at the church related lunch, I was given a tract to examine by someone. It was from a local modalist church, I reasoned. 

According to C. A. Blaising, monarchianism, also known as patripassianism and Sabellianism refers to a mainly Western concept of the third century which attempted to defend monotheism against tritheism by denying personal distinctions between Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Blaising (1996: 727). Blaising notes the term monarchianism was first used by Tertullian to denote those that wished to protect the monarchy of the one God from wrong theology concerning the economy of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Blaising (1996: 727).

Blaising noted this first (dynamic monarchianism) view had proposed monotheistic God, as in the Father in relation to Jesus a mere man who was 'endowed with the Holy Spirit'. Blaising (1996: 727). This view was supported in Rome in around 190 by Thedotus of Byzantium and then by Artemon/Theodotus. This first view was refuted by Hippolytus. Blaising (1996: 727).

Paul of Samosata depersonalized the Logos as the inherent rationality of God, the 'homoousia' of God. Blaising (1996: 727). The substance of God. For this Paul, the Holy Spirit was not a separate being but the grace of the Father. Blaising (1996: 727). This Paul also denied the preincarnate Word of God, and his teaching was condemned at the Synod of Antioch in 268.

This second view also became known as modalism. Blaising. (1996: 727). Sabellius was in Rome, Blaising (1996: 727), Turner (1999: 514). There is a possibility he may have been from Libya. Turner (1999: 514). He taught modalism in the third century and thus concepts developed the name Sabellianism. Turner explains sabellianism as an alternative denotation of modalism. Turner (1999: 514). Blaising states that Sabellius is often confused with Marcus of Ancyrra of the fourth century. He reasoned a divine monad named Huiopator projected itself as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. The Father as creator and lawgiver, the Son as redeemer the Spirit as grace giver. These were three different modes revealing the same divine person. Blaising (1996: 727).

Erickson notes that dynamic monarchianism seemed to deny the trinity. Erickson (1994: 334). He did examine modalism in his text in regard to the trinity. There is one God, variously designated as Father, Son and Holy Spirit but they do not stand for any real distinctions, but are simply useable at different times. Erickson (1994: 334). Erickson also points out the difficulty with patripassianism, in other words the Father suffering along with Christ as if the Father suffers identically with the Son under modalism. Erickson (1994: 334). Perhaps a difficulty, perhaps, not. As God is one of spiritual united nature. Would not God the Father understand all the sufferings of God of the Son? I would think so.

And an objection raised by trinitarians, and rightly so, is that the New Testament interactions between the Father and Son appear to be very real conversations and not based in modes. A reasonable point could be made that yes the human Jesus was interacting with the divine Father in sinless perfection but this was being done largely because in eternity, God the Son/Word had been interacting with God the Father in a similar way (John 1).

Concerning Hebrews 1, for example, it is demonstrated in the New Testament that the Father and Son are of the same substance and nature. The Holy Spirit in Acts 5, and in Matthew 28: 19 can be demonstrated as divine and I would therefore deduce have the same substance and nature.

Therefore it should be noted that triune persons are not three separate natures/Gods.

Further:

Jesus Christ did of course in the incarnation take a separate human nature.

The persons of the trinity could also be called distinctions, but they do personally interact according to the New Testament.


Hawthorne (1986: 1506). Click twice to enlarge.


University of Wales, Bangor


University of Wales, Lampeter/University of Wales, Trinity Saint David.

BLAISING, C.A. (1996) ‘Monarchianism' in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books.

BLAISING, C.A. (1996) ‘Nicea, Council of (325)’ in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books. 

BOWMAN, ROBERT M. (1990) Why You Should Believe in the Trinity, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

BROM, ROBERT H. (1983) The Eternal Sonship of Christ, San Diego, CIC 827. 

BROMILEY, G.W. (1996) ‘Trinity’ in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books. 

BROWNING, W.R.F. (1997) Dictionary of the Bible, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

ERICKSON, MILLARD (1994) Christian Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

FRANKE, JOHN R. (2005) The Character of Theology, Baker Academic, Grand Rapids. 

HAWTHORNE, GERALD F. (1986) 'Hebrews', in The International Bible Commentary, Grand Rapids, Zondervan.

TURNER, H. E. W. (1999) 'Sabellianism', in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press Limited.

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) Edited from PhD

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) Edited from PhD

Preface

Photo: Buchenberg, Germany (trekearth.com) 

This post which is edited work from my PhD demonstrates where Philosophy/Philosophy of Religion can work with Theology and Biblical Studies.

There would be areas of agreement and disagreement with Christian theology and worldview. The philosophical arguments of Kant are often used by critics of theism and Christianity and therefore at times need to be dealt with by those Christians interested in theological defences, apologetics, and I would suggest at times even evangelism and missions. One can see why my Doctorate is in both Theology and Philosophy of Religion. 

