Amphiboly

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CONWAY DAVID A. AND RONALD MUNSON (1997) The Elements of Reasoning, Wadsworth Publishing Company, New York.

PIRIE, MADSEN (2006)(2015) How To Win Every Argument, Bloomsbury, London.

WALTON, DOUGLAS (1996) ‘Informal Fallacy’, in Robert Audi, (ed), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Examples from Pirie

I met the ambassador riding his horse. He was snorting and steaming, so I gave him a lump of sugar.' (38)

'FOR SALE: Car by elderly lady with new body and spare tyre. (38)

Note

I now just realize this is how 'tyre' is spelled in British English. I wrote my MPhil and PhD theses with British English, but 'tyre' is still new to me.

(Canadian and American English is 'tire')

Amphiboly is the fallacy of ambiguous construction. (37)

The fallacy occurs often when one fails to consider alternate readings. (38)

This could be due to mistakes in punctuation and grammar.

He states that astrology makes good use of amphiboly as do fortune tellers and a prophet to 'hedge his bets' (38) and 'have it both ways. (38)

This would of course be a false prophet. A true prophet, receiving actual information from God would do no such thing and to hedge bets would risk death in error. Deuteronomy 13 and 18 both stating a false prophet within the Old Testament, Mosaic Law should be put to death.

In the New Testament context a false prophet is to be exposed as such by the Church. This minus the Mosaic Law. 2 Peter (false prophets and false teachers) and Jude (false teachers) are two notable New Testament books to expose false religionists. Jesus also mentioned false Christs and false prophets in Matthew 24.

I am not implying or indicating that all prophets use amphiboly, although to Pirie's credit, he points out a tool that can be used by false religionists.

'The Elements' text is useful considering vagueness and ambiguity in writing arguments.

Vagueness described as a term's lack of precision (176) and ambiguity allows for various possible meanings, each which may be precise. (176).

In Cambridge, Amphiboly is called '(double arrangement)' as traditional fallacy from Aristotle's list. (376). It is the use of 'syntactically ambiguous sentences.' (376).

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Affirming The Consequent Fallacy

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Affirming The Consequent Fallacy

Originally published 2015-11-11. Revised with additions on 2023-11-17...

Preface

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

PIRIE, MADSEN (2006)(2015) How To Win Every Argument, Bloomsbury, London.

Blackburn explains 'Any proposition of the form 'if p then q'. The condition hypothesized, p, is called the antecedent of the conditional, and q the consequent'. Blackburn (1996: 73).

According to Blackburn conditional equates to consequent.

Affirming The Consequent Fallacy

Pirie writes affirming the consequent fallacy is natural for those that confuse 'the order of horses and carts'. Pirie (2006)(2015: 35).

His example

'When cats are bitten by rabid hedgehogs they die. Here is a dead cat, so obviously, there is a rabid hedgehog about'. (35).

The author explains that there are other overlooked reasons for the death of the cat such as being hit by a vehicle or electrocuted. The death of the cat from a rabid hedgehog cannot be reasonably deduced as fact. (35).

It is proper to affirm the antecedent (p from Blackburn) to prove (q) the consequent, but not vice-versa. (35).

So, using his example, when cats are bitten by a rabid hedgehog they die (or when cats are infected by rabies, my add) (p), but the (q) cannot be affirmed to prove (p).

There are many possible reasons for a deceased feline.

Interestingly, Pirie notes that this fallacy is used in the legal system, the courts, as the basis for circumstantial evidence.

For example, based on his examples.

If John wanted to kill his wife Joan, he would have taken out an extra life insurance on Joan.

John did take out extra life insurance on Joan.

Or,

If John had wanted to poison Joan to death, he would have bought poison.

John did buy poison.

These both have alternate explanations (37) but when these mount up it becomes easier for a court to find someone guilty of a crime. (37).

Pirie writes that this fallacy under review, is used to impute motives to a person. (37). This could be committed in a legal and court context, or like to find guilt with someone.

Perhaps in truth, perhaps in error.

Logically fallacious: Affirming the Consequent 

Cited

'Description: An error in formal logic where if the consequent is said to be true, the antecedent is said to be true, as a result. 

Logical Form: If P then Q. Q. Therefore, P. Example #1: If taxes are lowered, I will have more money to spend. I have more money to spend. Therefore, taxes must have been lowered. 

Explanation: I could have had more money to spend simply because I gave up crack-cocaine, prostitute solicitation, and baby-seal-clubbing expeditions.'

'References: Jevons, W. S. (1872). Elementary lessons in logic: deductive and inductive : with copious questions and examples, and a vocabulary of logical terms. Macmillan.'

