Questionnaire feedback four

San Diego at night (photo from Ron Niebrugge)

1. Pastor Mark Slomka from Faith Community Church in San Diego, California has been nice enough to post an article where there is a link to download my questionnaire and a link to this blog. He also provided an email address where I can be reached.

http://www.pastormarkonline.com/

Thank you very much Mark, this is very helpful and much appreciated. Mark's method is a good way to give persons the option of downloading my questionnaire from a blog. I have not looked into providing this option with either one of my blogs as I have included email interaction in the process. However, if someone returns the questionnaire through Mark's site I am willing to discuss the questionnaire and my PhD work as well. Basically, most of my completed questionnaires have been gathered through email, with some through this blog, and others have been handed out at local Christian churches.

2. My advisor in Wales has not provided me with a firm number of completed questionnaires required, but the 148 I have finished as of this morning is not enough. I am aiming to have at least 200 finished questionnaires within my possession. The amount of questionnaires I need completed and the content of the questionnaire is a joint effort. My previous advisor and my present one assisted me with putting the questionnaire together and the questions are related to my theodicy work with free will, sovereignty, and soul-making views dealing with the problem of evil. I did not review an actual feminism theodicy, but reviewed some feminist material dealing with the problem of evil and therefore included some related questions. The questionnaire is not only a product of my conservative Reformed theology, but also contains requirements from Wales, Lampeter, and a secular University. Therefore the questions are representative of the theodicy approaches I reviewed and cultural Christianity from a broad perspective, and not just my own.

3. Issuing and collecting questionnaires is a lot of work, but since I am presently done my theoretical writing I am not writing academic chapters at this time. Once my data is completed obviously I will need to complete related chapters. I will attempt at times to write some academic articles on this blog, but I have limited time and energy, especially since that even with my two surgeries in 2006, I still have 30% sleep apnea!

Thanks for reading.

Russ:)


A problem of evil...

Questionnaire feedback three

Hawaii (photo from trekearth.com)

As of today I have received 141 completed questionnaires. My advisor at Wales would like several more finished and so I must continue to look for more assistance. Some points:

1. Although I enjoy meeting and emailing with new people, I do not particularly like requesting through this blog, email, phone, or in person help with my questionnaires from people that attend Christian churches. I am moderately introverted and I do not enjoy taking the risk of bothering or annoying someone, but I must add an empirical aspect to my PhD for the sake of originality. I therefore will ask persons for assistance with the questionnaires. The questionnaires are not an add-on to my dissertation but an essential aspect of the work.

2. I therefore am looking not only for individual Christians to assist me with my work but also congregations and college/University classes. If someone can assist me in sampling a congregation or class, please contact me.

3. I have received a fair amount of positive feedback from questionnaire respondents. There are limitations with empirical theology as there is a lack of context for questions and questions can somewhat be interpreted in a variety of ways, but those issues have been discussed in the articles Questionnaire feedback and Questionnaire feedback two. Please scroll down to view, or look in archives. Within the questionnaire I am required to use closed questions that are provided with a set of fixed alternatives from which to choose. Bryman (2004: 145). Open questions in contrast would allow persons to respond in any way they choose. Bryman (2004: 145).

4. I have been asked how I found a particular website or email address which I sent the questionnaire to. I do a general search for a particular denomination in a certain area and if a church is listed I see if I can find a senior minister’s email address. I am doing nothing wrong by sending a respectful email, anymore than someone is wrong by sending me a respectful email through this blog, or by leaving a respectful comment.

5. I have been asked that since my blog biography lists me as attending a Baptist seminary and being a member of a Presbyterian church, why I am contacting persons of other denominations. I am a conservative Christian that attends a secular University. I am not allowed to attempt to stack my questionnaire sample with persons that would agree with my theological views, and rightly so. I therefore within a Christian tradition, besides contacting churches that appear to be conservative, contact churches that appear to be liberal and that may have doctrinal views that I do not necessarily agree with. This approach is academic as I am providing the opportunity for those within Christian traditions that will perhaps not agree with certain theological concepts in my PhD and on my blogs, to provide me with data within the questionnaire. It should not be necessarily viewed as suspicious when I, as a conservative theologian, ask what may appear to be a liberal minister and his/her congregation for feedback, especially when I attend a secular University. This is an opportunity for many within conservative and liberal Christian churches to evaluate and examine theological thought and bias.

