Problems of Individual Suffering

La Campagna, Italy, trekearth.com

UWTSD, (2009), PhD Viva for Theodicy and Practical Theology (2010).

My doctoral thesis was challenged by the external and internal reviewers in regard to problems of individual suffering.

I explained to the external and internal reviewers that I reasoned that my Reformed, philosophical, theological, theodicy approach was significantly and largely true. However, as I was both finite and sinful, I did not have exhaustive insights to individual human suffering within problems of evil.

This is a significant reason why my tutors at the University of Wales, Trinity Saint David were correct to strongly suggest I include practical and empirical components along with theoretical ones, within my PhD thesis.

PhD thesis

I can interject and state that academically solving the logical and gratuitous problems of evil by tying them back to God is an ultimate intellectual solution, Wright (1996: 197), but there are still practical ramifications to deal with, such as why certain evils occur. The fact that a sovereignty theodicy can logically and reasonable solve its problem of evil, does not mean that suffering often comes with an explanation. This is where practical and empirical theology can be very helpful when they offer practical assistance to those suffering under the problem of evil.

Henri Blocher explains that philosophical explanations have failed in dealing with the problem of evil. Blocher (1994: 84). Although I somewhat disagree with this comment, I can acknowledge philosophical theodicy does not take the place of effective practical theology that can assist a sufferer in having a true Christian religious experience.

Carl Henry reasons that theistic arguments do not in themselves vindicate God, and God’s revelation is required. Henry (1983: 282). In other words, through the study of Scripture and personal experience with God through revelation, the creator can be better understood, even though he willingly allows evil.
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Problems of individual suffering do not cancel out reasonable, academic theodicy.

BLOCHER, HENRI. (1994) Evil and the Cross, Translated by David G. Preston, Leicester, InterVarsity Press.

HENRY, CARL (1983) God, Revelation and Authority: Volume 6: God Who Stands and Stays, Waco, Word Books.

HENRY, CARL (1996) ‘Image of God’, in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books.

WRIGHT, R.K.McGREGOR (1996) No Place for Sovereignty, Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.

Viva voce fight?

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UWTSD, (2009), PhD Viva for Theodicy and Practical Theology (2010).

The external reviewer from London complained (paraphrased) that I was not emotional and fired up enough during the Viva, also known as Viva Voce.

But after their verbal attacks, I then
supposedly livened up.

I replied that I did not think that a Viva was a fight.

But I thought to myself, if you two want a fight, you will get one, I have studied the problem of evil, theodicy, free will and determinism ten plus years more than either one of you fine scholars.

In the end, I was highly complimented for the Viva performance.The external reviewer admitted that I had significant philosophical knowledge, but more of this knowledge needed to be in the thesis. As I stated in the previous entry, I very much wanted to write a more philosophical thesis, but was advised otherwise. The final work has much more philosophical content.

PhD thesis

Systemization would be a task of systematic theology and philosophy of religion. Practical and empirical theology can provide opportunities to evaluate practically systematic theology and philosophy of religion in regard to the problem of evil. (2000)(2007)

I have studied Biblical Studies, theology and philosophy of religion for many years, and on a personal level philosophical theology has often had natural practical implications for me.

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, in David Basinger and Randall Basinger (eds.), Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House. 

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (2001) No One Like Him, John S. Feinberg (gen.ed.), Wheaton, Illinois, Crossway Books.

PATTON, JOHN (2000)(2007) ‘Modern Pastoral Theology in the United States’, in James Woodward and Stephen Pattison (eds.), The Blackwell Reader in Pastoral and Practical Theology, Oxford, Blackwell Publishing.

PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1977)(2002) God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1982) The Nature of Necessity, Oxford, Clarendon Press.

PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (2000) Warranted Christian Belief, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

WOODWARD, JAMES AND STEPHEN PATTISON (2000)(2007)(eds.), The Blackwell Reader in Pastoral and Practical Theology, Oxford, Blackwell Publishing.

Academic Responsibility?

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UWTSD, (2009), PhD Viva for Theodicy and Practical Theology (2010). 

This is brief a entry in regard to the 2009 Viva where the internal and external reviewers questioned the lack of biblical studies and philosophy work in the thesis, I presented.The reviewers suggested my work was evangelical and perhaps, biblically naive. 

I stated I had followed adviser directions and that the University should take responsibility for how I was advised. It was as if the left hand (Wales, tutors) and right hand (Wales, reviewers, internal and external) passed all responsibility on to the advised. 

