Notes on the Incarnation

Kassel, Germany (trekearth.com)

Introduction

December 19, 2005

My first post with my new notebook.

This is a repost with edits of a post from the blog when it was called thekingpin68 and I did not receive many comments. The original features a classic troll attack in comments from someone from California. I will share here to be nice and save you from clicking if you wish...

'what an absolute perfect blog of spiritual self indulgence...
I have NEVER read so much INTELLECTUAL TWADDLE in my LIFE [ and i have beem around a LONG time.
whew!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! you are TRULY a legend in your own mind!!!!!!
thanks for sharing.'

For those of that read my work and are not too sure about me, yes I am a legend in my own mind, I told me so. Actually, I still have a lot to learn as a child of God.

The California troll of course propelled me to write for the next 7 years.;)

Thank you.

The notes with revisions...

A pastor at church asked me for some notes for his upcoming sermon.

Colossians 2:9

MARSHALL, ALFRED (1975)(1996) The Interlinear KJV-NIV, Grand Rapids, Zondervan.

2:9 ὅτι ἐν αὐτῶ κατοικεῖ πᾶν τὸ πλήρωμα τῆς θεότητος σωματικῶς,
Because in him dwells the fullness of the Godhead bodily.

WRIGHT, N.T. (1989) Colossians and Philemon, Grand Rapids, IVP.

'Bodily form' can be translated as actually or in solid reality. p.103.

The Greek word theotes (Deity) is to be distinguished from theiotes (divinity). The term for divinity could be of a lesser being than God, and Jesus is called Deity. p.103.

There is thus no need for Christian to pay homage to lesser supernatural beings. p.103.

Christ is not a second Deity. p.103.

ASHBY, E G. (1986) 'Colossians' in The International Bible Commentary, Grand Rapids, Zondervan.

Colossians 2:9

He mentions that Lightfoot thinks that the term bodily form refers to both the incarnate and glorified Christ. Others see fullness of Deity not being as much corporeally, but corporately. p.1456.

There are of course three distinctions or persons within the Trinity, but if the first interpretation is correct, somehow the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit all work together within the incarnate and glorified body of Christ. Since God has one nature (Christ has nature of Father, Hebrews 1:3) even with the distinctions within the Trinity, the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, work together in all things including the literal body of Christ.

MARTINS, RALPH P. (1987) Philippians, Grand Rapids, IVP.

Philippians 2:6

Christ being in very nature God, refers to his pre-incarnate existence. p.100.

Being in a form of God could mean the essential attributes of God. p.101.

Concerning equality with God, one view is that the pre-incarnate God already had equality with God and chose not to cling to it. p.101.

Another view is that it that the pre-incarnate Christ could have claimed equality for himself but refused to do so. p.101.

I would think that the first view is the Biblical one in light of Christ being the eternal word in John 1, and claiming the eternal nature and the name of God for himself in John 8:58 (I AM).

The second view does not do justice to the Biblical text. p.101.

Perhaps although Christ was and is fully God, there was hierarchy in the Trinity before the Incarnation.

Christ was proclaimed as being equal with God by accepting his position as the incarnated, humiliated one. p.103.

HEWLETT, H.C. (1986) 'Philippians' in The International Bible Commentary, Grand Rapids, Zondervan.

Philippians 2:6

The participle 'hyparchon', means that Christ was already in existence. p.1444.

Christ was in very nature God and could not be Deity without being fully God. p.1444.

Not grasping at equality was not concerning nature, but state and circumstance according to Gifford. p.1444.

Christ would not exploit his Deity for his own advantage. p.1444.

He was concerned instead with submitting to the will of his Father in order to complete the atoning work, resurrection and culmination of the Kingdom of God.

ERICKSON, MILLARD J. (1994). Christian Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

Implications of Christ’s Deity

Persons can have real knowledge of God when we see Christ. p.703.

Redemption is available through his death. p.703.

God and humanity can be reunited. p.704.

