Thursday, May 26, 2016

Brief But Significant Symbolic Glossary

Burnaby Mountain Park



















LANGER, SUSANNE K (1953)(1967) An Introduction to Symbolic Logic, Dover Publications, New York.

Cited

'...a given symbol equals by interpretation a certain term or relation. (58).

Interpretation is abbreviated as 'int'. (58)

Glossary

Note my keyboard does not have the correct symbols in order for me to copy Philosopher Langer's glossary exactly. Where I am using an approximate symbol, it will be noted with *

This also allows an example of symbolic logic...

"=" =int "identical with"
"e" =int "membership in the class"*
"C" =int "entailment"*
"E!"=int "there exists" (58).

Therefore:

Howard James Bartel=Pope Chucklins=Saint Chuckles=Chucky

Batman superhero

To sleep C to dream (57).

To eat to digest.

Langer's example is:

E! God (57).

E! FC Bayern Munich
E! Donald John Trump
E! Justin Pierre James Trudeau

Langer warns:

'The assignment of arbitrary meanings to signs with traditionally established uses should be avoided. That is to say, one should not use = to mean chess playing...' (59).

The = symbol having similar traditional uses in philosophy, mathematics and science, therefore it would be reasonable for clarity to use = in its traditional context within symbolic logic. Certain symbols are 'generally used within those connotations.' (59).

Professor Langer (December 20, 1895 – July 17, 1985) Wikipedia, is a clear and concise philosophy presenter in regard to material presented in the text.

Burnaby Mountain Park







Burnaby Mountain Park
Burnaby Mountain Park

Monday, May 23, 2016

Briefly On Symbolic Suggestiveness: Chicago, Denver, New York

Time














The author states that

'Suggestiveness should never be allowed to interfere with logical clarity or elegance.

For instance, if we wanted to state that Chicago lies between New York and Denver, we might well use C for Chicago, and D for Denver, but to use NY for New York would be confusing, because, if we use Roman capitals for elements, the use of two letters would suggest some combination of two elements.' (59).

It could be viewed as suggesting two locations, for example.

'If we wanted a more suggestive symbolism than A, B, C,...' (59).

This would not be the most effective symbolism when documenting cities. In this example, the 'C' as the third city listed,for New York, could be confused with the 'A' for Chicago, the first city listed, because Chicago begins with the English letter 'C'.

Langer suggests for this set either:

C, D, and N

or

C, D, and Y

not

C, D, and NY (59)

I would prefer

C, D, and N to state that Chicago is between Denver and New York

Therefore for an example, adding

R=Dr. Russ

And the cities I have visited from that statement

v= Has visited
nv+ Has not visited

Notice as Langer has with her examples such as 'ch' for chess and 'br' for bridge (54-58), these are stated as elements in small letters in order to not be confused (hopefully) with the cities stated with large capital letters.

R v N

R nv C

R nv D

LANGER, SUSANNE K (1953)(1967) An Introduction to Symbolic Logic, Dover Publications, New York.

Saturday, May 21, 2016

Very Brief On Vicious Regress

I hope the extra wave effect, intentionally provided, is appreciated...















A Vicious Regress October 2 2006

Very Brief On Vicious Regress

I have been in a few recent discussions in regard to vicious regress and infinite regress.

To state:

A god, is caused by a god, is caused by a god, is caused by a god, ad infinitum, is an infinite regress. It is a vicious regress, because it does not solve its own problem and requires a first cause, without a cause.

A choice is caused by a choice, is caused by a choice, is caused by a choice, ad infinitum, is an infinite regress. It is a vicious regress, because it does not solve its own problem and requires a first cause, without a cause.

Time is caused by time, is caused by time, is caused by time, ad infinitum, is an infinite regress. It is a vicious regress, because it does not solve its own problem and requires a first cause, without a cause.

In the Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Simon Blackburn discusses ‘infinite regress’ and mentions that this occurs in a vicious way whenever a problem tries to solve itself and yet remains with the same problem it had previously. Blackburn (1996: 324). A vicious regress is an infinite regress that does not solve its own problem, while a benign regress is an infinite regress that does not fail to solve its own problem. Blackburn (1996: 324). Blackburn writes that there is frequently room for debate on what is a vicious regress or benign regress. Blackburn (1996: 324).

An example of a benign regress is infinite numbers both plus and minus, as they in reality represent conceptualized things as opposed to being real things. 'Problem' solved.

Therefore:

Based on my philosophical reading and Blackburn's explanation, it can be deduced that philosophers would debate whether a particular vicious regress is illogical and whether it is using a logical fallacy.

