Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) Edited from PhD

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) Edited from PhD

Preface

Photo: Buchenberg, Germany (trekearth.com) 

This post which is edited work from my PhD demonstrates where Philosophy/Philosophy of Religion can work with Theology and Biblical Studies.

There would be areas of agreement and disagreement with Christian theology and worldview. The philosophical arguments of Kant are often used by critics of theism and Christianity and therefore at times need to be dealt with by those Christians interested in theological defences, apologetics, and I would suggest at times even evangelism and missions. One can see why my Doctorate is in both Theology and Philosophy of Religion. 

Kantian philosophy

Kantian philosophy originates from philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). Kant like some other prominent philosophers of the Enlightenment era, such as Jonathan Edwards is a sophisticated writer.[1] It would take years of research to become a scholar of Kant, and it should be noted he is not a major player within theodicy discussion.

In his Inaugural Dissertation of 1770, Kant provides the idea that persons can only have a priori knowledge of space and time by the use of forms of the mind, which are imposed by human experience.[2] Kantian scholars Paul Guyer and Allen Wood (1999) with the Introduction to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, note that a priori knowledge originates independently of senses and experience.[3] According to Pojman the word a priori is the Latin for preceding and is considered knowledge that is not based on empirical experience, but is known by the meaning of words or definitions.[4] 

In the Critique of Pure Reason of 1781 and revised in 1787, Kant explains that the forms of appearance from which sensations can be understood are not themselves the empirical sensations.[5] Human experience will determine the method and forms by which particular things are understood by what Kant calls pure intuition.[6] Concerning human experience, Kant reasoned categories are applied to objects not because the objects make the categories possible, but rather because categories themselves provide and constitute necessary conditions for the representation for all possible objects of experience.[7] 

Therefore any human understanding of metaphysical reality would not be comprehended by empirical knowledge in a posteriori sense.[8] Guyer and Wood point out that Kant was not an empiricist,[9] as while Kant criticized and limited the scope of traditional metaphysical thought,[10] he also sought to defend against empiricism’s claim of the possibility of universal and necessary knowledge which he called a priori [11] knowledge, because no knowledge derived from experience, a posteriori [12] knowledge, could justify a claim to universal and necessary validity.[13] Guyer and Wood explain that Kant sought to defend the scientific approach to the acquisition of knowledge against skeptics that dismissed rigorous arguments in favor of ‘common sense.’[14] 

Kant critiqued the dogmatism of certain metaphysicians negatively,[15] and he also negatively noted as dogmatists those that would be intellectually indifferent to metaphysical inquiry.[16] Kant wished to limit the pretensions of dogmatic empiricists while defending metaphysical theories as a science and necessary in terms of practical reason.[17] Basically, Kant defended metaphysics as important and necessary,[18] but was sympathetic to the empiricists view that certain metaphysical questions were insoluble.[19] Kant noted that a priori is relational without its own inherent content.[20] It is synthetic and incapable of serving as metaphysical proof. 

A priori is relative to an experience only capable of producing appearances, and so a priori is factual as experience which it conditions.[21] Kant reasons objects that were present in empirical human experience were in the phenomena realm, while objects outside were the noumena realm.[22] He writes that the contingent things experienced by persons are phenomena.[23] These are things that could be experienced empirically and would be reasonably accepted as reality.[24] The noumena realm was not available to empirical senses.[25] 

Kant explains in a follow up work entitled The Critique of Practical Reason from 1788, that the noumena is the theoretical department of knowledge denied, while the phenomena is one’s own empirical consciousness.[26] All positive speculative knowledge should be disclaimed for the noumena realm according to Kantian thought.[27] Kant concludes The Critique of Practical Reason by noting that the phenomena realm is the external realm where consciousness has existence.[28] The noumena realm is invisible and has true infinity where Kant believes one can reason that contingent personality is dependent on the universal and necessary connection to the invisible world.[29] Importantly Kant thought it legitimate for one to postulate the noumena realm in a ‘negative sense’ meaning things as they may be independently or how they are represented,[30] but not noumena in the ‘positive sense’ which would be things based on pure reason alone.[31] Instead, noumena categories were only useful by applying them to empirical data structured in forms of intuition.[32]

The concept of noumena, according to Kant, was bound to the limit of pretension of sensibility and reason, and therefore only negative noumenon was of intellectual use.[33] Noumena in its negative sense are that which is not an object of sense intuition.[34] Kant rejects concepts of positive noumena based on pure reason[35] because, according to T.C. Williams (1987), noumenal concepts are not determinate knowledge of anything and must be based on a sense of sensible intuition.[36] Kant rejects the positive use of the term as it postulates objective knowledge of a metaphysical realm.[37] The positive sense of the term noumena is therefore fully rejected by Kant.[38] He explains that the noumenal in the negative sense is equivalent to the thing itself and alone is involved in the concept.[39] Kant’s view leads to a moral theology which has a doctrine of God and immortality postulated, along with theories of human free will and morality.[40] His moral theology is postulated and is not dogmatic, rational metaphysics.[41] 

The nature of the noumenal realm described by Kant would, to John Hick, cause those who profess natural theology to lower their expectations from proving God’s existence to merely making it probable at best.[42] Hick thinks that these probabilities are based on personal estimates of likelihood and are arbitrary.[43] Kantian philosophy postulates that any reality which existed beyond what can be empirically experienced is not knowable, and therefore God is placed beyond the realm of science based experience.[44] God and morality could not be affirmed as actual or possible concepts, although Kant states that they can be assumed as possibilities.[45] Hick takes this idea of Kant’s and deduces that when it comes to religious doctrine, the noumenal realm that stands behind the phenomena realm may have little in common with corresponding phenomena. I do not disagree with the Kantian view that the noumena realm is not empirically knowable,[46] and I readily admit that God as spirit is not empirically[47] or scientifically provable.[48] 