6. A comment I have received is that I seem to be comparing conservative and liberal theology. That is an aspect of my questionnaire and dissertation, but primarily I am comparing free will, sovereignty, and soul-making theodicy approaches. In other words, differing perspectives on the problem of evil. Within the study, differences between conservative and liberal theology will arise and be discussed but I have found so far that these three theodicy approaches cannot always be easily divided along conservative and liberal lines. For example, Augustine and Plantinga have primarily conservative free will concepts that are somewhat in contrast to Hick's liberal soul-making view. However, Hick does subscribe to an aspect of free will theodicy in that he states it was not logically possible for God to create human beings so that they would freely respond to him in love and faith. Hick (1970: 308). Hick postulates that God without contradiction could create human beings that would always freely act justly to each other, but the same cannot be guaranteed for a free and sincere human love for God. Hick (1970: 311). I reason that God could make human beings, or a type of human beings that would always freely and with love respond to God and other persons without committing wrong acts, but God seemingly made persons that would fall and planned to save some through his gospel. God willed the fall in a sense but did not coerce or force his creatures to fall. My questionnaire results will not necessarily show that on every key issue discussed the primary theological divide is between conservative and liberal.

Cheers!

Russ

BRYMAN, ALAN (2004) Social Research Methods, Oxford, University Press.

HICK, JOHN (1970) Evil and The God of Love, London, The Fontana Library.

We are not that familiar with soccer in Canada. Is that a regulation pitch?

Deism

York (photo from thekingpin68)

Deism is another important theological term in my studies on the problem of evil.

My brief and former academic advisor David. A. Pailin, defines deism as coming from the Latin word deus and parallels the Greek which is theos. Pailin (1999: 148). In modern times deism is used to define a supreme being who is the ultimate source of reality, but does not intervene in the natural and historical processes through revelation or salvific acts. Pailin (1999: 148). Pailin writes that the common use of the term ‘theism’ does not carry the same negative implications. Pailin (1999: 148). He explains that historically deism is not so much a set of doctrines, but a movement, largely British, that became popular in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Pailin (1999: 148). Many within deism will have doubts concerning concepts of supernatural religious doctrines, revelation and the authority of the Bible. Pailin (1999: 148). Pailin notes that some within deism desire to replace Christianity with a more ‘reasonable’ faith, and for others it is an attempt to produce a more ‘reasonable’ version of Christianity. Pailin (1999: 149).

William J. Wainwright explains that deism understands true religion as natural, as opposed to supernatural religion. Wainwright (1996: 188). He writes that some self-styled Christian deists accept revelation although they argue that the content is the same as natural religion. Wainwright (1996: 188). Most deists reject revelation as fiction, but many reason that God has ordained that human happiness is possible through natural means that are universally available. Wainwright (1996: 188). Salvation therefore does not come via divine revelation. Wainwright (1996: 188).

Henry Clarence Thiessen writes that for deism God is present in his creation by his power and not in his being and nature. He has endowed creation with certain invariable laws that he oversees in general terms. Theissen (1956: 74). God has created creatures and left them under invariable laws to their own destiny. Thiessen (1956: 74). For Thiessen, the Christian world-view rejects deism because it accepts that God has revealed himself in creation through divine revelation, has providential control and does at times use miracles within his creation. Thiessen (1956: 75). For Thiessen, a deistic God is not much better than no God at all for humanity. Thiessen (1956: 75).

Thiessen has an excellent point, if deistic approaches reject a God who intervenes within his creation, then it allows, practically speaking, for human beings to expect to have the same end in life as if there is no God. Wainwright deduces that God has ordained human happiness to all universally, but ultimately how happy can human existence be when physical death is the end result for every person? As pointed out in my article, The meaning of life, human life is not substantially meaningful, if permanently terminated. People lose their consciousness and life accomplishments without everlasting life, and therefore life loses ultimate meaning and happiness does not result. The deist can speculate that God can and perhaps shall provide everlasting life and ultimate continual meaning for life, but this is merely speculation devoid of any historically grounded revelation from God.