Kantian philosophy

Kantian philosophy originates from philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). Kant like some other prominent philosophers of the Enlightenment era, such as Jonathan Edwards is a sophisticated writer.[1] It would take years of research to become a scholar of Kant, and it should be noted he is not a major player within theodicy discussion.

In his Inaugural Dissertation of 1770, Kant provides the idea that persons can only have a priori knowledge of space and time by the use of forms of the mind, which are imposed by human experience.[2] Kantian scholars Paul Guyer and Allen Wood (1999) with the Introduction to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, note that a priori knowledge originates independently of senses and experience.[3] According to Pojman the word a priori is the Latin for preceding and is considered knowledge that is not based on empirical experience, but is known by the meaning of words or definitions.[4] 

In the Critique of Pure Reason of 1781 and revised in 1787, Kant explains that the forms of appearance from which sensations can be understood are not themselves the empirical sensations.[5] Human experience will determine the method and forms by which particular things are understood by what Kant calls pure intuition.[6] Concerning human experience, Kant reasoned categories are applied to objects not because the objects make the categories possible, but rather because categories themselves provide and constitute necessary conditions for the representation for all possible objects of experience.[7] 

Therefore any human understanding of metaphysical reality would not be comprehended by empirical knowledge in a posteriori sense.[8] Guyer and Wood point out that Kant was not an empiricist,[9] as while Kant criticized and limited the scope of traditional metaphysical thought,[10] he also sought to defend against empiricism’s claim of the possibility of universal and necessary knowledge which he called a priori [11] knowledge, because no knowledge derived from experience, a posteriori [12] knowledge, could justify a claim to universal and necessary validity.[13] Guyer and Wood explain that Kant sought to defend the scientific approach to the acquisition of knowledge against skeptics that dismissed rigorous arguments in favor of ‘common sense.’[14] 

Kant critiqued the dogmatism of certain metaphysicians negatively,[15] and he also negatively noted as dogmatists those that would be intellectually indifferent to metaphysical inquiry.[16] Kant wished to limit the pretensions of dogmatic empiricists while defending metaphysical theories as a science and necessary in terms of practical reason.[17] Basically, Kant defended metaphysics as important and necessary,[18] but was sympathetic to the empiricists view that certain metaphysical questions were insoluble.[19] Kant noted that a priori is relational without its own inherent content.[20] It is synthetic and incapable of serving as metaphysical proof. 

A priori is relative to an experience only capable of producing appearances, and so a priori is factual as experience which it conditions.[21] Kant reasons objects that were present in empirical human experience were in the phenomena realm, while objects outside were the noumena realm.[22] He writes that the contingent things experienced by persons are phenomena.[23] These are things that could be experienced empirically and would be reasonably accepted as reality.[24] The noumena realm was not available to empirical senses.[25] 

Kant explains in a follow up work entitled The Critique of Practical Reason from 1788, that the noumena is the theoretical department of knowledge denied, while the phenomena is one’s own empirical consciousness.[26] All positive speculative knowledge should be disclaimed for the noumena realm according to Kantian thought.[27] Kant concludes The Critique of Practical Reason by noting that the phenomena realm is the external realm where consciousness has existence.[28] The noumena realm is invisible and has true infinity where Kant believes one can reason that contingent personality is dependent on the universal and necessary connection to the invisible world.[29] Importantly Kant thought it legitimate for one to postulate the noumena realm in a ‘negative sense’ meaning things as they may be independently or how they are represented,[30] but not noumena in the ‘positive sense’ which would be things based on pure reason alone.[31] Instead, noumena categories were only useful by applying them to empirical data structured in forms of intuition.[32]

The concept of noumena, according to Kant, was bound to the limit of pretension of sensibility and reason, and therefore only negative noumenon was of intellectual use.[33] Noumena in its negative sense are that which is not an object of sense intuition.[34] Kant rejects concepts of positive noumena based on pure reason[35] because, according to T.C. Williams (1987), noumenal concepts are not determinate knowledge of anything and must be based on a sense of sensible intuition.[36] Kant rejects the positive use of the term as it postulates objective knowledge of a metaphysical realm.[37] The positive sense of the term noumena is therefore fully rejected by Kant.[38] He explains that the noumenal in the negative sense is equivalent to the thing itself and alone is involved in the concept.[39] Kant’s view leads to a moral theology which has a doctrine of God and immortality postulated, along with theories of human free will and morality.[40] His moral theology is postulated and is not dogmatic, rational metaphysics.[41] 