Jesus stated that God is spirit in John 4:24 and therefore God is not of a material nature and cannot be proven by the use of matter or scientific experiment. Hick states that natural theology can only at best demonstrate that God is probable;[49] however, I hold that Peter D. Klein’s definition of certainty[50] could possibly be applied to natural theology.[51] Klein (1996) in ‘Certainty’ describes the idea as being that a proposition is true if there are no legitimate grounds whatsoever for doubting it.[52] This is a reasonable concept, and I support the similar idea that a proposition is certain if there are no counter propositions that are superior.[53] 

Natural theology therefore would never be 100% certain,[54] but could hypothetically at least be philosophically certain as long as arguments that supported natural theology were true beyond any reasonable doubt,[55] or the arguments for natural theology were superior to those opposing them. As for Kant, his view allows for the concept of negative noumena.[56] The idea of noumena, according to Kant, was bound to the limit of pretension of sensibility and reason, and therefore only negative noumena was of intellectual use.[57] The use of positive noumena which trusts in pure reason is rejected. Conclusion Christian scholarship does not rely primarily on natural theology, which would be considered by certain scholars to simply use pure reason which some also think Kant had demolished.[58]

Revelation from God in Scripture and resulting claims made within could perhaps be tied to Kantian concepts and intuition arising from empirical sensations.[59] This is not a difficulty for a Reformed and some other approaches to Christianity, which do not rely primarily on philosophical deductions, but in supernatural revelation of God through empirical sensations, such as prophets, Christ, the apostles and scribes. My conclusion here, which I realize some will debate, is that Scripture is not primarily metaphysical speculation about God as discussed, but is rather coming through the authors and players within his Bible, which are reasoned to be divinely guided by God.

In other words:

Natural theology at points can be reasonable philosophically as secondary support for theism and Christianity.

Natural theology does not reveal the God of the Bible specifically.

Revelation and Scripture reveals the God of the Bible.

Therefore, Christianity is not primarily based on metaphysical speculation or pure reason.

[1] Blackburn rightly suggests there is a ‘notorious difficulty of reading Kant, made worse by his penchant for scholastic systemization and obscure terminology.’ Blackburn (1996: 206). I would suggest this difficulty will lead to inevitable differences in interpreting Kant.

[2] Blackburn (1996: 205). 

[3] Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 2).

[4] Pojman (1996: 595).

[5] Kant (1781)(1787)(1929)(2006: 66). 

[6] Kant (1781)(1787)(1929)(2006: 66). 

[7] Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 3). 

[8] Kant (1781)(1787)(1929)(2006: 66). 

[9] Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 2). Norman Kemp Smith within A Commentary to Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’ writes that empiricists eliminate a priori principles, appealing to sense experience only, therefore eliminating distinctions between inductive inference and expectation. Smith (1930: xxvii). Blackburn suggests Kant made a strong break from eighteenth century empiricism. Blackburn (1996: 206). Kant was not an empiricist as was David Hume that within (1779)(2004) Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, notes that for ‘ignorant ages’ persons including geniuses have ambitiously tried to produce new proofs and arguments for natural theology and God. Hume (1779)(2004: 2). Hume also reasoned that the supposed Supreme Being’s infinite divine attributes would be ‘totally incomprehensible’ and that human nature would not have ideas that would correspond to the attributes of this divine being. Hume (1779)(2004: 21). Hume’s degree of scepticism of God and natural theology and dependence on empiricism alone was not the same view as Kant. Kant (1788)(1997: 11). Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 3). 

[10] Kant was opposed to speculative views of indefensible rationalism. Blackburn (1996: 206). Cornelius Van Til suggests Kant reasons God is not a law giver to humanity, God cannot reveal himself through nature or human constitution with the image of God. The intellect of human beings makes no positive assertions concerning God. Kant rejects notions of theoretical knowledge of God and, instead, appeals to practical reason and faith. Van Til (1977: 246-247). Plantinga writes that it is suggested by many commentators Kant demonstrated there are insurmountable problems with the idea that the traditional Christian God exists. Plantinga (2000: 7).

[11] Kant called cognitions independent of all experience and the impressions of the senses a priori. Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 136). 

[12] Empirical experiences are called a posteriori. A posteriori knowledge is empirical knowledge through experience. Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 136). 

[13] Kant argued that inductive inference from data and experience was only possible based upon prior acceptance of views of rational principles established independently. Therefore experience does not validate these principles. Smith (1930: xxvii). Ameriks suggests Kant rejected unjustifiable metaphysical claims in place of principles of theory which are the conditions by which persons orientate themselves within experience. These principles are ‘necessary and discoverable’ therefore defeating empiricism and scepticism concerning reasonable metaphysical claims, and contrasting traditional rationalism and dogmatism. Ameriks (1996: 399).

[14] Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 2).

[15] Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 3).

[16] Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 3). Kant notes in ‘Critique of Practical Reason’ empiricism needs to be contrasted by the necessity of rational a priori principles. Kant (1788)(1997: 11). [17] Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 3). Ameriks writes, for Kant practical reason is that which determines rules for the faculty of desire and will as opposed to the faculty of cognition and feeling. Ameriks (1996: 399). 

[18] Ameriks (1996: 399). 

[19] Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 3).

[20] Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 3).

[21] Kant (1781)(1787)(1929)(2006: 43).

[22] Kant (1781)(1787)(1929)(2006: 482). Guyer and Wood note that the phenomena realm is the category applied to appearances whereas things in themselves are the noumena realm, which might be thought of but not known. Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 10). The phenomena realm is that which appears and is therefore empirical. 

[23] Kant (1781)(1787)(1929)(2006: 482).

[24] Kant (1781)(1787)(1929)(2006: 482). 

[25] Kant (1781)(1787)(1929)(2006: 393). 

[26] Kant (1788)(1898)(2006: 3). 