Accepting that human nature is corrupt as described in Romans 1-3, it is very unlikely that the problem of evil would ever be solved but rather merely treated by humanity if deism is true. There would at no time be any solution for sin, death, and the problem of evil, since the infinite, omnipotent God would not interfere with his creation and regenerate and change individuals in order to eventually establish a Kingdom of God where the problem of evil does not exist. With a deistic universe seemingly sin, death, and the problem of evil continue to exist as long as humanity does. Deism seemingly does not offer any ultimate solution to the problem of evil.

PAILIN, DAVID A. (1999) ‘Deism’, in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press Ltd.

THIESSEN, HENRY C. (1956) Introductory Lectures in Systematic Theology, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

WAINWRIGHT, WILLIAM J. (1996) ‘Deism’, in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Theodicy

Theodicy 

Photo: Conwy gardens, Wales 

Preface

Originally from April 13, 2007. Edited on July 25, 2022.

Saturday, September 19, 2020 PhD Full Version PDF: Theodicy and Practical Theology 2010, Wales TSD: MPhil/PhD theses

I have been busy lately finishing up my practical theology chapter, which is my last one prior to compiling my statistics from the questionnaires. 

I have 133 questionnaires completed, but would like to have 200 finished. I do not have a lot of time to blog presently but I thought I would define the term theodicy which is the key term within my PhD dissertation.

Please note, as advised by tutors, I have been taught at Wales to state definitions in my own words and I generally do not copy quotations anymore. I think the idea is to show more understanding by correctly putting a definition in my own words rather than copying. 

Theodicy defined

Robert M. Adams notes that the word theodicy is from the Greek, as theos is God and dike is justice. Theodicy is a defence of the justice of God in the face of objections arising from the problem of evil in the world. Adams (1996: 794). 

The term arose with the book from Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz in 1710 entitled Theodicy.

A good definition of theodicy is the explanation of how the infinite, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent God accomplishes his plans within his creation where the problem of evil exists. Simon Blackburn writes that theodicy is the part of theology concerned with defending the omnibenevolence and omnipotence of God while suffering and evil exists in the world. Blackburn (1996: 375). Louis J. Pojman explains that this view holds that evil can be explained in the light of an overall plan of God and that if correctly understood, this world is the best of all possible worlds. Pojman (1996: 599). Leibniz held to the concept that God's creation was the best possible. Leibniz (1710)(1998: 190, 264).

It should be noted from Pojman's definition that scholars such as Plantinga and Feinberg do not believe that God created a best possible world, but rather a good world. Plantinga explains that no matter how wonderful a world appears to be, no matter how many incredibly happy people there are, it is always possible there is an even better world containing more people who are even happier. Plantinga (1977)(2002: 34). He also deduces that God’s omnipotence could not guarantee a best possible world free from evil, because there is always a possibility of human decisions that are contrary to what God would have desired. Plantinga (1982: 180-181). 

Feinberg holds to modified rationalism which is the idea that God was not obligated to create anything, including a world, but chose to create purely from his own desires. Within modified rationalism, the concept of a best possible world is denied in favour of the view that God chose to create the present world which was initially perfectly good. Feinberg (1994: 36). Feinberg contrary to Plantinga reasons that God likely could have reasonably created a world where significantly free creatures would not commit evil actions. Feinberg (2001: 637). I deduce that God could have created significantly free human beings, or at least human-like creatures that only committed right actions. 

Perhaps God desired to create human beings that would ultimately possess a greater spiritual maturity than Adam and Eve prior to the fall because those restored in Christ would have experienced sin, the problem of evil, death and the atoning work and resurrection of Christ. Quite possibly restored human beings would ultimately be more spiritually mature and valuable to God than persons that never knew what it was like to disobey God and experience evil. 

I would also point out that Biblically speaking the angels that did not fall would seemingly be significantly free and have not committed wrong actions. In regard to fallen angels, it would be problematic to assume that God created angelic beings that did not with some level of freedom reject God's divine rule. God does not create creatures initially evil, or force or coerce them to sin, although in his sovereignty, willingly determines and allows all things. 

ADAMS, ROBERT. M (1996) ‘Theodicy’, in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 

AUGUSTINE (388-395)(1964) On Free Choice of the Will, Translated by Anna S.Benjamin and L.H. Hackstaff, Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall. 

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AUGUSTINE (426)(1958) The City of God, Translated by Gerald G. Walsh, Garden City, New York, Image Books. 

AUGUSTINE (427)(1997) On Christian Doctrine, Translated by D.W. Robertson Jr., Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall. 

