John Stuart Mill and omnipotence

John Stuart Mill and omnipotence

Castle Conwy, Wales 2001 

Reformatted: November 30, 2021, original 2009

John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) Blackburn states Mill is ‘the most influential liberal thinker of the nineteenth century.’[1] He is the son of Scottish philosopher James Mill (1773-1836).[2] George W. Carey (2002) writes that John Stuart Mill reasoned that traditional Christianity needed to be replaced[3] and Mill introduced a concept of a ‘limited God.’[4] Mill reasons there is a ‘final cause’ that appears to be God working within the natural order,[5] but this God was not omnipotent and had limited powers that were incapable of bringing about the full reality of what God wanted.[6] Mill within Theism from 1833 explains that there could be no real belief in a ‘Creator and Governor’ until humankind had begun to understand the confused phenomena which existed around them.[7] 

Humanity must bring itself out of the chaos and confusion of reality to have a workable system in able to work out ‘a single plan.’[8] This type of world was anticipated ‘by individuals of exceptional genius’ but could only become true after a long period of scientific examination and thought.[9] Mill desired to replace the God of Christianity with a Religion of Humanity.[10] He reasoned traditional Christianity had been overrated in its promotion of human virtue and morality in society.[11] The Christian God was not the actual creator of the world.[12] Mill’s views strike me as influential on modern western religious thought. I can support, in limited terms, human effort to understand reality and improve human conditions. Indeed humanity should come together as much as possible to develop a plan in order to benefit all of humanity. 

I would not support a ‘Religion of Humanity,’ but do favour persons of various religious and non-religious backgrounds working together for human benefit. Mill rejects Christianity and traditional Christian doctrine concerning omnipotence. Mill’s deity is similar to the ‘Platonic Demiurge’ and this deity simply develops matter from preexisting chaos and therefore would not only be limited in power but also finite in nature. Mill supports a concept of a first cause[13] as in a series of events[14] but this leaves the nagging question and problem of what was the cause of the Demiurge? An infinite eternal God can be understood as the first cause not needing a cause.[15] 

A finite deity, although admittedly logically possible, requires further explanation.[16] If the being is not revealed through Scriptural revelation, it is a God of primarily philosophical speculation and requires further elaboration on the part of Mill in regard to, for instance, why humanity should believe in and follow this type of deity, assuming that there is not a greater, infinite, eternal first cause that would necessarily exist behind that being. 

[1] Blackburn (1996: 243). 

[2] Blackburn (1996: 243). 

[3] Carey (2002: 115). 

[4] Carey (2002: 115). 

[5] Carey (2002: 115-116). Mill within Theism discusses the need for a cause and beginning to a series of individual facts. Mill (1833)(1985)(2009: 7). Everything persons know of has a cause and owes existence to a cause. He ponders on how the world can be indebted to a cause for which the world has its existence. He deduces ‘that not everything which we know derives its existence from a cause, but only every event or change.’ Mill (1833)(1985)(2009: 10). 

[6] Carey (2002: 116). David Gordon writes that Mill believed God was limited in nature and therefore not omnipotent. Gordon (2002: 3). 

[7] Mill (1833)(1985)(2009: 6). 

[8] Mill (1833)(1985)(2009: 6).

[9] Mill (1833)(1985)(2009: 6).

[10] Carey (2002: 110). In The Utility of Religion from 1874, Mill explains that Christianity offers rewards in the next life for good conduct and the Religion of Humanity would be superior as human virtue would exist for unselfish reasons. Mill (1874)(2002: 16). Although I reason Christians should do what is good and right, just because it is good and right, and not primarily for a possible reward, Mill does not demonstrate in my mind a conclusive argument in how human beings, as they are, can or will ever operate with completely unselfish motives. Is all selfishness wrong, or does some degree of human self-concern and a desire for self-benefit remain an integral part of how God intended humanity to be? [11] Carey (2002: 114). 

[12] Carey (2002: 116). Gordon reasons that Mill was ‘no Christian.’ Gordon (2000: 2). 

[13] Carey (2002: 116). Gordon (2002: 3). Mill (1833)(1985)(2009: 10). 

[14] Mill (1833)(1985)(2009: 7). 

[15] God’s essence is eternal and necessary (logically must exist), and the finite universe is temporal and contingent (not necessary). Shedd (1874-1890)(1980: 191 Volume 1). [16] Hypothetically, humanity and the universe could have been created by a finite God that was created by another cause. 

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

CAREY, GEORGE W. (2002) ‘The Authoritarian Secularism of John Stuart Mill’, in On Raeder’s Mill and the Religion of Humanity, Volume 15, Number 1, Columbia, University of Missouri Press. 

GORDON, DAVID (2000) ‘John Stuart Mill on Liberty and Control’, in The Mises Review, Volume 6, Number 1, Auburn, Alabama, Ludwig Von Mises Institute. 