[27] Kant (1788)(1898)(2006: 26).

[28] Kant (1788)(1898)(2006: 100). 

[29] Kant (1788)(1898)(2006: 100). 

[30] Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 13). 

[31] Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 13). 

[32] Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 13). 

[33] Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 350).

[34] Smith (1930: 413). Ameriks (1996: 400).

[35] Smith (1930: 413). Ameriks (1996: 400).

[36] Williams (1987: 149).

[37] Williams (1987: 150).

[38] Williams (1987: 151). 

[39] Smith (1930: 413). 

[40] Kant (1788)(1898)(2006: 846). 

[41] Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 14). 

[42] Hick in Geivett (1993: 230-231). 

[43] Hick in Geivett (1993: 230). In contrast I deduce Scriptural revelation would not necessarily be arbitrary estimates of God, but God and any revealed doctrines would be understood by a serious contextual evaluation of the Scripture.

[44] Kant (1788)(1898)(2006: 1). 

[45] Kant (1788)(1898)(2006: 1). Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 14). 

[46] Kant (1781)(1787)(1929)(2006: 393). Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 10). Smid (1999: 10).

[47] Kant (1781)(1787)(1929)(2006: 393).

[48] Kant (1781)(1787)(1929)(2006: 393). 

[49] Hick in Geivett (1993: 230-231). Geivett (1993: 49).

[50] Klein (1996: 113).

[51] And Biblical theology as well.

[52] Klein (1996: 113). Blackburn explains that a proposition would be considered certain when there is no doubt concerning its truth. Blackburn (1996: 60). 

[53] This would also accomplish the standard of a proposition being true as it is beyond (reasonable) doubt. 

[54] In my view 100% certainty is impossible to grasp for a finite being that cannot have 100% knowledge. Absolute certainty could only belong to an infinite, omniscient being.

[55] Klein (1996: 113). Blackburn (1996: 60).

[56] Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 350).

[57] Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 350). Smith (1930: 413). Ameriks (1996: 400).

[58] Hick in Geivett (1993: 230). Weber (1955)(1981: 203). Geivett would not agree and considers it dangerous to completely dismiss natural theology. Geivett (1993: 69-89). Even after accepting Kant’s critique as reasonable and somewhat valuable, I still reason that philosophical truths about God can possibly be deduced without the use of direct divine revelation and a supernatural event and/or Scripture. Deductions and knowledge concerning a first cause and/or God, do not however qualify as equivalent to the knowledge of knowing God as a result of Scripture and the influence of the Holy Spirit. Philosophical deductions concerning God would not necessarily be of pure reason, and I can agree with Kant that any reasonable deduction and intuition must be tied back to empirical experience by which to make sense of these deductions. Kant (1781)(1787)(1929)(2006: 66). Blackburn (1996: 205). [59] Kant (1781)(1787)(1929)(2006: 66). Blackburn (1996: 205). 

AMERIKS, KARL (1999) ‘Kant, Immanuel’, in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford, University, Press. 

FRAME, JOHN M. (2002) The Doctrine of God, P and R Publishing, Phillipsburg, New Jersey. 

GEIVETT, R. DOUGLAS (1993) Evil and the Evidence for God, Philadelphia, Temple University Press. 

GUYER, PAUL AND ALLEN W, in KANT, IMMANUEL (1781)(1787)(1998) Critique of Pure Reason, Translated and edited by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 

HICK, JOHN (1970) Evil and The God of Love, London, The Fontana Library.

HICK, JOHN (1978) ‘Present and Future Life’, Harvard Theological Review, Volume 71, Number 1-2, January-April, Harvard University. 

HICK, JOHN (1981) Encountering Evil, Stephen T. Davis (ed.), Atlanta, John Knox Press. 

HICK, JOHN (1993) The Metaphor of God Incarnate, Louisville, Kentucky, John Know Press.

HICK, JOHN (1994) Death and Eternal Life, Louisville, Kentucky, John Knox Press.

HICK, JOHN (1999) ‘Life after Death’, in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press.

KANT, IMMANUEL (1781)(1787)(1998) Critique of Pure Reason, Translated and edited by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 

KANT, IMMANUEL (1781)(1787)(1929)(2006) Critique of Pure Reason, Translated by Norman Kemp Smith, London, Macmillan. 

KANT, IMMANUEL (1788)(1997) Critique of Practical Reason, Translated by Mary Gregor (ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 

KANT, IMMANUEL (1788)(1898)(2006) The Critique of Practical Reason, Translated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott, London, Longmans, Green, and Co. 

KANT, IMMANUEL (1791)(2001) ‘On The Miscarriage of All Philosophical Trials in Theodicy’, in Religion and Rational Theology, Translated by George di Giovanni and Allen Wood, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 

KLEIN, PETER D. (1996) ‘Certainty’, in Robert Audi, (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 

LINDSELL, HAROLD (1976) The Battle for the Bible, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House. 

MURRAY, JOHN (1937-1966)(1977) Collected Writings of John Murray, Vol. 2: Select Lectures in Systematic Theology, Edinburgh, The Banner of Truth Trust. 

PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (2000) Warranted Christian Belief, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

POJMAN, LOUIS P. (1996) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company. 

SHEDD, WILLIAM G.T. (1874-1890)(1980) Dogmatic Theology, Volume 2, Nashville, Thomas Nelson Publishers. 

SMID, ROBERT W. (1999) ‘John Harwood Hick, His Life’, in The Boston Collaborative Encyclopedia of Modern Western Theology, Boston, The Boston Collaborative Encyclopedia of Modern Western Theology. 

SMITH, NORMAN KEMP (1930) A Commentary to Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’, MacMillan and Co., Limited, London. 

VAN TIL, CORNELIUS (1977) Christianity and Barthianism, Nutley, New Jersey, Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company. 

WILLIAMS, T.C. (1987) The Unity of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, The Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, New York. 

