I, deny

East Maple Ridge

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Another short entry in regard to the subject of negation in philosophy, which is also a subject in the Langer, Symbolic Logic text under review on this website.

Based on Blackburn, to deny a premise/proposition as true equals asserting it as false. To asserts in negation. (99).

I deny atheism as a worldview, and at the same time assert it as false. I assert the philosophical negation of atheism as a worldview.

(This is not to state that within atheism, there are not some valid critiques)

I deny libertarian free will as a view, and at the same time assert it as false. I assert the philosophical negation of libertarian free will as a view.

(This is not to state that within libertarian free will view (s), there are not some valid critiques)

In regard to the last three images from Blackburn: That is red is contradicted by that is green, and if both are considered false, it does not exclude, for example, that is brown.

Frege texts are in German and limited to cite in English:

Negation and being by Daniel Dahlstrom of Boston University

The Review of Metaphysics 64 (December 2010): 247–271. by The Review of Metaphysics.

Frege insists, for example, that the being of a thought (das Sein eines Gedankens) may be affirmed or denied and, hence, must be distinguished from its being-true (Wahrsein).12 Thus, for Frege it is not the affirmation but the thought that is denied. In the Tractatus (§5.5151), Wittgenstein categorically rejects an asymmetricalist position: “The positive sentence must presuppose the existence of the negative sentence and vice versa.”13 (251-252), Gottlob Frege, “Die Verneinung (1919)” in Logische Untersuchungen, ed. Günther Patzig (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1986), 56 and following.

Analyzing this, it appears the view is that the being of thought accepted or denied, must be philosophically separated from an affirmation of it being true or false. This would connect to Wittgenstein and views of certainty which I did review for my PhD.

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

DAHLSTROM, DANIEL (2010) The Review of Metaphysics 64 (December 2010): 247–271. by The Review of Metaphysics.

FREGE, GOTTLOB (1919) “Die Verneinung (1919)” in Logische Untersuchungen, ed. Günther Patzig (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1986).

WITTGENSTEIN, LUDWIG (1951)(1979) On Certainty, Basil Blackwell, Oxford.

Blackburn page 99.

Blackburn page 258.

Blackburn page 258.

Blackburn page 258.

East Maple Ridge

Denying the consequent (Arguing carefully)

North Vancouver, last evening

From Blackburn it is valid that the antecedent is prior to the consequent in philosophy and logic. It is stated that

p = Antecedent
q = Consequent

It is argued:

p The leg is broken
q The leg will hurt

The inference is...

-q The leg does not hurt
-p The leg is not broken

This is logical.

Psychology Dictionary April 7 2013

Cited

Logic. If a conditional statement is accepted as true then the negative can be inferred as well. Also called modus tollens...

Cited

Denying the consequent is where the negative aspect is also true.

This is logical.

Blackburn page 99.

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

However, in contrast.

The leg is broken

The leg is comfortable

(The leg is under the influence of narcotics)

This is logical.

Again we analyze the logical and the reasonable.

This is using fuzzy logic

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Premises and conclusions using fuzzy logic would be philosophically imprecise.

This type of logic was something I was strictly guided not to present  when writing my British academic questionnaires.

But even with British academic propositions, it was difficult to avoid degrees of truth. When dealing with the problem of evil and theodicy, I was often faced with concepts of degrees of evil. My doctoral text was reviewing and countering the philosophy that gratuitous evil worked against the existence of God. There are often, I reason, degrees of evil, but in my Reformed theology and philosophy I embraced the view that God wills and causes all things (both directly and allowing) and uses evil for divine purposes, and in that sense it is not gratuitous evil.

However, in my view, presenting logical and more importantly to me, reasonable premises and conclusions in text does at times require the use of degrees of truth.

For example, the use of HTML colour requires degrees and shades of red. A bright red, solid form of red is represented as #FF0000 from many sources. Another form of red may be called red, but is actually brownish in colour, for example. Various degrees and shades can be presented logically and reasonably with premises and conclusions, but in reality, there are many kinds of reds. Some are mixed with blue and/or yellow and other colours.

Blackburn page 151. 