AUGUSTINE (427b)(1997) On Christian Teaching, Translated by R.P.H. Green, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) ‘Theodicy’, in Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, p. 375. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

BOURKE, VERNON J. (1958) ‘Introduction’, in The City of God, Translated by Gerald G. Walsh, Garden City, New York, Image Books.

CALVIN, JOHN (1539)(1998) The Institutes of the Christian Religion, Book IV, Translated by Henry Beveridge, Grand Rapids, The Christian Classic Ethereal Library, Wheaton College. http://www.ccel.org/ccel/calvin/institutes.html 

CALVIN, JOHN (1540)(1973) Romans and Thessalonians, Translated by Ross Mackenzie, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 

CALVIN, JOHN (1543)(1996) The Bondage and Liberation of the Will, Translated by G.I. Davies, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

CALVIN, JOHN (1550)(1978) Concerning Scandals, Translated by John W. Fraser, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 

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CHADWICK, HENRY (1992) ‘Introduction’, in Confessions, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1729)(2006) Sovereignty of God, New Haven, Connecticut, Jonathan Edwards Center, Yale University. 

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1731-1733)(2006) Law of Nature, New Haven, Connecticut, Jonathan Edwards Center, Yale University.

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1754)(2006) Freedom of the Will, Flower Mound, Texas. Jonathanedwards.com. 

ERICKSON, MILLARD (1994) Christian Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House. 

ERICKSON, MILLARD (2003) What Does God Know and When Does He Know It?, Grand Rapids, Zondervan.

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, in David Basinger and Randall Basinger (eds.), Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House. 

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (2001) No One Like Him, John S. Feinberg (gen.ed.), Wheaton, Illinois, Crossway Books.

FLEW, ANTONY, R.M. HARE, AND BASIL MITCHELL (1996) ‘The Debate on the Rationality of Religious Belief’, in L.P. Pojman (ed.), Philosophy, The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company. 

FLEW, ANTONY AND A.MACINTRYE (1999) ‘Philosophy of Religion’, in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press Ltd.

FRAME, JOHN M. (1999) ‘The Bible on the Problem of Evil: Insights from Romans 3:1-8,21-26; 5:1-5; 8:28-39’, IIIM Magazine Online, Volume 1, Number 33, October 11 to October 17, Fern Park, Florida, Third Millennium.

FRAME, JOHN M. (2002) The Doctrine of God, P and R Publishing, Phillipsburg, New Jersey. 

GEIVETT, R. DOUGLAS (1993) Evil and the Evidence for God, Philadelphia, Temple University Press.

HASKER, WILLIAM (1989) God, Time, and Knowledge, Ithaca, Cornell University Press. 

HASKER, WILLIAM (1993) ‘C. Robert Mesle, John Hick’s Theodicy: A Process Humanist Critique’, in Philosophy of Religion, Volume 34, Number 1, pp. 55-56. Dordrecht, Netherlands, Philosophy of Religion. 

HASKER, WILLIAM (1994) ‘Can Philosophy Defend Theology?’, in Faith and Philosophy, Volume 11, Number 2, April, pp. 272-278. Wilmore, Kentucky, Asbury College. 

HASKER, WILLIAM (2000) ‘The Problem of Evil in Process Theism and Classical Free Will Theism’, in Process Studies, Volume. 29, Number 2, Fall-Winter, pp. 194-208. Claremont, California, Religion Online. 

HASKER, WILLIAM (2003) ‘Counterfactuals and Evil’, in Philosophia Christi, Volume 5, Number 1, pp. 235-249. La Mirada, California, Biola University.

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HICK, JOHN (1981) Encountering Evil, Stephen T. Davis (ed.), Atlanta, John Knox Press.

HICK, JOHN (1993) ‘Afterword’ in GEIVETT, R. DOUGLAS (1993) Evil and the Evidence for God, Philadelphia, Temple University Press.

HICK, JOHN (1993) The Metaphor of God Incarnate, Louisville, Kentucky, John Know Press. 

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MESLE, C. ROBERT (1986) ‘The Problem of Genuine Evil: A Critique of John Hick’s Theodicy’, in The Journal of Religion, Volume 66, Number 4, pp. 412-430. October, Chicago, University of Chicago Press. 

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PLANTINGA, ALVIN.C. (1977)(2002) God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 

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