In the end, my revised final, passed thesis, rightly contained far more Reformed theology, philosophy of religion and even some New Testament Greek. The last two academic approaches had been discouraged by my tutors prior to my Viva, in favour of empirical approaches that the reviewers were not very concerned about! My final thesis was superior in quantity to the pre-Viva version. The work below is in the final version with edits for this website. This is added Reformed theology and biblical studies. 

The reviewers were largely correct in their assessment, but as a local pastor with a Doctorate that unofficially reviewed my work, stated (paraphrased): 'You had that philosophical work in the thesis, and the tutors asked you to take it out.' 

My Viva performance, I was told, demonstrated I knew what I was writing and talking about. The external reviewer told me I could complete the revisions required in three months, but I did even more revisions and took eight months. The internal reviewer was very kind enough to do a final review and between the two of us, we only found a handful of further changes. I then received the PhD. Again, the final thesis is superior in quantity to the pre-Viva version.

PhD Edit

In my mind, the concept compatibilism, although the modern philosophical term is not used, is implied in Scripture. The subject of predestination for salvation, for example, is a complex theological discussion and could be a topic for a Biblical Greek thesis. However, within Ephesians 1, ‘predestined’ which is προορίσας (The Greek New Testament 1993: 654), within Ephesians 1: 5, in the context is ‘predestined us to adoption as sons through Jesus Christ’ The New American Standard Version Bible (1984: 1322). There is προορισθέντες at Ephesians 1: 11, as  in ‘we have obtained an inheritance, having been predestined according to his purpose’ appear to support Reformed compatibilist notions.

The Greek New Testament (1993: 655).

Strong describes proorizw as to limit in advance in figurative terms, and to predetermine, ordain, and predestinate. Strong (1890)(1986: 81). Bauer defines the root word as meaning to decide before hand, predestine of God and applies this definition to Ephesians 1: 5 and 11.Bauer (1979: 709). Minimally, there appears reasonable textual support from this verse that could support a Reformed compatibilistic perspective on how God chooses persons for his ultimate culminated Kingdom.  

A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament, Translated by Eric H. Wahlstrom, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press.

BAUER, WALTER. (1979) A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament, Translated by Eric H. Wahlstrom, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press.

STRONG, J. (1890)(1986) Strong’s Exhaustive Concordance of the Bible, Pickering, Ontario, Welch Publishing Company.

THE GREEK NEW TESTAMENT (1993) Stuttgart, United Bible Societies.

Augustine v Feinberg

Augustine v Feinberg

Preface

Photo: University of Wales, Trinity Saint David, official.

Revised 20250927.

Augustine (354-430)

John S. Feinberg (1946-)

University of Wales, Trinity Saint David (2009), PhD Viva for Theodicy and Practical Theology (2010)

My external and internal reviewers opined that Augustine, my first historical example within incompatibilism, was considered the far better historical source, within the problem of evil/theodicy discussion, than was John S. Feinberg, my main Reformed, compatibilism, example.

I disagreed.

Note that the external reviewer intentionally, he said (paraphrased), wanted to make the Viva a little heated, as I seemed too calm. He wanted to know that I really cared. So, I warmed up...

I based much of my Reformed theodicy approach via John S. Feinberg and secondarily as an historical source, John Calvin. I replied that popularity was irrelevant, and academic truth was not a popularity contest. I also pointed point out that one of my reviewers was a noted Roman Catholic, more likely to follow Augustine than Feinberg, that was a Reformed theologian and philosopher. I also mentioned that I did reference John Calvin in regards to free will and determinism, and he would rival Augustine in the popularity contest department. 

If one wished to play that game.

AUGUSTINE (388-395)(1964) On Free Choice of the Will, Translated by Anna S. Benjamin and L.H. Hackstaff, Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall.

Within On Free Choice of the Will, Augustine presents his free will theodicy, theodicy being an explanation for the problem of evil in a theistic universe. Augustine was somewhat influential on Alvin C. Plantinga’s free will defence in the 1970’s. Plantinga (1977)(2002: 26).

Augustine reasons that God is not the cause of evil, but rather human beings create the problem when they choose to follow their own temporal ways rather than God’s. Augustine (388-395)(1964: 3). A possible problem with Augustine’s view is that he blames the problem of evil on human choice but at the same time places a heavy emphasis on God’s sovereignty in creation. Augustine’s view on human free will appears libertarian while, as John Feinberg points out, Augustine’s concept of God’s sovereignty would seemingly require some form of determinism. Feinberg (1994: 98).