(Quite the examples from the website...)

Critical thinker academy: Affirming the Consequent

Cited

'“Affirming the Consequent” is the name of an invalid conditional argument form. You can think of it as the invalid version of modus ponens.

Below is modus ponens, which is valid:

1. If A then B

2. A

Therefore, B

Now, below is the invalid form that you get when you try to infer the antecedent by affirming the consequent:

1. If A then B

2. B

Therefore, A

No matter what claims you substitute for A and B, any argument that has the form of I will be valid, and any argument that AFFIRMS THE CONSEQUENT will be INVALID.

Remember, what it means to say that an argument is invalid is that IF the premises are all true, the conclusion could still be false. In other words, the truth of the premises does not guarantee the truth of the conclusion.

Here’s an example:

1. If I have the flu then I’ll have a fever.

2. I have a fever.

Therefore, I have the flu.

Here we’re affirming that the consequent is true, and from this, inferring that the antecedent is also true.

But it’s obvious that the conclusion doesn’t have to be true. Lots of different illnesses can give rise to a fever, so from the fact that you’ve got a fever there’s no guarantee that you’ve got the flu.'

(Yes, sadly I had the mumps and a fever as a child)

(Therefore a valid deductive argument can have: 

False premises and a true conclusion (FT) 

False premises and a false conclusion (FF) 

True premises and a true conclusion (TT) 

However... True premises and a false conclusion (TF) is invalid

Valid arguments with all true premises are called sound arguments

These also have true conclusions)

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Cumulative evidences

In PhD thesis research, this fallacy connects to cumulative evidences. One evidence by itself may not lead to a reasonable conclusion, but the more cumulative evidences there are, the more reasonable a conclusion.

From a Biblical perspective, historical Scriptural evidences for the existence of the triune God, Christ and the Gospel can be used, primarily in an attempt to demonstrate Christianity as a reasonable or most reasonable worldview, philosophy, theology.

Secondarily, theistic philosophical (philosophy of religion) evidences such as the idea as necessary for an infinite, eternal, first cause can also be used, although they do not prove the Biblical God, they support the existence of such a creator.

Therefore the secondary cumulative evidences can support the primary cumulative evidences.

But this should not be done affirming the consequent fallacy.

I would NOT state simply...

(A) An infinite, eternal, first cause, is necessary (antecedent)

(b) The eternal Biblical God is documented in scripture (consequent)

A to B exists (yes, both A and B exist)

Therefore 

B to A means B is A (affirming the consequent fallacy)

All is correct until the therefore...

More premises are required in support of B = A.

Deism and other forms of theism are other worldviews and philosophical and theological possibilities. But these propositions and evidences must be reasonably and accurately compared to the propositions, and conclusions, the evidences, for Biblical Christianity. Through my MPhil and PhD theses research, and my website research and articles, I have connected the historical, Scriptural God to philosophy of religion concepts. I do reason that within reasonable, but not absolute certainty, internally and externally the premises in support of Biblical Christianity as a worldview are superior to premises in support of any other worldview. Therefore Biblical Christianity is true. Note, from my archives, only the infinite God has absolute, 100% certainty.

But reviews of, and comparisons to, other worldviews have taken place. Even without admittedly complete objectivity, having been a biblical Christian from a very young age, this was done with the use of reasoning, prayer, considering propositions and then premises and conclusions as evidence.

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

CONWAY DAVID A. AND RONALD MUNSON (1997) The Elements of Reasoning, Wadsworth Publishing Company, New York.

LANGER, SUSANNE K (1953)(1967) An Introduction to Symbolic Logic, Dover Publications, New York. (Philosophy).

PIRIE, MADSEN (2006)(2015) How To Win Every Argument, Bloomsbury, London.

Accident Fallacy

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Accident Fallacy

Preface

 Slight revisions 20240817.

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

PIRIE, MADSEN (2006)(2015) How To Win Every Argument, Bloomsbury, London.

Cited

Pirie explains that this fallacy assumes the 'freak features of an exceptional case are enough to accept rejection of the general rule'. (33). The features in question may be accidental and may be considered an unusual, allowable exception. (33). Almost every generalization could be rejected because of a possible accidental case it does not cover. But to always maintain this is the fallacy of accident. (33). 

It is fallacious to treat a general, qualified statement as if it is unqualified. (33). The author states that it is a fallacy that appeals to anarchists because it appears to overturn general rules. (33).

General rules with a few exceptions.

Clarification

In philosophy:

An unqualified statement is considered certain.

Unqualified = Certain

A qualified statement has levels of uncertainty.