Persons can worship Christ. p.704.

Implications of Christ’s humanity

Jesus as a human had limited knowledge. p.711.

Some heresies

Docetism

Jesus only seemed to be human, because matter is evil, influenced by Platonic thought. p.713.

Apollinarianism

Denied the fullness of Christ’s humanity. It assumed that if Jesus had two natures that he must have both a human soul and a divine one. He saw this as absurd and thus denied that Christ had a human soul. p.714.

Erickson noted that orthodox, Biblical Christianity holds that Jesus had a human soul and divine one, yet was not two persons. In my mind this is a correct, yet difficult concept and Erickson admits that it is paradox. Jesus on the cross gave his spirit to the Father (John 19:30), so he possessed a human spirit and was fully human. My take is that in a sense there is one spirit that is a unity of both human and divine nature. It is one spirit that is a unity of two spirits, which do not mix yet work together as one place of personality. In the Incarnation, the divine nature of Christ was unified with a human spirit/nature. To say that Christ has two spirits or souls will perhaps lead some to the idea that Christ is two persons rather than one person with two natures. The human soul of Christ is unified with the divine soul of Christ, in such a way that the two natures do not mix, yet they work together as one spirit. Therefore when Christ died he did not give his spirits, but spirit. This one soul/spirit would allow Christ to be fully human, but without an active sinful nature.

So, Jesus as a human being would be like Adam before the fall. Sin would not have been within the nature of Christ, but it was not within Adam's nature before the fall either. Christ would have been tempted by sin as a human being, and if he would have been a perfect man alone he could have technically sinned. However, due to the fact the Christ was also God incarnate, and God cannot sin, I would conclude that Christ unlike Adam would not sin.

THEISSEN, HENRY, CLARENCE (1956) Introductory Lectures in Systematic Theology, Grand Rapids, Eerdmans.

Christ did not empty himself of his divine attributes but simply surrendered the exercise of them. p.296.

He quotes Strong who states that the incarnation purged depravity from Christ. p.305.

He did not have a sinful nature. Concerning Christ nature as God and man, Theissen quotes Hodge who states that Christ’s personality resides in the divine nature, not the human one. A divine person and not just a divine nature became incarnate. p.305.

This view would be contrasted by scholars such as Mounce and Cranfield:

Cranfield in his Romans commentary p.176, comments on the likeness of sinful flesh.

Cranfield states with what he thinks is the best explanation, that being that the Greek word for likeness is not to water down Christ's fallen human nature, as in being fully human, but is to draw attention that the fallen nature was assumed but Christ did not become a fallen human being.

So, unlike some views that reason Christ's sinful human nature was purged out at the incarnation, this view reasons it was there but because of his perfect obedience and I would reason deity, he did not become a fallen human being that sinned.

So, in a sense in the likeness of sinful flesh, he had fallen human nature.

In another sense in the likeness of sinful flesh, he did not have an active fallen human nature that would have led to sinful thoughts and choices.

Mounce in his Romans commentary sees it the same way on p.175-176, Christ took upon a fallen nature but did not become completely like us, as in sinners.

So, this could have occurred by having this fallen nature purged out of him at the incarnation or he could have kept the nature, but remained via the Father and Holy Spirit the perfect man and of course God and therefore essentially did not have a fallen nature which allowed him to be the perfect sacrifice.

So he would not have a sinful nature.

REYMOND, R.L. (1996) 'Incarnation' in Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books.

Essential that the divine Logos did not take himself into union with a human person, otherwise he would become two persons, with two centers of self-consciousness. p.556.

HEBBLETHWAITE, BRIAN, 'Incarnation' in A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, London, SCM Press.

Liberal.

In modern times the doctrine of the Incarnation has been challenged by Unitarians, by deists of the enlightenment, and by liberal protestants. It is seen as mythical, and a barrier to other faiths in a pluralistic world. p.290-291.


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ASHBY, E G. (1986) 'Colossians' in The International Bible Commentary, Grand Rapids, Zondervan.