WEBBER, OTTO (1955)(1981) Foundations of Dogmatics, Volumes 1 and 2, Translated and annotated by Darrell L. Guder, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 

Theodicy Praxis: Free will, Sovereignty and Soul-Making (PhD edit)

Theodicy Praxis: Free will, Sovereignty and Soul-Making (PhD edit)

Photo Chamerolles, France (France photos from trekearth.com)

This article from my PhD, edited 20240525.

Saturday, September 19, 2020: PhD Full Version PDF: Theodicy and Practical Theology 2010, Wales TSD

2010 Theodicy and Practical Theology: PhD thesis, the University of Wales, Trinity Saint David, Lampeter 

1. Theodicy Praxis: Free will, Sovereignty and Soul-Making (PhD edit)

1.1 Free Will Theodicy Praxis Versus Sovereignty Theodicy Praxis

Simon Blackburn writes that the term praxis originated in the era of Aristotle[1] and included the concept of goal-directed action, the action in itself being part of the end.[2] Praxis is not concerned with merely applying theoretical knowledge but adding to knowledge in the process of practically applying theory.[3]

When free will is practically applied, what are the results? A rejection by some within the Christian Church of the Reformed idea that God predestines with soft determinism individuals to salvation is important.[4] This would work hand in hand with the rejection of the idea that God causes evil by allowing sin to exist.[5] In both cases God’s divine sovereignty is downplayed, by Reformed standards.[6] With free will theory God would be viewed as allowing the problem of evil for greater purposes, but not willing it.[7] A praxis of free will theodicy would be that God can desire to save all persons, but cannot because human beings refuse to turn to God.[8] Moral choices are not caused or uncaused by another being, but are self-caused.[9] God therefore would be unable to save persons that freely reject him and they have made a moral choice to oppose God.[10] In contrast to the sovereignty perspective, since God does not cause evil and does not predetermine human actions such as who shall believe in him,[11] human beings are a greater impediment to a culminated Kingdom of God with a free will theodicy than with a sovereignty one.[12] This fits into Plantinga’s reasoning that in every situation transworld depravity will cause wrong human actions.[13] Transworld depravity provides the concept that in any possible world, including our own, each person would make at least one wrong decision and the resulting bad action would lead to evil occurring within creation.[14] It can be reasoned that the praxis related end goal of free will theodicy is for God within an incompatibilist, libertarian system to convince many human beings to accept Christ and turn from evil in order to fully establish the Kingdom of God.[15]

In contrast, with a compatibilistic sovereignty perspective, God is reasoned to transform and mould persons he chooses for salvation,[16] so that the culminated Kingdom takes place at God’s appointed time.[17] Both free will and sovereignty perspectives accept the Biblical idea of the culminated Kingdom, but free will places much more emphasis on the individual freely deciding that this is for him/her, rather than being determined in any way to do so.[18] Free will advocates will understand the process as God making an offer and over time convincing persons to believe it.[19] A devotion to God can only be a good thing when persons freely accept it.[20] Sovereignty perspectives reason that God alone makes the choice to begin a regeneration process that leads to salvation in a human being.[21] F.F. Bruce (1996) explains that because of the universal fact of human sin, there is no way to be accepted by God by human means.[22] This divinely guided change in a person must occur in order for salvation to ever take place within a human being with a corrupted nature.[23]

Free will theodicy, unlike soul-making theory, does not necessarily accept universalism[24] as part of its praxis and it could logically be argued that Plantinga’s transworld depravity would apply in all post-mortem situations.[25] In my view, these are perils of a praxis that rejects compatibilism and soft determinism. Even as traditional Christian free will theory would not accept universalism,[26] it still reasons eventually those citizens saved by Christ would not sin within the culminated Kingdom.[27] Those within the Kingdom will have been brought to God through Christ.[28] The resurrection work would be reasoned to change the entire nature of saved persons to sinless and allow everlasting life,[29] but without God also determining[30] that sin would never again occur, I reason that transworld depravity could always be a concern.[31]

A praxis of sovereignty theodicy would be that, from start to finish, salvation is primarily the goal directed[32] plan of God. Human beings are not brought to Christ through compulsion,[33] but when predestined in election[34] shall be convinced to accept the offer of salvation.[35] Praxis shifts from the incompatibilism of free will that assumes God desires to save all persons, but can only save those who are eventually persuaded to believe,[36] to an understanding that whom God desires to save shall be regenerated and placed in a process of salvation.[37] The problem of evil is therefore not primarily subject to, and in existence, because human sin is stalling the culmination of God’s plans.[38] I do not doubt that human beings do often oppose God’s plans, but God being almighty can overcome the problem of evil, and is working through this process slowly in history. Within a sovereignty perspective human sin does oppose God, but God will use sin for his purposes and regenerate and mould those he chooses towards salvation. As long as one can accept the idea that a perfectly moral God wills and allows evil[39] within his plans for the greater good,[40] there is a degree of intellectual certainty with sovereignty theodicy that free will theodicy lacks. God could inevitably bring about, through the use of the regeneration[41] and the resurrection of elected human persons,[42] the end of human corruption,[43] and even Plantinga’s concept of transworld depravity.[44] If God willed and created a finalized Kingdom of restored persons that had experienced the problem of evil and were saved from it, then it could be reasoned that with God’s constant persuasion through the Holy Spirit[45] and human experience and maturity, transworld depravity[46] would never take place again. No human wrong decision[47] would need to occur as God always determines otherwise, and restored human beings do not lack experience as did the first humans who rebelled against God causing corruption. I speculate that theological praxis of sovereignty theodicy is more certain and comforting than free will theodicy, as transworld depravity is overcome by taking the primary choice of human belief in God away from corrupted human beings[48] and placing it in the hands of a sovereign God.[49]