MILL, JOHN STUART (1833)(1985)(2009) Theism: John Stuart Mill, The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume X - Essays on Ethics, Religion, and Society, Toronto, University of Toronto Press. 

MILL, JOHN STUART (1874)(2002) The Utility of Religion, London, Longman, Green, and Reader. 

SHEDD, WILLIAM G.T. (1874-1890)(1980) Dogmatic Theology, Volume 1, Nashville, Thomas Nelson Publishers. 

WAINWRIGHT, WILLIAM J. (1996) ’Demiurge’, in Robert Audi, (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Blackberry photos: September 2009

Niceness does not equal goodness

Waikiki, Hawaii (photo from trekearth.com)

From my MPhil of 2003, and once again I am using British English.

MPhil

C.S. Lewis

5. Human Wickedness
Within this chapter, Lewis set out to show the reader that the western culture of his day (1940) had a misunderstanding of human wickedness. He stated that his culture put too much emphasis on kindness being the measure of good, and cruelty the measure of wickedness. Lewis pointed out that this kindness was based on the fact that: "Everyone feels benevolent if nothing happens to be annoying him at the moment." Lewis (1940)(1996: 49).

This is a good point, kindness or niceness is certainly not a measure of goodness. Being nice is a way of dealing with people which is most pleasurable, beneficial and brings about, generally, the most pleasurable and beneficial response. However, someone can be nice with evil intentions, an example would be Judas betraying Jesus with a kiss, or someone can act in unkind fashion but mean something for the good. For example, a Doctor re-broke my nose twice by hand without anaesthetic, after I had been assaulted by a bottle attack. This was cruel treatment and it caused me pain. The first attempt caused blood to pour out, however, the treatment straightened my nose and allowed me to look and breath better while lying down, providing me a better night’s sleep.

As well, kindness or niceness, as Lewis alluded to, often disappears when someone is annoyed. This hardly needs much explanation as we can relate to this with ourselves and others we know. I would think true goodness is an objective standard based on one emulating God, and thus one would be good to others regardless of circumstance. Lewis also stated that human beings needed to better understand that they were sinful and that Christ and Scripture saw them as so.

He noted that a human being could misunderstand wickedness by comparing oneself with someone else, and making a favourable review. Lewis pointed out that: "Every man, not very holy or very arrogant, has to ‘live up to’ the outward appearance of other men." Lewis (1940)(1996: 53). The reviewer is not fully aware of the sins of the people under review, and at the same time, within public persona, is hiding from the world around him/her, the depth of wickedness within.

Lewis thought that people tend to desire to see wickedness in the sense of corporate guilt. He believed that this was, in a way, evading the problems of individual sin. He noted: "When we have really learned to know our individual corruption, then indeed we go on to think about corporate guilt and can hardly think of it too much." Lewis (1940)(1996: 54).

Yes, it seems rather easy for individuals to allow social systems to do wicked things, and thus have the blame for evil shifted to it. However, Lewis has a point, individuals must take responsibility for thoughts and actions, clean up their own act, and then set out to change systems, if possible.

Lewis, C.S. (1940)(1996) The Problem of Pain, San Francisco, Harper-Collins.

Note: I had to have both my nose and teeth redone here in Canada!

As well, I reason as Christians even as we emulate God's goodness, sin will still taint our actions until our death and freedom from this realm.

Maps with agendas.:)


Someone's idea of an American map of the world.


A different perspective on a map of the world. From Oceania perhaps?








Ljubljana, Slovenia (photo from trekearth.com)

These are experimental photographs taken with my new Blackberry Curve. The cell phone shall be used in my eventual job search.

Enlightenment?

Gold Coast, Australia 

From my MPhil 

MPhil 

I realize I used some variant, but correct versions of words from British English back in 2003. 6. Enlightenment? In his sixth chapter, entitled Suffering and the God of the Philosophers, McGrath pointed out that suffering was nothing new in the world. He did state, however, that the philosophical way in which suffering was now discussed, had been changed. He noted: Indeed, I spent many years working through most of the major works on Christian theology written between the twelfth and sixteenth centuries, and cannot recall any of them treating the reality of suffering as a serious obstacle to Christian faith. McGrath (1992: 40). 

McGrath noted that the change took place beginning in the seventeenth century which led to the era of the Enlightenment. It shifted the defence of the gospel from revelation and Scripture to philosophy. The view was: "To defend the Christian faith, it was advisable to set aside traditional ways of justifying it, and instead to rely upon the wisdom of philosophy." McGrath (1992: 40). 