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House. 

Within this text Feinberg presents a defence which could be labeled a sovereignty theodicy. My personal sovereignty theodicy is embedded within my MPhil and more so my PhD and is somewhat similar to Feinberg’s work. As well as presenting his own perspective Feinberg does a thorough job of reviewing various theistic and atheistic concepts on the problem of evil. He reasons that God does not presently eliminate the problem of evil because to do so would violate divine plans and human development. Feinberg (1994: 130).

I found Feinberg’s explanation of this a bit repetitive and it would perhaps be good for him to have speculated on God’s reasons for willingly allowing evil in more specific terms as I have to some degree in my work.

Some of views discussed within the Viva...

Incompatibilism versus Compatibilism

Libertarian free will 

Libertarian free will is usually viewed as a form of indeterminism. The concept in libertarian free will is that a person is able to perform another action in the place of one that has been committed. This action cannot be predetermined by any circumstance or desire. There cannot be another, predetermined, simultaneous cause in a theoretical chain within indeterminism. Norman Geisler explains that indeterminism is defined as the idea that there are no antecedent (preceding conditions, my add) or simultaneous (at the same time, my add) causes of human actions. All human actions are free if a person could have done otherwise. Geisler (1996: 429). For the context of the Viva, libertarian free will was viewed as synonymous with incompatibilism.

Incompatibilism/Indeterminism 

Indeterminism is also equated with incompatibilism which states that God, or any other being, cannot cause by force or coercion any human action, nor can any action be simultaneously willed by God or any other being, for the human action to remain significantly free. Feinberg (1994: 60). Compatibilism, which I hold to, would agree with incompatibilism that God or any other being cannot cause by force or coercion any significantly free human action, but contrary to incompatibilism thinks that God can simultaneously will significantly free human actions. Feinberg (1994: 60). An entity that is forced or coerced into conscious, thoughts, will, choices, acts and actions is not morally responsible, where these are done without significant freedom. 

Of course, only the infinite God is an infinitely accurate, moral judge of guilt or not, in regards to the deeds of a finite entity. (God judges deeds, post-mortem, Revelation 20, also 21-22, 2 Corinthians 5, 2 Peter 3, as some key examples) Significant human free will would be viewed an incompatible with any form of determinism. 

Philosopher Tim Mawson reasons that incompatibilism, which he reasoned was also known as libertarianism or libertarian free will, in regard to human free will, believes that true human free will must be uncaused by preceding states. Mawson (1999: 324). In other words, no external force must cause a legitimate and truly free act of the human will. Within incompatibilist theory, a human action would never truly be free because God or an another external force (non-deistic view, my add) would have willed and determined it, before being simultaneously willed to a given person. Mawson (1999: 324). Significant freedom for incompatibilism, does not allow pre-determination, on the person, before being committed by the human being. The external force could hypothetically be a first cause within non-theistic theory. The Biblical concept theologically being that God is infinite and is therefore limitless; God is eternal and therefore has always existed (Genesis 1, John 1, as examples). 

This concept is connected to philosophical views of first cause. David M. Ciocchi describes the incompatibilist idea as being God can determine that an agent commit action x, but he cannot determine that an agent commit action x freely. Ciocchi (2002: 46). The theory is that significantly free human will and actions cannot be caused by an external force. This would include a first cause. This would include God. Again to Norman Geisler, he describes a form of incompatibilism which he, calls self-determinism. Moral choices are not caused or uncaused by another being, but are self-caused. 

Incompatibilists, therefore, do not deny there are outside forces that influence significantly free human actions; however, they do not accept any notion that a free act can be caused in a determined sense by one being upon another and remain a significantly free act. An act cannot be determined or simultaneously determined and remain truly free within incompatibilism. Geisler (1986: 75). 

Feinberg explains incompatibilism is defined as the idea within free will approaches that a person is free in regard to an action if he or she is free to either commit, or refrain from committing the action. Feinberg (1994: 64). There can be no antecedent (there can be no prior) conditions or laws that will determine that an action is committed or not committed. Feinberg (1994: 64). Feinberg importantly writes that just as the incompatibilist does not claim that all actions are significantly free, the compatibilist also does not attach significant freedom to all acts. Feinberg (2001: 637). Feinberg then admits that it is difficult for compatibilists to determine intellectually if certain acts were done by an individual with significant freedom, or with the use of some type of compulsion. Feinberg (2001: 637). He then states that this intellectual difficulty does not disprove compatibilism. 