1.2 Soul-Making Theodicy Praxis

A praxis of soul-making is that there is epistemic distance[50] needed to exist between humanity and God in order for persons to properly develop as individuals outside of God’s direct influence.[51] Hick and soul-making theodicy deduce that with free will many will reject God in temporal life,[52] but in post-mortem existence universal devotion to God will ultimately occur for all.[53] Since Hick rejects compatibilism,[54] ultimately God must inevitably convince human beings to freely follow him in a way that was amiss for many in their earthly lives.[55] Contrary to traditional Christian and Reformed doctrine which assumes corruption due to sin,[56] Hick’s soul-making philosophy reasons that human beings are not fallen, but immature and child-like[57] and need to evolve to a status of being able to worship and follow God.[58] There exists a praxis of progression from spiritual immaturity and inability to follow God[59] to the eventual point where all will follow God. The end goal and praxis is to take persons that are distant from God,[60] and to freely bring them into mature community with God.[61] A sovereignty view also believes God shall bring persons into a finalized community with him,[62] but God must determine and persuade selected persons within that process.[63] A soul-making process could be considered an aspect of sovereignty theodicy.[64] As Hick accepts universalism,[65] he rejects the notion that God would select some and reject others for everlasting hell.[66] For soul-making the evolutionary development process leads to the salvation of all persons and, therefore, a universal community of each human being God has ever made will eventually exist.[67] For Hick, God must save all persons or his creation would be a failure.[68] Free will theodicy also consists of an idea of human progression, as God would convince certain persons within this temporal life to follow him.[69] It does not accept that all persons will eventually follow God and credits this to free will.[70] I have explained my difficulty with the idea that God can save corrupt human beings that reject him without the use of compatibilism throughout this thesis.[71] Free will theory would not view a finalized God ruled Kingdom, that is missing some persons, as a failure[72] as God desired all to be saved,[73] but some refused God’s offer of salvation and call to election.[74] This was done freely and is not God’s fault that some have rejected him, as to have these people follow him would require determinism and these persons would be less than significantly free.[75]

[1] Blackburn (1996: 298).
[2] Blackburn (1996: 298).
[3] Anderson (2001: 22).
[4] For some, non-determinism alone allows for significant human freedom. Geisler (1986: 75).
[5] Erickson (1994: 361).
[6] God is not in control of human salvation as this is up to human free will. God can influence persons only and in no way can determine, even simultaneously, a truly free human act. As human beings have incompatibilistic libertarian free will they have caused evil and God is not morally blamable for this because he could only prevent this evil by cancelling significant human freedom. Augustine (388-395)(1964: 33). A problem here is Reformed and atheistic critics have postulated that God could have created significantly free creatures that would not commit evil. Mackie and Flew reason human beings could be made in such a way, and I acknowledge that a type of human being could be made in order to have significant freedom and not sin. I also reason that the angels that did not fall likely are significantly free and did not choose to sin. I here deduce angelic beings are significantly free and not merely robotic as some angels fell and some did not.
[7] Geisler (1986: 75).
[8] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 33).
[9] Geisler (1986: 75).
[10] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 33).
[11] Blackburn (1996: 31).
[12] An atheist and critic could reasonably and rightly suggest that persons use free will to such a corrupt degree that God will never be able to culminate a Kingdom where significantly free creatures do not continue to at times commit horrendous evils.
[13] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 53).
[14] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 53).
[15] This assumes that human beings by grace through faith can be convinced into belief in Christ and then regenerated and indwelled by the Holy Spirit.
[16] Luther (1525)(1972: 133). Calvin (1543)(1996: 204).
[17] Calvin (1539)(1998: Book II, Chapter 3, 6). Calvin (1552)(1995: 13).
[18] Geisler (1986: 75).
[19] Foulkes (1989: 55).
[20] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 78).
[21] Regeneration consists of the Holy Spirit of God beginning the salvation process of spiritual re-creation in a human being. Grenz, Guretzki, and Nordling (1999: 101).
[22] Bruce (1996: 93).
[23] Bruce (1996: 93).
[24] Contrary to Hick. Hick (1970: 381).
[25] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 53).
[26] Kreeft and Tacelli (1994: 286).
[27] Revelation Chapters 21-22 although containing figurative language describe a world free from tears and death and pain (21: 4). The New American Standard Version Bible Version (1984: 1417).
[28] Augustine viewed the atoning work of Christ as a means by which humanity can be brought back to a proper relationship with God. Augustine (398-399)(1992: 178). Christ would mediate humanity back to God. Augustine (398-399)(1992: 219).
[29] Augustine reasoned the resurrection would save believers from everlasting death. Augustine (400-416)(1987)(2004: Book 4: Chapter 13: 11).
[30] Geisler (1986: 75). I reason that as human nature has already demonstrated that it can fall, in the restoration it will need not only culminated perfect nature through resurrection, but also the influence of the Holy Spirit in heavy measure. Citizens will be filled with the Holy Spirit as was Stephen in Acts Chapter 6, for example. The New American Standard Version Bible Version (1984: 1234-1235). As God has developed saved persons to freely follow him with his guidance, I do not see why this would change within the everlasting realm.
[31] Without compatibilism in my view, incompatibilism and free will theory is left with the problem of explaining how human corruption and Plantinga’s transworld depravity will not prevent the salvation of persons and the completed and finalized Kingdom of God.
[32] Teleological. Bloesch (1987: 19).
[33] Shedd (1874-1890)(1980: 136-137 Volume 2).
[34] Whale (1958: 63).
[35] Feinberg (2001: 637).
[36] Peterson (1982: 104).
[37] Calvin (1543)(1996: 204).
[38] Peterson (1982: 104).
[39] Erickson (1994: 361). Many theistic and atheistic critics find this intellectually untenable.
[40] Calvin (1543)(1996: 37-40).
[41] Murray (1937-1966)(1977: 172).
[42] Whale (1958: 65-70).
[43] Berkouwer (1962: 192).
[44] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 53).
[45] Franke (2005: 151).
[46] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 53).
[47] Moral wrong decisions is meant here. A lack of infinite knowledge could still lead to a human being making a non-moral mistake, for example, not playing a perfect game.
[48] Augustine (421)(1998: Chapter 13: 8).
[49] Pink (1968: 20).
[50] Hick in Davis (2001: 48).
[51] Hick in Davis (2001: 48).
[52] Hick in Davis (2001: 48).
[53] Hick (1970: 381). This is the view of universal salvation as discussed in Chapter Four.
[54] Hick (1970: 381).
[55] Hick (1970: 381).
[56] Augustine (421)(1998: Chapter 13: 8).
[57] Hick in Davis (2001: 40-41). Hick cites the views of Irenaeus for support.
[58] Hick in Davis (2001: 40-41).
[59] Hick in Davis (2001: 40-41).
[60] Hick in Davis (2001: 48).
[61] Hick (1970: 289-290).
[62] Calvin (1539)(1998: Book II, Chapter 3, 6).
[63] Feinberg (1986: 24-25).
[64] Not identical to Hick’s approach, however.
[65] Hick (1970: 381).
[66] Hick (1970: 284).
[67] Hick (1970: 381).
[68] Hick (1970: 378).
[69] Augustine (398-399)(1992: 178).
[70] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 33).
[71] A difficulty shared by critics that are both atheistic and Reformed.
[72] Any failure in context would be placed at the feet of humanity. Augustine (388-395)(1964: 33). 167).
[73] Foulkes (1989: 55).
[74] Foulkes (1989: 55).
[75] Plantinga (1982: 166).