CRANFIELD, C.E.B. (1992) Romans: A Shorter Commentary, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

ERICKSON, MILLARD J. (1994) Christian Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

HEBBLETHWAITE, BRIAN, 'Incarnation' in A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, London, SCM Press.

MARSHALL, ALFRED (1975)(1996) The Interlinear KJV-NIV, Grand Rapids, Zondervan.

MARTINS, RALPH P. (1987) Philippians, Grand Rapids, IVP.

MOUNCE, R.H. (1995) The New American Commentary: Romans, Nashville, Broadman & Holman Publishers.

REYMOND, R.L. (1996) 'Incarnation' in Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books.

THEISSEN, HENRY, CLARENCE (1956) Introductory Lectures in Systematic Theology, Grand Rapids, Eerdmans.

WRIGHT, N.T. (1989) Colossians and Philemon, Grand Rapids, IVP.

Calvin on Augustine (PhD Edit)

Calvin on Augustine (PhD Edit)

Arundel Castle, West Sussex (trekearth.com) January 26, 2012 

Preface

An interesting and somewhat controversial section from my PhD thesis below. I have noted previously I have found Augustine, at least translated into English, how I read him, difficult to read and quite repetitive to work through. I am not doubting his historical greatness as a philosopher and theologian, but I think my point stands. The confusion for the better part of 2, 000 years whether or not Augustine is a compatibilist like Calvin, Feinberg and me and many in the Reformed camp that hold to a very strong view on God's sovereignty, or is an incompatiblist like Plantinga and many evangelicals that hold to various forms of libertarian free will demonstrates this confusion. It should be pointed out that there is a good amount of agreement with these views on some points that could add to the confusion at times. This is because they are both, even though one uses compatibilism and the other incompatibilism, within Christian Biblical/theological orthodoxy, whereas John Hick's theodicy, for example, primarily would not be.

Definition of Incompatibilism/Compatibilism 

Libertarian free will is usually viewed as a form of indeterminism. The concept in libertarian free will is that a person is able to perform another action in the place of one that has been committed. This action cannot be predetermined by any circumstance or desire. Norman Geisler explains that indeterminism is defined as the idea that there are no antecedent (preceding conditions) or simultaneous (at the same time) causes of human actions. All human actions are free if a person could have done otherwise. Indeterminism is also equated with incompatibilism which states that God, or any other being, cannot cause by force or coercion any human action, nor can any action be simultaneously willed by God or any other being, for the human action to remain significantly free. Compatibilism, which I hold to, would agree with incompatibilism that God or any other being cannot cause by force or coercion any significantly free human action, but contrary to incompatibilism thinks that God can simultaneously will significantly free human actions. 

Calvin on Augustine 

I include this section because as Augustine is listed as a forefather of free will theodicy,[1] as his ancient view would be considered incompatibilistic according to modern philosophy.[2] Calvin, however, throughout The Bondage and Liberation of the Will claims that Augustine supports his case for a free will theory in which human beings are in bondage to sin, unable to follow God on their own.[3] As an academic I cannot, in good conscience, use both Augustine and Calvin in this thesis without dealing with this matter.[4] As Augustine wrote a free will theodicy,[5] which included the idea that human beings require the ability to freely choose or reject God, in order to please the Almighty.[6] A.N.S. Lane (1996) notes that one problem with Calvin and his use of Augustine was Calvin rejected the use of the term free choice.[7] Calvin did state that although he rejected the term,[8] he believed his views to be in line with Augustine on human free will, that the will was free in the sense that it was not coerced but voluntary and self-determined.[9] Lane states that after centuries of debates between Catholic and Protestant scholars, many concluded Calvin correctly understood Augustine.[10] 

