Predestination Too

Predestination Too 

Predestined September 2010 

2 Peter 3 September 2016

This further revised section from my PhD post-viva final revisions, connects to my most recent 2 Peter 3, article.

PhD revised

In my mind, the philosophical and theological concept of compatibilism, although the term is not used, is implied in Scripture. The subject of predestination for salvation, for example, is a complex theological discussion and could be a topic for a Biblical Greek thesis.

However, within Ephesians 1, ‘predestined’ which is προορίσας[1] within Ephesians 1: 5,[2] and in the context is ‘predestined us to adoption as sons through Jesus Christ’ and προορισθέντες[3] at Ephesians 1: 11, as in ‘we have obtained an inheritance, having been predestined according to his purpose’ appear to support Reformed compatibilist notions. 

Strong defines προορίζω[4] which is the root word connected to the forms of the word in Ephesians 1, as to limit in advance in figurative terms,[5] and to predetermine, determine before, ordain, and predestinate.[6]  Bauer defines the root word as meaning to decide before hand, predestine of God and applies this definition to Ephesians 1: 5 and 11. [7] Minimally, there appears reasonable textual support from this verse[8] that could support a Reformed compatibilistic perspective on how God chooses persons for his ultimate culminated Kingdom. 

2 Peter 3 article revised

Quote

Erickson:

‘We must distinguish between two different senses of God’s will, which we will refer to as God’s “wish” (will1) and God’s will (will2).’ (361).

Will1 is God’s general intention and Will2 is God’s specific intention.

Or it could be stated Will1=God’s perfect will and Will2=God’s permissible will.

However, there is a theological and philosophical problem. If it is God’s eternal permissible will to save only some, then God caused this in a sense. I reason it can be traced to the fallen human nature that works through limited free will. As my Hebrews professor told me at Columbia Bible College (paraphrased), although we all have a fallen nature outside of Christ by default, some have a fallen nature that will never accept Christ and be acceptable to God. Others will be regenerated.

Therefore, God’s eternal, perfect will would actually be for some to reject him and remain everlastingly outside of his Kingdom, although in a sense, God wishes it would be otherwise, as can be seen biblically and theologically in 2 Peter 3: 9 and 1 Timothy 2: 4. There are various interpretations, however. 

The question arises if God wishes to save all people as in all individuals or all peoples? I have seen the all peoples explanation raised in Reformed writing and dialogue.

This places doubt that God's wish is God's perfect will. Rather it may be a divine wish. God wishes salvation for all (universalism) within his will, but it will not occur.

This is not outlandish or unreasonable. On one hand, God desires me not sin, he does not tempt me (James 1), but on the other hand God created humanity with an eternal plan of salvation from sin. This implies significantly free creatures that will sin is the eternal plan.

God, in my view, could create significantly free finite creatures than remain morally perfect, in a finite sense. The classic example, being angels that did not fall. Jesus Christ was both God and perfect man.  He never appealed to the sinful nature inherited by Adam and Eve. 

The atonement, resurrection and gospel work are from and in God’s perfect will (Ephesians 1, those chosen in Christ before the foundation of the word, implied eternal), I reason, and this leads to God ultimately producing humanity as desired within the Kingdom of God from start to finish.

BAUER, W. (1979) A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament, Translated by Eric H. Wahlstrom, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press.

ERICKSON, MILLARD (1994) Christian Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

STRONG, J. (1890)(1986) Strong’s Exhaustive Concordance of the Bible, Pickering, Ontario, Welch Publishing Company. 

THE GREEK NEW TESTAMENT (1993) Stuttgart, United Bible Societies.

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[1] The Greek New Testament (1993: 654).

[2] The Greek New Testament (1993: 654). 

[3] The Greek New Testament (1993: 655).

[4] Strong (1890)(1986: 81).

[5] Strong (1890)(1986: 81).

[6] Strong (1890)(1986: 81).

[7] Bauer (1979: 709).

[8] I realize many other verses could be examined concerning this subject.  I provide Ephesians 1 as a prime Reformed example within a limited space allotted for this topic.

Those emotional appeals...

This week

PIRIE, MADSEN (2006)(2015) How To Win Every Argument, Bloomsbury, London.

Emotional appeals as fallacy occur when 'it becomes the means of deciding the soundness of an argument.' (87). Emotions being used to influence what is determined as fact.

This fallacy can be triggered by a person (s) abusing the emotions of the determined audience. To play on the emotional disposition of such an audience. (88).

The author writes that 'sentimens is a clever fallacy.' (89). Perhaps this should be documented as 'sentiments'; a more common usage.

If someone does not play along with this sentimental philosophical approach, he or she may be considered 'cold'. (89). This can lead to an abandonment of reason. (89).

In contrast, emotional fallacy should be abandoned. Not emotions, but the abuse of emotions should not be used in attempts to determine reasonable arguments and truth.

I have written articles on this website noting the dangers of sentimental theology. See Blogger search, top right.

Blackburn is helpful here noting on emotion. (117).

'Each indicates a state of some kind of arousal, a state that can prompt some activities and interfere with others.' (117).

Emotion should not interfere with reasonable, intellectual activity that decides soundness of arguments and truth.