The nature of the noumenal realm described by Kant would, to John Hick, cause those who profess natural theology to lower their expectations from proving God’s existence to merely making it probable at best.[42] Hick thinks that these probabilities are based on personal estimates of likelihood and are arbitrary.[43] Kantian philosophy postulates that any reality which existed beyond what can be empirically experienced is not knowable, and therefore God is placed beyond the realm of science based experience.[44] God and morality could not be affirmed as actual or possible concepts, although Kant states that they can be assumed as possibilities.[45] Hick takes this idea of Kant’s and deduces that when it comes to religious doctrine, the noumenal realm that stands behind the phenomena realm may have little in common with corresponding phenomena. I do not disagree with the Kantian view that the noumena realm is not empirically knowable,[46] and I readily admit that God as spirit is not empirically[47] or scientifically provable.[48] 

Jesus stated that God is spirit in John 4:24 and therefore God is not of a material nature and cannot be proven by the use of matter or scientific experiment. Hick states that natural theology can only at best demonstrate that God is probable;[49] however, I hold that Peter D. Klein’s definition of certainty[50] could possibly be applied to natural theology.[51] Klein (1996) in ‘Certainty’ describes the idea as being that a proposition is true if there are no legitimate grounds whatsoever for doubting it.[52] This is a reasonable concept, and I support the similar idea that a proposition is certain if there are no counter propositions that are superior.[53] 

Natural theology therefore would never be 100% certain,[54] but could hypothetically at least be philosophically certain as long as arguments that supported natural theology were true beyond any reasonable doubt,[55] or the arguments for natural theology were superior to those opposing them. As for Kant, his view allows for the concept of negative noumena.[56] The idea of noumena, according to Kant, was bound to the limit of pretension of sensibility and reason, and therefore only negative noumena was of intellectual use.[57] The use of positive noumena which trusts in pure reason is rejected. Conclusion Christian scholarship does not rely primarily on natural theology, which would be considered by certain scholars to simply use pure reason which some also think Kant had demolished.[58]

Revelation from God in Scripture and resulting claims made within could perhaps be tied to Kantian concepts and intuition arising from empirical sensations.[59] This is not a difficulty for a Reformed and some other approaches to Christianity, which do not rely primarily on philosophical deductions, but in supernatural revelation of God through empirical sensations, such as prophets, Christ, the apostles and scribes. My conclusion here, which I realize some will debate, is that Scripture is not primarily metaphysical speculation about God as discussed, but is rather coming through the authors and players within his Bible, which are reasoned to be divinely guided by God.

In other words:

Natural theology at points can be reasonable philosophically as secondary support for theism and Christianity.

Natural theology does not reveal the God of the Bible specifically.

Revelation and Scripture reveals the God of the Bible.

Therefore, Christianity is not primarily based on metaphysical speculation or pure reason.

[1] Blackburn rightly suggests there is a ‘notorious difficulty of reading Kant, made worse by his penchant for scholastic systemization and obscure terminology.’ Blackburn (1996: 206). I would suggest this difficulty will lead to inevitable differences in interpreting Kant.

[2] Blackburn (1996: 205). 

[3] Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 2).

[4] Pojman (1996: 595).

[5] Kant (1781)(1787)(1929)(2006: 66). 

[6] Kant (1781)(1787)(1929)(2006: 66). 

[7] Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 3). 

[8] Kant (1781)(1787)(1929)(2006: 66). 

[9] Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 2). Norman Kemp Smith within A Commentary to Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’ writes that empiricists eliminate a priori principles, appealing to sense experience only, therefore eliminating distinctions between inductive inference and expectation. Smith (1930: xxvii). Blackburn suggests Kant made a strong break from eighteenth century empiricism. Blackburn (1996: 206). Kant was not an empiricist as was David Hume that within (1779)(2004) Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, notes that for ‘ignorant ages’ persons including geniuses have ambitiously tried to produce new proofs and arguments for natural theology and God. Hume (1779)(2004: 2). Hume also reasoned that the supposed Supreme Being’s infinite divine attributes would be ‘totally incomprehensible’ and that human nature would not have ideas that would correspond to the attributes of this divine being. Hume (1779)(2004: 21). Hume’s degree of scepticism of God and natural theology and dependence on empiricism alone was not the same view as Kant. Kant (1788)(1997: 11). Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 3). 

[10] Kant was opposed to speculative views of indefensible rationalism. Blackburn (1996: 206). Cornelius Van Til suggests Kant reasons God is not a law giver to humanity, God cannot reveal himself through nature or human constitution with the image of God. The intellect of human beings makes no positive assertions concerning God. Kant rejects notions of theoretical knowledge of God and, instead, appeals to practical reason and faith. Van Til (1977: 246-247). Plantinga writes that it is suggested by many commentators Kant demonstrated there are insurmountable problems with the idea that the traditional Christian God exists. Plantinga (2000: 7).