When reading Augustine’s theodicy, it appears to be supporting incompatibilism as human beings are noted to have the ability to freely choose or reject God.[11] He states that a human being could not act rightly unless he/she willed to do so,[12] and to do that the person must have free will in order to act rightly.[13] Calvin notes that this concept of free choice by Augustine would not be applicable to a fallen will, and could only be applied to Adam and Eve before the fall in Genesis occurred.[14] This point by Calvin, however, was never clearly demonstrated in Augustine’s writings; instead, Augustine has been viewed historically as a theologian who held to free will theory[15] within incompatibilist freedom in modern terms, and a strong view of God’s sovereignty.[16] Feinberg believes that Augustine was not the ancient equivalent of a modern compatibilist,[17] but made the error of writing a theodicy, which featured free will and incompatibilist thought, and yet held to a theory of God’s sovereignty, which would necessitate some type of determinism.[18] It would seem Augustine either made a logical error in accepting the ancient equivalents of incompatibilist human free choice and compatibilist sovereignty for God,[19] or he simply failed to adequately explain the connection in particular whether or not his free will theodicy applied equally to pre-fall and post-fall humanity.[20] Lane points out that Calvin, in The Bondage and Liberation of the Will, lacked the library resources needed and loosely quoted Augustine.[21] Calvin was familiar with Augustine’s traditionally strong view of God’s sovereignty,[22] and perhaps he rightly or wrongly interpreted that sovereignty as applying to Augustine’s concept of free will.[23] I would postulate in agreement with Feinberg that Augustine’s free will theodicy appears to be incompatibilistic in regard to human free will and is likely compatibilistic in regard to God’s sovereignty.[24] The connection between the two concepts seems not to be adequately explained by Augustine.[25] 

Rowan A. Greer states that it was realized by Augustine there was a difficulty holding to free will theodicy and a strong view of God’s sovereignty.[26] Greer concluded that Augustine always maintained a free will approach,[27] and held that God had sovereign control in the universe to punish evildoers.[28] Greer thought Augustine’s solution to the problem that his free will theodicy perhaps contradicted his views on sovereignty, would be to restrict the concept of free will to Adam and Eve before the fall.[29] It should be pointed out that this is Greer’s assumption[30] and, although it agrees with Calvin’s idea,[31] Greer speculates that Augustine viewed his free will idea as appropriate for Adam and Eve before the fall, and not for humanity after it.[32] Greer however, like Calvin,[33] was not able to produce a distinct Augustine reference that stated this, and so in my mind this supports the idea that it is still unknown whether or not Augustine, when discussing this idea of human freedom, was including post-fall humanity in that concept.[34] It is therefore reasonable to deduce that Augustine quite possibly held that fallen humanity still had some ability to freely choose and reject God,[35] which would place him in the incompatibilism camp in regard to human free choice.[36] Regardless of Calvin’s views,[37] in modern scholarship Augustine and his free will theodicy are primarily reviewed within incompatibilist camp.[38] 

AUGUSTINE (388-395)(1964) On Free Choice of the Will, Translated by Anna S.Benjamin and L.H. Hackstaff, Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall. 

CALVIN, JOHN (1543)(1996) The Bondage and Liberation of the Will, Translated by G.I. Davies, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House. 

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House. 

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press. 

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1996) ‘Freedom, Free Will, and Determinism’ in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books. 

GREER, ROWAN A. (1996) ‘Augustine’s Transformation of The Free Will Defence’, in Faith and Philosophy, Volume 13, Number 4, October, pp. 471-486. Wilmore, Kentucky, Asbury College. 

LANE, A.N.S. (1543)(1996) ‘Introduction’, in The Bondage and Liberation of the Will, by John Calvin, Grand Rapids, Baker Books. 

MCCANN, HUGH J. (2001) ‘Sovereignty and Freedom: A Reply to Rowe’, in Faith and Philosophy, Volume 18, Number 1, January, pp. 110-116. Wilmore, Kentucky, Asbury College. 

PETERSON, MICHAEL, WILLIAM HASKER, BRUCE REICHENBACH, AND DAVID BASINGER (1996)(eds.), ‘Introduction: Saint Augustine: Evil is Privation of Good’, in Philosophy of Religion, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

[1] Peterson, Hasker, Reichenbach, and Basinger (1996: 231).