Those emotional appeals can influence thought on academic and personal levels. A counter, I suggest, is a reasonably open-minded review of different views that oppose heartfelt ones. Even if these opposing views are not accepted it keeps one's own views sharper.

From a Christian, biblical perspective, one should seek God (and God the Father) through the incarnation of his Son, Jesus Christ who in eternal truth and the Holy Spirit, also a member of the eternal trinity (John 14).

Although the Scripture is not specific philosophy, philosophy of religion or scientific text, it can be reasoned that 'all truth is God's truth', and God should be sought for both biblical and extra-biblical knowledge. I am not meaning primarily (obviously!) an emotional religious, spiritual appeal to God, but one that encompasses the human experience of emotion and intellect.

BLACKBURN, SIMON, (1996) The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford University Press, Oxford

PIRIE, MADSEN (2006)(2015) How To Win Every Argument, Bloomsbury, London.

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Not to say more than is essential

Pinterest: Symbolic logic: I have never considered myself a nerd. Why? Because I understand many social norms but reject some of them. Whereas a nerd is often socially inept. The terms non-conformist and not anti-establishment would fit me better.

LANGER, SUSANNE K (1953)(1967) An Introduction to Symbolic Logic, Dover Publications, New York.

~=false or not

 ∃=sometimes or better

~ a fm a (fm is fellowman or in fellowship with).

It is false or not true that a is the fellowman of a, or is in fellowship with a. (94).

Universally, one cannot be the fellowman of self. (94).

However, one case to the contrary 'destroys the right to state it always holds.' (94). In this case the equation would therefore be:

(∃a): A fm a. Sometimes a is the fellowman of a. (94).

'For some value or values of a, 'A fm a' holds'. (94). It is true in at least one case. (94-95).

This reads as an exception clause within philosophy. 'It is essential in logic, not to say more than is essential. In this respect logicians are very prudent.' (94). The symbol should mean the least it can possibly mean. (94).

In my academic writing, both formal and website work, I have lived by the idea of careful use of words. To allow for exceptions. This was enforced especially within the British academic system. This does lead to careful revisions. The (∃a) symbols serves as a quantifier. Something is universally true but there may be at least one exception, the particular quantifier. (96).

Perhaps with ∃a: a (Russ) fm a (Russ) are two different person's named Russ.

Pinterest

Bhavinionline.com

John S. Feinberg: Incompatibilism & Compatibilism (PhD Edit)

Today

According to Google, my two Blogger websites set my own personal record for approximately 67, 000 pageviews in September. The Stat Counter statistics were similar. I would personally, very much love to thank you all for the support in making that happen...But, in reality the views are mostly due to my template change to dynamic and resulting Googlebots. Again as per United Kingdom PhD academic standards, citations are primarily in my own words. This is re-presented material in a new form. The PhD is Russell Norman Murray, Theodicy and Practical Theology (2010), The University of Wales, Trinity Saint David, Lampeter.
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John S. Feinberg, who has written extensively on the concepts of free will and determinism, explains incompatibilism is defined as the idea within free will theodicy or defence that a person is free in regard to an action if he or she is free to either commit, or refrain from committing the action. Feinberg (1994: 64). 

There can be no antecedent[1] conditions or laws that will determine that an action is committed or not committed. Feinberg (1994: 64).

Feinberg writes that for this view, freedom is incompatible with contingently sufficient nonsubsequent conditions of an action. The contingently sufficient nonsubsequent actions would be God making people in such a way that they only freely did one thing or another. Feinberg (1994: 60). 

Feinberg importantly writes that just as the incompatibilist does not claim that all actions are significantly free,  the compatibilist also does not attach significant freedom to all acts. Feinberg (2001: 637).

I reason, for example, God as primary cause, and in some cases secondary causes, can force or coerce human actions. But when actions are committed by a human being without significant freedom, there is not moral responsibility. For example, a person being forced or coerced to commit crimes under mind control, may not have significant moral responsibly for thoughts and actions.

Within hard determinism God (theistic model) would be the only cause of human actions,[2] while with soft determinism God would be the primary cause of human actions and persons the secondary cause.[3] Compatibilism, like incompatibilism, holds to free will but in a limited form. Pojman (1996: 596).

Feinberg, a noted compatibilist, describes compatibilism as stating certain nonconstraining conditions could strongly influence actions in conjunction with human free will performing these actions.

Feinberg (2001) explains that with this viewpoint, there will be no contradiction in stating God would create human beings who were significantly free, unconstrained, and yet committed actions that God willed. Feinberg (2001: 637).

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996)  Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy,  Oxford, Oxford University Press.

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, in David Basinger and Randall Basinger (eds.), Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids,  Zondervan Publishing House.

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (2001) No One Like Him, John S. Feinberg (gen.ed.), Wheaton, Illinois, Crossway Books.

POJMAN, LOUIS P. (1996) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.

STACE, W.T. (1952)(1976) Religion and the Modern Mind, in John R. Burr and Milton Goldinger (eds.), Philosophy and Contemporary Issues, London, Collier Macmillan Publishers. 

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[1] In his article entitled ‘Conditional’ Simon Blackburn writes that an antecedent exists if  p causes  q.  P  is the antecedent or prior cause of  q  which is the conditional and the consequence.  Blackburn (1996: 73-74).

[2] Pojman (1996: 596). 

[3] Stace (1952)(1976: 30).