McGrath was critical of this approach which overlooked revelation and Scripture, and instead looked to philosophy. It changed the God represented from a personal God of Scripture to a perfect philosophical God. He was particularly critical of seventeenth century philosopher Rene Descartes. McGrath thought that the " . . .enormous emphasis which came to be placed upon the perfection of God by Descartes was totally compromised by the undeniable fact of the existence of evil and suffering. How could a perfect being allow such imperfection to exist?" McGrath (1992: 41). 

McGrath believed that this type of thinking, which he described as creating the god of philosophers, put so much emphasis on God’s perfect attributes that it took away from God’s actual experience in suffering as Christ. So when modern critics were criticizing God, they often criticised this perfect, aloof God whom they thought represented Christianity, whereas the God of revelation and Scripture suffered personally on earth. He died for the sins of humanity, was resurrected and will restore creation. Seventeenth century revision of Christian thought was known as the Age of Reason, which led to the Enlightenment. Colin Brown described the Enlightenment as follows: The Age of Enlightenment (German Die Aufklarung) covers roughly the eighteenth century. It is sometimes identified with the Age of Reason, but the latter term covers both the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Although the Enlightenment had some of its roots in seventeenth century rationalism, the ideas which characterize the Enlightenment went far beyond the rationalism of Descartes, Spinoza, and the thinkers of their time. Brown (1996: 355). So from Brown’s idea, the roots of the Enlightenment started with philosophers like Descartes, but went beyond those men. 

Basically the ideas McGrath was discussing took place in the Enlightenment - Age of Reason. David A. Pailin, of Manchester University, stated: The Enlightenment’s criticism of the authority of tradition led to increasing secularization in attitudes and ideas. Nature is seen as an ordered whole rather than as a stage for divine interventions and supernatural happenings. So far as religious beliefs are concerned, claims to revelation are acceptable only when they are rationally justified and their contents subject to reason’s judgement. Biblical stories and accepted doctrines are not immune from criticism. Works like Bayle’s Historical and Critical Dictionary and Voltaire’s Philosophical Dictionary highlight the faults of revered figures and the questionability of standard doctrines. Historical and literary investigations into the Bible develop. Reports about miracles, especially that of the resurrection, give rise to considerable discussion. There is great hostility to priestcraft and suspicion of ecclesiastical pretensions to guide human understanding. Pailin (1999: 180). 

David Pailin’s comments demonstrate some of the modern assumptions made by philosophers of religion concerning Christianity. As McGrath indicated, there is a distrust of revelation and Scripture. As Pailin pointed out, revelation and ecclesiastical pretensions would often face great hostility philosophically. I agree with the Enlightenment approach to review Christian claims through reason, but it appears that more faith is put in the Enlightenment critics of Christianity than in the people who wrote the original work. Enlightenment thinking is committed to ". . . reason as the proper tool and final authority for determining issues." Pailin (1999: 179). 

Enlightenment thinking has human reason as the final authority, whereas traditional Christianity uses human reason, but it assumes that human nature is fallen and God must reveal himself to that reason. Enlightenment thinking, in my view, rests on the faulty idea that finite man should be able to be the final judge regarding ideas about God. Enlightenment era thinking, which is still prominent in liberal circles today, believes that man has the ability to reason out who God is, whereas traditional Christianity believes that God must reveal himself in order for human beings to come to some understanding of who he is. So the Enlightenment puts greater emphasis on the human mind comprehending God, whereas traditional Christianity puts emphasis on Scripture inspired by God, which must teach human beings about God. Two problems come to mind concerning the human mind’s ability to know God. First, the human mind is finite, God is infinite. It could be said that human beings could only understand God in a limited way. This is not to say that the limited human understanding was in error or without logic, but simply limited. 

For this reason, I think in this relationship God would have to take the initiative in presenting himself to humanity for greater understanding, and this would lead to revelation. Second, I believe there is significant evidence in Scripture and everyday life, that humanity is imperfect and sinful, and in a spiritual condition where they would have to be transformed in order to have a relationship with God. I am not saying that human beings cannot understand things about God without revelation, but I am stating that revelation is required for a changed spirit which could lead to a relationship with God. I, therefore, do not think that human reason outside of revelation should be our final authority in theology. 

BROWN, C. (1996) The Enlightenment, in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books. 

McGRATH, A. (1992) Bridge-Building, Leicester, Inter-Varsity Press. 

McGRATH, A. (1992) Suffering, London, Hodder and Stoughton Limited. 

PAILIN, D.A. (1999) Enlightenment, in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press Limited.

   

Re: Our after church lunch discussion, this photo is dedicated to Charles I, Charles II, and Trevor.

Wittgenstein and certainty

Wittgenstein and certainty

Preface

Lego church: I considered attending, but frankly it was just too small for me.

This article from my PhD work, was originally published on August 8, 2009, prior to my finalized PhD thesis. This presentation edited in September 2023.