Qualified = Uncertain    

Accident Fallacy

Blackburn writes that the accident fallacy is from the unqualified (certain my add) statement to the statement qualified (uncertain, my add). (7). Pirie explains that this fallacy assumes the 'freak features of an exceptional case are enough to accept rejection of the general rule'.

'a dicto simpliciter ad dictum secundum quid ' (7).

Blackburn writes that is an (alleged) fallacy. (7). Arguing from the general case to the specific, particular case, without recognizing some qualifying factors. (7).

He lists as example: 'If some snakes are harmless then some snakes in this bag are harmless.' (7).

I take it that philosophically, one should be careful in the diagnosis of accident fallacy, as it may not always be so.

My example: 

Florida won the 2024 Stanley Cup.

Florida will therefore will the next three Stanley Cups. 

Technically possible, but highly unlikely. There are 32 teams competing and the odds are Florida will not win the next three Stanley Cups. In a sense, it is an exception that any one particular team is that year's winner. It is always more likely that one of the other 31 teams will win the Stanley Cup, at least mathematically. Even a favoured team before the season would not likely even receive even odds to be champions from the odds makers.

We can see here why Blackburn calls it an alleged fallacy. My example could theoretically occur. A team can win four Stanley Cups in a row, but it has only be done by the Montreal Canadiens (2x) and New York Islanders (1x).

Converse Accident Fallacy

From the qualified (uncertain, my add) statement to the unqualified (certain, my add). (7).

'a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter' Blackburn (7).

The fallacy of taking out a needed qualification. (7).

Also known as 'converse fallacy of the accident'. (7).

'If it is always permissible to kill in war, then it is always permissible to kill'. (7).

My example:

I would question even the qualified (uncertain) statement in the example.

It is permissible to kill willing opposing combatants.

It is not permissible to kill unwilling opposing combatants (surrendered or injured).

It is not permissible to kill civilians.

Therefore, it is not always permissible to kill in war.

However, for the example listed, it is not always permissible to kill (answering the unqualified, certain premise) because warfare operates with a different set of legal and ethical rules than does non-warfare.

--- 

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

PIRIE, MADSEN (2006)(2015) How To Win Every Argument, Bloomsbury, London. 

Converse Accident: Hasty Generalization from Lander University 

Cited 

'Converse Accident: (hasty generalization) the fallacy of considering two few cases or certain exceptional cases and generalizing to a rule that fits them alone. (Note that the fallacy of converse accident is the opposite of the fallacy of accident.)'

Cited

'Converse accident fallacies arise since many different logical generalizations are consistent with a finite amount of data. But not all of those generalizations are consistent with each other.' 

webmaster@philosophy.lander.edu

Abusive Analogy

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Abusive Analogy

Preface

Revised on 20250601

PIRIE, MADSEN (2006)(2015) How To Win Every Argument, Bloomsbury, London.

Abusive Analogy

From Pirie

'The fallacy of abusive analogy is a highly specialized version of the ad hominem argument. Instead of the arguer being insulted directly, an analogy is drawn which is calculated to bring him into scorn or disrepute. The opponent or his behaviour is compared with something which will elicit an unfavourable response toward him from the audience.' (29).

Pirie provides the example:

'If science admits no certainties, then a scientist has no more certain knowledge of the universe than does a Hottentot running through the bush.' (29).

'(This is true, but is intended as abuse so that the hearer will be more sympathetic to the possibility of certain knowledge.) (29).'

This statement is not necessarily true, it is using hyperbole. Theoretically, a scientist could speculate on the existence of outer space, without being certain, while the Khoekhoe (more accurate term) may or may not, have an understanding of the concept of outer space, but also without certainty.

In other words, with Pirie's explanation, science using inductive reasoning, testing and empirical research may not claim certainty, at least in some cases, but there is still considerable, significant knowledge that has been obtained through the scientific method. A lack of certainty with inductive scientific reasoning, does not for example, by default make certain deductive philosophical and theological reasoning certain.

An analogy is not effective here as inductive and deductive reasoning succeeds or fails based on the trueness of premises and conclusions presented.

Blackburn explains that arguing by analogy is stating that since things are alike in some ways they will 'probably' (14) be alike in others. (14). The use of 'probably' here is key. Often arguing by analogy produces some similarities and some differences rendering the argument unsound.

If such an argument is used comparing only the things certainly alike it is reasonable.

However, Blackburn cites Wittgenstein, noting it can be irresponsible to generalize one case. (14).

In other words, generalizing by argument of analogy can be irresponsible. 