Limited free will 

This is not the ability to choose otherwise, as in middle knowledge and versions of libertarian free will. In my compatibilistic model, at least, through a theoretical chain of human nature, human will and human choice, a person embraces as secondary cause, what was caused, willed and allowed by the primary cause. This in regard to human conscious thoughts, will, choices, acts and actions. This first cause would be God in a biblical view. During my British studies I looked for the term limited free will in texts and online and did not see it. Eventually I heard, Dr. Charles Stanley also use it. I highly doubt I invented it, but at least it is somewhat original. I/we have significant moral responsibility in my/our conscious, thoughts, will, choices, acts and actions, that are not significantly forced or coerced.

Compatibilism/Soft determinism 

Significant free will (human in this context) would be viewed as compatible with at least some forms of soft determinism. Louis P. Pojman explains the difference between determinism, which is also known as hard determinism, and compatibilism, which is also known as soft determinism. Pojman (1996: 596). Within determinism or hard determinism, God (or an external force) causes an act and no created being is responsible for his or her moral actions, while for compatibilism or soft determinism, although God causes actions, created beings are responsible where they act voluntarily. Pojman (1996: 596). It could be stated that human secondary causes, through a theoretical chain of human nature, human will and human choice, embrace what has been caused and chosen by God, the first and primary cause, directly or indirectly. The human being could also be influenced by other secondary causes, such as other persons, angelic beings and demonic beings, for example. 

P.S. Greenspan writes that compatibilism holds to free will and determinism being compatible. Greenspan (1998: 1). Pojman, defines compatibilism as the concept that an act can be entirely determined and yet be free in the sense that it was done voluntarily and without compulsion. Pojman (1996: 596). As Feinberg explains that compatibilism does not allow for coercion or force, but holds that God, or some outside force, can simultaneously determine with the use of persuasion, that an action will or will not take place. Feinberg (1986: 24). Again with Feinberg, he writes that certain nonconstraining conditions could strongly influence actions, in conjunction with human free will performing these actions. Feinberg (1994: 60). With this viewpoint, there will be no contradiction in stating that God would create human beings who were significantly free, unconstrained, and yet committed actions that God willed. Feinberg (2001: 637).

W.T. Stace (1952)(1976) explains that moral responsibility is consistent with determinism in the context of soft determinism and requires it. Stace (1952)(1976: 29). If human actions are uncaused then reward or punishment would be unjustified. Stace (1952)(1976: 29). Stace reasons that there must be at least some human cause within human actions to make them morally responsible acts. Stace (1952)(1976: 30). 

Hard determinism 

Simon Blackburn comments that this is the doctrine that human action has no influence on events. Blackburn (1996: 137). Blackburn gives the opinion that fatalism is wrongly confused with determinism, which by itself carries no implications that human actions have no effect. Blackburn (1996: 137). During the Viva, the external examiner asked me if I believed in fatalism. I stated that I did not as I reasoned that fatalism was an impersonal concept and not within a theistic, planned, reality. Bloesch explains that fate is not chance, but instead is cosmic determinism that has no meaning or purpose. Bloesch (1996: 407). He writes that fate/fatalism would differ from a Christian idea of divine providence and its implied use of determinism, in that fatalism is impersonal and irrational, whereas providence is personal and rational. Bloesch (1996: 407). 

Tomis Kapitan notes that determinism is usually understood as meaning that whatever occurs is determined by antecedent (preceding cause) conditions. Kapitan (1999: 281). Pojman states that hard determinism holds that every event is caused and no one is responsible for actions, whereas soft determinism holds that rational creatures can be held responsible for determined actions as long as they are done voluntarily and without force or coercion. Pojman (1996: 586). 

Fini

I was told by reviewers that I did an excellent job in the Viva. With God's help, I will take it...

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AUGUSTINE (388-395)(1964) On Free Choice of the Will, Translated by Anna S.Benjamin and L.H. Hackstaff, Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall.

AUGUSTINE (398-399)(1992) Confessions, Translated by Henry Chadwick, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

AUGUSTINE (400-416)(1987)(2004) On the Trinity, Translated by Reverend Arthur West Haddan, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Series One, Volume 3, Denver, The Catholic Encyclopedia.