Further:

An argument can be logical and not sound, as sound arguments are not the only valid arguments but are those where 'all the premises are true'. (1997: 35).

Whether or not a particular vicious regress, and the examples I raised, are illogical and using a logical fallacy in the sense of invalid argument is of secondary importance. It is of primary importance when a vicious regress is not reasonable and does not solve its own problem and is fallacious as in faulty reasoning. That is the case with my three examples, I reason.

Bradley mentions that it is not illogical, and not a vicious regress that each act of free choice is caused by another act of free choice. I agree that it is not necessarily illogical, but disagree that the argument as described is not a vicious regress.

BLACKBURN, S. (1996) ‘Regress’, in Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

BRADLEY, RAYMOND D. (1996) ‘Infinite Regress Argument’, in Robert Audi, (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

CONWAY DAVID A. AND RONALD MUNSON (1997) The Elements of Reasoning, Wadsworth Publishing Company, New York.


A fine Bulgarian gift from Dean and Anjela a few years ago. Note, I am neither a communist, socialist, nor a smoker. I still do not know what I did to earn this lovely Bulgarian medal...

I did drive Anjela and Sophia to the mall once when Dean was away on work travel.

Tuesday, May 17, 2016

Ambiguous Language

Poland: trekearth


















Back to a review of the Langer text on Symbolic Logic, after a break since March as I was facilitating on a local church course and posting related articles.

The previous Langer post needs to be restated for context:

Chapter 2: The Essentials Of Logical Structure 

Langer provides further equations continued from the Chapter: pages 53-54

1. I played bridge with my three cousins

2. I played chess with my three cousins (53)

A=Speaker

B, C, D=Three cousins (54)

A br B, C, D (54)

If in chess each player was played separately

A ch B
A ch C
A ch D
A ch (B-C-D)* (54)

*The hyphen which could also be a + expresses an operation when the two terms are united as one. (54)

So this could be A ch (B+C+D)

I take it here the author means uniting B-C-D, as she explains this will be explained more later and must at this point be taken in faith. (54)

It is actually three terms, but I take the point and she means two or more.

---

'When a relation-symbol stands in a construct, the number of terms grouped with it reveals the degree of the relation. But when it is not actually used, but merely spoken of, it is sometimes convenient to have some way of denoting its degree. This may be done by adding a numerical subscript; for example, "kd2" means that "killing" is dyadic (a pair), "bt3" that "between" is triadic.' (55).

The examples of different degrees are provided:

ch2
br4 (55)

The author states that two beings named 'John' are not likely to be treated as the same in the language of discourse (56). It is made apparent in context that there is this John and that John. (56).

Symbolic logic provides a new medium of such expression. (57).

For example the following

John a

John b

Are a symbolic way of differentiating between two different persons named John using arbitrary symbols as Langer calls them. (58). Although the example is mine.

Langer writes natural language has a tendency to let one word have and embody many meanings and this leads to in philosophical terms fallacious argumentation and reasoning. (55).

In fact, twisted arguments can be created. (55).

A reason for the use of symbolic logic and reasoning as alternative within philosophy.

In a religious context, philosophy of religion crosses over with theology and there are at times theological arguments that are presented both in natural language and with symbolic logic, and so therefore learning both modes of argumentation is beneficial.

---

Continued

Ambiguous Language

Langer explains 'Our linguistic means of conveying relations are highly ambiguous. But the expression of relations is the chief purpose of language. If we were interested only in things and not in their arrangement and connection, we could express ourselves with our forefingers.' (56).

An interesting author example, and the idea of supposed human communication as ape-like creatures within the concept of Darwinian Evolution comes to mind. Assuming that at one point evolving 'humanity' perhaps did communicate by such methods.

This being the case, if indeed one would accept such views over explanations that include both reasonable scientific induction and deduction and a literal view and not mythological view of the historical religious history of Genesis and Scripture. This reasonable approach that can include both plain literal and figurative literal biblical interpretations based on what biblical language and context dictates.

But I digress.

The author explains that in the example, the two John's are not likely to be confused. This is because these relations can be explicitly known in discourse. (56).

However, Langer expresses the idea that terms and concepts not explained clearly through discourse need to be explained when obscurity in communication occurs. (57). In order to escape error 'another sort of discourse' is required. (57).

This being symbolic logic. (57).

A more precise symbolism can bring logic out of language. (57).

LANGER, SUSANNE K (1953)(1967) An Introduction to Symbolic Logic, Dover Publications, New York.