Wittgenstein and certainty

Ludwig Wittgenstein wrote On Certainty which is a classic philosophical work on the subject from the twentieth century.[1] Wittgenstein (1889-1951)[2] is an Austrian philosopher.[3] On Certainty deals with philosophical skepticism by postulating that knowledge exists, in a sense, but that this knowledge is dispersed and not completely dependable.[4] He notes that ‘I make assertions about reality, assertions which have different degrees of assurance.’[5] It is often general knowledge that is not generally doubted.[6] Skepticism cannot be refuted by claiming certain propositions are certain.[7] Argumentation cannot completely express metaphysical truths in particular.[8] He uses the example of a child taught either to be a theist or atheist, and the child will be able to produce evidence for either position depending on which one he or she is instructed to believe.[9] He does admit that there is in a sense objective truth,[10] but something would be objectively true only within a system of reason and knowledge through the understanding of reasonable persons.[11] His view allows for the logical possibility that something considered objective truth in one system, is not objective truth in another.[12] Philosophy should, therefore, not be understood as primarily making discoveries, as much a reminding persons of the issues that need to be dealt with when one turns to unfamiliar and uncertain issues.[13] Wittgenstein does act with certainty, but it is his own.[14] This does not in his mind justify his view as objective truth to others, it is simply belief.[15] He reasons that ‘knowledge and certainty belong in different categories.’[15] Obtaining knowledge is very important, and more vital than having certitude.[17] Knowledge and certainty are two different mental states.[18]

[1] Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1951)(1979) On Certainty, Basil Blackwell, Oxford.
[2] Blackburn (1996: 400). Sluga (1996: 859).
[3] Blackburn (1996: 400).
[4] Sluga (1996: 859). Wittgenstein (1951)(1979: 66).
[5] Wittgenstein (1951)(1979: 66).
[6] Sluga (1996: 859).
[7] Sluga (1996: 859).
[8] Sluga (1996: 859).
[9] Wittgenstein (1951)(1979: 107). I agree. Regardless of the truthfulness of either position, a child can be guided to have arguments for a taught philosophical viewpoint.
[10] Wittgenstein (1951)(1979: 108).
[11] Wittgenstein (1951)(1979: 108).
[12] Wittgenstein (1951)(1979: 108). This is reasonable. If the laws of science were not the same as this universe, in a vastly different realm, for example, then objective truth could be much different at several points.
[13] Blackburn (1996: 401).
[14] Wittgenstein (1951)(1979: 179).
[15] Wittgenstein (1951)(1979: 175).
[16] Wittgenstein (1951)(1979: 308).
[17] Wittgenstein (1951)(1979: 308).
[18] Wittgenstein (1951)(1979: 308). Knowledge and certainty are not the same thing for Wittgenstein.

My views on certainty

A definition of certainty which I would consider helpful would be along the lines of what I found in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. Peter D. Klein describes the Cartesian account of certainty as being that a proposition is true if there are no legitimate grounds whatsoever for doubting it. 

I embrace the similar idea that a proposition is certain if there are no counter propositions that are superior. Therefore in regard to the Christian faith and philosophy, and its belief in Scripture inspired by God, the atoning work of Christ, the resurrection, and everlasting life, applied to believers, these things could be viewed as certain provided there are no legitimate counter arguments that are superior. I reason that evidence shows Christianity is philosophically certain in this sense. In other words, I do not reason that there are superior external (non-biblical) or internal (biblical) propositions, premises/conclusions that counter the Christian worldview.

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

EELLS, ELLERY (1996) 'Probability', in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, pp. 649-650. Cambridge University Press.

KANT, IMMANUEL (1781)(1787)(1998) Critique of Pure Reason, Translated and edited by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

KANT, IMMANUEL (1781)(1787)(1929)(2006) Critique of Pure Reason, Translated by Norman Kemp Smith, London, Macmillan. http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~ppp/cpr/toc.html.

KANT, IMMANUEL (1788)(1997) Critique of Practical Reason, Translated by Mary Gregor (ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 

KANT, IMMANUEL (1788)(1898)(2006) The Critique of Practical Reason, Translated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott, London, Longmans, Green, and Co. http://philosophy.eserver.org/kant/critique-of-practical-reaso.txt 

KANT, IMMANUEL (1791)(2001) ‘On The Miscarriage of All Philosophical Trials in Theodicy’, in Religion and Rational Theology, Translated by George di Giovanni and Allen Wood, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

KLEIN, PETER D. (1996) ‘Certainty’, in Robert Audi, (ed), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

KLEIN, PETER D. (1998, 2005). ‘Epistemology’, in E. Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, London, Routledge.

SLUGA, HANS (1996) ‘Wittgenstein’, in Robert Audi, (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

WITTGENSTEIN, LUDWIG (1951)(1979) On Certainty, Basil Blackwell, Oxford.

 
Miniature city of London.