Wittgenstein 

Wittgenstein’s Generalisations About Generalisations: Medium-Dec 12, 2019

Paul Austin Murphy 

Cites

WITTGENSTEIN, LUDWIG (1912-1978) Ludwig Wittgenstein's Blue Book, University of Pittsburgh (depositor), University of Pittsburgh.

https://digital.library.pitt.edu/islandora/object/pitt%3A31735061817932

Digital Library

“Our craving for generality has [as one] source … our preoccupation with the method of science. I mean the method of reducing the explanation of natural phenomena to the smallest possible number of primitive natural laws; and, in mathematics, of unifying the treatment of different topics by using a generalization. Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes, and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics, and leads the philosopher into complete darkness. I want to say here that it can never be our job to reduce anything to anything, or to explain anything. Philosophy really is ‘purely descriptive’.” 

'I want to say here that it can never be our job to reduce anything to anything, or to explain anything. Philosophy really is ‘purely descriptive’.”'

A philosophical problem here, potentially at least, as this is just a small section of Wittgenstein's work and explanation, is of consistency. Wittgenstein is explaining something. He is not simply providing a description, but is offering an opinion. 

However, generalization within abusive analogy is fallacious because an ad hominem, personal attack, analogy, is concerned with attacking a person making the statement or premise (s) with a conclusion. When in contrast, what is important for accuracy is the trueness of a statement, or premise (s) and conclusion presented. Using an analogy with a generalization stating 'If science admits no certainties, then a scientist has no more certain knowledge of the universe than does a Hottentot running through the bush.' (29); this is generalizing the knowledge of the scientist within analogy. A lack of certainty does not equate to lack of knowledge, in the case of the scientist. The scientist may hold to many ideas as probably right, that may or may not, one day may be shown to be certainly right.

Wittgenstein: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Archive-Spring 2025 Edition 

By

Anat Biletzki 

Anat Matar

Cited 

'It is here that Wittgenstein’s rejection of general explanations, and definitions based on sufficient and necessary conditions, is best pronounced. Instead of these symptoms of the philosopher’s “craving for generality,” he points to ‘family resemblance’ as the more suitable analogy for the means of connecting particular uses of the same word. There is no reason to look, as we have done traditionally—and dogmatically—for one, essential core in which the meaning of a word is located and which is, therefore, common to all uses of that word. We should, instead, travel with the word’s uses through “a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing” (PI 66). Family resemblance also serves to exhibit the lack of boundaries and the distance from exactness that characterize different uses of the same concept. Such boundaries and exactness are the definitive traits of form—be it Platonic form, Aristotelian form, or the general form of a proposition adumbrated in the Tractatus. It is from such forms that applications of concepts can be deduced, but this is precisely what Wittgenstein now eschews in favor of appeal to similarity of a kind with family resemblance.'  

Generalities lead to error when they produce reasoning that fails to embrace true statements and or true premise (s) and conclusion. Better to specifically review and produce statements and or premise (s) and conclusion for accuracy in truth.

In regards to Wittgenstein rejecting definitions based on sufficient and necessary conditions: 

Texas State University/Department of Philosphy Confusion of Necessary with a Sufficient Condition 

Cited 

'A causal fallacy you commit this fallacy when you assume that a necessary condition of an event is sufficient for the event to occur. A necessary condition is a condition that must be present for an event to occur. A sufficient condition is a condition or set of conditions that will produce the event. A necessary condition must be there, but it alone does not provide sufficient cause for the occurrence of the event. Only the sufficient grounds can do this. In other words, all of the necessary elements must be there.' 

'Department of Philosophy

Dr. Craig Hanks, Chair'

I reason

Sufficient conditions mean all of the necessary conditions exist for an event

Wittgenstein: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Archive-Spring 2025 Edition 

My add below (PI):

• Philosophical Investigations, 1953, G.E.M. Anscombe and R. Rhees (eds.), G.E.M. Anscombe (trans.), Oxford: Blackwell.
• Philosophical Investigations (PI), 4th edition, 2009, P.M.S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte (eds. and trans.), Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
• ---

Primary sources noted on Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Archive 

Ludwig Wittgenstein

Bibliography 

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Bibliography

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

LANGER, SUSANNE K (1953)(1967) An Introduction to Symbolic Logic, Dover Publications, New York. (Philosophy).

PIRIE, MADSEN (2006)(2015) How To Win Every Argument, Bloomsbury, London.

WITTGENSTEIN, LUDWIG (1912-1978) Ludwig Wittgenstein's Blue Book, University of Pittsburgh (depositor), University of Pittsburgh.

https://digital.library.pitt.edu/islandora/object/pitt%3A31735061817932

WITTGENSTEIN, LUDWIG (1951)(1979) On Certainty, Basil Blackwell, Oxford.

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