Chenonceau, France


Chenonceau, France


Chateau, Les Halles France

ANDERSON, RAY S. (2001) The Shape of Practical Theology, Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.

AUGUSTINE (388-395)(1964) On Free Choice of the Will, Translated by Anna S.Benjamin and L.H. Hackstaff, Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall.

AUGUSTINE (421)(1998) Enchiridion, Translated by J.F. Shaw, Denver, The Catholic Encyclopedia.

BERKOUWER, G.C. (1962) Man: The Image of God, Grand Rapids, W.M.B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford, University, Press.

BLOESCH, DONALD G. (1987) Freedom for Obedience, San Francisco, Harper and Rowe Publishers.

BRUCE, F.F. (1985)(1996) Romans, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

CALVIN, JOHN (1539)(1998) The Institutes of the Christian Religion, Book IV, Translated by Henry Beveridge, Grand Rapids, The Christian Classic Ethereal Library, Wheaton College.

CALVIN, JOHN (1543)(1996) The Bondage and Liberation of the Will, Translated by G.I. Davies, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

ERICKSON, MILLARD (1994) Christian Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.

FOULKES, FRANCIS (1989) Ephesians, Grand Rapids, Inter-Varsity Press.

FRANKE, JOHN R. (2005) The Character of Theology, Baker Academic, Grand Rapids.

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.

GRENZ, STANLEY J., DAVID GURETZKI AND CHERITH FEE NORDLING (1999) Pocket Dictionary of Theological Terms, Downers Grove, Ill., InterVarsity Press.

HICK, JOHN (1970) Evil and The God of Love, London, The Fontana Library.

HICK, JOHN (1981) Encountering Evil, Stephen T. Davis (ed.), Atlanta, John Knox Press.

KREEFT, PETER AND RONALD K. TACELLI (1994) Handbook of Christian Apologetics, Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.

LUTHER, MARTIN. (1525)(1972) ‘The Bondage of the Will’, in F.W. Strothmann and Frederick W. Locke (eds.), Erasmus-Luther: Discourse on Free Will, New York, Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., INC.

MURRAY, JOHN (1937-1966)(1977) Collected Writings of John Murray, Vol. 2: Select Lectures in Systematic Theology, Edinburgh, The Banner of Truth Trust.

PETERSON, MICHAEL (1982) Evil and the Christian God, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

PINK, ARTHUR W. (1968) The Sovereignty of God, London, The Banner of Truth Trust.

PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1977)(2002) God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

SHEDD, WILLIAM G.T. (1874-1890)(1980) Dogmatic Theology, Volume 1, Nashville, Thomas Nelson Publishers.

SHEDD, WILLIAM G.T. (1874-1890)(1980) Dogmatic Theology, Volume 2, Nashville, Thomas Nelson Publishers.

WHALE, J.S. (1958) Christian Doctrine, Glasgow, Fontana Books.

END

2. False Prophecy


I saw two of these signs locally today, finally.

As I stated on Facebook. I reason this represents false prophecy. It is from Harold Camping of Family Radio, California. By the way, I use Facebook to socialize and to promote my blogs and have no strong interest in blogging there as well, but ended up in a fairly long discussion which I liked. But, in general, two theology/philosophy blogs with Blogger is enough.:) So, if you like something I state on Facebook in regard to one of topics, thank you very kindly, I like all the comments. But if you would like a long discussion, may I ask that you please comment on one of the Blogger blogs, thekingpin68 or satire and theology, thank you. I accept anonymous comments.

In this rare case a friend wanted me to publicly make a comment because the billboard signs were local and very public and so I posted on Facebook prior to Blogger, but I really do not want to start blogging on Facebook as well, the term 'Get a life' comes to mind.;)

Matthew 24: 34: 41 NASB

34"Truly I say to you, (AS) this generation will not pass away until all these things take place.

35"(AT)Heaven and earth will pass away, but My words will not pass away.

36"But (AU) of that day and hour no one knows, not even the angels of heaven, nor the Son, but the Father alone.

37"For the (AV) coming of the Son of Man will be (AW) just like the days of Noah.