[11] Kant called cognitions independent of all experience and the impressions of the senses a priori. Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 136). 

[12] Empirical experiences are called a posteriori. A posteriori knowledge is empirical knowledge through experience. Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 136). 

[13] Kant argued that inductive inference from data and experience was only possible based upon prior acceptance of views of rational principles established independently. Therefore experience does not validate these principles. Smith (1930: xxvii). Ameriks suggests Kant rejected unjustifiable metaphysical claims in place of principles of theory which are the conditions by which persons orientate themselves within experience. These principles are ‘necessary and discoverable’ therefore defeating empiricism and scepticism concerning reasonable metaphysical claims, and contrasting traditional rationalism and dogmatism. Ameriks (1996: 399).

[14] Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 2).

[15] Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 3).

[16] Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 3). Kant notes in ‘Critique of Practical Reason’ empiricism needs to be contrasted by the necessity of rational a priori principles. Kant (1788)(1997: 11). [17] Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 3). Ameriks writes, for Kant practical reason is that which determines rules for the faculty of desire and will as opposed to the faculty of cognition and feeling. Ameriks (1996: 399). 

[18] Ameriks (1996: 399). 

[19] Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 3).

[20] Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 3).

[21] Kant (1781)(1787)(1929)(2006: 43).

[22] Kant (1781)(1787)(1929)(2006: 482). Guyer and Wood note that the phenomena realm is the category applied to appearances whereas things in themselves are the noumena realm, which might be thought of but not known. Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 10). The phenomena realm is that which appears and is therefore empirical. 

[23] Kant (1781)(1787)(1929)(2006: 482).

[24] Kant (1781)(1787)(1929)(2006: 482). 

[25] Kant (1781)(1787)(1929)(2006: 393). 

[26] Kant (1788)(1898)(2006: 3). 

[27] Kant (1788)(1898)(2006: 26).

[28] Kant (1788)(1898)(2006: 100). 

[29] Kant (1788)(1898)(2006: 100). 

[30] Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 13). 

[31] Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 13). 

[32] Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 13). 

[33] Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 350).

[34] Smith (1930: 413). Ameriks (1996: 400).

[35] Smith (1930: 413). Ameriks (1996: 400).

[36] Williams (1987: 149).

[37] Williams (1987: 150).

[38] Williams (1987: 151). 

[39] Smith (1930: 413). 

[40] Kant (1788)(1898)(2006: 846). 

[41] Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 14). 

[42] Hick in Geivett (1993: 230-231). 

[43] Hick in Geivett (1993: 230). In contrast I deduce Scriptural revelation would not necessarily be arbitrary estimates of God, but God and any revealed doctrines would be understood by a serious contextual evaluation of the Scripture.

[44] Kant (1788)(1898)(2006: 1). 

[45] Kant (1788)(1898)(2006: 1). Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 14). 

[46] Kant (1781)(1787)(1929)(2006: 393). Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 10). Smid (1999: 10).

[47] Kant (1781)(1787)(1929)(2006: 393).

[48] Kant (1781)(1787)(1929)(2006: 393). 

[49] Hick in Geivett (1993: 230-231). Geivett (1993: 49).

[50] Klein (1996: 113).

[51] And Biblical theology as well.

[52] Klein (1996: 113). Blackburn explains that a proposition would be considered certain when there is no doubt concerning its truth. Blackburn (1996: 60). 

[53] This would also accomplish the standard of a proposition being true as it is beyond (reasonable) doubt. 

[54] In my view 100% certainty is impossible to grasp for a finite being that cannot have 100% knowledge. Absolute certainty could only belong to an infinite, omniscient being.

[55] Klein (1996: 113). Blackburn (1996: 60).

[56] Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 350).

[57] Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 350). Smith (1930: 413). Ameriks (1996: 400).

[58] Hick in Geivett (1993: 230). Weber (1955)(1981: 203). Geivett would not agree and considers it dangerous to completely dismiss natural theology. Geivett (1993: 69-89). Even after accepting Kant’s critique as reasonable and somewhat valuable, I still reason that philosophical truths about God can possibly be deduced without the use of direct divine revelation and a supernatural event and/or Scripture. Deductions and knowledge concerning a first cause and/or God, do not however qualify as equivalent to the knowledge of knowing God as a result of Scripture and the influence of the Holy Spirit. Philosophical deductions concerning God would not necessarily be of pure reason, and I can agree with Kant that any reasonable deduction and intuition must be tied back to empirical experience by which to make sense of these deductions. Kant (1781)(1787)(1929)(2006: 66). Blackburn (1996: 205). [59] Kant (1781)(1787)(1929)(2006: 66). Blackburn (1996: 205). 

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