From Blackburn, again as with the Langer, Symbolic Logic textbook, we deal with negation. If a room is hot, using fuzzy logic and logic of degrees, then it is at the same time, not cold.

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Blackburn

Ending to Mark (16: 9-20)

Cited from You Tube

The abrupt ending to the Gospel of Mark seemed troubling to early readers, and one seems to have written an alternative that not only gave a more complete conclusion, but also inserted encouragements meaningful to Christian readers early in the 2nd century.

Mr. Gore's views will find definite disagreement from some within the Christian Church, especially many conservatives and fundamentalists. At Canadian Baptist Seminary (Trinity Western University), I wrote a research paper on the subject and did, and still do find the abrupt ending of Mark 16: 8 biblically and theologically acceptable.

Jesus Christ had risen, and the risen Christ being 'red-letter' documented and quoted in the text is not a biblical, New Testament requirement, in my view.

Again, we should be careful of what we add to orthodoxy in the Christian Church.

However:

My Marcan (Markan) professor reasoned that 16: 9-20 was indeed not written by the New Testament disciple, Mark, but by a Holy Spirit inspired scribe. This is a reasonable possibility, and according to scholarship other books in the New Testament may have been written in whole or part by anonymous scribes (Hebrews for example).

I had and have an intellectual difficultly with the theory presented in my seminary class, that Mark had died and therefore could not finish the text. My view on God's sovereignty reasons that as the Lord has Mark author the gospel, he would finish that gospel.

Edited from previous work on my Satire Und Theology website:

Mark 16: 9-20 does not appear in Codex Vaticanus (B),or Codex Sinaiticus (Sin), the two oldest groups of manuscripts. Marlowe (2006: 1).

(Gore comments likewise on the video).

The manuscripts have Mark ending at 16: 8. However, 16: 9-20 does appear in Codex Alexandrinus (A), which is a slightly newer manuscript. Miller (2005: 1). It is possible a scribe or scribes added 16: 9-20, which became part the majority of New Testament texts, but it does not change the essential message of the Gospel or New Testament. We have copies from the two older groups of manuscripts which allow scholars to speculate that it is possible that Mark 16: 9-20 was not written by Mark, but written by a scribe at a later date.

I do not see any need to place demands upon the Marcan text and state that it had to have contained an actual resurrection appearance. The ending of the book does make it clear that Christ was no longer in the tomb and was resurrected. The tomb was empty, and a man, likely of supernatural origin in 16: 6-7 made it clear that Christ had risen.

My hope is that a scribe or scribes did not think that the lack of a resurrection appearance and an abrupt ending meant that another ending had to be created. My New American Standard Bible has two different additional endings after 16: 8. However, if endings were added by scribes, God has still provided the Church with evidence of this from Codex Vaticanus (B),and Codex Sinaiticus (Sin). The Church could therefore take anything stated in these verses as less than Biblically authoritative, but these verses do not influence major Christian doctrines.

I therefore can view our present New Testament as an essentially accurate copy of the original inspired word of God. Mark 16: 9-20 does not appear in Codex Vaticanus (B),or Codex Sinaiticus (Sin), the two oldest groups of manuscripts. Marlowe (2006: 1). The manuscripts have Mark ending at 16: 8. However, 16: 9-20 does appear in Codex Alexandrinus (A), which is a slightly newer manuscript. Miller (2005: 1).

We have copies from the two older groups of manuscripts which allow scholars to speculate that it is possible that Mark 16: 9-20 was not written by Mark, but written by a scribe at a later date. God has therefore not allowed a corruption of New Testament theology at its core even if he did allow an uninspired scribe to write 16: 9-20 and allowed it to become part of the majority text. It is also possible that Mark died and God inspired an associate who had known Mark to complete the book which appears in the majority text. As noted, I do find this view problematic.

Marlowe, Michael D. (2006) ‘Mark 16: 9-20’, Bible-Researcher.com, Ohio. Marlowe

Miller, Dave (2005) ‘Is Mark 16: 9-20 Inspired?’, Apologetics Press.org, Montgomery, Alabama. Miller

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