[2] McCann (2001: 115). Geisler (1986: 75).

[3] Calvin (1543)(1996: 95-96).

[4] Calvin (1543)(1996: 95-96).

[5] Peterson, Hasker, Reichenbach, and Basinger (1996: 231).

[6] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 37).

[7] Lane in Calvin (1543)(1996: xix).

[8] Lane in Calvin (1543)(1996: xix). Calvin (1543)(1996: 103).

[9] Calvin (1543)(1996: 103).

[10] Lane in Calvin (1543)(1996: xxiv).

[11] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 36).

[12] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 36).

[13] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 36).

[14] Calvin (1543)(1996: 95).

[15] Peterson, Hasker, Reichenbach, and Basinger (1996: 231).

[16] Feinberg (1994: 98).

[17] Feinberg (1994: 98).

[18] Feinberg (1994: 98).

[19] Feinberg (1994: 98).

[20] Feinberg (1994: 98).

[21] Lane in Calvin (1543)(1996: xxiii).

[22] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 3). Greer (1996: 481).

[23] Lane in Calvin (1543)(1996: xxiii).

[24] Feinberg (1994: 98).

[25] Feinberg (1994: 98). Lane in Calvin (1543)(1996: xxiii).

[26] Greer (1996: 481).

[27] Greer (1996: 481).

[28] Greer (1996: 481).

[29] Greer (1996: 481).

[30] Greer (1996: 481).

[31] Calvin (1543)(1996: 96).

[32] Greer (1996: 481). Calvin (1543)(1996: 96).

[33] Calvin (1543)(1996: 96).

[34] Greer (1996: 481). Calvin (1543)(1996: 96).

[35] Feinberg (1994: 98). Lane in Calvin (1543)(1996: xxiii).

[36] Feinberg (1994: 98).

[37] Calvin (1543)(1996: 96).

[38] Therefore Augustine is primarily reviewed as such.

C.S. Lewis and Thoughts on Total Depravity

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Usually I present one post a month, but since the response has been good for the December/January post I present a second short January article. I did state that I would consider this as an option in the past based on comments/interaction/emails/pageviews. Cheers. Blessings in 2012.

The article C.S. Lewis and total depravity was presented February 2, 2008. I have added a new section.

Lewis and Depravity

The entire MPhil can be found in the January 2006 archives and the link below:

MPhil 2003

C.S. Lewis and Thoughts on Total Depravity

British born, Clive Staples Lewis (1898-1963) was a world renowned British writer whose theological literary works have been influential within Christian apologetics. Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, describes Lewis’ beginnings and places of study.

Anglican scholar-novelist and Christian Apologist, perhaps best known for his literary fantasies that explore theological concepts. Born near Belfast in Northern Ireland, he received his B.A. from University College, Oxford, in 1924, and was fellow and tutor in English literature at Magdalen College, Oxford, from 1925 until 1954. He then accepted the Chair of Medieval and Renaissance English at Cambridge. Hein (1996: 630).

Lewis pointed out some definite examples of human wickedness in his era and culture; however, he rejected the idea of Total Depravity. He stated:

This chapter will have been misunderstood if anyone describes it as a reinstatement of the doctrine of Total Depravity. I disbelieve the doctrine, partly on the logical grounds that if our depravity were total we should not know ourselves to be depraved, and partly because experience shows us much goodness in human nature. Lewis (1940)(1996: 61).

I can see the logic of Lewis’ point of view; however, I don’t agree with his conclusions. I will first give the comments of C.C. Ryrie and then explain my perspective.

The concept of total depravity does not mean

(1) that depraved people cannot or do not perform actions that are good in either man’s or God’s sight. But no such action can gain favor with God for salvation. Neither does it mean

(2) that fallen man has no conscience which judges between good and evil for him. But that conscience has been effected by the fall so that it cannot be a safe and reliable guide. Neither does it mean

(3) that people indulge in every form of sin or in any sin to the greatest extent possible.