38"For as in those days before the flood they were eating and drinking, (AX) marrying and giving in marriage, until the day that (AY)Noah entered the ark,

39and they did not understand until the flood came and took them all away; so will the (AZ) coming of the Son of Man be.

40"Then there will be two men in the field; one will be taken and one will be left.

41"(BA) Two women will be grinding at the (BB) mill; one will be taken and one will be left.

Also in Matthew 24: 24, Jesus warned against false Christs and false prophets that would show great signs and wonders, and if possible even mislead the elect.

Short non-exhaustive thoughts on Church government

Butchart Gardens, Victoria BC (trekearth.com)

Methodology

I am not a chauvinist. I am not a feminist. Females are equal to males, both made in the image of God, Genesis 1: 27. I am a Biblical theologian. I write this post because like the previous article it came up in a recent discussion. That is all. That is where many of my ideas come from.

As a philosophical theologian and philosopher of religion I like to state that Church Ministry as a profession is not my 'bag'. But all Christians should be ministers at least as in small 'm'. I have never had any interest in becoming a Reverend. Frankly, I would be a pretty useless theologian and Christian philosopher if I could not minister to someone in Christian love. I do this. While I was in Dublin in 1995 a lady tried to kill herself, sort of, by leaving her baby and carriage across the street outside of a pub and she threatened to jump into the River Liffey and I did council her until the police came. I think she was trying to get her husband's attention. I had just been in the city for thirty minutes. Welcome to Dublin. A very nice city by the way.

Government

The other day I was briefly discussing women as elders in the Church with a Reverend. We basically have a very similar view. We agreed that the overseer (episkopos) Browning (1997: 112), in the New Testament was a man and should be today, even with cultural considerations such as more education for women. I did state I thought the issue did get slippery in regard to educated Christian women with Doctorates in congregations with men with much less spiritual maturity. Especially small congregations. I stand by this.

My scanner is small and some of the texts are very large and so the scans will not be perfectly straight, my apologies once again.

Strong page 40

There are other considerations such as I Timothy 3 pointing out that an overseer should be the husband of one wife. So a man. Also in Ephesians 5 there is the concept of the husband as head of the wife and as Christ is the head of the Church, a reasonable resulting view being a woman therefore should not be the spiritual head of a local church, if she is not the spiritual head of the home. I do not conclude from this that a woman should not be a head of a corporation, country, etc..

Browning states that when the overseers met they were considered the elders (presbuteroi) Browning (1997: 112). Wallace notes it in English as (presbytereroi). Wallace (1996: 347). Thiessen expresses his opinion that the terms pastor, elder and bishop all were one and the same office in the New Testament quoting Acts 20. Thiessen (1956: 418). He quotes Saint Jerome that stated the elder was identical to the bishop in the text the 'Early Years of Christianity' from E. De Pressense. Thiessen (1956: 418). Wallace states that the term episkopos/overseer is used interchangeably with versions for the word for elder in Acts 20 and in Titus. Wallace (1996: 347). Wallace reasons overseers are always elders but he is not sure that elders are always overseers. Some elders may have not been overseers. Wallace (1996: 347).

Image is from Strong page 80.

If in the New Testament when the overseers met they were the elders then there could be an argument made that the only legitimate elders today in a church are overseers/pastors/Reverends.

However, with my findings it is not crystal clear that only overseers were elders Biblically.

Browning states women could be regarded as deacons. Browning (1997: 93). Deacons were agents of the overseers. Browning (1997: 93).

Conclusions

If what Browning appears to be stating and what Thiessen is stating is the Biblical case, then today's elected elders that are not overseers are actually more like deacons. So, there can be an argument and discussion on whether or not women can be elders/deacons by this modern church definition only. But, I do not think they can be elders/overseers Biblically. This is a slippery topic.

If the other view suggested by Wallace is the Biblical case, then women can become Biblical deacons only.

Yes, this in my view is somewhat semantics.

BROWNING, W.R.F. (1997) Oxford Dictionary of the Bible, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

STRONG, J. (1890)(1986) Strong's Exhaustive Concordance of the Bible. Grand Rapids, Welch.

THIESSEN, HENRY C. (1956) Introductory Lectures in Systematic Theology, Perrysburgh, Ohio, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

WALLACE, R.S. (1996) ‘Elder' in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books.


Butchart Gardens, Victoria, BC (trekearth.com)


Victoria, BC (trekearth.com)

Now I admit while I was attending Bible School I used to nap in the
library while I waiting for driving partner Bobby Buff to do his assignments. As he did his work at school and I did mine at home, but this is one place I would never nap.


Well, we have had some really smart blondes (comment) on this blog...I imagine this one is smart too. 

Thanks PMH for the photos.

The Battle of Ricky's: Dr. Kingpin and The Demon Chaser

Langley Castle, Hexham, England (All article photos from trekearth.com)

To quote the previous post...'This is the last post for this blog for 2010.' So, in order to keep plans I will date this article of December 19, 2010, January 1, 2011. I did not want to do another post so close to Christmas as some people may become busy and forget about blogs, but there is the saying 'The Lord leads' and I am led I reason to write this post and I will date it 2011 and hopefully receive several comments after the New Year, and hopefully before. But it may well be a post that receives more attention in 2011.

So, once again Merry Christmas and Happy New Year.

A. Non-Exhaustive Background

J.R. Williams states that the charismatic movement began in the 1950s and was often termed 'neo-Pentecostal'. Williams (1996: 205). In recent times participants known as charismatics are described often as being involved in 'charismatic renewal'. Williams (1996: 205). Williams explains the immediate background of this movement is 'classical Pentecostalism' which dates from the early twentieth century. Williams (1996: 205). Classical Pentecostalism emphasized strongly baptism in the Holy Spirit as an endowment of power subsequent to/after conversion and the continuation of the spiritual gifts (1 Corinthians 12) in post New Testament times is considered valid. Williams (1996: 205). Baptism with the Holy Spirit is understood as an experience where a Christian believer is filled with the presence of the Holy Spirit. Williams (1996: 205). It is thought to occur at conversion or it can occur after. Williams (1996: 205). This would be a very strong spiritual guidance of a believer by the Spirit of God.