AUGUSTINE (421)(1998) Enchiridion, Translated by J.F. Shaw, Denver, The Catholic Encyclopedia.

AUGUSTINE (426)(1958) The City of God, Translated by Gerald G. Walsh, Garden City, New York, Image Books.

AUGUSTINE (427)(1997) On Christian Doctrine, Translated by D.W. Robertson Jr., Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall.

AUGUSTINE (427b)(1997) On Christian Teaching, Translated by R.P.H. Green, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

BLOESCH, D. (1996) ‘Fate, Fatalism’, in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books.

CALVIN, JOHN (1539)(1998) The Institutes of the Christian Religion, Book II, Translated by Henry Beveridge, Grand Rapids, The Christian Classic Ethereal Library, Wheaton College. http://www.ccel.org/ccel/calvin/institutes.html

CALVIN, JOHN (1539)(1998) The Institutes of the Christian Religion, Book IV, Translated by Henry Beveridge, Grand Rapids, The Christian Classic Ethereal Library, Wheaton College. http://www.ccel.org/ccel/calvin/institutes.html

CALVIN, JOHN (1540)(1973) Romans and Thessalonians, Translated by Ross Mackenzie, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

CALVIN, JOHN (1543)(1996) The Bondage and Liberation of the Will, Translated by G.I. Davies, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

CALVIN, JOHN (1550)(1978) Concerning Scandals, Translated by John W. Fraser, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

CALVIN, JOHN (1552)(1995) Acts, Translated by Watermark, Nottingham, Crossway Books.

CALVIN, JOHN (1553)(1952) Job, Translated by Leroy Nixon, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House. 

CALVIN, JOHN (1554)(1965) Genesis, Translated by John King, Edinburgh, The Banner of Truth Trust.

CIOCCHI, DAVID M. (2002) ‘The Religious Adequacy of Free-Will Theism’, in Religious Studies, Volume 38, pp. 45-61. Cambridge.

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1729)(2006) Sovereignty of God, New Haven, Connecticut, Jonathan Edwards Center, Yale University. 

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1731-1733)(2006) Law of Nature, New Haven, Connecticut, Jonathan Edwards Center, Yale University. 

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1754)(2006) Freedom of the Will, Flower Mound, Texas. Jonathanedwards.com. http://www.jonathanedwards.com 

ERICKSON, MILLARD (1994) Christian Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House. 

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, in David Basinger and Randall Basinger (eds.), Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House. 

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (2001) No One Like Him, John S. Feinberg (gen.ed.), Wheaton, Illinois, Crossway Books.

FLEW, ANTONY, R.M. HARE, AND BASIL MITCHELL (1996) ‘The Debate on the Rationality of Religious Belief’, in L.P. Pojman (ed.), Philosophy, The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.

FLEW, ANTONY AND A.MACINTRYE (1999) ‘Philosophy of Religion’, in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press Ltd. 

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1975) Philosophy of Religion, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House. 

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1978) The Roots of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House. 

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press. 

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1996) ‘Freedom, Free Will, and Determinism’ in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books.

GREENSPAN, P.S. (1998) Free Will and Genetic Determinism: Locating the Problem (s), Maryland, University of Maryland. http://www.philosophy.umd.edu/Faculty/PGreenspan/Res/gen2.html 

KAPITAN, TOMIS (1996) ‘Free Will Problem’, in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 

MACKIE, J.L. (1955)(1996) ‘Evil and Omnipotence’, in Mind, in Michael Peterson, William Hasker, Bruce Reichenbach, and David Basinger (eds.), Philosophy of Religion, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

MACKIE, J.L. (1971)(1977)(2002) ‘Evil and Omnipotence’, in The Philosophy of Religion, in Alvin C. Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids. Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

MAWSON, TIM (1999) ‘The Problem of Evil and Moral Indifference’, in Religious Studies, Volume 35, pp. 323-345. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 

PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1977)(2002) God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1982) The Nature of Necessity, Oxford, Clarendon Press.

PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (2000) Warranted Christian Belief, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

POJMAN, LOUIS P. (1996) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company. 

STACE, W.T. (1952)(1976) Religion and the Modern Mind, in John R. Burr and Milton Goldinger (eds), Philosophy and Contemporary Issues, London, Collier Macmillan Publishers.

Saturday, September 19, 2020 PhD Full Version PDF: Theodicy and Practical Theology 2010, Wales TSD