Positively total depravity means that the corruption has extended to all aspects of man’s nature, to his being: and total depravity means that because of that corruption there is nothing man can do to merit saving favour with God. Ryrie (1996: 312).

I would think Lewis did not significantly understand the doctrine. Ryrie’s first point answers Lewis’ objection. The doctrine is not about humanity being so evil that no good is possible. The point is that these good works can in no way earn salvation. As well, with Ryrie’s second point, humanity could acknowledge the existence of sin and evil in them because they still had a conscience, although it was scarred. Also, the depravity is not total in the sense of every aspect of evil in people being maximized, it means instead that humanity is corrupt to the point where salvation cannot be merited.

I think Ryrie explains the concept well, and understands it, unlike Lewis. However, I wonder if human beings can commit truly good acts, like both men suggest. I would think since humanity is totally depraved that no true human good is possible. If true goodness is found in perfection, as is God, then we cannot obtain that good. Even as Christians that attempt to perform the will of God with the help of the Holy Spirit, would there not be just a little taint of sin in all our actions? It is my view that human good is likely an absence of a complete maximization of our total depravity. I, for example, may appear to be humanly good compared to a serial murderer; however, that is because the murderer has been found out as someone who has committed heinous crimes, where as Lewis pointed out with an individual, my evil can be hidden in public persona.

HEIN, R. (1996) C.S. Lewis, in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books.

LEWIS, C.S. (1940)(1996) The Problem of Pain, San Francisco, Harper-Collins.

RYRIE, C.C. (1996) Total Depravity, in Walter A. Elwell (ed.),Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books.

January 3, 2012

That section from MPhil was written in 2003 and prior, obviously prior to me being a Doctor.

‘However, I wonder if human beings can commit truly good acts, like both men suggest. I would think since humanity is totally depraved that no true human good is possible. If true goodness is found in perfection, as is God, then we cannot obtain that good. Even as Christians that attempt to perform the will of God with the help of the Holy Spirit, would there not be just a little taint of sin in all our actions? It is my view that human good is likely an absence of a complete maximization of our total depravity.’

It is my deduction even as of 2012 that one in Christ would at least have to be out of the sinful flesh, as in being in spirit form in Paradise, assuming it as some type of literal actual place (Luke 23, 2 Corinthians 12 and Revelation 2), and eventually be in resurrected form (1 Corinthians 15), to be free from this taint. John Calvin makes the point in the Bondage and Liberation of the Will that purity is spoiled by a tiny blemish and implies that sin is included in every good work (in this present realm). Calvin (1543)(1996: 27). Therefore I still support those MPhil conclusions.

CALVIN, JOHN (1543)(1996) The Bondage and Liberation of the Will, Translated by G.I. Davies, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.


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John Hick on Hell (PhD Edit)

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Hell

John Hick strongly disagrees with the Augustinian tradition of an everlasting hell.[1] Within this approach, the idea that significantly free persons reject God and do not repent and follow the creator,[2] leads to a conclusion that God will issue post-mortem punishment of these people.[3] Hick reasons such a view is a product of religious imagination.[4] He writes that the everlasting hell idea has served the Christian Church well throughout history because it demonstrated the cosmic drama that separates humankind from God and Christ.[5] Hick, however, sees the fatal flaws within the view of everlasting hell as necessarily leading those who study theodicy in the modern era to reject such a doctrine.[6] He notes since everlasting punishment would not assist in soul-making that it would be unconstructive, constituting the largest part of the problem of evil.[7] Since the universe would forever contain the evil of rebellious persons, God’s creation would permanently be spoiled and ultimately a failure.[8] Clark Pinnock (1992) describes a conditional immortality view within the Four Views on Hell text by William V. Crockett.[9] Pinnock explains that reconciliation and redemption would be questionable within heaven if evil existed in hell forever.[10] Surely God would have to abolish all evil in his new creation postulates Pinnock.[11] The subject of everlasting punishment is not central,[12] and therefore as seen within this thesis is not reviewed within the theodicy work of Augustine, Plantinga, or Feinberg. Everlasting hell was connected by Hick to Augustinian and Reformed thought,[13] but arguments for or against everlasting hell are not directly related to free will or sovereignty theodicy.[14]