Robert Faricy designates a charismatic as one in the Christian community guided by the Holy Spirit and believing in a working within the gifts of the Spirit through love. Faricy (1999: 91). There are the spiritual gifts and manifestations from the New Testament era still in existence today, is the reasoning.

B. Dr. Kingpin and The Demon Chaser

A family friend wanted me to meet an older gentleman that my friend states considers himself a prophet and works in demonology. The gentlemen was seemingly a Christian man working within the charismatic movement. We met for brunch at a Ricky's restaurant in Langely, BC. This was my second bust-up that week as I also got into short one with a Professor in California via email. Take a shot at the new PhD week? By God's grace I was ready.

Is Ricky related to Denny? Just wondering.

Before I continue, I do not consider myself a charismatic.

I do reason spiritual gifting and guidance does exist today. But, I do not think that there are Apostles and Prophets today as their place and ministry was in the Biblical eras. The miraculous that took place in the New Testament, and also in the Hebrew Bible, was primarily a foreshadowing of the healing and blessings of the future culminated Kingdom of God.

Therefore, Christians should not typically expect miraculous types of events to occur in the post-New Testament era.

Further, this gentleman that I will call The Demon Chaser seemed like a very sincere Christian man and we parted on good loving terms, agreeing to pray for each other. We did agree on certain issues concerning the Church being in trouble in regard to theology and obedience. My disagreements with him are not primarily because I view him as charismatic, but because his views are extreme and what I would deem as hyper-charismatic.

My three academic advisors for my Wales MPhil and PhD theses work were are charismatic and quite scholarly. I am not criticizing charismatic theology primarily here, but a hyper-charismatic theology.

B1. Free will and Determinism

The primary debate in our friendly but at times heated interaction took place concerning the topic of free will/determinism in regard to human salvation. I took the compatibilistic Reformed limited free will stand that I took in my MPhil, strengthened and understood better in my PhD and have taught on both of my blogs, especially this one. The gentleman took a libertarian free will stand. If this subject interests please look in search and you will find several articles related.

A problem with his approach however was his admittance that he only sees things in black and white. There is no grey/gray he stated. This is not surprising for someone that would take an extreme viewpoint that I would deem as hyper-charismatic. A related problem is that with a complex subject like free will/determinism, that I just spent over ten years of my life studying in the context of academic theology and philosophy, is that it requires an understanding of intellectual subtleties. He indicated he did not care about the term 'libertarian free will' and implied he just basically wanted to deal in terms of human choice or no choice.

Therefore, the end result is he is left with two extreme choices, in my view, libertarian free will or hard determinism, and he makes the choice of the first although he refused to call it by that name.

My goal in this article is not to argue my views on free will and determinism. That has been done often on this blog, but here are some definitions for context, especially for my newer readers. I do not want to go on and on with the same debates, and do not want to bore the reader with similar type presentation far too often, but I present these definitions for context.

Libertarian free will is usually viewed as a form of indeterminism. The concept in libertarian free will is that a person is able to perform another action in the place of one that has been committed. This action cannot be predetermined by any circumstance or desire. It would also be considered as a form of incompatibilism.

Here is an explanation of hard determinism and my compatibilist position of soft determinism.

Philosopher Louis P. Pojman explains that within determinism or hard determinism, an outside force causes an act and no created being is responsible for his or her moral actions, while for compatibilism or soft determinism, although an outside force causes actions, created beings are responsible where they act voluntarily. Within hard determinism an outside force would be the only cause of human actions, while with soft determinism an outside force would be the primary cause of human actions and persons the secondary cause. Pojman (1996: 596). God would be the primary cause within Christian theism of a Reformed tradition.

B2. Deliverance Ministry

The gentleman appeared to verify my friend's statement that he considered himself a prophet.

He claimed to have:

Met Jesus Christ.

Predicted as in prophesied 911.

He claimed:

That Christians could live sinless enough lives to avoid death, as did Enoch (Hebrews 11: 5).

That Christians should be seeking lives of perfect health. He reasoned that demonic beings were behind certain health problems.

So:

Could he have met Christ? Possible, but it would be very difficult to prove. Frankly, his theological errors make this questionable from my perspective.

Could he have predicted as in prophesied 911? Possible, but one would need to see solid evidence for this that was more than a prediction/deduction, but something clearly from the Holy Spirit as prophecy.

I agree with what Hebrews states about Enoch, but this gentlemen attempted to prove his point by naming a man within the modern age that disappeared walking and was never found. The gentlemen stated some persons thought the man was killed and eaten by an animal, but the body was never found. I would conclude that without inside knowledge, a person would have no idea what happened to this man and would have no reason without much stronger evidence to reason that he was taken to heaven as was Enoch.

This gentleman implied that my health issues, which I am not going to get into here, but are typical type of human ailments we all generally have, could be due to demonic beings and that I perhaps needed a deliverance. Well, I do not want to be mean here, but this man was older and seemed a little hunched over in the back. In other words, he did not look perfectly healthy. Should I assume this is the work of demons?

In the fall (Genesis 3 forward), we human beings will all (virtually accepting Enoch, for example) die and suffer previously in body and spirit.

God wills all things.

One would need a divine supernatural healing from God, 'deliverance' or not, to have perfect health.

Therefore, I see no reason to necessarily tie demonic beings into human health issues.

Langley, BC


Langley, BC

Fort Langley, BC

FARICY ROBERT (1999) 'Charismatic', in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press Limited.

POJMAN, LOUIS P. (1996) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.

WILLIAMS, J.R. (1996) ‘Charismatic Movement' in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books.