December 24, 2011

In contrast

I was wisely advised by my adviser not to go deeply into the subject in my PhD thesis as it would be too controversial and dangerous in the secular setting of UK/European academia. I have however discussed this subject in other posts on both blogs.

In the annihilation article on satire and theology I presented an argument against the annihilation of unregenerate post-mortem persons. This is not exhaustive and is an argument, not the argument. I have used Erickson as a source to support my premises and conclusion.

God is perfectly holy.

Erickson writes that God is totally separate from his creation. Erickson (1994: 284).

Erickson lists Exodus 15: 11, 1 Samuel 2: 2 and Isaiah 57: 15.

God is absolutely pure and good; God is not evil. Erickson (1994: 285).

Erickson lists Job 34: 12, Habakkuk 1: 13 and James 1: 13

Human beings are sinful. Due to the fall.

Jeremiah 17: 9, Romans Chapter 1-3, Romans 3: 23, Romans 6: 23.

Sin must be atoned.

God is the administrator of justice and cannot justly simply forgive sins. Erickson (1994: 816). God is equally the God of love and justice. Justice is therefore not ignored for the sake of love, as a holy God must be just.

Christ as infinite God outlasted finite sin in the atonement.

As God, Christ’s death has infinite worth. Erickson (1994: 804). As God he can atone for all finite human sin.

Christ as a perfect man was sacrificed for imperfect persons in the atonement.

As a human, Christ could redeem other humans. Erickson (1994: 804). Christ redeemed all of human nature through the atonement. Erickson (1994: 804).

Therefore:

Those outside of Christ cannot justly be annihilated as their sins are never atoned.

Further, Biblically, all persons exist port-mortem (Revelation, Chapter 20). Unfortunately, it could be reasoned that everlasting punishment exists as finite unregenerate persons continue to attempt to, in a sense, atone for their sins in hell, but can never fully cover their sins without Christ. Therefore they cannot justly be annihilated. Earthly sins are not covered, and post-mortem sins (rejecting God and related) in disembodied and resurrection states also remain uncovered.

BROWNING, W.R.F. (1997) Oxford Dictionary of the Bible, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

CROCKET, WILLIAM (1992) Four Views On Hell, William Crocket (ed.),Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.

ERICKSON, MILLARD (1994) Christian Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

HICK, JOHN (1970) Evil and The God of Love, London, The Fontana Library.

---

[1] Hick (1970: 284).

[2] Hick (1970: 284).

[3] Hick (1970: 284).

[4] Hick (1970: 284).

[5] Hick (1970: 284).

[6] Hick (1970: 284-285).

[7] Hick (1970: 377). It can be deduced that everlasting hell is a realm that is not an aspect of God’s creation intended for human development. It would not have to be free from the problem of evil. Our present universe would be restored through Christ and the problem of evil ended. Any everlasting hell would not constitute, in our context, the largest aspect of the problem of evil.

[8] Hick (1970: 378).

[9] Pinnock in Crockett (1992: 154).

[10] Pinnock in Crockett (1992: 154).

[11] Pinnock in Crockett (1992: 154). Browning suggests everlasting hell concepts such as Hades may relate to the Christian, New Testament use of ancient myths that consisted of the ‘decent of deities to the underworld,’ such as Orpheus, Eurydice and Persephone. Christ may be understood to have descended here after his death (First Peter 3: 19). Browning (1997: 168).

[12] It is a related issue to the study of theodicy.

[13] Hick (1970: 284).

[14] Hick (1970: 284).

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